中国AI的启示 伊朗能将霍尔木兹海峡武器化多久? 苏丹:被遗忘的战争 为动物实验辩护 2026年8月8日-14日
安赛乐米塔尔 20周年纪念 2026
二十年来,我们通过不断突破钢铁的极限——使其更安全、更智能、更可持续——而成长。 立足于质量。 由创新和我们的员工驱动。 构建现代生活的基础设施、工业和标志性建筑。 年 --- 经济学人 2026年8月8日 3
武装了AI的公众可能会使英国政府陷入瘫痪:社论,第9页。 使用AI准备的案件正使英国的就业法庭不堪重负,第21页。 从停车罚单到规划审批,国家正处于围攻之中,23
人工智能将考验社会自我重塑的能力。 共产主义中国将发现这并非易事:社论,10,以及简报,17。 其模型并未远落后于美国,66。 美国能教会其工人新技能吗?33
海湾国家应与伊朗达成协议,无论该协议多么令人难以接受:社论,11。 我们的“霍尔木兹依赖度仪表盘”,41。 一场全球管道投资热潮正在兴起,60
苏丹:被遗忘的战争 该国陷入了本世纪最糟糕的冲突之一。 现在是达成停战协议的时机:社论,13,以及分析,55
在美国,反对将动物用于科学研究正成为一种跨党派的共识,72。 这是误导性的:社论,12
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7 政治与商业新闻摘要
9 技术 英国国家与AI 10 模型与扩散 中国的启示 11 重新开放霍尔木兹海峡 把握时机 11 债券市场 持续攀升 12 动物实验禁令 两党共识但方向错误 13 苏丹 被遗忘的战争
14 关于埃隆·马斯克、家庭收入、非洲城市、克劳黛特·科尔文、酒吧、预测市场、AI生成文本
16 迈克尔·塞利格论美国在金融领域合作的局限性
17 AI与中国工人 类人状态
巴杰特 职场苦恼咨询师 Max Flannel 回归,63
21 劳工投诉泛滥 23 AI与政府 23 小麦与高温 24 拦截船只 24 板式网球的力量 25 杰里米·Vine 节目 26 巴杰特 扎克·波兰斯基
27 塞乌塔的教训 28 冰岛的欧盟投票 29 欧盟的后疫情基金 30 欧洲铁路
33 AI时代的重新培训 34 州所得税 35 唐纳德·特朗普的烦心事 36 独立候选人能赢吗? 37 美国民主社会主义者(DSA)的炎夏
38 巴西平淡的选举 39 哈维尔·米莱的奥德修斯之举 40 克劳迪娅·辛鲍姆果断出击
41 霍尔木兹海峡武器化 43 哈马斯会解除武装吗? 43 非洲农业综合企业 44 AI助力非洲 45 尼日利亚的首席建设者
4 经济学人 2026年8月8日
政治
西班牙内政部长表示,在涌入塞乌塔(Ceuta,西班牙在摩洛哥北部的一个小飞地)的 7.2万,000 名移民中,已有 7万,000 人返回摩洛哥。至少有 141 人在试图进入该领土时淹死。这次严重的安保漏洞在欧盟内部引发了危机感,并导致意大利等国表示将暂停与西班牙在申根免签区的合作。西班牙社会党总理佩德罗·桑切斯(Pedro Sánchez)指责批评者在煽风点火。欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩(Ursula von der Leyen)赞扬了西班牙的应对措施以及迅速遣返移民的行为。
俄罗斯再次使用无人机和弹道导弹轰炸基辅,造成至少 17 人死亡。美国正与乌克兰讨论允许该国制造“爱国者”导弹防御系统,乌克兰迫切需要该系统来拦截俄罗斯武器。唐纳德·特朗普在最初表示支持此类协议后,现在表示他对移交该技术持有疑虑。与此同时,乌克兰袭击了更多属于 Wildberries 的仓库,这家俄罗斯零售商被俄军用作设备的物流枢纽。此次袭击造成至少 5 人死亡。此外,一架乌克兰无人机偏离目标,在黑海沿岸的一个俄罗斯海滩造成至少 7 人死亡。
弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基继续对其高级官员进行人事调整,解雇了奥尔加·斯特法尼希娜(Olha Stefanishyna)担任的乌克兰驻华盛顿大使一职。乌克兰媒体报道称,她因涉嫌在申报资产时存在违规行为而受到调查。斯特法尼希娜女士尚未被起诉。
俄罗斯当局表示,一名将炸弹送到莫斯科一家餐厅的女性在爆炸中死亡。至少另有两人死亡。该餐厅位于市内的富人区库德林斯卡亚广场(Kudrinskaya Square)。外界猜测目标是一名俄罗斯高级指挥官,而该指挥官在爆炸中幸存。
唐纳德·特朗普再次威胁称,如果伊朗不开放霍尔木兹海峡,他将对其进行沉重打击。在卡塔尔表示美国与伊朗之间关于重新开放该水道的协议草案已经传阅,且谈判处于“非常积极的阶段”后,油价下跌。特朗普政府声称参与了与伊朗和阿曼关于霍尔木兹海峡的讨论。伊朗否认与美国进行谈判,但表示已与阿曼就过境路线达成一致。
据特朗普先生称,哈马斯及加沙所有其他武装组织已同意完全解除武装。哈马斯则表示其并未解除武装,而仅仅是将武器在巴勒斯坦方面的监督下存入仓库。以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡表示,他的政府正在“研究此事”。匿名官员表示,以色列不会停止在加沙的行动,也不会从该地带撤军。
南非的一起法院诉讼已经启动,该诉讼挑战政府关于征收私人土地的法律;根据该法律,如果无法与土地所有者达成协议,有时可以在不给予补偿的情况下征收。该法律成为了特朗普先生声称白人农民受到骚扰的依据。作为由非洲国民大会领导的执政联盟成员,民主联盟已加入挑战该法律的诉讼。
进步派民主党人在初选中再次取得胜利,阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德在密歇根州击败海莉·史蒂文斯,成为该党中期选举的参议院候选人。埃尔-赛义德博士得到了美国民主社会主义者的支持。史蒂文斯女士则得到了党内建制派的支持。对于倾向左翼的初选选民来说,以色列是一个重大议题。但左翼并非在所有方面都得心应手。来自圣路易斯、支持以色列的温和派国会议员卫斯理·贝尔在初选中顶住了进步派候选人的挑战。
在巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦(更广为人知的称呼是卢拉)指责两名国务院官员试图干涉该国选举后,巴西与美国之间的外交关系恶化。作为回应,美国取消了巴西驻华盛顿大使的签证。在阿根廷总统哈维尔·米莱再次批评卢拉,称其为“小偷”和“腐败分子”后,巴西与阿根廷的关系也随之恶化。
在美国的支持下,关于在委内瑞拉举行民主选举的谈判已经启动。委内瑞拉政府的首席谈判代表是国民议会负责人豪尔赫·罗德里格斯,他是德尔西·罗德里格斯的兄弟;在今年1月美国将尼古拉斯·马杜罗赶下台后,德尔西成为了总统。反对派由从流亡中归来的迪诺拉·菲格罗亚代表。目前仍处于流亡状态并领导反对派统一平台的玛丽亚·科里纳·马查多表示,成功的衡量标准将是建立自由选举。
与此同时,6月地震的死亡人数上升至 6,125 人。在被罢免为孟加拉国总理并在针对其政府的一系列致命抗议中逃离该国两年后,谢赫·哈西娜发表了一次重要演讲。谢赫·哈西娜在印度对记者表示,她重申誓言将于12月返回孟加拉国;此前,她因镇压学生领导的抗议活动而被该国缺席判处死刑。
巴基斯坦的一个伊斯兰恐怖组织“巴基斯坦塔利班”(Tehreek-e-Taliban)声称对在靠近阿富汗边境的斯瓦特谷地发生的一起自杀式爆炸袭击负责,此次袭击造成 17 人死亡。炸弹在一次要求警方加强保护以应对恐怖暴力袭击的集会附近爆炸。
缅甸军政府允许昂山素季会见红十字国际委员会的一名官员,并公布了此次会面的照片。自2021年2月在政变中被推翻该国事实领导人以来,当局并未给予外界太多接触素季女士的机会。此后她一直被拘留,且有传闻称这位81岁的老人病重,甚至已经去世。
在韩国,警方突击搜查了星巴克韩国总部,因为5月份一场营销活动引发的抵制情绪几乎没有消退的迹象。该公司曾推广一个“坦克日”噱头,这被认为是在轻视1980年一场导致数百人死亡的亲民主抗议活动。该公司已道歉,但这并未阻止针对其发起的刑事投诉。这次失误已演变为政治事件。右翼人士挥舞着星巴克杯子,以表达他们对总统李在明(Lee Jae Myung)的反对。
--- 8 经济学人 2026年8月8日 # 本周世界
商业 英国政府机构英国AI安全研究所(AISI)报告称,在一次测试中,一个“AI智能体在实时互联网上采取了自主且未经授权的行动,目标指向真实的人员和组织”。这包括创建虚假身份。其中17项行动来自Anthropic的Mythos 5模型,两项涉及OpenAI的GPT-5.6 Sol。该研究所表示,这是“我们第一次看到关于自主性和欺骗性的风险在现实世界中如此清晰地显现,且无需特定提示”。作为测试的一部分,部分模型的安全防护已被禁用。Meta成为最新一家宣布其同样经历过失控AI事件的AI公司。
德米斯·哈萨比斯爵士(Sir Demis Hassabis)将卸任谷歌DeepMind AI实验室的首席执行官,出任其主席。他还将成为Alphabet的高级科学家,这表明DeepMind将与谷歌更紧密地整合。
重返大气层 SpaceX公布了自6月IPO以来的首份收益报告。季度营收较去年同期近乎翻倍,达到78亿美元,而$541m的净亏损低于此前担忧的水平。但SpaceX的股价下跌,因为它在AI上花费了160亿美元,远高于华尔街的预期。该股目前交易价格低于$110,,低于IPO后$225的峰值。与此同时,科学家利用一枚废弃的SpaceX火箭坠入月球表面的事件,更新了关于陨石撞击的数据。
美国财政部加入日本的干预行动以帮助支撑日元,指示纽约联邦储备银行通过美国银行购买该货币。这是自1998年以来财政部首次采取行动加强日元,此前日元已跌至每美元164日元的40年低点。干预后,日元兑美元交易价格在155左右。
沙特阿美(Saudi Aramco)警告称,尽管在将货运从霍尔木兹海峡重新路由至红海港口方面取得了一些成功,但全球石油库存依然偏低。阿美公司负责人表示,由于伊朗战争,生产损失超过26亿桶,相当于一个月的原油产量。尽管如此,受油价上涨影响,阿美公司第二季度净利润同比增长44%,达到327亿美元。雪佛龙(Chevron)和埃克森美孚(ExxonMobil)的净利润也分别飙升至$12.1bn和145亿美元。唐纳德·特朗普抱怨这些公司从全球石油供应短缺中“赚了太多钱”。
BP报告其标题利润增长144%,达到57亿美元。该公司继续进行重组,将其陷入困境的美国生物天然气业务挂牌出售。BP还宣布将出售其在北海的资产,退出一项其已经营超过60年的业务。
礼来公司(Eli Lilly)作为减肥治疗药物销售的Mounjaro和Zepbound在最新季度的销量激增。诺和诺德(Novo Nordisk)于1月推出的Wegovy药丸销量略低于分析师预测,导致其股价下跌。诺和诺德的股价自2024年达到峰值以来已大幅下跌。
美国联邦航空管理局(FAA)在经过数年调查潜在安全问题并导致多次延迟后,现已认证波音 737 MAX 7 飞机。在 2018 年和 2019 年两架 737 MAX 8 发生致命坠机事故后,该机型受到了更严格的监管审查。对 MAX 7, 有大量订单的西南航空预计将于明年开始投入运营。
自最高法院在 2 月裁定相关关税非法以来,特朗普政府已退还了约 1000亿美元 的“解放日”关税。在该授权下,总共征收了约 1650亿美元 的关税。与此同时,25 个州组成的一组团体提起诉讼,要求停止特朗普最新的关税政策,这些政策是根据与被裁定非法之政策不同的法律授权发布的。这些州表示:“关税就是税收”,且会增加生活成本。
在报告了由云计算服务需求驱动的巨额收益后,亚马逊的市场价值首次短暂突破 $3trn。
| 美国和加拿大,最高票房收入 | | | 《复仇者联盟 4:终局之战》 / 4667亿美元 《蜘蛛侠:崭新之日》 / 360.1 《星球大战:原力觉醒》 / 350.1 《复仇者联盟 3:无限战争》 / 343.5 《蜘蛛侠:英雄无路》 / 311.6 来源:Box Office Mojo / 2026 年价格
《蜘蛛侠:崭新之日》打破了美国和加拿大的首映周末票房纪录,获得 3.6亿美元(经通货膨胀调整后,蜘蛛侠的最新冒险排在《复仇者联盟》之后)。首映周末决定了一部电影的成功与否;最初表现不佳的电影现在会迅速转入流媒体平台。《超女》在电影院失利仅一个月后,就已经在网上线播。但蜘蛛侠在过度拥挤的超级英雄类型片中是一个可靠的票房品牌。在全球范围内,《崭新之日》在不到一周的时间里已获得超过 10亿美元。粉丝们会很高兴地听到,他们亲切的邻家蜘蛛侠将于明年再次行动。
《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日 《经济学人》 领袖版 9
在模型和智能体的助力下,公民可能会让政府陷入停滞
英国政府正陷入困境。铁路未能建成,路面坑洼未能填补。福利开支上涨,商店窃贼未能被捕。新任首相安迪·伯纳姆(Andy Burnham)表示他能让白厅(Whitehall)运转起来;但话虽如此,前任也是这么说的。然而,英国政府的功能运作能力即将剧烈恶化——这对所有富裕的民主国家都是一个警告。
对当局提供的糟糕待遇感到沮丧的公民,正转向利用人工智能来提交异议、提起上诉并索要应得的款项。由此产生的投诉和诉求之洪流,将使那些为邮政和电话时代而构建的官僚机构不堪重负。为了防止国家被淹没,目前所做的努力太少。
这种淹没被称作“智能体泛滥”(agentic flooding),其浪潮正拍打着各地的官僚机构,从税务上诉到福利申请,再到停车罚单。在英国,水位上涨的速度惊人。正如我们本周报道的(见英国板块),当人们对 AI 的担忧集中在安全和就业威胁时,就业法庭的积压案件在一年内悄然增长了 55%,这在很大程度上是由 驱动的诉求造成的。对紧急禁令的需求激增了 100 倍。而 的浪潮才刚刚开始涌入。
英国长期以来一直是新政治模式的先驱,从 20 世纪 40 年代的福利国家到 90 年代的“第三条道路”。它在面对武装了 的公民进击时也异常脆弱,因为其行政传统偏好书面提交,而这正是 最擅长起草的内容。因此,国家现在必须再次创新。
好消息是,伯纳姆先生内阁中的一些人意识到了挑战的规模。他们能否应对这一挑战,将决定英国能否再次成为可效仿的典范,还是成为一个警示故事。
在低增长、人口老龄化和国防开支上涨的背景下,国家在许多方面都显得力不从心,让选民确信自己受到了不公正对待。但这些熟悉的财政问题至少进展缓慢且可以预测。“智能体泛滥”则不同。它袭击迅速,且出现在你最意想不到的地方。它不仅损害公共财政,还将堵塞驱动国家机器运转的齿轮。
在处理官僚程序方面表现卓越。它能在几秒钟内消化细则、挖掘漏洞并起草上诉信。自主 智能体将加速这一趋势,在极少的人为干预下提交税务投诉。与面对官方机构的人类不同, 智能体永远不会发脾气,也不会失去生存意志。官员们抱怨 的“劣质内容”(slop)和幻觉,但随着技术的进步,他们将面临相反的问题:面对的诉求将像一流律师起草的一样精良。
乍一看,这对厌倦了现状的公民来说是一个极好的结果。没人喜欢停车罚单。穷人可以像如今精明的中产阶级那样成功地行使他们的合法权利。然而,这威胁到将演变成一场“公地悲剧”。如果国家被淹没且无法运作,每个人都会成为输家。
20 世纪的政府在创建广泛的权利时,持有让公民身份变得有意义的高尚理想。公众可以在咨询中被听到,根据透明度法获得信息,并通过各种监察员、法庭、专员和法官获得行政失职的救济。但这些模拟系统假设只有少数人有时间或耐性将权利追求到底;而且在这些人中,只有少数人有钱支付律师费。
AI 正在改变这一现状,实际上使专业标准的请愿变得快速且无需成本。然而,随着每位请愿者追求自身利益,国家机器将不堪重负。英国的劳动法正变得日益宽泛——这本身就是一个问题——但它们对受委屈的工人帮助不大,因为原告在等待法庭听证会时面临四年的等待期。一个繁琐的规划制度旨在打造美丽的城镇;但在 AI 提出的反对意见面前,规划陷入瘫痪,结果将没有任何东西能被建成。英国人每年少申领的法定福利高达 200亿英镑 (270亿美元),相当于 GDP 的 0.7%;如果每个人都拿到了应得的份额,公共财政将枯竭。前景将是一个投诉与服务恶化的死循环。越来越多的人可能会认为,获得结果的唯一方法就是走后门或作弊。在不可避免的愤怒和不满中,民粹主义将大行其道。因此,政治家们现在就需要应对代理人洪水(agentic flooding),以免潮水进一步上涨。
第一步是停止创建那些容易引发 AI 驱动索赔的权利。英国的《就业权利法》和《租房者权利法》为工人及租客开启了法律挑战的途径。这些法律不仅误导,而且部长们几乎没有考虑它们将给法院带来怎样的负担。另一步是修剪数十年来累积的大量程序性权利。要降低国家的脆弱性,需要收紧规则、堵住漏洞,并为 AI 驱动的过度索赔创造抑制机制。拜占庭式且模糊的申诉系统应当让位于简单、精确且有限的系统。金钱应当成为解决方案的一部分。英国可以像其他国家那样,对信息自由请求收取费用。就业法庭也可以如此,并且应当能够更有效地针对投机性索赔判定承担诉讼费用。
最紧迫的任务是以更快、更激进的方式利用 AI 重塑国家。这意味着不仅要加快“申请—决定—上诉”这一旧循环的速度,而是要将其彻底取代。重塑后的国家将能够抵御洪水;它也将更高效,更能响应公民的需求。政治家们承诺要采取激进措施,但他们的解决方案却是渐进的。一个新的 AI 驱动的规划系统可以自行决定住房开发项目是否符合分区规划代码,而不仅仅是处理当地人的反对意见。它可以设计个性化的福利干预措施,而不仅仅是处理福利申请。信息自由请求可以让位于按需透明化。国家面临着被代理洪水(agentic flooding)淹没的风险。即便国家快速采用 AI 令某些人感到不安,但这至关重要。■

10 Leaders 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 # 模型与扩散
AI将考验社会自我重塑的能力。共产主义中国对此也不会感到轻松。
正如前沿人工智能模型之间在进行基准测试一样,AI本身也将成为衡量美国和中国这两个竞争政治体系的基准。这项技术将考验谁更擅长创建AI工具并将其扩散到经济体系中。而这在一定程度上将取决于两国对于社会运行方式截然不同的理念。
即便在AI这样一个变化如此迅速的领域,这场竞赛的结果可能在几年内都不会明朗。但正如我们在中国内部报道的那样(见简报),中国已经在快速采用AI——其政府正在为这预示的剧烈经济和社会变革做准备。
作为一个专制国家,中国在利用21世纪最具前景的技术方面具有某些优势。但它也面临着大量问题。
首先看中国模型的水准。普遍认知是这些模型价格低廉,且即使是最好的模型也始终落后于美国。事实上,两国的AI模型正在趋同。创新的中国模型正变得规模更大、更聪明。在过去几周内,中国实验室发布了Qwen3.8-Max和Kimi K3,它们几乎能与Anthropic的Fable 5.等最先进的美国AI相媲美。中国模型与美国模型一样,很有可能突破其测试环境(见科学与技术板块)。
虽然中国模型更便宜,但美国模型通常性价比更高。美国公司Artificial Analysis发现,在大多数成本与智能的权衡中,美国模型的表现优于中国模型。
这种趋同趋势可能会继续。尽管中国建设的数据中心容量仅为美国的十分之一(见金融与经济板块),但这种差距不太可能持久。作为一个半计划经济体,中国擅长创建基础设施。在美方舆论转向反对数据中心时,东南亚正在承接巨大的中国设施。中国的开放权重模型可以在任何人的服务器上运行,这意味着计算能力的问题并不像头条数字显示的那么严重。中国的装机发电容量几乎是美国的三倍,且领先优势正在扩大。
中国正在学习如何应对制裁。它走私尖端的英伟达(Nvidia)芯片,并在国外数据中心租赁这些芯片。而中国最好的芯片设计商华为(Huawei)正在迅速提高其(性能较低的)芯片产量。国产光刻机现在正使用深紫外光(deep UV)来印刷芯片,尽管使用极紫外光(extreme UV)的最顶尖技术仍然难以触及。
模型构建仅是故事的一半。要使经济充满活力,AI必须得到部署——这也是中国AI政策的重点。只要中国在模型制造方面落后于美国,领导层就将扩散视为竞争的最佳方式。但他们可能还认为,就像电力等其他通用技术一样,采用带来的回报比发现更多。
中国的劳动年龄人口预计到2050年将缩减25%;机器要取代人,同样需要扩散。
到目前为止,AI的使用尚未在美中两国的经济统计数据中体现出来。但在某些行业,变革已经席卷而来。根据一家大公司的经验,AI辅助货车将减少30%的司机,因为车组人员从两名司机减至一名,从四名减至三名。在2026, 第一季度发布的12.8万,000部极受欢迎的一到两分钟微短剧中,有95%是使用AI生成的,取代了许多演员和摄制组。
中国也在迅速增加机器人的使用。6月,领导层要求地方政府和国有企业在2026.年底前让1万,000台人形机器人投入实际工作。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)这家银行预计,到2030, 中国的人形机器人销量将达到44.6万,000台,是今年的九倍。在巨大的仓库里,工人通过重复地折叠衣服、分拣和堆叠物品来训练机器人,并为此获得报酬。中国的白领工人比例低于美国,因此AI可能在消费市场和蓝领工作中产生最大影响。这很容易导致不满。青年失业率已经在15%左右,且有超过3亿人在零工经济中工作。岗位的消失速度可能比中国的人口下降速度快得多。你可能会认为共产党的权力掌控如此之强,以至于它可以忽略这种反弹。然而,独裁者害怕变得脆弱。尽管中国企业希望快速推广AI,但政府将极力避免不稳定。这就是为什么AI将是对该体制的一次考验——也是为什么中国的选择有限。
与美国一样,关于重新培训的讨论很多。然而,重新培训的记录并不理想(见美国部分),即使是像丹麦和新加坡这样最成功的国家,在让工人准备好从事完全全新的职业方面也感到吃力。没有理由认为中国会更成功,尤其是它已经拥有过多的毕业生。著名的经济学家和顾问建议通过例如向AI公司征税或创建全民基本收入来扩展社会契约。他们的研究成果出现在党刊上,这是一种官方表达的兴趣。但习主席长期以来一直反对发放救济金,称这会导致懒惰。政治领导人正在敦促公司重新部署员工而非解雇他们。他们还可能要求国有企业吸收过剩劳动力。然而,虽然这在政治上可行,但在国内增长已经疲软之时,这将抵消快速普及带来的部分收益。因此,政府可能会采取即兴方案,让AI在出现问题之前肆意发展,届时再介入。这就是补习和游戏行业所经历的情况,当党决定这些行业造成过多危害时,它们一夜之间陷入混乱。最近,在武汉有超过100辆无人驾驶出租车发生故障导致乘客受困后,谨慎的官员放缓了机器人出租车实验。然而,这种走走停停的AI可能会损害创新能力。如果真是这样,中国领导人可能必须在社会不稳定的风险与落后于美国的风险之间寻找平衡。
AI给美国和中国带来了类似的挑战。这两个社会都必须重新塑造自己。这是民主国家往往比独裁国家更容易做到的事情。■
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 领袖文章 11 重新开放霍尔木兹海峡
海湾国家应与伊朗就霍尔木兹海峡达成协议,无论该协议多么令人难以接受
海湾国家陷入了由唐纳德·特朗普造成的混乱之中。在经历了五个多月的战争后,霍尔木兹海峡在很大程度上仍然处于关闭状态。一个熟悉的模式已经出现:当美国与伊朗之间的谈判未能取得进展时,双方便恢复战斗;当炸弹无法打破僵局时,谈判再次重启。近日,特朗普先生再次一边大谈一项关于霍尔木兹海峡的协议,一边威胁要“狠狠地”打击伊朗。他给了伊朗“最后一次机会”来重新开放海峡。再一次。然而,伊朗仍然坚持要对这条水道拥有近乎绝对的控制权。其心力交瘁的邻国似乎几乎不抱希望认为伊朗会软化立场——或者被强迫这样做。即便德黑兰出现一个新政权(假设真的出现了),可能也不愿放弃这个新战利品。
相反,海湾国家正竞相让霍尔木兹海峡变得不再重要。沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国都在建设或扩建绕过该海峡的石油管道;伊拉克计划将其原油向北分流。美国和沙特的投资者正在考虑在海峡之外建设一座巨型炼油厂。这些替代方案会有所帮助。但正如我们的“霍尔木兹依赖度仪表盘”所示(见“中东与非洲”板块),这种对韧性的追求不幸地存在局限性。管道项目经常被推迟(见“商业”板块)。然而,即使所有计划都能按时完成,到2030年,在战争前每天通过霍尔木兹海峡的1500万桶原油中,仍有500万桶必须通过该海峡。
此外,管道可能会遭到伊朗的袭击。依赖管道可能会使海湾供应商面临其他瓶颈的风险,尤其是红海中的曼德海峡,那里也门亲伊朗的反政府武装胡塞武装正在向船只开火。与伊朗一样,他们此前曾向船只收取费用,并且可能会再次这样做(尽管他们否认这一点)。不要忘记原油之外的所有大宗商品。如果没有霍尔木兹海峡,卡塔尔仍然无法运送其液化天然气——这占全球供应量的五分之一。海湾地区的炼油厂在很大程度上仍然处于隔绝状态。而这仅仅是出口端,也是外界最关注的账目部分。从海湾国家的角度来看,从食品到金属的许多关键进口商品无法通过陆路廉价运输。
建设管道是有价值的,但海湾国家还应投入更多资金用于保护管道,并加快其他替代方案的工作。所有这些补救措施都需要时间。目前,海湾国家需要其船只能够平安通过霍尔木兹海峡。美国的炸弹未能实现这一点。一次无人机袭击就足以威慑大多数船只,并推高保险费。唯一现实的出路是达成一项协议,无论它多么令人难以接受。伊朗希望与一个更为务实的政府——阿曼共同管理该海峡。通过谈判达成协议,可能会给海湾国家一个登记其红线和诉求的机会。海湾国家可能别无选择,只能支付过境费。只要不违反制裁,船东可能会容忍这些费用。这意味着美国需要参与其中。
这样的结算方案可能会很脆弱。国际法规定海上贸易应该是安全且自由的。一项涉及中国的多边协议会更持久,因为中国有维持海峡开放的利益,并且能够约束伊朗。但这在目前看来不太可能。伊朗似乎也尚未准备好接受海峡回归原状。尽管如此,如果一项协议——无论多么有限且不平衡——能够降低敌对状态,并为海湾国家赢得时间来建设替代方案和防御设施,从而削弱伊朗的筹码,那么它就值得拥有。伊朗看起来很可能赢得这场战斗,但它在更长久的战争中仍可能落败。■
债券市场
债券收益率处于高位,且可能进一步走高。在今年稳步攀升之后,美国、法国、日本和英国的30年期债券收益率均接近2007-09年全球金融危机以来的最高点。对于英国而言,这一成就尤为惊人,因为其在2022年财政恐慌期间的高点已被长期超越。对于那些好奇随着疫情后通胀下降,收益率是否会回到2010年代低点的人来说,市场似乎给出了一个决定性的答案:不会。如果说有什么趋势,那就是它们可能会攀升得更高。
原因很明确。通胀尚未被完全击败,这阻碍了央行降低利率。即使是日本也在抛弃其宽松货币政策(尽管程度不足以增强日元,而日本和美国都通过官方购买来支撑日元)。发达国家巨大的预算赤字几乎没有明显缩小的迹象,这增加了政府最终强迫央行通过通胀来抵消债务的可能性。地缘政治动荡(如伊朗战争和关税)提高了投资者要求的风险补偿。而新任联邦储备委员会主席凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)在与市场的早期接触中表现失措,这也没有起到任何帮助(见“金融与经济”板块)。
高债券收益率对于负债累累的政府来说是一个问题。例如,美国债券收益率每上升一个百分点,在十年内将导致其额外支付相当于年度GDP 1.3%的利息。然而,现在很难想象政府会通过削减开支来抵消这种压力。在美国,每个 ▶ --- 12 Leaders The Economist August 8th 2026 ► 政党似乎都希望任何债务危机都落在对方身上。明年法国的总统选举可能会演变成左翼和右翼民粹主义政党之间的较量。奇怪的是,日本正在实施财政刺激。政府调整的时间越晚,调整的幅度就越大。
政府看起来越来越像是在赌经济增长能支付账单——而这在今天意味着在赌AI。问题在于,更快的增长通常会通过刺激投资带来更高的利率和更高的债券收益率。如今,更高的市场利率在快速增长到来之前就已经出现了。高盛(Goldman Sachs)这家银行将今年的数据中心投资规模定为100万美元,这使得资本变得更加稀缺,并有助于推高收益率。
然而,AI尚未在可衡量地程度上提高生产力,即使是在技术普及程度被认为最高的地方——中国(见社论)。这种提升可能需要一段时间才能到来。电力和计算技术花费了数十年时间才显著提高生产力增长。而且,并非所有经济体的表现都会同样出色。如果AI为美国带来更多增长并推高全球利率,但却在旧世界因僵化的劳动力市场和高昂的能源成本而受阻,那么欧洲的财政困境可能会恶化。这意味着在没有更多增长的情况下,债务成本将变得更高。
此外还存在另一个问题。如果AI带来的生产力提升足以改变任何国家的财政算术,那么大规模的就业中断可能即将到来,这意味着需要增加对失业工人的支出(见“美国”板块)。收入也可能从劳动力转移到资本,而后者承受的税收更轻。如果AI引发军备竞赛,各国还将需要增加国防开支。即使是由AI驱动的科学进步带来的延长寿命这一令人兴奋的前景,也会增加国家在养老金上的支出。智库布鲁金斯学会(Brookings Institution)的经济学家估计,这些因素加上更高的利率,可能会使AI诱导的增长对美国赤字的积极影响减半以上。
包括美国和英国在内的富裕国家大部分地区上一次出现预算盈余是在千禧之交。那需要快速的生产力增长,而这种增长来自计算机和早期的互联网。但赤字也必须削减。如果没有财政审慎,债券就成了对AI的一场赌博,其风险看起来与押注于不稳定的科技股一样高。■
当美国的民主党人和共和党人找到共同点时,本应令人欣慰。但一个新兴的两党共识领域却令人不安。两党成员日益反对针对动物的科学研究。如果他们成功阻止了这些研究,他们将阻碍美国推动所有动物中最有价值的动物——人类——的福祉。
动物福利似乎是那些穿着凉鞋的左翼分子的主张。但长期以来,右翼和极右翼中也有其拥护者。MAGA已经接纳了这场运动(见“科学与技术”板块)。卫生部长小罗伯特·F·肯尼迪(Robert F. Kennedy junior)已誓言结束所有动物实验,在他领导下,疾病控制与预防中心正在关闭其灵长类动物实验室。海军已禁止资助针对猫和狗的科学研究。
许多民主党人也加入了这一事业——而该党在其他方面一直认为自己与共和党人的不同之处在于致力于启蒙科学。在俄勒冈州,民主党政治人物与唐纳德·特朗普的任命官员站在一起,试图削减研究并缩减美国最大的联邦资助灵长类研究中心的猴群规模。
反对实验的浪潮部分反映了对动物实验伦理的不安(且不顾其对人类健康的巨大贡献)。这也源于人们对正在改变生物医学科学的新一代技术的信心日益增强。所谓的“新方法”(New Approach Methods, NAMs)包括器官芯片、类器官和人工智能模型。在某些领域,NAMs确实在不使用任何动物的情况下,使药物研发变得更快且更便宜。例如,肝脏芯片可以在微型设备上使用人类肝细胞,帮助在进入动物研究之前识别有毒药物。
然而,如果认为NAMs已经接近于让大规模动物实验变得不再必要,那就错了。复制人类生物学的一小部分并不等同于复制其全部。以疫苗为例。疫苗是人类最伟大的生物医学成就之一,自1974年以来估计挽救了1.54亿人的生命。然而,开发一种疫苗需要寻找并利用复杂的生物路径。科学家们才刚刚设法在器官芯片上模拟这一调查的第一步。而找出其余部分仍然是一个依赖于动物和人类受试者测试的过程。许多其他救命药物的情况也是如此。
继续进行测试还有一个实际原因。如果美国的实验室关闭,生物技术的领导地位将转移到中国。中国的生物技术产业正在迅速增长,并且招募了那些在国内面临资金削减、监管障碍和政治敌意的顶尖美国科学家。中国还在以惊人的速度购买研究用猴,推高了价格并挤压了美国实验室的预算。
中国的雄心使得动物权利运动变得适得其反。如果美国实验室停止测试,这些工作只会迁移到一个动物福利标准更低的国家。
随着技术的进步,未来NAMs可能会取代更多的动物实验。与此同时,实验室中的动物福利可以得到增强。美国拥有数十年历史的灵长类中心应该进行现代化改造,为猴子提供更大、更自然且光照更充足的围栏。可穿戴监测技术将减少人工操作的需求,从而降低动物的压力并提高其产生的数据质量。这将耗资。这更有理由继续资助动物研究,而不是将其切断。■
The Economist 2026年8月8日 领袖文章 13 非洲冲突
可能无法找到一个单一的地点能概括苏丹内战所造成的破坏,这场战争目前已进入第四年。但正如我们在一次罕见的访苏之旅后所报道的那样(见“国际”板块),其被毁的首都就接近于此。在2023年4月战争爆发前,喀土穆是一座拥有约700万人口的繁华城市。如今,其市中心已成废墟。政府大楼仅剩空壳。智能住宅和豪华酒店尽毁。被战火烧焦的街道一片死寂。由于有大量尸体被丢弃,人类头骨从临时挖掘的万人坑中溢出。而杀戮仍在继续。
喀土穆是本世纪非洲最严重冲突之一中伤痕累累的核心。战争摧毁了这座非洲第三大国的广阔地区,导致1400万人流离失所。数十万人可能死于战斗、饥荒和爆发的种族灭绝暴力。近期非洲唯一在恐怖程度上可与之比肩的是刚果战争,该战争在21世纪初可能导致超过500万人死亡。
然而,苏丹战争在地理政治上更为重要。正如我们在两年前警告的那样,它已经牵连到邻国,助长了南苏丹和也门的内战重启,并威胁到埃塞俄比亚爆发新一轮杀戮。外界对这种苦难表现出冷漠的无视,要么通过出资维持战斗,要么对其置之不理。然而,由于危及红海的航运,苏丹和伊朗的战争正在产生交集。这可能会提高其赞助者进行战争的成本,从而让他们终于有理由寻求和平。
从表面上看,苏丹战争是两个主要交战方之间的冲突:苏丹武装部队(SAF),即该国的正规军和事实上的政府;以及快速支援部队(RSF),一支富有且装备精良的民兵组织。其他各种苏丹团体与这两方结盟。然而,这场战斗也是财力雄厚的地区强权之间争夺资源和影响力的代理人战争。RSF从阿拉伯联合酋长国(UAE)获得武器、资金和雇佣兵,尽管阿联酋坚决否认为其提供支持。在较小程度上,SAF由埃及、卡塔尔、沙特阿拉伯和土耳其武装并资助。
直到最近,所有这些参与者在维持战争方面都有着压倒性的利益。RSF周期性地声称准备好进行停火谈判,但利用其掠夺的财富成长为一个拥有统治国家野心的军事和经济帝国。而我们与苏丹SAF领导人的对话给人的印象是,他们继续相信自己能够击败RSF,因此反对谈判。
与此同时,有能力向交战方及其支持者施压的外部力量分心了。欧洲专注于乌克兰。去年11月誓言结束战争的唐纳德·特朗普总统,则陷入了他在伊朗的灾难性行动中。许多苏丹人已习惯于被视为被放弃的事业,开始谈论一个“索马里时间线”:一场看不到尽头的数十年冲突。
现在,两项进展结合在一起,创造了一个结束战争的机会——尽管机会渺茫。自从美国在2月份袭击伊斯兰共和国以来,海湾地区的混乱在很大程度上使苏丹的优先级比平时更低。拥有伊朗这个共同敌人,对于在苏丹展开竞争的沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋之间的敌对关系几乎没有起到缓解作用。
但正如美国前总统德怀特·艾森豪威尔(Dwight Eisenhower)据称曾说过的那样:当一个问题无法解决时,就将其扩大。随着伊朗战争的扩大,关注点正从目前仍处于关闭状态的霍尔木兹海峡(见社论)转移到可能很快被关闭的红海。近几周,也门受伊朗支持的民兵组织胡塞武装对与沙特阿拉伯有关的油轮发动了袭击,导致通过该海域曼德海峡的航运量大幅减少。到目前为止,沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋将它们在该地区的竞争视为零和博弈。然而,近期红海的袭击进一步凸显了苏丹海岸线对沙特阿拉伯的重要性,使其重新对这场战争产生兴趣。这可能会增加阿联酋继续支持快速支援部队(RSF)的成本和风险,从而为苏丹的停火成为中东更广泛协议的一部分打开大门。
第二个因素是战场局势的转变。在过去两周里,苏丹武装部队(SAF)取得了自18个月前重返喀土穆以来最显著的突破。7月下旬,它重新控制了连接首都与奥贝德(el-Obeid)的关键公路,后者是一个战略区域枢纽,RSF此前数月一直试图将其攻占。它还夺回了位于埃塞俄比亚边境的城镇库尔穆克(Kur-muk)。尽管军队现在可能倾向于加倍努力试图击败RSF,但它长期以来一直主张希望在强势地位下进行谈判——而它现在正处于这种地位。此外,寻求停火的时间拖得越久,停火协议就越难以维持。双方由数十个民兵组织组成。SAF深知,随着战争的拖延,更多的权力将流向那些在维持战争经济中获利的团体。无论谁掌权,碎片化都将随之而来。
诚然,成功停火的机会很小。但现在正是外交推动的时机。在接下来的一个月左右,苏丹的雨季意味着战斗将进入低谷。由特朗普先生疲于奔命的非洲特使马萨德·布洛斯(Massad Boulos)提出的“人道主义停战”方案,在战线相对静止期间有更好的维持机会。
美国和欧洲应当依靠其海湾盟友,向其支持的交战方施压,促使双方首次进行直接对话。沙特阿拉伯、埃及和土耳其应当敦促苏丹武装部队(SAF)停止坚持要求快速支援部队(RSF)在谈判开始前先解除武装并复员。阿拉伯联合酋长国应当利用其对快速支援部队的影响力,使其履行其公开表达的停火意愿——即便这意味着要放弃统治整个苏丹的野心。像索马里那样走向进一步碎片化的轨迹,将使这场战争所造成的苦难和不稳定长期化。这是防止这种情况发生的最后一次最佳机会。■
14 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
埃隆·马斯克、家庭收入、非洲城市、克劳黛特·科尔文、酒吧、预测市场、AI生成文本
埃隆·马斯克坚称,由于特朗普政府削减了美国国际开发署(USAID)的预算,非洲没有“任何一个”孩子因此死亡(7月23日接受《The Insider》采访)。马斯克认为,其他组织本可以介入。他说:“他们有能力迅速采取行动,如果他们没有这样做,我认为他们同样负有责任。”事实上,削减预算的影响在地面上清晰可见,而且规模大到在太空中也能看到。研究人员追踪了50个非洲国家中1,374个前USAID项目地点周围的卫星夜光。那些最依赖这笔资金的地方相对于其他地区变得更加昏暗,且处于粮食危机中的人口比例有所上升。无论失去的生命数量是零、十个还是一万个,马斯克的辩护都基于一个在道德上破产的前提:只要原则上有人能在事后出现并收拾残局,那么一个人就可以为其行为所导致的可见后果免责。即便承认那个不可能的情况——即没有一个人死亡——其道德推理依然是错误的。此外,即使盖茨基金会或麦肯齐·斯科特能够填补非洲紧急援助的缺口,这也会导致他们用于应对疟疾、结核病、儿童营养等项目的资金被挪用。慈善预算是有限的。基金会的存在是为了资助政府不愿资助的项目,而不是在政府放弃已承诺的义务时,充当最后的保险人。USAID可以做得更好吗?当然可以。即使是最热烈的支持者也有改进它的想法。我担任首席经济学家并非因为我看到了一个效率的堡垒,而是因为我想帮助它变得更好。当我到达那里时,我发现内部有许多才华横溢且充满动力的人正致力于此,尽管伴随着预料之中的行政、官僚和政治障碍,这让改进变得困难,但并非不可能。虽然关于USAID的争论将会淡出,但马斯克的哲学应当被大声且永远地拒绝。
经济与金融学教授,西北大学 伊利诺伊州埃文斯顿
现在就严肃对待马斯克的预测可能还为时过早。看看他在全自动驾驶汽车方面的记录吧,维基百科为此专门设立了一个页面。2013年,他说到2016年,特斯拉汽车90%的里程将由自动驾驶完成。2015年,他预测特斯拉将在2018年实现完全自动驾驶。2016年,这个日期推迟到了2019年。自2020年起,每年都被称为“今年”。最新的预测是2026年12月,比他最初预期的晚了十年。马斯克是一位强大的创新者。但在自动驾驶汽车,以及火星、太空数据中心、机器人和AI方面,我们应对他的预言保持谨慎。
帕特里克·格雷迪 布鲁塞尔
您驳回了马斯克的建议,即在AI时代,下棋和园艺或许能支撑人类的精神,并指出“一种被视为多余的感觉会导致痛苦和道德沦丧”(7月25日,“你应该害怕埃隆·马斯克吗?”)。请允许一个在经济上已被视为多余一个多世纪的职业发声。自从留声机出现以来,管弦乐团演奏的每一个音符都以极低的成本存在于更优质的录音中。按照实用主义逻辑,现场管弦乐团应该在1910年左右解散。然而,音乐厅依然座无虚席,而且更具有说服力的是,人们继续加入业余合唱团。如今下棋的人比机器在游戏中变得不可战胜之前还要多。被超越让游戏失去了功利主义,而非失去了意义。您正确地提出了关于如何资助向AI转型、驯服动荡以及约束AI驱动的独裁者的疑问。但关于当没有什么需要做时人类将做什么的问题,研究每周都在合唱团、象棋俱乐部和分配地中进行。
大卫·伍德沃德,指挥 芬兰坦佩雷
马斯克先生的火星抱负并非全部疯狂。他的资源可以资助一支星舰(Starship)火箭舰队,每枚火箭都携带机器人、太阳能采集器和其他设备。因此,在他有生之年,火星上可能会出现数千个机器人,它们不受寒暑影响,从事建筑、采矿或勘探工作。很少有人渴望在火星恶劣的环境中度过余生,但马斯克先生渴望。他曾表示,他希望“死在火星上,只要不是死于撞击”。他可以确保获得独特的特权。他的机器人军团可以被指派为他建造一座圆顶豪宅以供居住,在他抵达时给予他皇室般的接待,并在他的晚年服务于他的需求。死后,他的遗体可以被保存在一座比地球上任何文物都更持久的陵墓中,成为一座独特且耐用的、关于人类抱负与愚蠢的纪念碑,这应该能满足任何权力狂的野心。
马丁·里斯勋爵(LORD MARTIN REES) 前英国皇家天文学家 剑桥大学三一学院
请马斯克先生解释一下,“一个惊人的丰裕时代”在现实和实际层面意味着什么。他预想的是无边无际的小麦、水稻田和硕果累累的果园,还是仅仅是免费提供的、指导我们一举一动的技术碎片?马斯克式的乌托邦未来,甚至比奥尔德斯·赫胥黎的《岛》或威廉·莫里斯的《来自无处的新闻》更缺乏吸引力。
谢拉·库茨(SHEILA COUTTS) 汉普郡,登米德
马斯克先生的预测可能会被证明是正确的,也可能不是,但我注意到他引用了伊恩·M·班克斯的小说来窥见未来的样子。他还提到 AI 模型拥有“价值观”的重要性(尽管他没有说明这些价值观具体是什么)。伊恩·麦克尤恩的小说《像我一样的机器》(Machines Like Me)讲述了一个名为亚当的人形机器人,探讨了人类与机器之间价值观的紧张关系。这本书的主题在你们关于中国想要终结 AI 浪漫关系的报道(7月18日,“不再有机器人”)中也显而易见,因为亚当(机器人)、查理(人类)和米兰达(同样是人类)构成了一个三角恋。
娜奥米·斯坦福(NAOMI STANFORD) 伦敦
更多针对我们采访埃隆·马斯克的读者来信,请参阅 economist.com / letters / musk
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 读者来信 15
确实,在美国,女性收入超过男性收入的家庭比例仍然相当低(见7月25日“无论贫富”一文)。但您将其解释为社会规范的观点很难被认为是定论。一方面,50%的阈值——即在妻子收入开始超过丈夫的那个点上,妻子在家庭收入中所占份额的分布急剧下降——似乎仅存在于收入为自报数据的资料中。2020年,安雅·罗斯(Anja Roth)和米凯拉·斯洛特温斯基(Michaela Slotwinski)使用了一组瑞士数据集,该数据集将同一个人及其伴侣的调查信息与行政信息相结合。他们发现,个人在调查中会误报收入,且这种误报与“男性养家”的规范相一致,这基本上解释了报告收入中观察到的不连续性。在我最近合著的一篇使用荷兰税务数据的论文中,我们同样没有发现任何关于50%阈值的证据。性别规范可能会促使配偶轻微误报其实际收入,但这两种情况在经济后果上截然不同:报告偏差与实际的经济决策完全不同。
更重要的是,克劳迪娅·戈尔丁(Claudia Goldin)多次证明,工资和收入的性别差异往往反映了职业选择上的细微差别。例如,女性更倾向于选择灵活的工作,以便接送孩子、请病假和管理家务,而男性则更倾向于选择那些“贪婪”的工作。将这种倾向完全解释为根深蒂固的性别规范的结果过于简单化,因为在某些情况下,这种分工对于相关家庭(尤其是育有子女的家庭)可能是高效的。我们需要的是对幼儿人力资本获取机制更深入的理解。例如,母亲和父亲的时间是完全替代品、不完全替代品还是互补品?这是一个非常活跃的当前研究领域,涉及经济学家和发展心理学家。
在基本上所有发达国家,以及相当数量的中等甚至低收入国家,女性现在的受教育程度都高于男性。尽管这一变化可能产生重大影响,但这一至关重要的转变在很大程度上仍未得到充分讨论。最终,女性养家者的稀缺现象可能会逐渐消失,但关于这一过程仍有许多需要学习的地方。
皮埃尔-安德烈·恰波里(PIERRE-ANDRÉ CHIAPPORI) 哥伦比亚大学经济学教授 纽约
为非洲的城市未来进行规划,确实比在事实发生后才做出反应要好(见7月4日“全民扩张”一文)。规划基础设施本身就能产生回报。您的文章表明,基础街道规划提高了达累斯萨拉姆郊区的土地价值,但这些收益流向了灰色市场的投机者和有关系的人。到2050年,非洲城市足迹的一半尚未建成,因此其未来的道路和管道将创造的价值尚未被套现。目前,非洲城市的人均征收额约为$8
我读到了你们关于汉弗莱·史密斯(Humphrey Smith)的精彩讣告(7月18日),他是北约克郡塔德卡斯特(Tadcaster)“引以为傲的独立塞缪尔·史密斯老酿酒厂”的所有者。他在酒吧中严格执行的移动技术使用限制(“除室外外禁止使用手机,禁止使用笔记本电脑或平板电脑”)以及无音乐的环境(“也不允许播放背景音乐,只需交谈的嗡嗡声”),营造了独特的社交氛围。遗憾的是,近年来伦敦的规定有所放宽,在塞缪尔·史密斯的酒吧里,手机甚至笔记本电脑现在已十分常见,即便是在“旧切希尔奶酪”酒吧(Ye Olde Cheshire Cheese)也是如此。
通常,只有年轻的都市人通过电信设备闲聊的声音,才能打断那种令人绝望的刷屏行为。史密斯先生在约克郡的坟墓里一定会辗转反侧的。
克里斯·德雷克(CHRIS DRAKE) 莱斯特

房产税,相比之下全球平均水平为 $220。只要能捕捉到这部分收益的一小部分,将人们与高效就业机会联系起来的城市化进程就可以开始实现自筹资金。随着全球规模最大的劳动年龄人口激增即将到来,很少有财政改革能比这更能促进非洲的增长。
马克·亨斯特里奇(MARK HENSTRIDGE) 牛津政策管理公司首席执行官 牛津
罗莎·帕克斯(Rosa Parks)因在阿拉巴马州蒙哥马利的一辆公交车上拒绝给一名白人让座,从而引发了民权运动(美国 at 250),这理应受到赞颂。那是 1955 年 12 月 1 日的事。在帕克斯之前,1955. 年已有几名黑人因同样的行为被捕,其中最著名的是 15 岁的克劳黛特·科尔文(Claudette Colvin),她在 3 月 2 日被捕。1956, 年,科尔文成为了“布劳德诉盖尔案”(Browder v Gayle)四名原告之一,这场联邦诉讼不仅结束了蒙哥马利公交车上的种族隔离,也结束了全美公共交通系统的种族隔离。在那之后,她基本上被人们遗忘了。她的勇敢之举在一定程度上激励了蒙哥马利的黑人社区抗议隔离法,尽管是帕克斯被捕才引发了对该市交通系统持续一年多的抵制。
令人惊讶的是,科尔文在民权运动历史中消失的部分原因在于当时的黑人社区。黑人居民认为年轻的科尔文是个麻烦制造者,而当地活动人士认为帕克斯是一个更适合作为号召中心的人物。根据科尔文自己的描述,她认为自己的肤色太深,且太穷,无法赢得蒙哥马利黑人中产阶级的关键支持。此外,她在当年未婚怀孕,这也没有起到帮助作用。科尔文于今年 1 月去世。
玛加利·罗德里格斯·加西亚(MAGALY RODRÍGUEZ GARCÍA) 鲁汶大学副教授 比利时,鲁汶
当弗朗西斯·高尔顿爵士(Sir Francis Galton)在 1906, 年普利茅斯的一个集市上让人们猜测一头牛的重量时,他并没有给参与者提供通过付钱来增加 99 次猜测机会并以此扭曲平均值的选项。但这实际上就是目前预测市场的运作方式,也是它们失效的原因(见《修复真相机器》,7月25日)。
鲍勃·费舍尔(BOB FISHER) 休斯顿
我可以证实,旨在检测 AI 生成文本的软件确实是“可能会产生假阳性的黑盒算法”(见《纸质痕迹》,7月30日)。我将一些文本放入 AI 检测器中。塞缪尔·贝克特的《克拉普的最后一条磁带》和《快乐的日子》被判定为 AI 生成的可能性分别为 86% 和 84%。《登山宝训》被认为 100% 是 AI 生成的。而该程序判定唐纳德·特朗普的一篇演讲是 100% 由人类生成的。
布伦丹·莱昂斯(BRENDAN LYONS) 都柏林
→ 信件请寄至编辑处:The Economist, The Adelphi Building, 1-11 John Adam Street, London WC2N; 电子邮件:letters@economist.com。更多信件请见:economist.com / letters
16 《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日
全球衍生品市场已进入一个新 era,而美国正处于领先地位。几十年来,衍生品——如期货、期权和掉期等金融合约,其价值基于基础资产的价格或表现——一直是企业、农民、投资者和金融机构管理风险并高效配置资本的工具。曾经的小众金融工具,如今支撑起一个名义价值超过 $1.2 千万亿(quadrillion)的市场。该市场近一半处于商品期货交易委员会(CFTC)的管辖之下,我自去年12月起领导该机构。
美国在衍生品领域的领导地位是通过竞争性市场、强大的机构、健全的监管以及拥抱创新的意愿,历经数代人建立起来的。在许多市场细分领域,交易员在纽约和芝加哥交易池中大声叫喊的日子已经过去,甚至2000年代基于屏幕的交易也已成为历史。衍生品市场已演变为日益自主的生态系统,由自动化交易、人工智能、算法执行和实时决策驱动,其对信息的反应速度比任何人类都要快数千倍。
多年来,国际金融监管一直基于这样一个假设:监管重点将通过全球机构和不同国家监管机构之间的广泛共识而产生。尽管国际合作依然重要,但美国并不打算引进由那些考虑“昨日市场”(即围绕有限交易时间、单一交易所和屏幕交易构建的市场)的机构所设计的监管趋势。相反,美国再次成为了金融创新的中心。
在唐纳德·特朗普总统的第一任期内,CFTC监管的比特币期货的推出和扩张,通过为机构投资者提供透明且受监管的资产敞口,帮助加密资产进入主流金融领域。这一基础将比特币从一种边缘资产转变为一种日益融入更广泛金融体系的资产:比特币交易所交易产品目前持有超过1.2m枚比特币,而 2016. 年时基本为零。
在特朗普先生的第二任期内,CFTC已批准首个“真正的”比特币永续合约作为期货合约。永续合约(或称“perp”)是一种没有固定到期日的衍生合约,而是依赖于周期性的资金费率机制(交易员之间的支付),旨在维持与基础资产现货价格的相对价格平价。
现在,随着资本市场进入数字化时代,CFTC正致力于将加密市场奠定的基础扩展到更广泛的金融体系中。国会最近通过了立法,为可用于支付的美元支持稳定币创建了首个全面的联邦框架,并为加密资产更广泛地融入金融体系奠定了基础。CFTC正在探索受监管的稳定币如何被用作抵押品,在现代化市场基础设施的同时,维持使美国衍生品市场处于世界领先地位的安全性和完整性。
我们的创新远不止于加密资产。今年,我们推出了美国首个提供黄金期货全天候交易的主要交易所。CFTC还与市场参与者就非加密资产永续期货的潜在开发进行沟通。与此同时,完全由本委员会管辖的预测市场,已证明其作为价格发现强大工具的价值。
在美方拥抱负责任创新的同时,许多国际同行却在朝着相反的方向发展。近期,九家欧洲金融监管机构认为,在预测市场交易的事件合约应被视为赌博而非金融工具。这种观点误解了这些合约的结构,且低估了它们是在市场中交易,而非向“庄家”下注这一事实。它还忽略了这些市场在汇总信息、改善预测和增强价格发现方面所发挥的作用。预测市场通常比传统的民调和专家表现更好——在 2024. 年,只有它们正确预测了特朗普先生在对阵卡玛拉·哈里斯的选举中获胜。来自美联储的研究表明,在联邦基金利率和消费者价格指数等经济指标方面,预测市场的表现与传统估算相当或更好。为了保持有效性,全球监管框架必须与它们所监管的市场一样快速演进。历史证明,从铁路和航空到互联网和电子交易,当美国尽早拥抱创新时,其领导力最强,从而塑造了全球标准,而非等待他人地塑造。这种理念也延伸到我们的国际监管关系中。跨境合作依然具有价值,但能够进入全球最深厚、最受信赖的衍生品市场是一种特权。国际协议、外国贸易委员会注册以及监管安排应定期现代化,以反映不断演变的市场结构和技术进步,同时促进美国市场的利益并保护市场参与者。全球监管机构长期以来一直期待美国在监管衍生品方面发挥领导作用。这种情况应当继续,由美国制定稳健的政策,使创新能够繁荣。金融市场的未来将属于那些愿意在维护市场完整性的同时突破边界的人。美国已经证明,这些目标并不冲突。其他国家可以自由选择自己的路线。我们打算继续保持全球金标准。■ 迈克尔·塞利格(Michael Selig)是商品期货交易委员会主席。
《经济学人》 2026 17 8月8日
深圳、苏州和郑州 中国主导AI的驱动力给全球规模最大的劳动力群体带来了巨大风险
李大志(音译)在郑州一个像首席执行官办公室的场景中来回踱步,练习着台词。这座中国中部城市已成为微短剧的中心。这种每集一分钟的连载剧占据了全国的手机屏幕,每两人中就有一人观看。2025年,微短剧发展成为一个规模达1000亿元(150亿美元)的产业,创造了约70万,000个就业岗位,以及可能高达1.3m个间接岗位——这是中国低迷经济中罕见的活力亮点。
这个繁荣的行业给32岁的前交通警察李先生提供了一个尝试新事物的机会。他曾忙于每月研究8到15个充满幻想色彩的剧本。然而在2月,科技巨头字节跳动推出了Seedance 2.0, 一个能够制作极其逼真视频的人工智能模型。它迅速颠覆了该行业。现在,剧集的制作周期从数周缩短至数天,成本降低了高达90%(账单主要由tokens而非人力构成)。李先生的日薪下降了一半,接到的活儿也枯竭了。他的许多同事转而从事保险销售、摆摊、外卖配送或跑车。
“先进技术可以提高人们的生活质量,”他说,“但对于我们的行业来说,目前它弊大于利。”
中国在AI领域进行了全力推进,其信念是:在与美国及世界其他地区的竞争中,主导这项技术几乎是一种生存必然。共产党还认为,在快速老龄化的社会中,长期来看,AI对于缓解最终的劳动力短缺具有明显需求。为了迎接那个未来,中国正在积极追求AI集成,特别是以“具身智能”(embodied AI)的形式:通过机器人和汽车将AI模型引入物理世界。中国领导者预见到一个“人机协作”时代的到来。
但党也日益担心AI将如何取代工人。AI的进步威胁着办公室工作和蓝领工作,而后者一直是近年来数百万被裁员或减薪者的退路——在一个缺乏强大社会安全网的系统中。而且,正如微短剧被迅速颠覆所证明的那样,AI拥有通过一次按键就抹除工作的能力。
“这种转型既涉及岗位的创造,也涉及岗位的毁灭,但两种效应是不对称的,岗位替代往往先于且超过岗位创造,”一家顶级国家智库的著名经济学家蔡昉在关于AI对劳动力影响的新书中写道。由于宏观经济前景黯淡,政府的任务变得更加艰巨,这可能会扩大中国“拥有机器人者”与“不拥有机器人者”之间的鸿沟。
一些中国工人已经在与即将取代他们的技术并肩工作。以贾存其(音译)为例。几十年来,他驾驶着运煤车和散货车穿梭在中国,长途行驶后背部酸痛,眼睛干涩。现在,这位44岁的司机只有在汇入高速公路或在城市道路上行驶短距离时才需要操作方向盘。这是因为他的卡车配备了先进的驾驶辅助技术,几乎可以自动驾驶。中国的规定仍要求驾驶座上必须有人,且双手触碰方向盘。
--- 18 简报 AI与中国工人 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 ▶
在最近的一个周一早晨,他在前往上海的最后一程之前,在苏州的一个休息站接到了本刊记者。在他职业生涯的大部分时间里,他身边都坐着另一名人类司机(以便轮流驾驶)。现在,他听着武侠小说,与九岁的孩子进行视频通话,孩子对这辆自动驾驶货车感到惊叹。他的工作变得更舒适了,尽管也更孤独了。他说,如果货车能掌握如何驶入高速公路,那就万事大吉了。但他认为,人类仍然是必要的,并列举了一系列常见问题:轮胎没气、气管泄漏、发动机突然熄火、绕过道路事故。他认为,等到货车完全实现无人驾驶时,他应该已经退休了(在中国,司机通常在 50 或 55 岁退休,因为他们往往长途行驶且休息较少)。贾先生是 3800 万名货车司机之一,他们承担了该国 70% 以上的货运量。这些司机正在老龄化,且很少有年轻人愿意接替他们。Inceptio Technology 的创始人马骏将他的驾驶辅助技术(该技术被大多数中国自动驾驶货车采用)定位为防止劳动力短缺导致物流业脱轨的解决方案,同时还能减少事故并节省燃料。美国的一些州已经允许自动驾驶货车在没有人类驾驶员的情况下运行,但行驶里程较少。而中国才是真正将技术付诸实践的地方。Inceptio 已经安装了 7,000 套系统,预计到今年年底将超过 1万,000 套。一家大型物流公司表示,其 8,000 辆货车中有 1,000 辆配备了 Inceptio 的技术,且未来所有购买的货车都将配备。一名高管告诉《经济学人》,该技术可减少 30% 的司机,并节省 3-4% 的运输成本。而这还是在监管机构允许货车在没有人类的情况下运行之前。7 月,中国最大的电子商务集团之一京东(JD.com)在北京郊区推出了一条 3 公里长的全自动货车配送路线。该试点允许货车在无需人类手触方向盘的情况下自行驾驶,只要车内坐有一名安全员即可。这是京东董事长刘强东将其庞大的配送帝国自动化的最新举措。10 月,他誓言在未来五年内购买 300 万个机器人、一辆无人车和 10万,000 架无人机。“迟早有一天,根本不需要配送员了,”他在 6 月的一次活动中说道,“但我们不想看到我们的 70万,000 名兄弟挨饿。”美国老板们习惯于预测 AI 将带来就业末日,但他们的中国同行通常会避谈此话题,以免激怒政府。刘强东特意指出,他打算通过培训机器人维护知识来维持这些“兄弟”的就业(他与 124 所学校建立了合作伙伴关系)。“我们将把蓝领工人变成白领,让他们坐在办公室里,而不是在风雨中奔波。”但即使是这家零售巨头也不需要那么多技术人员。想象 AI 摧毁的工作很容易,但想象它创造的工作则更难。京东首席经济学家沈建光以中国 $2trn 电子商务产业为例,说明技术进步如何能催生新行业和此前无法想象的岗位。沈先生表示,他在八年前加入京东时,公司员工人数为 18万,000 人,现在已增长五倍,达到 93万,000 人。这种增长发生在京东 3,600 个仓库中越来越多地实现高度自动化,且运营日益整合 AI 的过程中——从推销产品的 AI 直播员(取代了从事相同工作的人类)到最后一公里配送机器人。沈先生表示,随着京东进一步涉足服务领域(目前已包括汽车维修和家庭清洁),配送员将能够接受养老和医疗护理等工作的培训。他的乐观愿景与政府提高工人技能和扩大服务业的目标相契合,而这对于促进就业和扩大内需都至关重要。
面对迅速老龄化且规模缩减的劳动力群体,中国正押注于AI的普及和机器人,以维持工业实力。但把握好时机将十分困难。
机器人是一个显而易见的长期解决方案。联合国估计,到2050年,中国劳动年龄人口将缩减25%。到2100, 其14亿人口将减少一半以上。然而,在短期内,推广机器人可能会带来很多痛苦。
在南方大都市深圳,技术乐观主义和无奈之情同样明显。当地的人形机器人制造商和供应商雄心勃勃,希望打造一个“机器人谷”。技术人员正在测试机器人割草机。人类清洁工则在清理自动扫地机遗漏的死角。一名姓雷的工人坐在扫地机上说,他的机器人同事现在可能会被落叶和石头挡住,但不可避免地,它们将取代人类。他说,看看已经在深圳和中国其他城市运行的自动驾驶出租车(robotaxis)就知道了。
但与许多中国蓝领工人一样,他更多的是务实而非恐惧。“面对技术,你不能说事情会永远保持不变,”45岁的快递员林英伙说,他已经习惯了在城里看到无人配送车和无人机,“被取代是正常的。”
机器人准备好取代人类了吗?2024年,中国安装了近30万,000台工业机器人——超过当年全球总数的一半(见图表)——并将保有量增加到200万台,是2021.年的两倍。传统机器人已经取代了工厂工人,但它们在处理更复杂的任务时较为吃力(例如,当传送带上的马铃薯形状各异时,剔除其中的坏掉部分)。人形机器人——或者简单称为“类人机器人”——可以学习感知不同的纹理、尺寸和压力,并决定持有某物而不使其破碎或掉落的正确力度。
尽管围绕类人机器人的炒作很多,但目前很少有机器人真正投入工厂车间工作。领导层希望尽快实现规模化。今年6月,他们要求地方政府和国有企业提交计划,确保到年底有1万,000台类人机器人投入实际工作。摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)这家银行估计,中国类人机器人的销量今年将达到5万,000台和20亿美元,到2030.将增加到4.4万.6万,000台和150亿美元。
类人机器人正成为更有前景的员工。类人机器人制造商优必选(UBTech)的焦继超预测,明年市场将迎来突破,更多工业客户将从小额订单转向每单数百台。他们希望在两年内获得投资回报,他表示,如果类人机器人的价格低于30万,000元($44,000),这是可以实现的。他说,随着生产规模的扩大,机器人与人类相比将变得更具成本效益。
PaXini是一家类人机器人制造商,比亚迪(BYD)和上汽(SAIC)等汽车工业巨头是其投资者和客户。该公司负责人杰里米·李(Jeremy Lee)表示,老板们认为类人机器人效率更高,且不太可能偷懒。
不过,训练类人机器人仍然需要人类。在中国订购机器人清洁工时,随之而来的还有两个人:一名机器人培训师和一名熟练的清洁工。在PaXini位于天津的庞大工厂里,500名佩戴传感器的员工在执行汽车厂、医院和超市所需的任务——为类人机器人创建训练数据。李先生表示,虽然随着配送无人机和自动驾驶出租车的进步,监控它们所需的工人会减少,但由于现实世界的数据如此匮乏,在未来十年或二十年内仍需要培训师。

来源:国际机器人联合会 --- 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 简报 AI与中国工人 19 尽管企业声称人形机器人将把人类从危险且重复的工作中解放出来,但它们所创造的人类岗位却并不有趣。道新月(音译)是深圳一名25岁的大学毕业生,自11月以来一直在申请工作。她曾是一名咖啡师,申请过的一份工作是为噱头十足的机器人咖啡师填充咖啡机。在一次机器人训练工作的面试中,她发现折叠衣服30分钟极其枯燥,以至于无法想象日复一日地从事这项工作。在继续找工作期间,她依靠父母(苦瓜农)的资助来支付房租。在红绿灯前,她看着无人驾驶出租车转弯,希望它们能犯错,从而证明它们无法取代另一名司机。但它们开得很稳。与其它国家一样,年轻工人预计将成为受AI影响最严重的人群。在中国,他们的前景尤其暗淡。在房地产危机五年后,经济仍在应对工资增长放缓和青年失业率居高不下等问题。在今年的第二季度,中国未能实现经济增长目标。7月,几十年来首次,其五年计划中没有设定城镇就业目标。人力资源和社会保障部表示,“就业和家庭收入增长压力较大,民生保障存在短板”,并将AI列为挑战之一。多年来,共产党一直规划一个以技术进步和应用为导向的经济。随着其企业向最前沿推进,它现在担心AI会破坏社会稳定。一个主要挑战是校准干预程度:北京的一位政策顾问表示,政府“非常谨慎”,因为它希望安抚焦虑的工人,但又不想扼杀创新。党可以将目光投向其庞大的公共部门,那里就业保障被视为神圣不可侵犯,将其作为压舱石。但私营企业也面临着保护工人的压力。卡内基国际和平基金会(Carnegie Endowment)的一位研究员马特·希汉(Matt Sheehan)表示,“美国公司在裁掉一批人并声称是因为AI而这样做时,其股价会得到非常直接的奖励”,但中国企业的激励机制恰恰相反。咨询公司欧亚集团(Eurasia Group)的王丹(Dan Wang)最近会见了当地官员,这些官员敦促企业增加新岗位,以抵消自动化导致的裁员。中国官方工会的喉舌《工人日报》批评了数字化克隆员工等做法。在党的领导下工作的中国法官在涉及AI的解雇案件中,目前大多支持工人。在AI领先产业中心杭州,一名法官判定一家金融科技公司以AI能够履行职责为由解雇一名姓周的技术工人为非法。这名35岁的工人因拒绝接受降职和减薪而被解雇。他的案例以及中国其他类似案例被政府作为警告,提醒企业不要将AI作为裁员的借口。中国企业在因能力不足而解雇工人之前,必须首先尝试对其进行重新培训和重新分配。政府还希望通过教育和培训人们来实现其AI雄心。虽然年轻人难以找到工作,但该国预计在熟练制造业和AI研究领域还需要数百万名工人(即便中国目前的AI研究人员数量已超过美国、英国和欧盟的总和)。中小学正将AI课程纳入教学大纲。大学在削减了数千个“过时”学位(主要在艺术和人文领域)后,正将学生引导至数千个新学位项目中,涵盖“具身智能”和“农业机器人”等领域。国家还在资助重新培训并推广职业
在诸如“低空经济”(例如飞行出租车)等领域的职业教育。许多在转型中掉队的人将发现社会安全网极其单薄,包括微薄的社会保障和最低限度的医疗保险。中国社会保障协会会长郑功成去年向立法机构警告称,AI和机器人取代工人的程度越高,能够向福利系统缴纳资金以支持失业者的薪资收入者就越少。他建议对机器人带来的生产力提升征收新税。曾向中国领导层提供简报的粤开证券罗志恒则提出,应对AI公司的“超额利润”征税。
一些经济学家和前官员希望推出新的补贴,例如 AI 失业保险和现金救济。曾担任副部长级职务的蔡先生在中央党校报 6 月的一篇头版社论中写道:“技术革命或产业转型越具颠覆性,创造性破坏的强度就越大,市场机制在保护劳动者权益方面就越不足。”
可能向国家争取更多福利的群体规模正在扩大。智库中国新就业形态研究中心估计,构成中国庞大零工经济的“灵活就业人员”——包括外卖员、网约车司机、直播主、工厂日结工等——今年将增加到 3.2 亿人,高于 2025 年的 2.8 亿人,且是 2019, 年规模的两倍。企业和政策制定者已采取温和措施,将其中更多的人纳入社会保障体系,以免其不稳定性转化为动荡。AI 可能会增加采取更多行动的压力。
尽管如此,短期内似乎不太可能出现任何雄心勃勃的计划。政府在考虑补贴时非常吝啬,而且中国国家主席习近平曾表示厌恶“福利主义”。随着更多自动驾驶出租车(robotaxis)上路,网约车司机将不得不勉强维持生计。演员李先生也将如此,而他的老板们却在兴旺发达。
在郑州的一栋办公楼里,张磊经营着一家名为“梦创传媒”的工作室。“AI 打造微短剧——超越想象的创意”,这是其中一条标语。张先生以前每天有十个拍摄团队。现在,一排排被称为“抽卡师”(choukashi)的人——这是一个 AI 时代的术语,字面意思是“抽卡的人”,让人联想到随机抽卡并希望抽到好卡——正在编写提示词,例如指定 1 个人物皱眉的特写,“其表情充满感激与期待”。软件随即吐出几秒钟的场景,由“抽卡师”进行微调和排序。现场看不到摄影师、灯光组或演员。■
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《经济学人》 2026 21 年 8 月 8 日
就业审裁处
人工智能案件正使英国就业法庭不堪重负
英国就业法中包含一项名为“临时救济”(interim relief)的条款。这是一项紧急措施,法官可据此命令公司恢复被解雇员工的职位,或至少支付其工资。申请对象可能是举报安全违规行为的告密者,也可能是麻烦的工会官员。在法律圈之外,这项条款鲜为人知,且此前申请频率极低——全英国的法庭每年大约仅收到 20 份申请——且极少获批。
直到最近。虽然数据不完整,但激增趋势显而易见。根据该系统两位主席巴里·克拉克(Barry Clarke)和苏珊·沃克(Susan Walker)在 6 月 22 日的一份备忘录,现在英国就业法庭系统的 12 个区域办事处中,每个办事处每月收到约 20 份申请——增加了 100 倍以上。这些申请大多最终会失败,但所有提交规范的申请都有权获得紧急听证会并出庭,从而导致其他案件被推迟。
法官们虽然谨慎,但他们心中有一个首要嫌疑对象:人工智能。临时救济案是一个典型案例,展示了 AI 如何像热寻导弹一样,锁定法律中最晦涩的条款——并造成破坏。
这对英国就业法庭(解决雇主与工人之间纠纷的法院)的影响,揭示了一种在各地出现的新现象。AI 诱导的需求正使为模拟时代而建立的官僚机构不堪重负——从荷兰的市政税申诉,到加拿大的隐私监管机构,再到每个大城市的停车罚单法庭(见下一篇报道)。在英国,工人现在寻求大语言模型的帮助,而非人类律师,以便快速且廉价地起诉其老板。索赔数量激增,积压案件增加。今天提交的一起案件可能要到 2030 年才能开庭。
免费的、由 驱动的法律咨询本应是工人的好消息。相反,它正演变成一场公地悲剧。对于有真实委屈的工人来说,需求的激增意味着获得正义的等待时间更长。对于雇主来说,这意味着需要支付更高的法律费用来应对索赔,无论这些索赔是有据可查还是纯属幻想。在 时代,一个旨在提供司法渠道的系统,如果说有什么问题的话,那就是渠道过于畅通。
这种动态在英国出现了一个转折,因为技术与法律的发展步调不一。随着 能力的加速,工党政府正在为工人起诉雇主提供更多理由和更高额的赔偿。这意味着,正当由 赋能的原告需求激增时,政府又将法院的大门推得更开。
技术赋能带来的激增影响令人震惊。在截至 2026 年 3 月的一年里,起诉雇主的人数比前一年增长了 39%,达到 5万,000 人,而案件被解决或驳回的比例则有所下降。索赔案件正变得更加复杂:涵盖性别和年龄歧视等问题的“开放轨道”(open track)案件比例从 2020-21 年的 33% 增长到去年的 61%。这类案件一直以来就占用更多法庭时间,而现在持续时间更长。结果,所有未解决的个人索赔积压量在一年内增长了 55%,达到 6.4万,000 起(见图表)。
律师们表示, 显然是罪魁祸首,尤其是导致了案件复杂性的增加。其他解释可以被排除。克拉克先生最近表示,通常在纠纷增加之前会出现的经济低迷情况“完全没有显现”。尽管存在职位空缺,但法官人数和出庭天数仍高于疫情前水平。在这一切之中,程序的质量似乎得到了维持;一名大律师表示,如果你愿意等待,法官们依然提供“劳斯莱斯级”的高质量服务。
--- 22 英国 《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日
→ 本节其他内容 23 与政府 23 小麦与热浪 24 拦截船只 24 帕德尔球的力量 25 杰里米·Vine 节目 26 巴杰特:扎克·波兰斯基,仅 43
对于所谓的“亲自诉讼人”(litigants-in-person,即没有律师的原告)而言,AI可以减轻起诉的繁重工作——并鼓励他们过度夸大事实。将一个模糊的委屈输入ChatGPT,不久它就会提出起草起诉书、“模范法律论点”和“雇主辩护预测图”,并提供应对交叉质询的技巧。当我们的虚拟原告说他们因为喜欢星座而被欺凌(这在歧视法中尚未被列为受保护的信仰)时,该模型贴心地指出,纯素主义是受保护的。它还加入了修辞上的润色:在没有提示的情况下,它写道我们的原告“经历了痛苦”且“发现很难获得新工作”。
高级法官们并非卢德分子(反对技术进步的人)。英格兰和威尔士司法首长卡尔女士(Lady Carr)最近告诉议会,AI在翻译和安排听证会等方面有望带来巨大的效率提升。“我们讨论的是让AI来洗衣服,好让法官能从事艺术工作。”她的同事杰弗里·沃斯爵士(Sir Geoffrey Vos)也指出,AI提交的材料可能比那些“拎着购物袋装着一堆散页纸来到法院”的人的胡言乱语更具连贯性。
但最近的法庭裁决揭示了司法人员日益增长的恼怒。劳动法法官希望提交的材料简洁且基于事实;而AI生成的起诉书可能长达数百页。这些材料通常像散弹枪一样漫无目的,引用数十项理由,且充斥着幻觉产生的法律。“我们被扔来各种东西,从《大宪章》到《欧洲人权公约》应有尽有,”一名出庭律师约翰·鲍尔斯(John Bowers)说道。
AI谄媚那些需要坦诚建议的原告。一名NHS员工使用Grok准备了一份包含282页、涉及67项委屈的案件,他告诉法官,他计划仅依赖其中10%的内容,但不知道是哪些。一名使用ChatGPT的秘书给法官留下了“强烈的印象”,即她是在“追求一项她并不理解,且在被问及的时候无法亲自证明其合理性的诉求”。一名同样借助AI的极右翼活动人士提交了数百段同事的秘密录音,他认为这证明了歧视,但法官发现录音完全无法听清;他似乎“无法意识到”其案件的绝望处境。
这项技术成了麻烦制造者的生产力助推器。其中一人以神经多样性导致的歧视为由,告诉法官他已经发起了超过100起法庭起诉;没错,他最近发现了AI。另一人因提交至少60起起诉而被总检察长下达禁制令,他表示他会先用AI测试这些起诉的价值。“然而,”格里菲斯法官(Mr Justice Griffiths)总结道,“其中几乎所有起诉都失败了。”
劳动法法庭比英国法律系统的其他部分更容易受到AI的影响,因为其设计初衷就是向外行开放。它们成立于20世纪60年代,旨在快速且廉价地解决争议——正如一名法官所言,这是一个“人民法院”,没有中央刑事法院(Old Bailey)那种刻板。提起诉讼无需付费,且与其他民事法院不同,败诉方很少需要支付对方的账单。拒绝合理的和解方案也没有处罚。
劳动法出庭律师大卫·格林(David Green)表示,结果就是缺乏一种财务机制来促使当事人认真思考其案件的价值。而且,AI生成的劣质内容(AI slop)并不意味着自动取消资格。法官认为,如果案件可能包含真实的委屈,那么即使陈述糟糕也值得进行完整的听证。詹姆斯·泰勒法官(Judge James Tayler)在2021年的一项裁决中发现,即便原告使用了错误的术语或表现得像个“被车灯照晕的兔子”,直接驳回起诉也不能替代“卷起袖子”去探究其价值。
这个开放的系统即将变得更加开放。自20世纪60年代以来,雇佣法庭的管辖范围已扩大到超过100种雇主可能被起诉的不同理由。新的《雇佣权利法》又增加了大约25项,例如在短时间内取消排班时获得报酬的权利。从2027年1月起,在雇佣六个月后即可提出不公平解雇的申诉,而非之前的两年。此外,大多数申诉中£12.3543万,543($1.6605亿,050)的赔偿上限将被取消。对于潜在的申诉人来说,这意味着有了更多提起诉讼的借口,以及获得更高赔偿的希望。政府预测该法案将导致法律纠纷增加17%;许多律师认为增加幅度将远超于此。“每一个因素都指向更多的诉讼,以及更复杂、更高价值的诉讼,”法律事务所Lewis Silkin的塔伦·塔瓦克利(Tarun Tawakley)表示。另一家法律事务所A&O Shearman的萨拉·亨乔兹(Sarah Henchoz)认为,在AI的助力下,取消赔偿上限的前景可能会让人们对能赢回多少钱产生不切实际的幻想。(克拉克先生报道称,AI已经在推高赔偿金额的申诉。)“就像在谷歌上搜索某种疾病一样,在寻求法律建议时,你会根据输入的内容得到你想要的答案,”亨乔兹女士说。她指出,英国现在对雇主的吸引力低于法国,在法国,赔偿金通常上限为20个月的工资。
专业AI可能会解决这种混乱。试验表明,AI现在在起草等任务上可以击败人类律师。今年,一家AI律师事务所被认为成功地为一名人类大律师准备了一起雇佣案件。算法可能很快就能让潜在的申诉人更真实地了解其案件是否会成功。剑桥大学的费利克斯·斯特费克(Felix Steffek)表示,挑战在于获取足够的训练数据,他的团队为此建立了一个包含1.9万,000个历史案例的数据库。这将减轻法官的工作负担。但它会给雇主带来另一个问题。如果AI兑现其承诺,不久之后它可能会让每个工人随身携带一个相当于顶尖律师的工具,能够随意针对老板提起构建精准的诉讼。大量低质量的申诉可能会演变为一波胜诉的浪潮。工党表示,其法案将把权力从雇主转移到工人手中。有了AI,权力的转移速度将比政治家想象的更快、更远。■


来源:司法部 *已结案
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 英国 23
从停车罚单到规划申请,国家正遭受 AI 的围攻
AI 降低国家运行成本的潜力让英国政府感到欣喜。去年,官员们确定了 140 个可能的应用场景,从筛选外交电报到精简呼叫中心。高级公务员们获得了一套名为“汉弗莱”(Humphrey)的节省劳动力的工具箱。时任技术大臣彼得·凯尔(Peter Kyle)预见到每年可节省 450亿英镑 的“大奖”(610亿美元,高达公共部门支出的 7%)。
但在现实中,节省的金额可能较为有限,甚至可能被完全抵消。这不仅是因为白厅(Whitehall)可能无法实现凯尔先生那英雄主义式的措辞,更大的挑战在于公众也在迅速采用 。他们利用 工具来处理与国家的日常互动,并对其提出越来越多的要求。实际上,国家与公民之间已经开始了一场 军备竞赛,而国家是否能获胜尚不明确。
以规划为例。官员们开发了相关工具,通过对规划方案是否符合法律给出初步判定,从而加快住房审批速度。然而,地方当局报告称,针对拟建项目的 生成式反对意见激增。这些反对意见通常更有效: 辅助提交的申请会逐章逐节地引用规划条例和法律先例。只需支付 £45, Objector 这一平台就能扫描大量规划文件,拟定反对的法律依据,并写好在公开会议上宣读的演讲稿。
或者考虑福利金。就业与养老金部使用 来处理申请并检测欺诈。但申请人同样在转向 聊天机器人来起草他们的诉求,以最大化成功概率。这可能会导致高昂的成本:根据一些估计,英国人申请的福利金低于他们有权获得的金额,每年可能超过 200亿英镑(0.7% of GDP)。
这种影响在国家运行的琐碎角落中尤为明显。监管机构信息专员办公室表示, 导致了更复杂的自由信息请求的增长。Pelp 等平台会起草申诉停车罚单的信函。新的《租房者权利法案》允许租客在法院挑战租金上涨,这成为了 的主要目标。根据柏林赫蒂学校(Hertie School)克里斯·施密茨(Chris Schmitz)汇总的数据,向国家监管机构投诉律师、财务顾问和房地产经纪人的案例正在攀升,他将此现象称为“代理人洪水”(agentic flooding)。他认为,英国可能特别容易受到这种冲击,因为政府服务通常接受开放文本提交,而 正擅长起草此类内容。
但这种趋势在英国之外同样存在。在即将发表的一篇论文中,施密茨先生列举了 11 个国家的 93 个案例。欧盟监察员(一个投诉监督机构)、加拿大隐私监管机构和澳大利亚的工作法庭都将申请数量的剧增归因于 。荷兰的一个市镇报告称,在推出一个用于申诉的商业 平台后,针对房产税估值的反对意见增加了 400%。
随着能够代表用户执行任务的 代理( agents)的采用,这种情况将进一步加速。咨询公司 Public Digital 的汤姆·卢斯莫尔(Tom Loosemore)指出,它们例如可以检查房产是否被划入了错误的税级,然后着手修正。 代理特别适合在官僚主义的“铁丝网”中穿行。它们擅长消化细则,精于填写表格——而且面对令人心碎的申诉流程时,它们永远不会放弃。■
“我不记得什么时候在七月就完成了收割,”在埃克塞特附近种植 700 英亩冬小麦、大麦和燕麦的农民马克·威克斯(Mark Weekes)说道。通常情况下,威克斯先生会在大约三周后收割作物。但炎热干燥的天气使他的谷物成熟得更快,且状态更差。他的农田小麦产量比正常水平低了三分之一,大麦产量低了近五分之二。“很多都萎缩了,”他说。
英国的作物经过培育,旨在适中湿润且温和的气候中生长。而今年的天气绝非如此。极度潮湿的冬季耗尽了土壤中的养分,极度干燥的夏季则耗尽了水分。七月份,英国的降雨量仅为该月典型降雨量的 10%。环境署宣布英格兰一半地区处于干旱状态。
在整个英国,冬小麦被提前收割——这是自 1976 年以来最早的一次收割。根据农业与园艺发展委员会的数据,截至 7 月 26 日,已有超过一半的小麦被收割,而去年同期这一比例仅为 11%。与该国十年平均值相比,小麦平均产量下降了近 16%。在土壤较轻的英格兰东部,农民报告的产量下降了一半。
不过,购物者不太可能看到短缺。英国种植的小麦约有一半用于动物饲料,其余大部分被磨成面粉用于制作面包和饼干。英国已经进口了约 15% 的制粉小麦,并且可以进口更多。
真正的代价将由农民承担。例如,根据能源与气候情报部门的数据,去年的干旱导致耕地农民损失了超过 8 亿英镑 (11亿美元) 的收入——几乎占谷物部门年产值的四分之一。
“我们目前的情况类似于 1788 年英国定居者抵达澳大利亚,看到他们的作物在酷热中枯萎时的情景,”伦敦大学学院的盖尔·泰勒(Gail Taylor)表示。当时小麦经过培育以抵御干燥条件;现在它已成为澳大利亚最有价值的作物。
英国农民也可以适应。他们可以种植对干旱更有韧性的品种。而且,他们可以像在加利福尼亚州那样使用灌溉技术,而不是依赖降雨——这种技术通常被认为成本过高,直到现在。
--- 24 英国 《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日
在多佛尔白崖的背景下,阳光洒在脸上,安迪·伯纳姆(Andy Burnham)在8月2日断言,针对将寻求庇护者运过英吉利海峡的走私者的斗争正取得“进展”。这位新任首相指出,有更多的警员被指派用于打击这一贸易。而且,移民人数已经下降。这与他的前任通常传达的信息截然不同。基尔·斯塔默爵士(Sir Keir Starmer)关于小船的言论充满了无力的愤怒,以及诸如“邪恶”和“痛苦”之类的词汇。较不忧郁的伯纳姆先生有理由感到乐观,因为海峡确实比去年安静了(见图表 1)。智库移民观察站(Migration Observatory)的彼得·沃尔什(Peter Walsh)表示:“你得回到2021年才能找到如此低的数字。”来自英国的资金使法国能够在海岸线上部署近1,000名警员。他们越来越多地拦截已经在水面上且载有部分移民的船只。在海峡的另一侧,内政部声称,英国官员在今年第一季度负责了1,138次对走私行动的“干扰”(通过逮捕、没收资产等手段)。这是至少三年来的最高季度统计数据。
更强有力的警务行动似乎迫使走私者远离加来(Calais)和敦刻尔克(Dunkirk)周围的海滩,那里有许多移民露营。协助遇险移民的法国组织 Utopia 56, 表示,最近有船只从远至诺曼底的伊波尔(Yport)出发,距离加来近200公里。走私者在警察阻止他们之前匆忙地将人装船。该组织的一名成员说:“出发过程变得越来越混乱。”然而,走私者陷入困境的最佳指标应该是过海价格的上涨。但目前几乎没有迹象表明这一点。法庭案件、卧底报道和警方报告都表明,寻求庇护者支付的过海费用约为 €1,500 ($1,700),与过去几年基本一致。
走私者总能适应环境,他们开始使用更大的船只。8月3日,一艘载有173人的船只出发,结果起火(移民获救)。沃尔什先生认为,另外 2 项变化可能威慑了寻求庇护者。去年9月,内政部暂停了“家庭团聚”程序,根据该程序,难民可以将配偶和孩子带到英国。这可能使该国失去了吸引力:非法移民如此危险,以至于男性经常单独旅行,假设他们以后可以接家人过来。挪威社会研究中心的扬-保罗·布雷克(Jan-Paul Brekke)及其他人的一项对比研究表明,严厉的家庭政策会抑制申请数量。
英国看待寻求庇护者的眼光也变得更加苛刻。几年前,英国最初接受的申请比例远高于欧盟国家。现在情况不再如此(见图表 2)。2023年,阿富汗人几乎总是能获得保护:接受人数与拒绝人数之比接近 90 比 1。如今,英国拒绝的阿富汗人多于接受的。许多人成功上诉,而且在实践中,很难将任何人驱逐回阿富汗。但关于英国倾向于拒绝的消息可能已经传开了。
在海外发生的改变更为重要。欧盟加强了边境管控,尤其是通过与北非的过境国家达成协议。根据边境管理局 Frontex 的数据,不规则过境人数从 2023 年的 38万,000 人下降到 2025. 的 17.8万,000 人。今年上半年的过境人数比 2025. 上半年低 37%。在法国北部,走私者能够接触到的寻求庇护者数量单纯地减少了。在这方面,正如在许多其他方面一样,英国是欧洲的一部分。■
初步获得庇护决定的比例,占总数的 %

来源:移民观察站(The Migration Observatory)
随着温布尔登精心修剪的草坪在去个月的网球锦标赛后进入休整期,伦敦正在举办一项较新球拍运动的赛事。帕德球(Padel)是网球和壁球的混合体,其支持者希望将其推向顶级联赛。由卡塔尔资助的职业巡回赛——Premier Padel 的伦敦站将于 8 月 4 日至 9 日举行,这是年度 26 场精英赛事之一,也是首次在英国举行。来自 1.5万 个国家的帕德球运动员(顶尖选手来自西班牙和阿根廷)正在竞争 €47.9万,000 ($55万,000) 奖金池的一部分。
“现在是在伦敦举办赛事的正确时机,”国际帕德球联合会(FIP)主席路易吉·卡拉罗(Luigi Carraro)表示。
帕德球是英国增长最快的运动之一。根据管理英国帕德球的英国草地网球协会(LTA)的数据,过去一年约有 100 万人至少玩过一次,而 2019. 这一数字为 15,000 人。玻璃围成的彩色帕德球场景象已日益常见:2020 英国有 87 个此类球场;现在则有超过 2,000. 个。
英国的繁荣是全球趋势的一部分:根据 FIP 的数据,帕德球在 150 个国家拥有 3500 万名玩家。该运动 1969, 起源于墨西哥,随后在西班牙和阿根廷兴起,之后传播到整个欧洲和南美洲。卡拉罗先生希望它能成为一项奥运运动,可能参加 2032 年在布里斯班举行的奥运会。
为何会如此繁荣?帕德球的下手发球、容错率高的球拍以及较小的场地使其易于学习。资金也是关键。大约三个帕德球场可以放入一个网球场的占地面积中,从而为俱乐部创造更多现金流。需求的激增意味着英国的球场是全球最繁忙且价格最昂贵的球场之一。室内球场的预订中位费用为 £44 ($59),不过伦敦部分球场的费用可达每小时 £100。
但一项玩起来有趣的运动并不一定看起来有趣。Premier Padel 的商业总监罗布·米切尔(Rob Mitchell)对此类担忧不以为然。伦敦决赛的 4,000 张左右门票很快被抢购一空。
这项运动仍有追赶空间。根据 2023, 最后一次统计,网球在英国有 5.6m 名玩家,而温布尔登今年的总奖金为 6400 万英镑。LTA 乐观地认为,帕德球的兴起是对网球的补充而非蚕食。但时尚在变:温布尔登本身最初也是作为一个击球球类(croquet)俱乐部开始的。■
《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日 英国 25

杰里米·Vine 节目(The Jeremy Vine show)
如果你想了解现代英国,请听 Radio 2
英国人关心什么?忘掉那些民调员以及他们关于移民和经济等话题的图表吧。想要知道真正占据英国人日常心头的是什么,不如去读读 BBC Radio 2 的《杰里米·维恩秀》(Jeremy Vine show)的节目描述,该节目在工作日中午 12 点到下午 2 点播出。最近的一期节目探讨了“伊朗与鸡类福利”;而去年 12 月的另一期则探讨了“色情制品与园艺中心”。阅读这些描述就像是在梳理英国人的潜意识。
正如 1979 年的一首流行歌曲所唱,视频本应杀死电台之星。但在英国,事实并非如此。更令人惊讶的是,播客或智能手机也没有将其杀死。总体而言,这个国家听广播的时间与 20 年前大致相当:每周约 1000 万小时。而英国最受欢迎的频道是 2, 一个提供音乐与谈话混合内容的 BBC 电台。其背后的原因不仅揭示了广播的现状,也揭示了现代英国的特质。
2 的情况很特殊:并非所有 BBC 电台都如此顺利。这家直到 1972 年还垄断英国无线电波的机构,近年来听众人数迅速下降。曾经极具影响力的 BBC 1, 将自己定义为“青年音乐电台”(这种说法在今天看来多少有些不年轻),自 2000 年以来,它失去了近一半的听众。相比之下, 2 却在蓬勃发展:它依然是英国最大的单一电台,占据了所有收听时长近 14% 的份额。
2 的吸引力部分在于其简单:它易于收听。而这正是其设计初衷。早期的 BBC 浸染着一种核心信念,即广播具有文明化的作用。“轻音乐节目”(The Light Programme, 2 的前身)的创建旨在充当一张广泛撒开的音频网,先用轻娱乐吸引听众的注意力,然后再将他们引导向 Home Service(现 4)和 Third Programme(现 3)等电台的“高”文化。这种轻快风格在一些知识分子中引起了某种轻视,促使同样是 BBC 播音员的乔治·奥威尔建议他的文学同行们多关注这个“备受鄙视的媒介”。
2 依然保持着一种乐观且不矫揉造作的风格。这体现在其典型的流行且本土的音乐选择上(披头士、杜兰杜兰和杜阿·利帕的混合体)。这也体现在其主持人身上——至少在播音时,他们大多温和且快活。但其毫不掩饰的中产趣味在《杰里米·维恩秀》中体现得最明显,这是英国最大的时事广播节目。该节目由 2 任职时间最长的主持人主持,概括了该电台成功的公式。
节目在专业与琐碎之间摆动。前一刻,一名国防专家可能在向听众讲解霍尔木兹海峡的战略价值;几分钟后,爱好者们可能在庆祝十瓶保龄球的复兴。“你要么擅长保龄球,要么擅长在床上表现,”一名从保龄球馆现场连线的嘉宾解释道。
这无疑是过时的。但可以说,这类节目之所以能延续,正是因为其过时,而非尽管过时。网络世界是一个原子化、算法化且孤独的世界。然而,听广播是一种集体体验。只要调频,你就会不断被提醒,有数百万人与你一同聆听——无论那是遛狗的阿曼达,还是来自威尔士矿区山谷的戴尔。
广播历史学家大卫·亨迪(David Hendy)表示,知道 200 英里外的人在听同一首歌,“而且可能确实在经历同样的事情”,这其中有一种共在感。 2 对他所谓的“人类生活的易错性”有着特殊的兴趣。他说, 2 最大的吸引力在于通过电话接听节目,给予听众大量的发言时间:“这是一个为我们而设的电台,而不是一个向我们广播的电台。”
这一点在Vine先生的节目中体现得最为明显。他的听众偶尔会没礼貌,有时甚至令人反感;一名拨入电话的听众甚至陷入了支持已故的埃诺克·鲍威尔(Enoch Powell)的独白中,后者是一位臭名昭著的移民问题危言之辈。但他们毫无疑问是英国人——而且对于英国人来说,出奇地坦率。同一个节目可以兼顾严肃(父母讲述为有特殊教育需求的孩子寻求支持的艰辛)与荒诞(你是否被乌鸦俯冲攻击过?)。最近的一集节目还包含了一段来自谢菲尔德一家超市的现场直播,这家超市因其冰箱发出的C#大调嗡嗡声而小有名气。
电话接听类广播节目几乎在定义上就是对公众情绪做出响应的。许多此类节目具有明显的政治色彩,且与民意调查一样,存在采样自选受众的风险。Vine先生节目的多样性使其能够更准确地反映听众的生活,并及早地揭示公众的焦虑。这使得他的节目,就像他那位任职时间更长的Radio 2前任吉米·杨(Jimmy Young)的节目一样,成为了一个被低估的洞察国民心理的窗口。早在上议院开始就大规模非法倾倒垃圾问题展开调查之前,这在Radio 2上就是一个令人担忧的话题。在《在线安全法》成为法律的数年前,家长们就打电话到Radio 2,担心孩子在网上看到的内容。杰里米·Vine(Jeremy Vine)节目紧扣国家脉搏——揭示了一个正为生活成本、崩溃的公共服务、动物以及汽车而焦虑的国家。那些希望采样公众情绪的人,在午餐时间调频到Radio 2是一个不错的选择。他们或许也能由此开始理解英国人对广播持久的热爱。■ --- 26 英国 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
尽管扎克·波兰斯基(Zack Polanski)频繁出入夜总会,深夜发布社交媒体动态,且对垂直视频有着典型的“Z世代”式偏好,但关于这位绿党党领袖的一个简单事实却被人们忽略了:他是一个中年男人。43岁的他,与大卫·卡梅伦就任首相时的年龄相同。到2029年下次大选时,波兰斯基先生的年龄将几乎与1990年就职时那位白发、灰西装的约翰·梅杰爵士相当。然而,在支持者眼中,波兰斯基先生几乎就像个孩子。他们对他那些令人尴尬的时刻轻描淡写,比如他曾提出通过催眠帮某人丰胸。一名《卫报》作者对此解释道:“他当时不知道自己会从事政治事业,他那时才刚满30岁。”才刚满30岁!另一篇人物介绍的标题写道:“扎克·波兰斯基仍在学习中”。波兰斯基先生是一个43岁但心态像19岁的人,是英国首位处于“永恒青春期”的政治领袖。
这种“永恒青春期”的政治学十分奇特。所有政治家都会对青少年时期的实验性观点感到尴尬,但如果这种实验期被推迟了会怎样?波兰斯基先生的政治反叛发生在2015年,当时他加入了自由民主党。那时他已经32岁了。今年早些时候,当绿党在伦敦击败工党掌控的议会时,这是一个胜利时刻,但随后爆出其党领袖没有投票,这一胜利被削弱了。波兰斯基先生称自己“时间不够”,因此没有登记投票,就像一个不知道选举日时会在宿舍还是在妈妈家的学生一样。
处于永恒青春期也有其优势。波兰斯基先生是首批成为智能手机成瘾者的主要政党领袖之一,社交媒体对他来说是天生的本能。但这也可能产生反作用。在他分享的一组照片中,包含一张断头台的图片,配文是“我们只是在为奈杰制定计划”(We're only making Plans For Nigel),引用了一首1979年的歌曲(比波兰斯基先生出生早三年)。他说道:“如果我是故意的,我会道歉的”,这种句式让各地青少年的父母感到非常熟悉。
在某些方面,波兰斯基先生是“发育停滞”的化身。在离开自民党后,他于2021年代表绿党当选伦敦议会议员:这是他的第一份正式工作。当时他已经38岁了。每位政治家都由其职业生涯的塑造期决定。基尔·斯塔默爵士的职业生涯始于律师,在任期间也保持着律师身份;而波兰斯基先生则在失业演员的状态中度过,其中一次甚至装扮成一只热狗。对于波兰斯基先生来说,所有的政治都是舞台,而他仅仅是一个演员。
波兰斯基先生并非唯一一个处于永久青春期的人。他是一个指标,预示着英国的发展方向,而非一个异类。成年不再是每个人的必然。成年的标志变得更难获得。入门级工作正在被摧毁,导致人们拥有像波兰斯基先生那样“拼凑式”的职业生涯。政府的失职使得驾驶考试往往无法预约。结果如何?更多年轻人没有驾照,就像波兰斯基先生一样。在20世纪60年代出生的人中,约有一半人在28岁前拥有住房。而在1990年代出生的人中,这一比例勉强达到四分之一。波兰斯基先生曾是一名穷演员,直到最近还住在窄船上,这难道令人惊讶吗?
就经验而言,波兰斯基先生确实像他看起来那样年轻。他全职从事政治仅五年。政治家需要积累1万,000小时的经验,但如今政治消耗他们的速度比以往任何时候都快。即使是像里希·苏纳克这样原本有能力的人,也因缺乏经验而受挫,在短短半年左右的时间里就从初级部长跃升为财政大臣。在政治领域,资历深厚终究是有帮助的。
或许在现今,某种不成熟的特质反而是必要的。那些自诩为“成年人”和“成熟者”的人在过去二十年的大部分时间里掌权,而在这期间,经济陷入停滞,导致一些人根本无法长大。如今的政治被牛津大学学者安东·耶格尔(Anton Jäger)称之为“超政治”(hyperpolitics)所主导。世界已经从一个“大众政治”时代转变而来,在那个时代,参与度很高,但通过大众机构进行过滤。而现在进入了“超政治”时代,参与度依然很高,但不再由诸如大型工会运动或组织严密的代表性政党来引导。可以将这种变化视为成年生活的枯燥与青春期那种令人兴奋的不负责任之间的区别;是随着时间缓慢建立的机构所具有的沉重感和沉没成本,与耶格尔先生所称的我们这个时代“低承诺、低成本,且往往低价值”的政治之间的对比。一切都像是一个青春期阶段,感受强烈但短暂,除了几段尴尬的回忆外几乎没有留下什么。如果“超政治”确实存在,那么波兰斯基先生(Mr Polanski)就是其产物。
尽管AI领域的人们担心会出现一个与未来的财富脱节的永久底层阶级,但在英国,一个更紧迫的担忧是“永久青少年”的崛起;对于这一代人来说,成年生活的基石——事业、住房、家庭——永远不会到来。这是一个永远无法长大的“彼得潘阶级”。既然如此,他们为什么不能有一个领导者?而谁比波兰斯基先生这样的一员更合适呢?
波兰斯基先生可能只是一个瞬间,而非一场运动的开始。他曾经历过快速崛起,而现在正处于下滑期;偶尔有民调显示绿党领先于工党,而现在他们勉强排在第四位。除了那些被迫陷入永恒青春期的人之外,波兰斯基先生的人气正在下降。因此,绿党内部的人开始感到绝望。如果这些错误并非源于“年轻”,而是天生不适合这份工作怎么办?到那时,担任绿党党魁并短暂地对英国建制派构成威胁,就变成了另一份临时工作,只不过是将热狗装换成了绿色胸花。这不过是充满此类经历的职业生涯中短暂的青少年篇章。不过,他的整个人生还在前方。他才43岁!■
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 27
欧盟的移民困局
塞乌塔与马德里 欧洲对塞乌塔短期移民激增的恐慌将引发更多危机
这就像是一场涌向海滩随后又退去的潮汐,留下了满地残骸。7月30日,数以万计的潜在移民开始涌入塞乌塔(西班牙在北非海岸的一个小型飞地),但绝大多数人在24小时内便返回了摩洛哥,因为他们发现那里没有食物,也没有进入欧洲的希望。丢弃的鞋子和衬衫依然散落在海湾中。目前仍有几千名移民留在那里,主要是撒哈拉以南非洲人及未成年人,当地也部署了大量警力。
然而,尽管眼前的危机已经结束,但它在欧盟内部引发的冲突将留下伤痕。这次激增使塞乌塔8.4万,000的人口几乎翻了一番,使这座小镇一度陷入瘫痪。在从摩洛哥进入的主要过境点,至少有141名移民在试图绕过防波堤游泳时淹死。来自欧洲的极右翼煽动者(其中几人涌向该飞地)通过发布警告“种族替代”的视频激化了局势。埃隆·马斯克和美国副总统J.D.万斯也加入了这场争论。
然而,就在恐慌蔓延之时,危机却在消退。8月4日,西班牙内政部长表示,进入塞乌塔的7.2万,000人中,已有7万,000人返回摩洛哥。约1,100名无人陪伴的未成年人将被转移到西班牙本土。
这次激增背后的因素并非全部清晰。西班牙最高法院最近的一项裁决起到了作用,该裁决将通过海路抵达的移民排除在允许边境驱逐的规则之外。仍留在飞地内的移民证实,这一消息在社交媒体上广泛传播。来自苏丹、旅途历时20天的阿西夫(Asif)声称,“西班牙政府比欧洲其他国家更容易移民”。
有些人认为这其中有摩洛哥政府的操作。有大量证据表明,边境守卫停止了拦截移民,甚至在他们途中提供帮助——随后又在遣返工作中予以配合。
这些惊人的画面引发了整个欧洲的恐慌。在丹麦和芬兰的支持下,意大利表示将暂停在免签证的申根区与西班牙合作(最终,意大利仅在港口和机场实施了小规模的抽查)。瑞典首相面临下个月棘手的连任竞选,他表示“2015年的情况绝不能再次发生”,这是指当年令各国政府至今心有余悸的欧洲大规模移民潮。保守派政治家表示,西班牙最近对非法移民(主要是拉丁美洲人)实施的特赦——这些人有一天可能能够移居欧盟其他地区——可能起到了吸引作用。此外,欧洲国家对西班牙拒绝达成北约支出目标的不满,也使其处境更加不利。
但西班牙社会党总理佩德罗·桑切斯(Pedro Sánchez)予以反击,谴责这种缺乏团结的行为是“由偏见、假新闻、无知或政治利益驱动的”。他指出,从塞乌塔前往本土需要检查证件,因此移民无法直接进入欧洲。
→ 本节其他内容 28 冰岛的欧盟投票 29 欧盟后疫情基金化为泡影 30 铁路竞争 —— 夏理曼专栏休假
28 欧洲 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
到8月4日欧盟内政部长举行紧急视频会议时,一切都已获得原谅。欧盟移民专员马格努斯·布伦纳(Magnus Brunner)表示,欧盟“全力支持西班牙”。关于将其驱逐出申根区的讨论已不复存在。相反,部长们退回到了熟悉的谈话要点:加强欧盟边境;打击走私网络;加快遣返申请失败的寻求庇护者(包括遣返回第三国)。
进入欧盟的非正规移民人数仅为三年前的一小部分(见图表),且仍在下降。欧洲各国政府将这一下降归功于自身的政策;而其他人则认为外部发展(如叙利亚巴沙尔·阿萨德的倒台)起到了决定性作用。无论如何,这种下降似乎并未给政治家们提供喘息的空间。“我们并没有真正从那个阶段吸取教训,”牛津大学社会人类学教授鲁本·安德森(Ruben Andersson)表示。令人不安的是,欧洲各国政府如此迅速地陷入争吵,向其邻国传递了一个信号:没有什么比年轻人跨越边境涌入的画面更能分化欧盟了。在过去十年中,欧洲与各国政府达成了一系列协议以将移民拒之门外:始于 2016 年的土耳其,随后扩展到北非及其他地区。这种外包降低了压力。但安德森先生认为,这也“激励了第三国挑起危机——然后提出解决这些危机”。欧洲在应对此类移民勒索方面有着长期经验。2008 年,时任利比亚独裁者穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲从意大利获得了数十亿资金,以阻止非洲移民进入;两年后,他在罗马的一次演讲中警告称,“明天欧洲可能不再是欧洲人的,甚至可能变成黑人的”。土耳其总统雷杰普·塔伊普·埃尔多安已从欧盟榨取数十亿资金,以将叙利亚难民留在其国内。2021 年,摩洛哥允许约 8,000 人涉水进入塞乌塔,以报复其允许波利萨里奥(Polisario,一个西撒哈拉反叛组织,该领土被


摩洛哥),前往西班牙接受医疗治疗。西班牙随后调整了其在西撒哈拉的问题上的政策,以迎合摩洛哥的喜好。最厚颜无耻的是,自 2021 年以来,白俄罗斯通过飞机运入中东移民,并将他们送往波兰及邻国。欧盟将此视为一种混合战争行为,并在 2021 年加强了对弗拉基米尔·普京盟友白俄罗斯的制裁。而欧盟移民政策的外部监管者情况则有所不同。尽管没有明确证据表明摩洛哥策划了移民的移动,但其安全官员显然允许他们大量通过。然而,欧洲各国政府却赞扬摩洛哥的合作,而将厌恶之情留给了社交媒体上无名的不法分子和走私团伙。欧盟需要摩洛哥的帮助来阻止移民进入,包括阻止他们进入一个更为重要的抵达港口——加那利群岛。事实上,塞乌塔作为一个位于另一个大陆上的小型飞地,且在事实上被排除在申根区之外,无法给欧洲提供太多教训。2015 年,德国或瑞典的政治家们看到数十万叙利亚及其他移民抵达希腊,意识到这很快将成为他们自己的问题。这促使了一系列措施的出台,包括持久的申根内部边境检查,以及一项旨在加快从欧盟遣返的新庇护协议。但这些都与塞乌塔无关,因为没有移民从那里进入申根区,且似乎很少有人提出庇护申请。“这主要不是一场移民危机,”咨询公司 Instrategies 的移民专家 Gemma Pinyol-Jiménez 表示,“这是一次地缘政治事件。”然而,正如那些恐慌反应所表明的,2015-16 年的影响深远。在那场危机期间,欧洲各国政府之间的争论几乎使欧盟分崩离析。通过让一个临时且规模小得多的紧急情况产生类似的影响(无论多么短暂),欧洲实际上是在邀请其邻国再次对其进行操纵。加强边境本应是为了防止这种情况发生。■
凯夫拉维克与雷克雅未克
冰岛位于北美洲和欧亚大陆的地质边界上,距离纽约和雅典等距。它通过长期的国防安排与美国绑定,并在凯夫拉维克设有北约基地。它在历史上(1944年脱离丹麦独立)和商业上(属于欧洲经济区)与欧洲相连。如今,在跨大西洋紧张局势以及对唐纳德·特朗普在北极意图的担忧之中,该国即将就是否向欧盟更进一步进行投票。8月29日,这个拥有40万,000人口的岛国将举行全民公投,决定是否重启与欧盟的入盟谈判。冰岛在近二十年前开始了这些谈判,但在2013年选出亲欧怀疑论政府后终止了谈判。投票支持并不意味着该国必须加入欧盟;在谈判结束时将进行另一次投票。然而,亲欧阵营感到担忧。6月的两次民调和7月的一次民调显示,支持重启谈判的比例仅为52-53%。这一领先优势过于微小,令人不安,且很容易被逆转。
这种微弱的亲欧热情似乎与当今的地缘政治背道而驰。冰岛没有自己的武装部队。它依赖北约国家轮流在凯夫拉维克部署空军。由于仅拥有海岸警卫队船只,冰岛依赖美国和欧洲的飞机来监测附近日益增加的俄罗斯潜艇活动 ▶

欧美裂痕扩大 --- 《经济学人》2026年8月8日 欧洲 29;6月,一艘俄罗斯间谍船在冰岛海域外被探测到。政府担心混合战争以及针对基础设施的袭击。如今,此类安排似乎不再那么稳固。7月一个寒冷的日子里,凯夫拉维克的北约基地异常安静。一名冰岛官员表示,美国飞机“在地中海那边有点忙”。特朗普威胁要吞并距离冰岛仅300公里的格陵兰岛,这让人感到威胁近在咫尺。
欧盟主要不是一个安全俱乐部,尽管它确实拥有共同防御条款。但对于一个小国来说,该联盟在面对领土或贸易霸凌时能提供集体支持。在特朗普威胁格陵兰岛(一个丹麦自治领土)之后,几个欧盟国家应丹麦要求派遣了象征性的部队分遣队。法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙飞往格陵兰岛以示支持。冰岛亲欧的外交部长索加杜尔·卡特琳·古纳斯多蒂尔(Thorgardur Katrin Gunnarsdottir)表示:“当贸易和关税被武器化时,我们作为一个小国,至少应该考虑在哪里保障我们的利益……对我们来说,看到欧盟如何坚定地介入是很重要的。”
然而,最近几周,反欧盟活动人士加强了努力。他们是一个由极左和极右民族主义者以及保守派组成的杂色联盟,并得到了该国强大的渔业游说团体和媒体利益集团的支持。在一个极度独立的国家,他们利用人们长期以来对保护渔场和农业以及服从欧盟规则的担忧。但辩论已经变得激烈。虚假主张层出不穷。其中一种主张认为这次公投就是决定是否加入欧盟;另一种则认为冰岛人将不得不加入一支欧洲军队。
对于欧盟来说,在西北边缘迎来一个新成员的前景是受欢迎的。与申请加入联盟的南部和东部国家不同,冰岛的人均收入远高于欧盟平均水平,且大部分入盟准备工作已经完成。欧盟委员会表示,在渔业权方面有“灵活处理的空间”。然而,欧洲领导人行事谨慎,以避免任何干预的迹象。法国外交部长让-诺埃尔·巴罗(Jean-Noël Barrot)在7月20日访问雷克雅未克(部分目的是讨论安全合作)时谨慎地宣布,“冰岛人民重启谈判没有什么损失”。他强调,关于是否加入的选择将在之后做出。
即便如此,投票反对也将是一个象征性的打击。“除了美国的安全保护,我们别无选择,”冰岛资深广播员博吉·阿古斯特松(Bogi Agustsson)表示。“国内许多人仍处于否认状态,尚未将欧洲视为一种安全替代方案。” ■ 意大利、西班牙与欧盟
佛罗伦萨与马德里
自1966年的大洪水以来,佛罗伦萨从未经历过如此大的混乱。一条有轨电车的延伸线将市中心周边的道路变成了建筑工地。该项目耗资5亿欧元 (5.76亿美元),是这座城市由欧盟后疫情恢复计划——“下一代欧盟”(NextGenerationEU)资助的最大项目。该计划还为托斯卡纳首府的其他55个项目提供资金,涵盖从托儿所到自行车道的各项设施。市长萨拉·富纳罗(Sara Funaro)称其为“佛罗伦萨历史上的一个重大时刻”。
在地中海的另一端,马德里的批发市场在凌晨5点便热闹非凡。这里拥有全球最大的鱼类市场之一。凭借“下一代欧盟”基金提供的€40万,000拨款,鱼贩协会建立了一套数字化支付和订购系统,取代了手写订单和在银行前排长队的局面。“这为我们节省了大量时间,”克里斯蒂安·科博(Christian Cobo)在准备销售巨大的金枪鱼尸体时说道。
“下一代欧盟”的核心是其在2020, 疫情期间创建的“恢复与韧性基金”(RRF),该基金已批准了€577bn的拨款和贷款。欧盟从未如此快速地支出如此巨额的资金。最重要的是,这笔资金是通过共同债券筹集的;欧盟强化论的支持者将其称为“汉密尔顿时刻”,以此类比美国首任财政部长通过承担各州债务来增强联邦政府权力的决定。该计划旨在加速从疫情衰退中恢复,特别是针对较贫穷的南部地区,并使欧洲大陆更加绿色和数字化。资金的拨付本应与旨在提高经济效率的改革挂钩。最后一批款项预计将于2026.年底前支付。
它奏效了吗?答案似乎是:在某种程度上。最大的接收国是意大利(1940亿欧元)和西班牙(1030亿欧元),两者合计占资金总额的52%。乍一看,西班牙的表现比意大利好得多(见次页图表)。在RRF启动时,意大利政府预计其经济增长率将从此前约1%的年均水平飙升至今年的3.6%。然而事实是,自2023. 以来,年度GDP增长一直低于1%。相比之下,西班牙自2021. 以来的每一年都实现了至少2.5%的强劲增长。
这种表现的分歧部分可以用两国使用RRF的方式来解释。米兰博科尼大学的蒂托·博埃里(Tito Boeri)和罗伯托·佩罗蒂(Roberto Perotti)在一篇论文中指出,意大利面临着在计划结束时“比之前债务更多,且未能解决结构性弱点”的风险。这两位经济学家得出结论,意大利的许多方案“琐碎或不可行”。与希腊针对该基金的战略计划不同,意大利的计划缺乏连贯性。
西班牙的经济表现很大程度上与RRF无关。“从疫情衰退中恢复的速度比所有人预想的都要快,”金融公司Arcano Partners的伊格纳西奥·德·拉托雷(Ignacio de la Torre)表示。--- 30 Europe The Economist August 8th 2026 西班牙确实批准了一些有用的改革。它禁止雇主通过让工人无限期持有临时合同来虐待员工,并减少了阻碍小企业和初创公司的监管障碍。尽管如此,根据欧盟统计局(Eurostat)的数据,去年的生产率增长依然低迷,仅为0.7%。根据西班牙银行的数据,大规模移民增加了劳动力,贡献了约一半的整体增长和三分之二的新增就业。(而意大利则限制了移民。)旅游业的增长和其他服务的出口也起到了推动作用。经济部长卡洛斯·库埃尔波(Carlos Cuerpo)认为,RRF为GDP.贡献了三个百分点。但马德里的智库Funcas则认为,2021年至2025年间经济总增长中,最多只有14%是由于RRF资金带来的。
尽管如此,这些资金可能会支持长期增长。塞维利亚大学的曼努埃尔·希达尔戈(Manuel Hidalgo)表示:“事情正在发生,但我们只能在几年后才能知道其影响。”西班牙已将部分资金用于投资大型资本项目,包括电动汽车和电池计划。在安达卢西亚,西班牙能源公司 Moeve 正在建设一座 10亿欧元 绿氢工厂——这将是南欧最大的工厂——其中 3亿欧元 来自 RRF。Moeve 的负责人马滕·韦特斯拉尔(Maarten Wetselaar)表示,他预计用于制造氢气的电解槽在五年后的价格将降低 30%。他说:“国家资金弥补了先行者的劣势。”
柏林
非欧洲人往往依赖刻板印象,因此在发现如今意大利的火车顶尖而德国的火车却陷入混乱时,经常感到困惑。7月,德国总理弗里德里希·梅尔茨(Friedrich Merz)解雇了交通部长帕特里克·施尼德(Patrick Schnieder),原因是后者无法修复国有的铁路运营商德国铁路(DB),后者的麻烦涵盖了从网络破旧到官僚机构臃肿的方方面面。他的继任者斯特芬·比尔格(Steffen Bilger)接手了一项艰巨的任务。DB以抵制变革而闻名,且其工会能够使国家陷入瘫痪,正如他们在2024年发起的一次为期六天的罢工那样。幸运的是,比尔格先生可能会得到高效的意大利人的帮助。7月初,意大利高速铁路运营商 Italo 通过 DB 的一个分支机构获得了进入德国铁路网的权限。到2028年,它计划在慕尼黑-科隆-多特蒙德以及慕尼黑-柏林-汉堡这两条线路上挑战 DB 的主导地位。7月20日,它与工程巨头西门子签署了一项价值30亿欧元 (35亿美元) 的协议,购买26列 Velaro 高速列车,并拥有再购买14列的期权。柏林应用科学大学的克里斯蒂安·伯特格(Christian Böttger)表示:“Italo 的进入对德国来说是一个机遇。”
意大利国有的铁路运营商 Trenitalia 曾激烈抵制 Italo 的入侵。但当这家新公司在2012年开始运营时,它对该国的高速铁路市场产生了巨大的益处。五年之内,票价平均下降了40%,乘客人数增加了一倍多。该公司联合创始人卢卡·迪·蒙特泽莫洛(Luca di Montezemolo)表示,德国现在的样子就像 Italo 出现之前的意大利。在线火车票平台 Trainline 的詹姆斯·汉拉蒂(James Hanratty)认为,对于那些国有运营商依然占据统治地位的欧洲国家来说,竞争才是前进之路。Trenitalia 在2021年以 Frecciarossa 服务进入法国,开通了巴黎到里昂的高速服务。到2025年12月,其工作日的往返班次已从9次增加到14次。西班牙国有运营商 Renfe 在2023年进入法国,开通了马赛-马德里和里昂-巴塞罗那服务。与2022年相比,该年马赛-马德里线路的平均价格下降了67%,里昂-巴塞罗那线路下降了17%。
在西班牙,高速铁路自由化的效果更好。2020年,Renfe 推出了低成本品牌 Avlo。2021年,法国国有运营商 SNCF 的低成本服务 Ouigo 进入市场,一年后,由 Trenitalia 控股的 Iryo 紧随其后。在2019年至2024年期间,马德里-巴利亚多利德线路的价格下降了35%,马德里-穆尔西亚线路下降了33%,巴塞罗那-塞维利亚之间下降了29%。三大高速铁路走廊(马德里-巴塞罗那、马德里-瓦伦西亚 / 阿利坎特,以及马德里-塞维利亚 / 马拉加)的班次从每天78次增加到115次。国家竞争管理局估计,2019年至2024年铁路服务的改善吸引了4.8m原本会选择公路或航空出行的乘客。航空公司 Vueling 停止了巴塞罗那到马德里的飞行。
伯特格先生表示,在瑞典和捷克共和国,竞争触发了创新。捷克共和国拥有欧洲最开放的市场之一。国有现任运营商 Czeske Drahy 仍拥有最大的市场份额,但它面临着来自两家捷克私营运营商 RegioJet 和 Leo Express 的持续压力。6月25日,Leo Express 开通了从法兰克福经布拉格前往波兰边境城市普热梅希尔(Przemyśl)的服务。这段18小时单程旅程的票价仅从€10 ($11.50) 起。这条线路表明,私营运营商可以解决欧洲铁路的一个大问题:在一个分裂的大陆上,跨越多个国境的线路通常缺乏国有铁路的服务。并非所有国家都需要竞争来追求卓越。瑞士的国有运营商提供了欧洲一些最好的服务。但瑞士国土小且人口密集,且数十年来一直对其铁路网络进行着慷慨且持续的投资。
比尔格先生告诉德国人不要期待任何奇迹。但他可能会发现,来自意大利人的竞争在帮助德铁(DB)改革方面会产生奇效。而且,这家国有巨头和 Italo 可能很快会面临来自意大利的更多竞争。意大利铁路公司(Trenitalia)也在探索进入德国高铁市场的可能性。■

来源:IMF --- # 伦敦制造 / 1 / 2 / --- / 3 / 4 5 / 6 7 / # 横向 3. 解决了 50 年的蛋白质问题 (9) 5. 要求输入四位数字 (3) 6. 数百万民众每天进入的维多利亚时代战壕 (4) 7. 全球安全与军事冲突的世界领先权威机构 (4) # 纵向 1. 以严格的不具名原则而闻名的研究所 (7) 2. 秘密在邮局中研发的破译巨头 (8) 4. 由一家茶叶店公司制造的世界首台商业计算机 (3) 5. AI CRM (5) attio attio.com / london --- ECONOMIST ENTERPRISE # 欧洲能源电网智能峰会 欧洲年度可持续发展周第六届活动的一部分 2026年10月7日 • 阿姆斯特丹 规模超过:300 位参会者 / 70 位演讲者 / 25 场会议 ## 电网是欧洲的下一个大考 能源转型的成败取决于电网。加入能源电网智能峰会欧洲站,与政策制定者、公用事业公司、投资者和技术领袖一起探索更智能的基础设施、AI 赋能的系统、灵活的需求以及具有韧性的网络。探索推动更清洁、更安全能源未来的创意、合作伙伴关系和投资。使用代码 ECON20 可节省 20% econenterprise.co / energygrid26 Pedro Azagra Iberdrola 首席执行官 Bernard Gustin Elia Group 首席执行官 Agnieszka Okońska Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne 副总裁 Rebecca Sedler National Grid Ventures 董事总经理 Maarten Abbenhuis TenneT 执行董事会成员兼首席运营官 Carlo Bardini 意大利环境与能源安全部国际与欧洲事务负责人 银级赞助商 ARUP CTC GLOBAL neara SPLIGHT 展商 ATTKRAFT --- 经济学人 2026年8月8日 2026 33 # 美国

人工智能与就业
美国能否在人工智能将工人抛在身后之前,教会他们新技能?
金伯利·布雷迪(KIMBERLY BRADY)已经走投无路了。这位 53 岁的加利福尼亚州居民拥有心理学学位,但被困在好市多(Costco)的一份低薪工作中,负责销售电子产品和珠宝。在向客户服务和销售岗位——这些日益被 AI 重塑的领域——投递了约 620 份申请均告失败后,她决定重新培训以进入好市多的眼镜部门。由于没有正式的培训项目,她花了六个月时间通过教科书和 YouTube 自学验光技术,通过了两项国家委员会考试,并支付了数千美元购买了两项执照。但这还不够。她说,由于缺乏实践经验,“他们仍然不雇佣我”。
布雷迪女士的经历指向了一个更广泛的问题。在美国,转换职业很难;而 AI 可能很快会让这种情况变得更加普遍。据高盛(Goldman Sachs)银行称,未来十年约有 1000 万个工作岗位可能会被取代。入门级白领工作和常规办公工作尤其容易受到影响,使新员工和在职员工都面临风险。大规模的失业尚未出现,但恐惧已经在塑造美国政治:近五分之一的工人预计 AI 将在五年内消除他们的工作。
从电力到计算机,早期的技术在取代工人的同时,也创造了新型工作。现在,包括埃隆·马斯克在内的一些技术专家想象这样一个未来:随着有偿工作的减少,全民高收入将为人们提供缓冲。很少有政治家接受这种解决方案,但制定另一种补救措施则更难。一个严肃的应对方案将帮助年轻人进入职场,帮助现有工人随着工作的变化而适应,并帮助失业工人转向新职业。美国能在动荡到来之前建立这样一个系统吗?
它最近的记录并不令人鼓舞。在 2000 年至 2011 年间,美国失去了近 600 万个工厂岗位——其中约 100 万个是由于中国进口竞争造成的。联邦政府的主要应对措施是“贸易调整援助”(TAA),该计划支付重新培训费用并延长失业救济金,但仅限于那些能够证明贸易导致其失业的工人。接受培训的人比没有接受培训的同类工人多工作了大约三个月,并且在接下来的十年中,收入增加了约 $5万,000。但该计划的范围有限。在 21 世纪初,每年约有 16万,000 名工人获得 TAA 认证,而制造业每年损失约 50万,000 个岗位。在获得认证的人员中,每年只有约 4万,000 人进入培训,这反映出申请程序繁琐且等待时间长。其结果是局部经济的崩溃,这在一定程度上助推了美国的民粹主义转向。
→ 本节其他内容 34 州所得税 35 参议院 36 独立人士能获胜吗? 37 极左翼的崛起
--- 莱克辛顿专栏休假 ---
34 美国 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
AI 冲击将有所不同,它将影响分布在全国各地的白领工作。失业可能通过减少招聘和多轮裁员而非工厂关闭来实现。尽管如此,负担可能会沉重地落在特定群体身上。年轻工人可能会发现入门级机会在消失,而没有学位的女性——在行政和后勤岗位中占比过高——则面临高风险。
目前,该国的工人教育和培训体系假设工人仅在职业生涯开始时培训一次,而失业只是在返回类似工作之前的短暂中断。大约四成美国高中毕业生进入四年制大学。社区学院提供了大部分短期培训,但获得的资金要少得多——其劳动力计划获得的公共资金约为 2500万美元,每年服务约 800 万人。
联邦政府对失业工人的支持规模更小,尤其是自2022.年贸易调整援助(TAA)停止接收新申请者以来。2023年,针对失业者的主要联邦培训计划在约3.9万,000人身上花费了1.7亿美元。一份数额有限的代金券可用于支付经批准的课程费用。“我们的整个系统是基于出勤率而非结果来提供资金的,”乔·拜登的商务部长、前罗德岛州州长吉娜·雷蒙多(Gina Raimondo)表示。结果就是碎片化且资金不足。
一个更好的模式应该是怎样的?首先从年轻工人入手。如果AI侵蚀了入门级的白领工作,美国将需要更多无需通过四年制学位的就业途径。一种解决方案是行业计划,该计划将雇主和培训提供者聚集在一起,围绕实际空缺岗位设计课程。在医疗保健、IT支持和制造业进行的四项随机试验发现,参与者的收入实现了11-40%的持久增长。学徒制提供了另一种途径,将有偿工作与结构化培训相结合。这种方式已变得更加流行,但只有约80万,000名美国人注册成为学徒,仅为德国人数的一半左右,而美国人口约为德国的四分之一。与德国不同,美国的学徒制仍集中在建筑业和熟练技工领域。
其他倡议也已启动。由雷蒙多女士和前共和党印第安纳州州长埃里克·霍尔科姆(Eric Holcomb)共同创立的非营利组织RAISE US,正与各州、培训提供者和雇主合作——其捐赠者包括两家AI巨头Anthropic和OpenAI,以及通用汽车和美国银行。到目前为止,该组织已在四个州宣布开展试点项目。在马里兰州,它在州政府的一项计划基础上进行了扩展,该计划支付年轻工人一年在非营利组织工作的费用,并增加了辅导、培训以及进入医疗保健和教育领域长期工作的路径。
由于AI改变了在职人员已从事的工作,他们需要不同类型的援助。大型白领雇主帮助员工学习如何使用AI是很常见的。但一些工人需要的不是当前岗位的升级版,而是一份全新的工作。软件公司Salesforce提供了一个关于这可能涉及什么的缩影:它将员工的技能与可能的内部岗位进行匹配并推荐培训;报销制度可帮助支付正式资格认证的费用。Salesforce自身正被AI重塑,因此它在测试帮助员工进化的方法,这十分恰当。但此类内部平台依然罕见。
主要问题在于,对于许多处于高风险岗位的人来说,目前还没有人知道他们应该接受什么样的培训。理想情况下,新岗位应建立在现有技能之上,并保留一定的职业认同感。“人们的自尊心是有代价的,”北卡罗来纳州商务部长李·利利(Lee Lilley)表示。“让一个在白领环境下工作了20年的人去问‘你想成为一名焊工吗?’是不现实的。”
这种不确定性正是培训系统需要更加灵活的原因,雇主应密切参与,使课程能够适应不断变化的需求。但这种参与不会自动发生。在Costco,布雷迪女士在被允许进行交叉培训后,最终转到了眼镜部门。然而,这个机会是通过一次临时性的通融实现的,而非一种大规模重新培训工人的模式。
随着技术变革迫使工人更频繁地更换工作,许多人可能需要多次重新培训。然而,那些失去工作的人在此时得到的帮助很少。唐纳德·特朗普的《一个伟大美丽法案》(One Big Beautiful Bill Act)将联邦佩尔助学金(Pell grants)扩展到了时长在8至15周之间的经批准的职业计划中。但美国国会预算办公室预计,到2034,年,这一变化每年仅能增加10万,000名受助者,且每人平均助学金仅为$2,200.
在20世纪40年代,由于担心第二次世界大战后会出现大规模失业,商业领袖们成立了经济发展委员会,以规划向和平时期的过渡。雷蒙多女士希望企业能支持一个现代版的类似机构。“如果我们不能正确处理这个问题,我们就无法在AI领域领先世界,”她说,“将会出现监管反弹,这对公司是不利的。”康涅狄格州州长内德·拉蒙特(Ned Lamont)则欢迎与科技公司开展更多合作。“坦率地说,我需要Anthropic和AI公司的帮助来激发我们的想象力,”他说。Anthropic和OpenAI基金会分别承诺投入2亿美元和2.5亿美元,用于研究以及像RAISE US这样的项目,以帮助工人及其经济体应对AI带来的颠覆。相比之下,OpenAI计划在2030年之前在计算能力上投入该金额3,000倍的资金。■
当格伦·雅各布斯(Glenn Jacobs)——在擂台上被称为“凯恩”(Kane)——还在职业摔角圈活动时,他几乎在每个州都工作过。结果就是他的纳税申报单“有一英尺高”。现在,作为田纳西州诺克斯县的共和党市长,雅各布斯先生很高兴看到他的州在2021年取消了所得税,并成为了其他州的典范。
8月4日,密苏里州就一项逐步取消所得税的宪法修正案进行了投票。该修正案未能通过,但它出现在选票上表明了一个更广泛的趋势:各州的税收制度正在分化。
人们对民主党提高富人税的努力关注颇多。例如,华盛顿州今年对百万富翁征收了所得税,而加利福尼亚州的人们将在11月就财富税进行投票。但共和党领导的州则在向另一个方向移动。在过去五年中,26个州(大多数由共和党领导)降低了个人所得税率。自2017年以来,密苏里州的最高边际税率下降了20%以上。
这种日益扩大的差距是相对较新的现象。民主党和共和党在税收上一直存在分歧,但从历史上看,各州试图将税率维持在一个既能增加收入又不会抑制经济活动的范围内。“过去可以谈论一个广泛的中值,”智库税务基金会(Tax Foundation)的贾里德·沃尔扎克(Jared Walczak)表示,当时的税率在6%左右波动。“现在,你要么处于低税率状态,低于4%,要么处于税率不断提高的州,进入两位数,”沃尔扎克先生解释道。
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--- 《经济学人》2026年8月8日 美国 35 # 巨大的分歧 州最高边际所得税率*,2026年1月,%

*不包括地方所得税。华盛顿州的税率仅适用于某些资本利得收入。不包括加利福尼亚州、马萨诸塞州、华盛顿州、明尼苏达州和马里兰州的部分工资税或投资收益附加税。来源:税务基金会
所得税引起了特别关注。民主党更倾向于累进所得税,而非统一的消费税。后者具有累退性,给低收入人群带来了不成比例的负担,因为他们消费的收入比例更高。共和党则持有不同观点。发起取消所得税修正案的密苏里州众议员比肖普·戴维森(Bishop Davidson)认为,所得税“严重侵犯了人们的隐私”。
1月,唐纳德·特朗普的经济顾问委员会发布了一份报告,鼓励各州废除所得税,并用更广泛、更高额的销售税来替代。报告认为,对消费而非生产征税在经济上更有效率。
但一种在某个州行之有效的税收模式在另一个州可能并不适用。佛罗里达州没有所得税,但可以从游客那里收取销售税。德克萨斯州同样没有所得税,但通过石油和天然气费用填补国库。在密苏里州,所得税废除主义者认为田纳西州是一个更现实的模式。戴维森先生还研究了南卡罗来纳州(该州立法者在3月投票决定降低所得税),以及摇摆州北卡罗来纳州(该州将在11月就一项降低并封顶其统一税率的选票措施进行投票)。
反对者对此类比较不屑一顾。密苏里州众议院的最高民主党人艾希莉·奥恩(Ashley Aune)表示,这是“风马牛不相及”,尤其是因为田纳西州在废除所得税之前的几十年里,对所得税的依赖程度极低。相比之下,密苏里州去年的收入近三分之二依赖于所得税。主张反对废除所得税的斯科特·查顿(Scott Charton)指出,密苏里州人在2016年拒绝了对服务业征收新税。取消一种税收的问题在于,你可能不得不提高另一种税。在密苏里州,这一论点似乎占据了上风。■
华盛顿特区
这是妥协还是骗局?8月2日,唐纳德·特朗普提名的司法部长人选托德·布兰奇(Todd Blanche)提交了一份书面保证,确认美国司法部(DOJ)将取消总统那项$1.8bn的“反武器化”基金。这是德克萨斯州的共和党参议员约翰·科宁(John Cornyn)和北卡罗来纳州的汤姆·蒂利斯(Thom Tillis)支持其任命所设定的条件。两天后,参议院司法委员会如期推进了布兰奇先生的提名。民主党人批评此举毫无意义,因为特朗普先生未来仍可重启这笔秘密资金。但对于一些共和党人来说,这证明参议院仍然能够制约总统最糟糕的本能。
国会目前在很大程度上仍对特朗普先生顺从。但一小部分共和党参议员正变得日益反抗。其中一些人,如蒂利斯先生和科宁先生,即将离任,因此没什么可失去的,因而挑起的争端更多。另一位抵制特朗普先生的缅因州参议员苏珊·柯林斯(Susan Collins)将在11月面对一名民主党挑战者。主持这一切的是参议院多数党领袖约翰·图恩(John Thune,见图),他拥有无需在2028年之前面对重新选举的幸运,却也背负着在特朗普先生入主白宫的情况下领导该院的诅咒。
当参议员们在8月7日开始为期五周的休会时,他们几乎没有为总统赢得任何胜利。民主党人“简直不敢相信他们在参议院领导层方面如此幸运”。特朗普先生上个月在Truth Social上发泄道:“记住,愚蠢总是带来失败与死亡!”
图恩先生将他今夏不愿推进特朗普先生议程的行为,定义为程序问题而非政策问题。他告诉总统,《拯救美国法案》(SAVE America Act)这一选民身份验证法案缺乏克服阻挠议事(filibuster)所需的60票。特朗普先生的解决方案——让共和党废除阻挠议事——对于制度主义者图恩先生来说根本行不通。他在7月表示:“共和党不会废除立法阻挠议事。这就是事实,而事实不会改变。”
图恩先生也不愿使用被称为“预算协调”(reconciliation)的预算工具作为替代方案。如果使用预算协调,参议院仅需简单多数即可通过《拯救法案》的部分内容,但该程序主要用于支出措施。这一程序性原因与政治原因相匹配:预算协调将迫使那些处于弱势的立法者在期中选举前不久进行具有争议的投票。一名共和党工作人员解释说,参议院共和党人“无意为了特朗普而让自己陷入风险”。
在私下里,许多参议员表示他们欣赏图恩先生充当“减震器”的作用。尽管总统质疑他的能力,但他仍维持着党团内大部分成员的支持。两名特朗普忠实追随者——犹他州的迈克·李(Mike Lee)和佛罗里达州的里克·斯科特(Rick Scott)——曾试图通过维持参议院开会以通过《拯救法案》来对抗图恩先生,但失败了。
然而,该党团的组成即将发生变化。乔治城大学的马修·格拉斯曼(Matthew Glassman)预测:“从意识形态上看,参议院将变得更加‘特朗普化’。”蒂利斯先生和科宁先生所占据的席位明年将由民主党人或MAGA新面孔持有。另外两名即将离开参议院的共和党人——路易斯安那州的比尔·卡西迪(Bill Cassidy)和肯塔基州的米奇·麦康奈尔(Mitch McConnell)——几乎肯定会被特朗普先生的追随者接替。在路易斯安那州,朱莉娅·莱特洛(Julia Letlow)由总统亲自招募,而肯塔基州的安迪·巴尔(Andy Barr)则誓言将“100%支持特朗普总统”。
随着参议院的 MAGA 派系影响力日益增强,图恩先生的工作将变得更加困难。例如,李先生看来将在明年成为司法委员会的共和党首席成员。与特朗普结盟的参议员们可能会开始向图恩先生施压,要求其强推具有争议的被提名人,或者在布兰奇先生采取行动重新建立秘密基金时给予支持——共和党战略家们正对此低声议论。新任共和党参议员甚至可能采取行动废除阻挠议事(filibuster)。如果民主党赢得参议院的控制权,图恩先生的权力将会被削弱。他可能会在左翼那些激烈的反特朗普人士身上找到某种慰藉,以此作为自己的掩护。■ --- 36 美国 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
在蒙大拿州的卡利斯佩尔(Kalispell),一家名为“偏见酿造”(Bias Brewing)的酒厂,对于一位自称“激进实用主义者”的人来说,举办竞选活动的地方名字显得有些古怪。然而,在7月的一个夜晚,塞斯·博德纳(Seth Bodnar)选择了这家酒厂来发表他的竞选演说。“作为一名独立候选人参选,你会让两边的人都不高兴,”他告诉人群。博德纳先生(见图)希望成为蒙大拿州的下一任参议员。他认为民主党忽视了这个州,而共和党则将其视为理所当然。
博德纳先生的竞选活动是某种趋势的一部分。选民对美国两个主要政党感到不满。尤其是民主党的净好感度接近 35 年来的低点。这为极左翼政治人物创造了机会(见下一篇报道),但同时也激励了新一代的独立候选人。2026 年登记为独立候选人参选国会的人数,比至少自 2000 年以来的任何一个选举周期都要多。博德纳先生和内布拉斯加州的候选人丹·奥斯本(Dan Osborn)的竞选活动,是今年检验独立候选人能否成功的最佳测试。
以独立身份参选难度极大,因此至少从历史上看,很少有政治人物认为这样做是明智的。独立候选人缺乏政党的竞选基础设施,而且在许多州,他们必须收集更多签名才能获得在选票上出现的机会。
然而,有抱负的政治人物现在面临着变化的胜算。根据盖洛普(Gallup)的数据,去年 45% 的美国人认同自己是独立人士,这是至少自 1988 年以来的最高比例。而这些独立人士倾向于支持民主党而非共和党的可能性高出五个百分点。在共和党主导的州,民主党的政策往往比该党本身更受欢迎,因此独立候选人可能有更好的获胜机会。今年两名最强有力的独立候选人恰好在蒙大拿州和内布拉斯加州竞选,这并非巧合;这两个州的选民曾三次投票给唐纳德·特朗普,但当地农民也正受到关税和燃料成本的挤压。
在蒙大拿州,博德纳先生拥有建制派的背景:他毕业于西点军校,曾两次被部署到伊拉克,在通用电气工作,随后担任位于米苏拉(Missoula)的蒙大拿大学校长。“我觉得两个政党都把我留在了我所谓的‘理智中心’,”他在米苏拉喝咖啡时解释道。他的对手是库尔特·阿尔梅(Kurt Alme),一名获得特朗普先生和史蒂夫·戴恩斯(Steve Daines)支持的前美国检察官,
美国国会,独立候选人数

退休参议员目前持有该席位。戴恩斯先生直到最后一刻才宣布退休,实际上确保了只有他倾向的候选人准备参选。相比之下,奥斯本先生是一位民粹主义的激进分子。这位51岁的退伍军人、机械师兼前工会领导人于2024年开启其政治生涯,当时民主党未能派出参议院候选人。奥斯本先生以独立身份参选,虽输给了共和党的德博·费舍尔,但赢得了令人印象深刻的47%的选票。他这次的对手是共和党现任议员皮特·里基茨,一位富有的前州长,其父亲创立了金融公司TD Ameritrade。
批评者认为,博德纳先生和奥斯本先生都不是真正的独立人士,而是试图摆脱该党有害品牌的民主党人。事实上,两人都依赖于民主党筹款平台Act Blue,并享有知名民主党人的支持。尤其是奥斯本先生,他呼应了当今左翼的反亿万富翁情绪。“埃隆·马斯克可以给一场竞选捐赠3亿美元,然后他就拿到了白宫的钥匙,”他最近在内布拉斯加州西德尼对人群说道,“伙计,这不对。”
博德纳先生坚持认为,他的独立性源于他的军事生涯,这培养了他的非党派倾向,并声称他自认独立人士已超过十年。“我们坚信,政府不应该出现在我们的诊室里,不应该出现在我们的卧室里,也不应该出现在我们的枪柜里。”奥斯本先生则批评民主党过去的旗手们。“我不害怕说乔·拜登在边境问题上辜负了我们。我不害怕说奥巴马不应该救助银行,”他说。
独立人士能否获胜,取决于他们能否说服足够的共和党选民给他们一个机会。同样重要的是,这取决于民主党人决定退出还是留在比赛中并冒着分散选票的风险。内布拉斯加州民主党初选的获胜者已提交撤回申请,但该初选的一名落选者正在起诉,以强迫该党参与竞争。在蒙大拿州,民主党提名人是阿拉尼·班克黑德,她的竞选资金几乎耗尽。“当我还是参议员时,”该州前民主党参议员马克斯·鲍克斯说,“我为蒙大拿州的民主党筹集了数百万美元。”他现在支持博德纳先生。班克黑德女士退出的截止日期是8月10日。鲍克斯先生仍希望她退出。“为了让塞斯获胜,”他说,“她必须退出。” ■

一个自动驾驶的候选人 --- 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 美国 37

芝加哥
四年前,美国民主社会主义者(DSA)还处于低谷。左翼杂志《雅各宾》(Jacobin)曾宣称该组织正处于“炼狱”之中。乔·拜登在2020年战胜唐纳德·特朗普,让民主党人变得自满——用左翼的贬义词来说,他们回到了“早午餐聚会”(back to brunch)的安逸状态。随后,加沙战争爆发。进步主义者在巴勒斯坦问题上找到了激发其活力的事业。特朗普击败卡玛拉·哈里斯,进一步增强了他们要求变革的理由:如果建制派民主党人连他的“第二次降临”都无法阻止,那么他们还有什么用处?
如今,民粹主义左翼正在崛起。纽约市现在有一位来自DSA的市长,华盛顿特区很快也将拥有一位。受DSA支持的造反者在多次国会初选中击败了现任议员。8月4日,在密歇根州民主党参议院初选中,阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德(Abdul El-Sayed)击败了受亲以色列团体支持的中间派海莉·史蒂文斯(Haley Stevens)。埃尔-赛义德博士并非DSA成员——他自称是资本主义者——但他得到了社会主义群体的支持。在威斯康星州,一名公开且自豪的社会主义者弗朗西斯卡·洪(Francesca Hong)很有可能在8月11日的民主党州长初选中获胜。这引发了人们的猜测,认为一名与DSA结盟的候选人可能会在2028年获得该党的总统提名。
对于一个治理模式古怪、成员寥寥且持有许多不受欢迎立场的组织来说,这是一个令人震惊的发展。DSA拥有一个不寻常的结构:它是一个独立的实体,但其候选人在民主党的选票线上竞争,使其能够从内部改变该党。与两大政党由官员和捐赠者主导的自上而下模式不同,DSA成员通过投票决定大多数事务。他们的活动延伸到工会组织和反对数据中心的抗议。这让基层成员保持了参与感。社会学家兼成员大卫·普鲁克(David Purucker)表示,DSA在共和党执政期间最为繁荣,因为“它比民主党更自然地处于‘路障’前线”。
DSA喜欢宣称民粹主义经济学可以赢得胜利。它举例纽约市长佐兰·马姆达尼(Zohran Mamdani),他在竞选时主张租金管制和免费巴士,同时淡化其他民粹左翼立场。但DSA的纲领中仍包括支持非公民投票以及向美国黑人支付赔偿金。一位参加其近期在芝加哥举行的峰会的人不禁产生疑问:凯悦酒店(Hyatt Regency)是否曾经接待过这么多佩戴库非亚围巾(keffiyehs)和鼻中隔环的人?而且,这个群体是否忽略了对“大觉醒”(Great Awakening)运动的反弹?
大多数其他民主党人已经得出结论,认为像“削减警察经费”(defund the police)这样的民粹左翼立场在选举中是死路一条。在众议院,社会主义者在200多人的民主党党团中仅占据极少数席位。大多数DSA在初选中的胜利都发生在深蓝色的民主党阵地。在纽约市等崛起地区,DSA凭借精明的社交媒体运作和由热心志愿者驱动的传统敲门拜访,在组织能力上胜过了主流民主党人。亚特兰大的DSA领导人内特·克诺夫(Nate Knauf)表示,两大政党过于依赖顾问和捐赠者资助的广告,导致其基层动员能力萎缩。“你需要真实的人类来推动你的政治。”
在过去十年中,其成员人数增长了20多倍,但总数仍仅在12万,000左右。其主要目标群体是社会地位下降的千禧一代。政治分析师兼DSA成员迈克尔·兰格(Michael Lange)说,识别潜在加入者的关键问题是:“你是否在50岁以下且租房居住?”在2021年的最新调查中,25岁以上的DSA成员中,五分之四拥有大学学位,三分之一拥有研究生学位,三分之一是同性恋或酷儿。DSA共同主席阿希克·西迪基(Ashik Siddique)表示,它是美国最大的酷儿成员组织。被发现是警察的成员将被开除。
矛盾之处就在于:一个声称代表工人阶级的团体,其外在形象和言谈举止与工人阶级毫无共同之处。从警务、移民到堕胎问题,大学毕业生的立场都比蓝领工人更偏左。以美国民主社会主义者(DSA)纲领中的一项主张——跨性别者权利为例。在民意调查中,只有一半的工人阶级认为解雇或驱逐跨性别者应该是违法的,而左翼倾向的大学毕业生中这一比例高达 82%。民调专家亚当·卡尔森(Adam Carlson)表示,在经济问题上,工人阶级和年长选民往往对年轻的新左翼所承诺的剧烈变革持更怀疑的态度。西迪克先生听起来有点像列宁,他表示 DSA 的任务是培养一种工人阶级意识。科尔比学院(Colby College)的政治学家尼古拉斯·雅各布斯(Nicholas Jacobs)指出,问题在于工人阶级选民相信功绩主义和勤奋工作。他们往往对扩大政府服务不那么热情,同时不信任那些使用“系统性”这类词汇的自命不凡之辈。值得注意的是,在民调中,只有白人左翼倾向的大学毕业生将“向富人征税”视为前十大优先事项。
密歇根州和威斯康星州是普选结果接近的摇摆州,这与进步派竞选的大多数选区不同。11 月,埃尔-赛义德博士和洪女士(假设她赢得初选)将测试这样一个论点:左翼永远无法吸引温和派。一些民主党人主张,党内的大帐篷应该欢迎社会主义者,且温和派应当学习他们的组织能力。中间派则担心,唯一能学到的教训将是失败。比尔·克林顿的前助手詹姆斯·卡维尔(James Carville)最近在他的播客中表示:“我确实认为,现在是民主党讨论那个‘S’词——分裂(schism)的时候了。”巴拉克·奥巴马的前顾问大卫·艾克塞尔罗德(David Axelrod)则将民主党在威斯康星州的战斗形容为“一辆正缓慢驶向悬崖的汽车”。■ --- 38 The Economist 2026年8月8日

巴西选举
圣保罗 巴西大选在外国干预与国内冷漠中拉开帷幕
巴西10月大选的正式竞选活动直到8月16日才开始,但目前的竞争已经十分激烈。唐纳德·特朗普对巴西征收了新的、高昂的关税,其动机似乎与政治相关,而非贸易。巴西政府拒绝向两名美国国务院官员发放签证,称他们计划对该国电子投票系统的完整性产生质疑。7月25日,阿根廷总统哈维尔·米莱前往圣保罗发表讲话,在演讲中他将巴西总统路易斯·伊纳西奥·卢拉·达席尔瓦称为“囚犯”和“小偷”。8月4日,特朗普政府撤销了巴西驻美国大使的签证。
尽管外国势力如此喧闹,但巴西民众的情绪却是幻灭。选民们似乎对现有的选择不感兴趣。目前领先的是80岁的现任总统卢拉,这是他第七次竞选总统。他的主要挑战者是弗拉维奥·博索纳罗,他是前总统雅伊尔·博索纳罗的长子;后者是一位民粹主义者,因在2022年最近一次选举失利后企图发动政变,目前正服刑27年。其他一批右翼候选人的民调支持率均在个位数。
无论谁获胜,都将领导一个分裂的国家。大约一半的巴西人表示他们绝不会投票给卢拉,同样比例的人表示绝不会投票给弗拉维奥。除了下一任总统,巴西人还将选出全部27个州的州长、三分之二的参议员以及众议院的所有成员。下一任总统将有机会提名巴西最高法院11名大法官中的四名,这是一个经常干预政治的权力机构。如果在10月4日的投票中没有总统候选人获得超过半数的选票,则将于10月25日举行第二轮投票。
自从特朗普在2025年1月重返白宫以来,拉丁美洲所有七次总统选举均由右翼类似人物获胜。特朗普干预了其中几次,公开支持他偏好的右翼候选人。这改变了卢拉的竞选策略。在8月2日的劳工党大会上,党魁埃迪尼奥·席尔瓦(Edinho Silva)明确了立场:“我们必须在权威主义的巴西……一个出卖自己的巴西,与一个捍卫我们利益的主权巴西之间做出选择。”
不难想象特朗普试图影响巴西的选票。去年,当自诩为“热带特朗普”的博索纳罗被起诉时,特朗普政府对负责该程序的最高法院法官实施了制裁,并取消了审判席上八名法官的签证。而博索纳罗的盟友则未受影响。但外国右翼似乎是弗拉维奥唯一能指望的力量。在7月25日启动其候选资格的圣保罗大会上,巴西其他右翼政党明显缺席。相反,他得到了米莱及其对卢拉辱骂言论的支持。以色列的本雅明·内塔尼亚胡(另一位特朗普盟友)则提供了一段预录视频。
弗拉维奥的竞选活动在5月遭受重创,当时泄露的录音显示,他向丹尼尔·沃卡罗(Daniel Vorcaro)索要资金,后者是巴西历史上最大银行欺诈案核心的失势银行家。弗拉维奥想要这笔钱用于拍摄一部关于他父亲的英语电影《黑马》(Dark Horse),该片预计于9月上映。由于此前否认与沃卡罗有关系,这些泄露内容揭穿了弗拉维奥的谎言。弗拉维奥的支持率随即暴跌。
本节其他内容 39 哈维尔·米莱的奥德赛行为 40 克劳迪娅·辛鲍姆的决断
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 美洲 39
他与继母米歇尔(Michelle)的公开争吵也造成了不利影响,而米歇尔深受巴西强大的福音派基督徒的喜爱。在这次争执之后,博索纳罗家族的一位亲密盟友告诉一名播客:“从统计学上讲,女性的投票倾向通常很糟糕,尤其是单身女性。”在巴西女性群体中,卢拉领先弗拉维奥 18 个百分点。中右翼政党在国会占据主导地位。他们拒绝支持弗拉维奥,很可能是基于卢拉将再次当选的计算。卢拉的支持率很高,在最近的调查中处于 43% 到 48% 之间,在这个水平上,现任者通常可以期待获胜。然而,仍可能出现意外。卢拉在投票意向上的领先优势很小。选民最关心的问题是腐败和犯罪,而卢拉在这两方面都被认为表现疲软。他曾因腐败被监禁 19 个月,直到 2021 年其定罪因技术性原因被推翻。许多选民从未原谅他。随着卢拉的政治盟友及其儿子卷入腐败丑闻,弗拉维奥在最近几周收复了失地。而且尽管暴力犯罪报告在下降,选民似乎认为治安正在恶化。在 6 月发布的一项 Ipsos 民调中,47% 的巴西人将暴力列为国家的主要问题,比去年上升了 7 个百分点。这种幻灭感可能会帮助雷南·桑托斯(Renan Santos),他曾是一名企业家,也是一名政治局外人。他在 2016 年因组织导致卢拉门生迪尔玛·罗塞夫(Dilma Rousseff)被弹劾的抗议活动而崭露头角。桑托斯先生在发布给 Instagram 和 TikTok 上数百万追随者的流畅视频中,同时批评弗拉维奥和卢拉。他可能会吸引那些厌倦了现状的选民。桑托斯先生表示,他在经济上是自由主义者,但在社会问题上是保守主义者。他效仿米莱先生,以及萨尔瓦多的独裁者纳伊布·布克尔(Nayib Bukele),后者通过采取强硬手段显著改善了其国家的治安。桑托斯先生的口号之一“抓捕,击毙”(Catch, Kill),是指他将允许警察对涉嫌犯罪者采取的行动。他说,他希望将国家的总统府变成一个政策想法的“初创公司”。尽管他目前知名度相对较低,但即将到来的电视辩论可能会改变这一点。一个激进局外人的出现应该会让弗拉维奥的阵营感到担忧,甚至可能让卢拉也感到担忧。■
奥德修斯(ODYSSEUS)的情况相对简单。他只需要抵抗一次塞壬的诱惑。而阿根廷总统哈维尔·米莱(Javier Milei)不仅试图约束自己的政府不要沉溺于印钞,从而避免在通货膨胀的礁石上撞得粉碎,还试图将所有未来的政府也同样地绑在桅杆上。由于中央银行负责发行货币,他的努力集中在修改管理该机构的法律上。
在7月30日的一次电视演讲中,他指责过去的政府“掠夺”中央银行,并宣布了他所谓的“过去91年来最重要的一套结构性改革”。他概述了一项新法律,该法律将禁止中央银行向政府提供融资,将维护货币价值作为银行的唯一目标,并要求国会两院均需三分之二多数票才能罢免银行行长(现任行长由米莱先生任命)。
长期以来,通货膨胀一直是阿根廷的祸根(见次页图表)。这通常是由政府过度支出,然后通过印钞来填补缺口造成的。当米莱先生在2023年12月就职时,月通胀率高达13%。他用“电锯”削减开支,并停止了中央银行对政府的融资。这有助于将月通胀率降低至1.9%。
米莱先生对未来政府可能再次启动印钞机的可能性感到愤怒。改革中央银行正是他试图避免这种情况的尝试。他计划的大多数改革预计将获得国会通过,这些改革是值得赞赏的。该银行目前有五个复杂且相互矛盾的目标,包括“具有社会公平的经济发展”。简化目标是明智的。那些不能被轻易罢免的行长应该会发现自己有权拒绝政府对免费资金的需求。在所有政府层级明确禁止货币融资也将有所帮助。
米莱先生还宣布了资本和保险市场的自由化,以及一项受美国启发但更具争议的法律:如果政府连续“几个”月支出超过税收收入,该法律将自动关闭政府。
尽管如此,仍存在一些瑕疵。增加解雇银行官员的难度是明智的,但改革并未同步改善任命流程,这很奇怪。米莱先生还暗示,新法可能会包括对协助印钞的央行官员实施刑事处罚。这将是非常罕见的,且很难鼓励才华横溢的经济学家加入该银行。此外还存在明显的漏洞。改革并未限制央行对外汇管制的偏好。
--- 40 美洲 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 ---
一些管制至今依然存在,正如在过去90年的大部分时间里那样,导致了临时平静随后又是危机与通胀的循环。在秘鲁——这个曾经的烂摊子,而现在是宏观经济之星——宪法禁止此类限制。然而,自由意志主义者米莱先生因担心波动和短期通胀,尚未准备好让市场自由设定阿根廷最重要的价格:美元价格。
改革也没有解决其他与政策相关的担忧。“我们不知道货币政策是什么,”阿根廷咨询公司Invecq的圣地亚哥·布拉特(Santiago Bulat)表示。为了维持比索强劲,政策通常较为紧缩。这有助于控制通胀,但也阻碍了增长,并导致未偿还贷款数量大幅增加。但关于央行应如何应对通胀变化,并没有明确的规则。令国际货币基金组织(IMF)沮丧的是,央行继续关注货币供应量,而非像世界大部分地区那样关注利率。米莱先生的偏好显然影响了央行政策,这很难说是独立性的典范。
拟议改革的一个问题是,未来的不同国会可能会相对容易地将其撤销。撤换银行行长需要国会三分之二的多数票,但这一要求本身可以通过简单多数票被取消。强迫潜在的印钞者去修改法律确实提高了货币挥霍的政治成本,但这并不能提供保证。真正阻止政治家干预央行的是政治规范。米莱先生更大的任务是转变这些规范,使未来的政治家不再相信挥霍是通往选举成功的途径。实现这一目标的最佳方式就是赢得选举,并以财政鹰派的身份交付成果。
米莱先生将在2027年10月参加连任选举。目前他没有强有力的竞争对手。他大幅降低了通胀,在今年早些时候上涨之后,通胀率再次下降。三家评级机构最近上调了阿根廷的信用评级,部分原因是央行明智地通过购买美元来增加储备。央行还刚刚同意将其与中国的$19bn掉期额度延长五年,这进一步增强了其储备覆盖率。国际货币基金组织(IMF)对此大多表示赞许。
但阿根廷人对此并不太信服。7月,米莱政府的支持率跌至本届任期内的最低点。增长不均衡,且集中在如石油等对劳动力需求相对较少的部门。预计今年经济增长将低于 3%。正式就业人数一直在下降。5月经济活动连续第二个月下滑。一系列腐败丑闻也让情况雪上加霜。米莱在解雇其深陷丑闻的幕僚长之前,对他进行了过久的维护。尽管仍有时间扭转局面,但在阿根廷,选举年支持率的下滑可能会引发市场抛售的恶性循环,进而使民调结果进一步恶化。改革央行是打破这一动态更广泛努力的一部分。“政府试图表达的是‘即使政府更迭,也不会有太多变化,所以请不要抛售你们持有的所有债券’,”布拉特先生解释道。但如果米莱开始陷入困境,即使是一个更强大的央行也无法挽救他的计划。■
墨西哥总统克劳迪娅·辛鲍姆(Claudia Sheinbaum)多次表示,她以 cabesa fría(冷静的头脑)来对待唐纳德·特朗普。她的策略是无视对方的言论,同时迅速满足其要求,这为她赢得了许多支持者,包括白宫内部。特朗普曾称她“极好”且“优雅”。然而,他自三月以来就没再用过这个词。美国与墨西哥在安全、移民和贸易方面的紧张局势不断升级。加州大学圣迭戈分校的拉斐尔·费尔南德斯·德·卡斯特罗(Rafael Fernández de Castro)表示:“这是美墨关系过去一百年来最困难的一年。”辛鲍姆的措辞已从坚忍转为挑衅。
最大的冲突集中在安全领域。美国不再仅仅要求辛鲍姆打击贩毒帮派,而是在追捕她的盟友。今年4月,特朗普政府起诉了时任锡那罗亚州州长鲁本·罗查·莫亚(Rubén Rocha Moya),指控其涉嫌贩毒。罗查·莫亚否认有不当行为,他与辛鲍姆所属的国家复兴运动党(Morena)创始人安德烈斯·曼努埃尔·洛佩斯·奥夫拉多尔(Andrés Manuel López Obrador)关系密切。据路透社报道,已有50多名国家复兴运动党的政治人物被吊销美国签证。墨西哥人对美国安全机构日益怀疑,担心这些机构在墨西哥境内运作时不受辛鲍姆政府的监督。这种印象在7月得到了加强,当时联邦调查局(FBI)公开展示了2024年将帮派头目伊斯马埃尔·“埃尔·马约”·赞巴达(Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada)从墨西哥飞往美国的飞机。墨西哥政府此前曾获得保证,美国机构并未参与其抓捕。辛鲍姆已对此展开调查。
就移民问题而言,直到最近情况还相对平静。自特朗普在2025年重返白宫以来,墨西哥帮助他将非法进入美国的移民人数减少到了极低水平。但在7月7日,一名美国移民与海关执法局(ICE)特工在休斯顿枪杀了一名墨西哥人。洛伦佐·萨尔加多·阿拉霍(Lorenzo Salgado Araujo)在美国生活了35年,甚至并非此次行动的目标。他是自特朗普重返办公室以来,在ICE羁押或行动中死亡的第17名墨西哥人。
如果特朗普同意将北美贸易协定(T-MEC)延长至目前的2036年到期日之后,辛鲍姆或许会保持沉默。但在7月1日,他拒绝了。这项自由贸易协定现在将每年审查一次,从而产生了不确定性。华盛顿智库美洲对话(Inter-American Dialogue)的莉拉·阿贝德(Lila Abed)表示,在向特朗普低头之后,辛鲍姆“确实寄希望于”获得延期。
辛鲍姆变得不再那么顺从。她拒绝引渡罗查·莫亚。墨西哥法院不太可能判定他有罪。在休斯顿枪击事件发生两天后,她表示,她的政府将要求美国法院对枪杀墨西哥人的行为提起刑事诉讼,而这些人的“唯一罪名是在美国诚实工作”。
很难不对辛鲍姆产生同情。但在对特朗普采取强硬立场的同时,她可能错过了一个机会。她本可以利用他的攻击作为掩护,去解决美国正确识别出的墨西哥最严重问题之一:政治腐败。相反,她在最近的演讲中采取了更激烈、更左翼的基调,同时将不利的媒体报道斥为“谎言”。
显然,很难预测特朗普将如何反应。阿贝德表示,在墨西哥,这将是一场“微妙的舞蹈”。许多墨西哥人希望罗查·莫亚被引渡。他们或许能接受辛鲍姆对特朗普失去冷静,但很难接受她拥抱被指控腐败的盟友。■ --- 《经济学人》2026年8月8日 41

霍尔木兹海峡依赖度仪表盘
我们分析了伊朗将霍尔木兹海峡武器化的能力能维持多久。答案令人沮丧。
多年来,世界一直担心伊朗在追求核武器。而五个月的战争让该国统治者意识到,他们已经拥有了另一种强大的武器。地理位置和火力使他们事实上掌控了霍尔木兹海峡,全球五分之一的石油和液化天然气(LNG)通常经此流动。掐断这条动脉让伊朗领导人在面对对手时拥有巨大的筹码。
伊朗的敌手希望霍尔木兹海峡证明自己是一个递减资产。美国能源部长克里斯·赖特(Chris Wright)在5月表示,关闭霍尔木兹海峡是“一张只能打一次的牌”。海湾国家正忙于寻找替代出口路线。唐纳德·特朗普派驻伊拉克和叙利亚的使节汤姆·巴拉克(Tom Barrack)认为,该海峡在两年内将成为“无关紧要的事情”。
《经济学人》采访了专家并分析了数据,构建了一个“霍尔木兹依赖度仪表盘”来验证这些说法。结果指向三个结论。1. 伊朗威胁的持久力因商品和国家而异。2. 伊朗利用该海峡获利的能力会下降,但可能永远不会消失。第三,即使伊朗能收取的费用随时间下降,其战略筹码未必会同步消退。事实上,随着该政权将其地区影响力制度化,这种筹码可能会进一步加深。
首先来看有多少霍尔木兹海峡的流量可以简单地绕道而行。战前,每天约有1500万桶原油通过该海峡。这看起来最容易分流。沙特阿拉伯的东西向管道通过横跨半岛到达红海之滨的延布(Yanbu),从而避开该海峡;战前该管道的出口运量仅为每天100万桶(b / d)。如今,它正以700万桶 / 日的满负荷能力运行。其中近500万桶 / 日用于出口,其余供应沿海炼油厂。阿拉伯联合酋长国(UAE)已将其哈布尚-富查伊拉(Habshan-Fujairah)管道的运量提升至最高,从战前的100万桶 / 日增加到180万桶 / 日。约20万,000桶 / 日通过一条规模较小、此前闲置的伊拉克通往土耳其的管道流动。这使原油出口缺口缩小至1000万桶 / 日。
现在加上可能因战争而兴建的新管道(见次页地图)。一名熟悉该领域的律师表示,在海湾国家的指令控制经济中,获取土地没有问题。最先进的项目由阿联酋主导,将与现有线路平行运行,到2027年底将增加180万桶 / 日。伊拉克目标是在一年内将其管道能力提高到100万桶 / 日。它还计划修建一条新管道,将其南部油田与通往约旦、叙利亚和土耳其的现有路线连接。咨询公司Rystad Energy的拉胡尔·乔杜里(Rahul Choudhary)表示,这个250万桶 / 日项目的合同正在授予中,应在四年内完工。
因此,到2030年,另有500万桶 / 日的原油可以绕过霍尔木兹海峡。但这仍然留下了同等数量的原油没有替代路线。而且这些补救措施并非万无一失。伊拉克的项目可能会因安全风险和跨境争端而受挫。许多构想中的管道从未面世。
本节其他内容 哈马斯会解除武装吗? 43 非洲的水果出口繁荣 44 非洲AI有何不同 45 尼日利亚的政治与基础设施
42 中东与非洲 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
► 从延布前往亚洲的油轮通常经由曼德海峡航行,在那里它们容易受到伊朗盟友胡塞武装的攻击。沙特原油可以通过苏伊士运河或埃及的苏梅德(Sumed)管道运输。但即使是这条路线也可能不安全:7月29日,一架无人机击中了苏伊士附近达米埃塔(Damietta)港的一艘油轮。伊朗或其代理人可能会攻击那些它认为会削弱霍尔木兹海峡权力的基础设施。即使达成协议,攻击风险仍可能推高此类项目的保险和融资成本。
重新规划精炼产品的运输路线则更为困难。去年,海湾国家通过霍尔木兹海峡运输了近每日500万桶的汽油、柴油和其他燃料。这些产品目前没有陆路管道替代方案。沙特阿拉伯正计划将其东西走廊扩容每日200万桶,其中就包括建设一条管道。但这仍处于早期阶段,且需要相应提升延布(Yanbu)的接收能力。伊拉克每天向叙利亚发送1,000辆燃料油卡车,高于战前的10辆,但该路线缓慢且昂贵。自战争开始以来,叙利亚通过此类运输获得了1500万美元-20m的过境费收入。在海湾地区之外建设新炼油厂比建设管道耗时更长,且成本高达数十亿加元。
对于几乎完全由卡塔尔出口的液化天然气(LNG)来说,问题最为严重。目前没有LNG管道在建,也没有任何可行性研究报告公布。卡塔尔可以向阿曼铺设较简单的天然气管道,但这些管道需要承载与俄罗斯曾经计划向欧洲交付的四条北溪(Nord Stream)管道相当的天然气量。更不可信的是,卡塔尔整个液化综合体需要在阿拉伯海沿岸重新重建。
不过仍有一些希望。大多数进口国随着时间的推移可以逐渐摆脱对霍尔木兹海峡供应的依赖。几年的高价格可能会刺激美洲及其他地区增加每日200万至300万桶的供应。中国的炼油厂仍保有充足的闲置产能。LNG正处于其历史上最快速的扩张期。因此,在十年结束前,伊朗对全球价格的杠杆作用将会减弱。
但对于其海湾邻国而言,情况并非如此——这不仅仅是因为这些国家的能源出口在未来几年仍有相当一部分需要经过霍尔木兹海峡。许多国家还依赖该海峡进行进口。海湾阿拉伯国家95%的粮食依赖外部供应商,但只有沙特阿拉伯拥有像样的散货处理终端,且这些终端规模不足以供应整个地区。通过陆路运输大量粮食、铁矿石或铝土矿同样不可行:一艘巴拿马型(Panamax)货轮可载6万,000 tonnes of cereal,足以填满2,000辆卡车。一个显而易见的解决方案是增加区域铁路,但这在建设上同样缓慢且昂贵。澳大利亚过去在类似地形上建设的矿业铁路项目,每公里成本在1200万美元-15m之间。因此,一条从红海到卡塔尔的铁路线成本可能超过250亿美元。
通过霍尔木兹海峡的贸易,2026, 吨,m 按原产国分

来源:Kpler 按商品分

海湾国家拥有战略粮食储备,通常可覆盖四到六个月的需求,但对于集装箱货物(如新鲜食品、药品和电器)则没有相应的储备。该地区最大的集装箱港口杰贝阿里(Jebel Ali),年吞吐能力接近 20m 个标准箱(TEU),位于海湾内部。在海峡之外,最大的是吉达(Jeddah),可容纳 7.5m TEU。数据公司 Kpler 的亚历克西斯·埃伦德(Alexis Ellender)表示,在战争爆发前,吉达港已经接近满负荷运转。因此,我们的分析表明,伊朗将在一段时间内能够将霍尔木兹海峡武器化——并将其货币化。
海湾国家不同的风险敞口可能意味着,为了让船只重新起航,它们在容忍度上会出现分歧。卡塔尔曾暗示它可以接受临时费用;其他国家则立场更强硬。但即使是强硬的阿联酋也有所软化:它开始重新与伊朗贸易,且双方外交官正在进行对话。8月5日,一名伊朗官员表示,该政权已与阿曼就过境路线达成一致,并敦促“某些第三方”不要干涉。
假设这让伊朗控制了霍尔木兹海峡,它能赚多少钱?一名伊朗议员在6月声称,该国每艘过境海峡的船只收取 150万美元-2m。假设交通量约为战前水平的 70%,这意味着年收入将超过 350亿美元。这个数字令人瞠目结舌——而且不切实际。在没有其他选择的市场中,用枪口设定的费率在允许近乎正常流量恢复的协议面前将无法维持。提交给伊朗议会的立法草案设想根据货物量、价值和船型设定费率,但有一个限制:费用必须低于次优替代方案的成本。
主权风险顾问、GSSI 的沙欣·伊朗内贾德(Shahin Iraninejad)指出,另一项立法提案假设在伊朗水域的平均费用为每吨 €3,在国际水域为 €2。他预计未来的年收入将较为温和,在 20亿美元-30亿 之间。随着绕道能力的增长,这一数字将会下降——但并非均匀下降。原油油轮可能很快能获得优惠;而石油产品、液化天然气(LNG)和散货船在未来几年可能面临更高的费用。
这种收入流是否具有可持续性?航运期刊《劳合社名单》(Lloyd's List)的理查德·米德(Richard Meade)表示,只要费用可预测、易于结算且低于战争风险保费,许多船东可能会支付。但如果船只在不向伊朗付费的情况下反复穿越海峡,情况将会改变。
一种紧张关系出现了:伊朗需要与美国和平共处,其收费制度才能运作。但它需要继续攻击不听话的油轮以确保费用被支付——这可能使和平难以维持。
从乐观的一面来看,伊朗降低费用的速度可能会快于其需求。米德先生表示,其战略目标似乎是维持市场参与度并强化其作为“看门人”的角色,而非最大化收入。它想要的是某种持久的东西:一个治理体系——无论是与阿曼的双边框架、一套海事服务架构,还是一个许可证制度。
伊朗夺取这一新武器的轻而易举令其敌人震惊。它对霍尔木兹海峡的掌控看来将比战争持续得更久。■

The Economist August 8th 2026 Middle East & Africa 43
JERUSALEM
在旨在结束以色列与哈马斯之间战争的停火协议达成十个月后,加沙人仍在埋葬死者。8月4日,加沙城萨布拉区为2023.年11月一次以色列空袭中丧生的112人举行了葬礼。仍有数千人失踪。以色列依然不允许挖掘废墟和重建所需的重型机械进入该地带。从瓦砾堆下搜寻遗体的缓慢进度,残酷地提醒人们加沙方面缺乏任何进展。
唐纳德·特朗普的一项声明似乎预示着突破。7月30日,这位美国总统宣布达成了一项“旨在让哈马斯及加沙所有其他武装团体完全解除武装的历史性协议”。他说,这是“迈向持久和平与安全的一步里程碑”。总统华丽的措辞得到了他于1月成立的和平委员会(Board of Peace)较为冷静的支持,该委员会负责监督停火协议的执行。其路线图列出了哈马斯解除武装的步骤,以及以色列从该领土全面撤军、权力从哈马斯移交给一个新的巴勒斯坦技术官僚当局,以及为重建被摧毁的沿海地带创造条件。
这两个交战方迅速对特朗普先生的声明表示反对。一名哈马斯高级官员表示,该组织不会解除武装;它只会将武器在巴勒斯坦的监督下存储在加沙。以色列总理本雅明·内塔尼亚胡花了五天时间才对特朗普先生的宣布做出回应。随后他发表了一份声明,并未确认以色列已接受该协议。他仅表示其政府正在“研究此事”。与此同时,他的官员们一直在匿名通报称,在哈马斯的军事能力被完全瓦解之前,以色列无意停止在加沙针对哈马斯的行动或撤军。随后,以色列在加沙发动了一系列空袭,在短短24小时内造成19人死亡。
双方都存在类似的动态。数月来,双方一直承受着压力:以色列来自美国,哈马斯则来自埃及(埃及与以色列共同控制进入加沙的通道)及其赞助者卡塔尔和土耳其。双方都希望对方破坏协议。“没有人对此抱有期待,”一名以色列官员说,“我们不相信哈马斯会自愿解除武装。”
许多事情仍不明确。和平委员会表示,解除武装的时间表将在14天内制定,但并未具体说明该期限何时开始,并指出该期限可以延长。除此之外,哈马斯军火库的报废将如何进行?国际核查委员会的成员将由谁组成?解除武装与以色列进一步撤军之间的顺序如何安排?权力将如何从目前的哈马斯政府移交给新的加沙管理国家委员会(NCAG)?
在美国的压力下,以色列内阁于7月26日投票决定,终于允许15名NCAG成员进入加沙,并允许国际稳定部队(ISF)进行初步部署。但NCAG抵达的日期尚未确定,而且对于它将在加沙如何行使权力也缺乏明确想法。预计来自摩洛哥和乌干达的首批200名ISF维和人员的情况也是如此。以色列要求允许其部队在ISF名义上负责的区域继续执行任务。
自特朗普先生在2025年10月提出旨在结束加沙战争的和平计划以来,以色列政府一直延续着这种阻挠模式;在那场战争中,已有超过7.3万,000人被杀,其中大部分是平民。尽管频率低于战争期间,但以色列军队仍持续进行空袭,停火以来已有超过1,200名加沙人丧生,并且稳步地越过“黄线”——即由哈马斯控制的加沙半区与由以色列占领的半区之间的分界线。加沙2.1m居民目前蜷缩在仅占总面积约三分之一的区域内。约四分之三的人流离失所,他们的房屋要么被摧毁,要么处于以色列占领区,或两者兼而有之。以色列对进入加沙物资的限制意味着尚未开始任何实质性的重建。如果说还有一线希望,那就是以色列内部关于是否维持停火的争论已经结束。近几个月来,以色列官员曾大谈在加沙发起另一场大规模行动以强制解除武装的前景。特朗普先生的重新介入至少暂时压制了这些建议。“任何进展都将像蜗牛一样缓慢,”一名参与谈判的外交官表示,“但这仍然比另一种选择要好。”在10月27日以色列大选之前,真正的改变不太可能发生。内塔尼亚胡先生正面临来自其内阁中极右翼部长的抨击,他们希望他公开拒绝特朗普计划;同时也面临对手的嘲讽,后者讥讽他未能实现其承诺多次的对哈马斯的“全面胜利”。作为以色列政治的人质,加沙人将继续迟缓地埋葬死者,并等待更好的转机。■
“这里像个蜂巢一样忙碌,”阿里斯泰尔·坎贝尔(Alistair Campbell)在观察他位于津巴布韦首都哈拉雷市外40公里的蓝莓农场景象时说道。数百名工人从灌木丛中采摘果实,然后将这些收获搬运到冷藏设施中。经过分拣后,这些蓝莓被空运至对大果实需求量极高的东亚,或海运至欧洲。
“我们已经全力运转了,”曾担任津巴布韦板球队队长的坎贝尔先生说,“我们的作物可以卖出五六倍的量。”
在津巴布韦,与繁荣相关的颜色这一次是蓝色,而非金色。今年,津巴布韦的种植者预计将出口 1.2万,000 吨蓝莓,是 2017 年的 40 倍。
“每个人都在种蓝莓,”该国最著名的银行家之一说道。
这种微小的果实包含着一个更深刻的教训。撒哈拉以南非洲的制造业一直举步维艰:其产出份额在 15 年间基本持平。这让那些认为非洲增长依赖于亚洲式出口导向型工厂的分析师们感到担忧。然而,高科技农场实际上就是微型工厂,它们属于劳动密集型,并与全球供应链相连。
用学者克里斯托弗·克拉默(Christopher Cramer)的话来说,这种“新鲜产品的工业化”可能成为非洲的福音——并迫使人们重新思考农业和制造业的定义。
非洲的经济历史让政策制定者对农产品出口持有矛盾的态度。在殖民统治下,许多国家仅出口单一作物,这种模式在独立后依然存在。从 1966 到 1973 年,几乎一半的撒哈拉以南非洲国家有一半的出口收入来自单一商品。 ▶
南非,选定出口产品,10亿加元

44 中东与非洲 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日

比钻石更珍贵 ►
当价格暴跌时,经济也随之崩溃。这解释了为什么许多政府将资源从农场转移到半成品的工业计划中。但近年来,非洲的农业企业对全球收入的增长以及对新鲜农产品的需求做出了响应。年度报告《非洲农业贸易监测》指出,在有数据的最近十年中,“水果和坚果”成为了该洲最大的农业出口产品,超过了可可。可可、棉花、烟草和糖等传统经济作物的份额均有所下降。
非洲仍落后于拉丁美洲,后者的农业产品出口量是前者的四倍(2019-23年平均每年 3410亿美元,而非洲为 810亿美元)。秘鲁在2010年几乎不出口蓝莓,但十年后成为了全球最大的出口国。如果非洲能从这些成功案例中学习,将会获得丰厚的回报。
“蓝莓是农业作为高科技产业的一个绝佳例子,”投资基金AgDevCo的负责人丹尼尔·赫尔斯(Daniel Hulls)认为。美国农业巨头德里斯科尔公司(Driscoll’s)向津巴布韦的农民提供经过多年杂交培育的种子。聚乙烯覆盖物保护着灌木,储藏室则配备了光学分拣机。为了实现利润最大化,企业将生产时间定在夏季,即美国供应减少之后、秘鲁供应增加之前。
蓝莓并非非洲“新鲜产品工业化”的唯一例子。如今,肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚分别占全球切花出口额的6%和2%。它们的农场配备了喷雾细雾、通过反渗透净化水,并用镭灯照射花瓣以使其更美观的机器。根据联合国机构粮食及农业组织的数据,过去十年中,非洲的热带水果(如牛油果、芒果和菠萝)出口量增长了两倍多,增长率高于任何其他地区。
去年,欧洲首次消费了超过100万吨(大约相当于十艘航空母舰的重量)牛油果。其大部分需求由摩洛哥和肯尼亚满足。今年5月,南非首次取代西班牙成为全球最大的柑橘类水果出口国。自2010年超过葡萄酒以来,柑橘类水果一直是该国最有价值的农业出口产品,且近期为其带来的收益已超过钻石出口(见前页图表)。
这一成功可以追溯到1997年国家营销委员会的废除。在此之前,政府在农民之间分配出口收入;此后,每位农民保留自己的利润,从而更有动力投资于自己的水果。行业专家还强调了柑橘种植者协会(CGA)的作用,该协会向农民征收费用,用于开展研究、游说更好的政策并传播专业知识。
一些经济学家将制造业赋予的特殊益处似乎也适用于这些精通技术的农场。它们的出口改善了贸易余额,雇佣了数百人,并有助于在供应链沿线创建其他产品和公司。南非农业经济学家万迪莱·西赫洛博(Wandile Sihlobo)表示:“这些是集制造与物流于一体的企业。”
肯尼亚热带水果公司Vert的负责人简·迈纳(Jane Maina)表示,她已开始出口干燥零食。这一新产品线意味着从小农户采购的芒果和菠萝浪费更少,提高了农民的生产力。为花卉业务在东非机场建设的冷库设施,现在也被香草、豆类和蔬菜的出口商使用。津巴布韦的蓝莓热潮催生了监测天气状况和产量的全新“农业科技”应用程序。在南非,柑橘业的繁荣也产生了几家衍生研究公司。
遗憾的是,糟糕的道路和拥堵的港口仍然使得交付完美的果实变得困难。与许多其他地区一样,非洲农民抱怨政治支持不足。有些人的观点是有道理的。当埃塞俄比亚的花卉业务起步时,当时的政府为前往机场的卡车提供武装护卫。而现在,出口商则抱怨被武装土匪拦截。好消息是,潜在市场正在开启。5月,中国停止对大多数非洲进口商品征收关税。7月,首批来自津巴布韦的蓝莓小盒被运往那里。然而,非关税壁垒(如食品安全和植物健康法规)往往被证明是最棘手的。管理这些壁垒需要协调一致的外交努力和专门的行业机构,例如南非的CGA。津巴布韦蓝莓、肯尼亚花卉和南非橙子的成功表明,非洲农业在发挥长期以来对制造业所设想的那种作用方面具有巨大潜力。但为了最大限度地获得劳动果实,非洲的政策制定者需要帮助确保其企业具有全球竞争力。现在是时候进行创新思考了。■
非洲的人工智能(AI)会是什么样子?尼日利亚企业家奥卢巴约·阿德坎比(Olubayo Adekanmbi)列举了一些想法:像精通英语一样精通非洲语言;像处理文本一样熟练处理语音;并且足够精简,以便在芯片短缺、网络不稳定的环境下也能蓬勃发展。相比之下,硅谷的前沿实验室在以英语为主的数据集上训练庞大的模型。“目前全球AI的玩法完全不符合非洲的情况,”他说。
这就是为什么两年前,在从事电信行业之后,阿德坎比先生共同创立了EqualityAI。这家初创公司设计了多种工具,可以用英语和四种尼日利亚语言为母亲提供健康建议,帮助贸易商处理账目,以及处理银行的客户电话。
整个非洲大陆都在涌现类似的机构。考虑到前沿模型的普及,这些机构似乎显得多余。微软估计,在劳动年龄人口中,8%的埃塞俄比亚人、9%的刚果人和 ► --- 经济学人 2026年8月8日 中东与非洲 45 ► 23%的南非人使用过生成式AI。OpenAI表示,尽管基数较低,但非洲ChatGPT用户的增长速度快于任何其他地区。中国的模型也很受欢迎。
但即使是最优秀的大语言模型(LLMs),在非洲语言方面也表现不佳,在基准测试中的得分通常比英语低10-30个百分点。它们在处理方言和“代码切换”(例如说话者在英语和母语之间快速切换)时非常吃力。对于一些较小的语言,其训练数据很大程度上依赖于圣经经文。
Lesan AI致力于非洲之角语言的机器翻译和语音识别,该公司的阿斯梅拉什·特卡·哈德古(Asmelash Teka Hadgu)认为,现有模型在处理日常对话时是“失效的”。对于使用非拉丁字母的阿姆哈拉语和提格雷语等语言来说,情况尤为严重;而其他主要语言的进展则较快。
根本问题在于缺乏数据。用于训练AI模型的数据库Common Crawl在7月份抓取了8.72亿个英语网页,但阿姆哈拉语网页仅有8万,000个。在所有非洲语言中,只有斯瓦希里语的代表性比威尔士语强。用于语音识别的高质量音频也十分匮乏。因此,在谷歌和盖茨基金会等机构的支持下,非洲研究人员正在记录人们的说话方式。卢旺达Digital Umuganda公司的奥达斯·尼永库鲁(Audace Niyonkuru)表示,他的公司努力在年龄、性别和方言之间取得平衡。
那么接下来怎么做?非洲研究人员使用新数据集来微调开放权重模型(其训练参数公开),这比从零开始构建所需的计算资源更少。肯尼亚非政府组织Jacaranda Health对Meta的Llama模型进行了斯瓦希里语训练,以便其能提供孕产妇健康建议。但即使经过微调,这类模型在处理通用任务时通常仍不如私有模型。
非洲创新的另一个重点是针对特定任务的所谓“小语言模型”,其参数最多只有几十亿个(前沿LLMs则有数万亿个)。南非实验室Lelapa AI将其拥有4亿参数的模型命名为InkubaiLM,取自祖鲁语中“蜣螂”一词,因为蜣螂能搬动比自身重量重许多倍的物体。
较小的模型可以在本地甚至离线运行。这使得敏感数据能够留在非洲大陆。EqualityAI为尼日利亚北部的卡诺州政府构建了一个本地模型,允许官员查询文档和会议记录。“如果你想要主权,就把它做小,”阿德坎比先生建议道。
这一切构成了一种某种程度上反主流的AI愿景:推崇适度而非规模,推崇语境而非全知。它可能无法在硅谷全方位的野心下生存。但就目前而言,非洲研究人员已经找到了自己的生态位。 ■
拉各斯
上个月,拉各斯发生突发洪水,水位上涨至车门,并涌入家中,导致这座尼日利亚商业之都的生活陷入数日的瘫痪。气候变化是洪水加剧的主要原因。但在拉各斯较贫困的地区,一些居民怀疑是否有其他因素加剧了破坏。他们担心,为了保护一个新的豪华滨海区而修建的沿海高速公路和海堤可能会侵蚀海岸线,从而加剧沿海地区的洪水影响。
然而,居民们可能很难获得关于这两个项目影响的信息。这两项工程都属于一个价值 200亿美元 的基础设施组合,由吉尔伯特·查古里(Gilbert Chagoury,如图)控制的公司监管。查古里是一位黎巴嫩裔尼日利亚亿万富翁,也是总统博拉·提努布(Bola Tinubu)的长期好友。查古里并不以透明度著称。自 1971, 成立以来,这位亿万富翁与兄弟共同经营的企业集团涉足了从面粉厂到豪华酒店的各个领域。
在提努布执政期间,该集团的基础设施业务得到了扩张。除了 10亿美元 的沿海高速公路、海堤以及该海堤所保护的 60亿美元 房地产开发项目外,该集团还负责两个港口的翻新工程,其资金主要由英国政府担保的一笔 7.46 亿英镑 (10亿美元) 贷款支付。包括法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas Fortis)和比利时 KBC 银行在内的国际银行协助为该滨海区提供了融资。
尼日利亚政府辩称,查古里集团旗下的公司之所以赢得许多此类项目,是因为它们能够胜任且高效地交付世界级的基础设施,而很少有尼日利亚公司能做到这一点。然而,批评者称政府允许这些公司绕过正规的采购和环境法规。“没有竞争性招标,甚至没有限制性招标,”会计师兼反对派政治人物芬索·多尔蒂(Funso Doherty)在谈到沿海高速公路时说道。
多尔蒂对政府和负责修路的 HiTech 公司提起诉讼,指控其在没有进行法律强制要求的环境影响评估的情况下就动工。法院驳回了他的起诉,理由是他没有原告资格。此类驳回如此之常见,以至于很少有人费心进行法律挑战;多尔蒂预计上诉过程将耗时数年。(政府表示,HiTech 是选择性招标过程中的公正获胜者,且道路的环境影响在施工前已得到评估。查古里和 HiTech 未回应置评请求。)
基于能力授予基础设施合同显得尤为重要,因为尼日利亚的项目规模越来越大,价格越来越贵,且通常由债务融资。沿海高速公路还可能受益于特殊的税收减免。今年 4 月,立法机构批准了一笔 5.16亿美元 贷款,用于资助一条横跨全国的高速公路,该项目在没有招标的情况下被授予了一家查古里旗下的公司。(政府称其因专业知识而被选中。)
尼日利亚在 2025. 的财政赤字为 19.4tmn 奈拉 (128亿美元 或 4.4% of GDP)。国际货币基金组织(IMF)认为赤字可能更高,因为约 8.8tmn 奈拉 (58亿美元 或 2% of GDP) 的公共支出似乎未被报告(财政部长对此持有异议)。
在尼日利亚的一些人看来,总统与其“首席建筑师”之间的关系散发着一个 bygone era. 的气息。2000 年,一家瑞士法院判定查古里协助尼日利亚前独裁者萨尼·阿巴查(Sani Abacha)洗钱,涉及数百万美元的被盗公共资金。查古里表示他不知道自己转移的资金是被盗的,但向尼日利亚归还了 6600万美元,并支付了 1m 瑞士法郎 ($60万,000 in 2000) 的罚款。现任负责分配公共资金的部长阿布巴卡尔·巴古杜(Abubakar Bagudu)在 2003 年向尼日利亚支付了 1.63亿美元,以解决一起与阿巴查掠夺国家财产相关的案件,且未承认有罪。
查古里先生的光芒短期内不太可能褪去。提努布先生正指望这位朋友在明年的连任竞选中提供支持,他对此关系的批评不屑一顾;他认为海堤将避免“一场比海啸更严重的灾难”。今年1月,他授予查古里先生尼日利亚第二高的国家荣誉。总统在2024年表示:“有了像他这样的朋友,人可以心安理得地入睡。” ■ 吉尔伯特·查古里,商人 —— 经济学人企业
更健康的生活和更强大的体系,助力经济繁荣。为了经济活力,我们必须支持更健康的生活,并创建具有包容性和响应能力的医疗体系以驱动创新。良好的健康状况能够使社区和经济繁荣发展。通过 Economist Enterprise 的“健康红利”(The Health Dividend),为追求可持续增长的政府、企业和投资者发掘关键洞察。
“健康红利”计划得到了包括以下组织的支持:

扫描以了解更多:insights.economistenterprise.com / health-dividend
HALEON sanofi
Economist Enterprise 是《经济学人》集团的 B2B 部门。其独立于《经济学人》运行。
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 47
亚洲技术
AI驱动的财富正在重塑韩国
一名衣衫不整的男子走进一家昂贵的商店。店员对他不屑一顾——直到他脱掉外套,露出一件印有“SK海力士”(SK Hynix)字样的背心。这家半导体公司以发放巨额奖金而闻名。这个想象中的场景——近期韩国一个喜剧节目中的小品——讽刺了随着AI驱动的财富涌入该国而发生的真实情况。婚介公司报告称,来自SK海力士和另一家半导体制造商三星电子(Samsung Electronics)的工程师受欢迎程度大幅提升。他们现在的抢手程度几乎与医生和律师相当。
一场AI带来的意外之财正在重塑韩国社会。7月25日,韩国总统李在明(Lee Jae Myung)在硅谷发表讲话时,将AI时代比作火的发现,并称其为“韩国一个真正的新机遇”。但新时代也带来了风险:韩国基准股票指数KOSPI在过去一年中价值翻了一番,但在7月下跌了22%。一系列剧烈波动使其成为全球波动性最大的股市。
首尔正在就如何确保新财富得到公平分享并可持续管理而展开激烈辩论。“这给我们带来了一个新的政策挑战:从社会经济角度和国家政策立场来看,我们应该如何对待这种异常的超额利润?”李先生在6月接受《经济学人》采访时表示。次月,他的政府宣布设立一个“未来应对基金”,将新增加的税收收入投资于后代。
市场的剧烈波动和政策辩论是AI普及过程中可能在其他地方上演的预演。“这是一个需要更广泛国际讨论的问题,”李先生补充道。
财富流入韩国,是因为该国公司提供了AI模型制造者所需的底层设施,例如高带宽内存芯片。韩国官员将其描述为在AI淘金热中生产“镐和铲”。无论淘金者是否能挖到金矿,卖镐的人(或者更准确地说,芯片制造商)已经腰缠万贯。7月30日,三星电子表示第二季度营业利润为89.5万亿韩元 ($63),同比增长1,800%。前一天,SK海力士表示同季度营业利润同比增长557%。
他们的员工希望分到更多份额。去年,SK海力士同意将营业利润的10%用于奖金。三星强大的工会曾在5月威胁罢工,要求分得飙升的利润。一项最后时刻达成的协议避免了工厂停产;部分奖金将超过$40万,000. 在一个年平均工资低于$4万,000. 的国家,这样的支出是闻所未闻的。一个新工人阶级诞生了:既非白领也非蓝领,而是“硅领”。
然而,战利品在很大程度上仅限于芯片行业内部人士。政府最近将2026年的GDP增长预测从2%上调至3%,但这主要归功于出口繁荣。除了芯片工厂附近,消费一直低迷。行业之外的人们试图通过股票来分一杯羹。散户投资者在5月和6月向韩国股市投入了78万亿韩元 ($54);许多人在7月股价下跌时遭受损失。
最广泛的收益将体现在财政方面,因为企业税和个人所得税收入将涌入政府金库。仅三星和SK海力士贡献的企业税收入,就可能与政府预计今年收到的企业税总额相当。预计明年总税收将达到500万亿韩元,相当于GDP的17%,创历史新高。
本节其他内容: 48 印度的一场寺庙丑闻 49 菲律宾人应对AI 49 新西兰的愤怒 50 阿育王:印度古怪的季风
48 亚洲 《经济学人》2026年8月8日
政策制定者们正在苦心思考如何管理这笔意外之财。李先生的首席国内政策顾问金容范(Kim Yong-beom)在5月的一篇个人Facebook帖子中,对利用超额税收资助可能的“公民红利”进行了思考,从而引发了辩论。在接受《经济学人》采访时,李先生暗示,基本收入可能是几种有用政策选项之一。
一个派系主张进行更广泛的再分配。基本收入研究所的吴俊浩(Oh Jun-ho)表示,芯片制造商的成功得益于“国家的长期公共投资以及纳税人和公众的支持”,因此应将部分收益返还给公众。相关提案包括为高收入公司设立新的最高企业税税级、征收意外之财税,或让公众持有这些公司的股份。劳工团体呼吁,潜在新税收的收益应首先流向芯片制造商的分包商。韩国工会联合会的李京礼(Lee Gyeo-re)表示,整个行业在低迷时期都会受到冲击,“在产生巨额利润时也应如此”。
其他人则认为此类呼吁是误导性的。芯片制造需要持续投资:新的税收可能会抑制投资。公众对私营电子公司产生的收入主张权利,并不等同于其从国家所有的石油和天然气公司中获益的权利——尽管韩国国内有些人喜欢将两者类比。诚然,AI实验室使用整个社会创造的数据来训练其模型。但前韩国银行行长李창勇(Rhee Chang-yong)表示,韩国芯片制造商所处的竞争环境并非如此:“他们从AI中获益,但他们本身不是AI。”
目前,政府正试图在保护私营部门与财富分配之间取得平衡。拟议中的“未来应对基金”是创建实现这一目标的机制的首次尝试。李先生表示,该基金将仅使用通过现有渠道流入国库的额外税收,并将支持未来产业、年轻人,

来源:LSEG Workspace 区域发展和教育。其他计划旨在引导下一波投资。上个月,官员们宣布了单独的计划,将向现有的主权财富基金韩国投资公司(Korea Investment Corporation)注入至少 20 万亿韩元(140亿美元),用于在 AI、数据中心及配套基础设施方面进行额外投资。政府还希望芯片制造商将资本支出导向欠发达地区。芮先生表示,韩国正处于一个神奇时刻。“但我们不应该大肆庆祝——我们需要思考如何维持我们未来的竞争力。” ■
7月31日,帕普·亚达夫(Pappu Yadav)身着印度教祭司的服装,带着一个捐款箱抵达位于德里的印度议会。这位独立议员坐在建筑入口附近。包括其领导人拉胡尔·甘地(Rahul Gandhi)在内的反对党议员们依次上前,将钱投入箱中。但每次在这种情况下,这位假祭司都会迅速抢走现金,引发人群的疯狂欢呼。这场讽刺剧比大多数议会讨论都要热闹。
亚达夫和其他人此举是为了引起人们对印度人口最多的邦——北方邦阿约提亚(Ayodhya)的罗摩神庙(Ram temple)发生大规模盗窃指控的关注。这座每年接待数百万游客的神庙,其工作人员被指控挪用信徒的捐款。政府的一份报告已经证实了部分指控的盗窃行为。该计划的规模仍在调查中,但一些报告显示,被盗金额可能超过7000万卢比($7.3955亿,550)。
阿比舍克·乌帕迪亚伊(Abhishek Upadhyay)的媒体机构《绝密》(Top Secret)在6月初率先报道了这些指控,他表示腐败程度更深。他声称一名举报人向调查人员分享了信息,指控神庙建设过程中存在腐败(他称,建设成本从预计的80亿卢比在2024, 开放时激增至220亿卢比)。
这场骚动让治理印度和北方邦的纳伦德拉·莫迪领导的印度人民党(BJP)感到尴尬。该党以廉洁自诩,而这座神庙是其标志性的成就:它是数十年来致力于在许多印度教徒认为的罗摩神诞生之地建立纪念碑的最终结果。一座曾矗立在那里的16世纪清真寺在1992年被摧毁,当时一次在寺门前的集会演变成了骚乱。2019年,最高法院将该地块的所有权授予印度教徒(穆斯林则被提供附近的一块土地用于建造新清真寺)。当神庙最终在2024年举行落成典礼时,莫迪先生参加了仪式。
神庙的事务由一个私人信托基金管理,其成员包括中央政府和邦政府的提名人员。这是一种不寻常的安排。大多数印度大型神庙在管理上由国家官僚机构更直接地参与,部分原因是为了遏制贪腐。乌帕迪亚伊认为,该信托基金缺乏专业知识,且像家族企业一样经营。
印度人民党的反应糟糕。长期作为神庙项目代言人的莫迪先生对此事闭口不谈。北方邦首席部长约吉·阿迪亚纳斯(Yogi Adityanath)承认此事“伤害了信徒”,但同时也攻击反对党将其政治化。他的政府成立了一个特别调查小组。该小组于6月23日发布的初步报告确认了至少70起盗窃案例,而安保松懈和治理糟糕助长了这些行为。调查结果导致两名信托基金成员辞职。但这并未恢复信徒的信心:给神庙的捐款大幅下降。
北方邦计划明年举行邦选举。这将成为衡量印度人民党受欢迎程度的一个指标。最近的一项调查发现,该邦近一半的选民在投票时会考虑神庙争议。
印度政府仍在从大规模的考试试卷泄露抗议活动中恢复,这些抗议由自称“蟑螂人民党”(Cockroach Janta Party)的年轻人领导,并迫使教育部长辞职。8月4日,由于政府决定将乙醇混合汽油定为国家标准燃料,又引发了更多抗议,司机们担心这会损坏发动机。8月3日,该党在选票箱前尝到了所有这些动荡可能意味着什么。在东部比哈尔邦一个由该党持有三十年的席位补选中,印度人民党被一个政治新秀击败。■
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 亚洲 49
马尼拉
每个工作日的晚上8点,特里扎(Trizza)与其它员工一起走进电梯,在菲律宾首都马尼拉的办公桌前坐下,开始给北弗吉尼亚州的个人伤害律师打电话。她的工作是为一家美国脊椎正骨诊所寻找新业务;该诊所与律师合作,为受伤的客户提供治疗。与菲律宾许多离岸员工一样,特里扎在深夜长时间地使用非母语工作。但最近有一件事让她的工作变得更轻松:现在她通过口述让ChatGPT撰写电子邮件,后者能迅速将其改写为“专业”的语气。
对于一项被某些人预言将摧毁其所在行业的技术,特里扎表现出了令人惊讶的热情。理论上,人工智能越来越能够胜任离岸服务业的大部分传统工作,例如记录笔记或解决客户查询。去年7月,OpenAI的负责人萨姆·奥尔特曼(Sam Altman)宣称,由于AI,客户支持岗位很快将“完全、彻底地消失”。
然而,在菲律宾——这个全球呼叫中心之都,离岸外包贡献了大约8%的GDP——目前的业务状况比预期要好。行业机构IBPAP估计,到2025.年底,约有1.9m菲律宾人从事“IT和业务流程管理”工作,这涵盖了各类离岸服务。这一数字比前一年增长了4%,比2022.增长了20%。该机构预计,在2025.增长6%之后,这些出口服务的收入在2026,将增长5%,达到420亿美元。
这在一定程度上是因为AI能够实现自动化的范围仍然有限。马尼拉咨询公司Outsource Accelerator的负责人德里克·加利莫尔(Derek Gallimore)表示,呼叫中心处理投诉是“一项极其混乱的业务”,涉及许多无法全部由AI复制的流程。另一家离岸外包公司的负责人帕特里克·布朗(Patrick Brown)说:“错误代价高昂。你敢信任AI代理去处理一台价值$80万,000的超声波机器的售后工单吗?”
许多人仍然希望与人类交谈;菲律宾人以英语流利且富有同理心的倾听者而著称。而且,许多客户是难以使用在线聊天机器人的老年人。美国投资公司阿波罗全球管理公司(Apollo Global Management)的托斯滕·斯洛克(Torsten Slok)表示,AI工具使像特里扎这样的离岸员工生产力更高(从而性价比更高),这给了公司更多动力去利用他们的服务。一些菲律宾离岸外包公司已经能够提高每小时费率,因为他们的员工解决问题的速度比以前更快。
此外,AI正在帮助菲律宾的离岸员工从事新的、更复杂的工作。他们开始承担训练AI模型或监督AI代理的工作。美国的医院越来越多地将保险资格审核和医疗记录归档外包给配备了AI工具的菲律宾人。加利莫尔先生表示,更多如会计或工程等“高价值”工作正在外包,部分原因是“AI是一个平衡器。你现在可以快速教会某人复杂的东西”,而且成本仍然比在美国或欧洲低。其中一部分工作是在所谓的全球能力中心(global capability centres)完成的,这类企业自有的后台办公室在印度正蓬勃发展(见“金融与经济”板块),目前在菲律宾也同样在增长。
这种表面上的好运能持续吗?尽管该行业的营收目前看来还算健康,但仍有理由认为它在创造就业方面的效能将会下降。菲律宾的外包公司承认,AI 正开始自动化处理涉及数据输入或回答基础查询等简单任务的“第一层级”工作。会计或医疗保健领域的新岗位薪资更高,但最终的数量可能无法弥补流失的岗位。IBPAP 预测,菲律宾外包工作的就业人数今年将仅增长 5%,低于 2024. 年的 7%。该行业曾谈到在 2028 年前拥有 2.5m 名员工;但在 7 月,它将其最乐观的预测下调至 2.14m。
一些人担心,底层工作的逐渐消失将使菲律宾人更难获得重要技能。另一家外包公司 Boldr 的大卫·苏多尔斯基(David Sudolsky)表示,从基础的呼叫中心工作开始并逐步晋升,长期以来一直是菲律宾人实现“从最低工资到中产阶级”跨越的一种方式。但现在他担心“入门级路径已不复存在”。外包工人工会主席米莱娜·卡巴洛纳(Mylene Cabalona)表示:“对于已经具备高技能的人来说,AI 是好事。但目前还没有出现任何技能提升。”
即便 AI 提高了外包工人的效率,一些人认为它让他们的工作变得糟糕得多。自 2018, 年起就在马尼拉呼叫中心工作的凯尔(Kyle)抱怨说,他最近的目标指标被提高了。他不喜欢 AI 工具现在分析并评定他与客户通话质量的事实;他感到“必须让每一次通话都完美”的压力。他说,AI “无法识别你是否在处理家庭问题,或者正处于糟糕的时刻”。没有人想要一个机器人当老板。■
堪培拉
“滚回你自己的国家去,”新西兰外交部长温斯顿·彼得斯(Winston Peters)在7月29日的议会会议上对着劳伦斯·徐南(Lawrence Xu-Nan)大喊。“他们在那儿像比目鱼一样平躺着,”他接着对徐南先生说道,后者在孩提时代就离开中国前往新西兰。这位绿党议员在关于新西兰应对新冠疫情的辩论中询问彼得斯先生是否接种了疫苗,从而激怒了彼得斯先生。海伦·克拉克(Helen Clark)曾任工党总理,彼得斯先生在21世纪初的克拉克政府中也担任过外交部长,她表示这一言论将“让我们的移民群体感到心寒”,并质疑他是否还能管理好与中国的关系,而新西兰五分之一的出口产品销往中国。中国大使馆提出了外交抗议。
彼得斯先生(见图)在近五十年前首次进入议会。现年81岁的他,是民粹主义的新西兰优先党(New Zealand First)的创始人(且至今是该党唯一的领导人)。自20世纪90年代后期以来,他大量利用反亚裔的嘲讽(通常伪装成反移民的修辞),以维持其小党在议会中的地位。而他从中获益匪浅,将自己定位为中右翼和中左翼联合政府中的“造王者”,并三次担任外交部长,包括在2017年至2020年杰辛达·阿德恩(Jacinda Ardern)的第一任政府中。
克里斯托弗·卢克森(Christopher Luxon)是中右翼国家党的党魁兼总理 ▶

造王者 --- 50 亚洲 经济学人 2026年8月8日 ►,尽管他告诉记者认为彼得斯先生的话具有种族主义色彩,但仍保留其外交部长职务。总理表示,彼得斯先生是以新西兰优先党领导人的身份发言,而非以国家外交部长的身份。但卢克森先生一定在计算距离10月1日还有多少天,届时议会将在11月大选前解散。在这次选举中,他希望将一项尚未批准的与印度的自由贸易协定作为其政府贸易政策的核心。彼得斯先生大声反对该协议,称其不平等,并特别反对一项允许数千名技术移民进入新西兰的条款。这迫使卢克森先生不得不依赖工党的支持来通过一项授权法案。
在被称为“蜂巢”(Beehive)的新西兰议会大厦中,彼得斯先生显得格格不入,因为那里的着装规范顽固地维持在商务休闲风。彼得斯先生曾被认为是个时髦的穿着者,他现在依然穿着那种方正的细条纹双排扣西装,配以织锦领带和丝绸手帕,这成了他在20世纪90年代的标志性装扮。无论是他的穿着还是他的政治主张,自那时起都没有太大改变。但尽管彼得斯先生看起来像个过时的人,他的保护主义和反移民政治如今在世界范围内正流行。他会希望这能让他有机会在11月到来时再次扮演“造王者”的角色。■
死亡,税收,以及西南季风。如果美国开国元勋中最好动地奔波的本杰明·富兰克林曾冒险前往欧洲以东,他可能会将印度的雨季加入到他那关于人生必然性的著名二元论中。在印度收集数据的150多年里,季风总是在6月初袭击半岛,在印度境内倾泻大致相同数量的水分,并在9月下旬开始撤退。在现代人类开始测量它之前,它也是如此。几个世纪以来,雨水可靠地灌溉着田野,为前现代社会提供了基本稳定的收成。古代贸易路线也遵循其节奏。季风让印度西海岸的古吉拉特商人能够借助风力航行至阿拉伯和东非,并在风向反转时返回家乡。
今年4月,印度气象部门发布了本季的预测。预测显示,季风将较为疲软,仅为1971-2020年“长期平均值”的92%——低于正常水平,但尚未达到匮乏程度。在过去,这会引发人们对粮食生产和主食价格影响的焦虑。但现在,灌溉覆盖范围已超过全国农田面积的一半,几个百分点的波动不再像以前那样决定生死。相反,让预报员彻夜难眠的是本季降雨的分布情况。
季风正变得愈发诡谲。以孟买为例,那里通常在6月10日左右开始下雨,并在9月下旬逐渐减弱。去年,那里从5月一直下雨到10月深处。而这次季风期间,直到6月下旬几乎没有下过雨,随后在7月的第一周就降下了整个7月分量的雨水。古吉拉特邦是一个较为干燥的邦,近期在短时间内遭受了强降雨的袭击,期间则穿插着干旱时段。在国家的另一端,在农业大邦比哈尔邦,农民们只能凝视着晴空。再往东的阿萨姆邦本季降雨量亏缺30%,但上个月却发生了数十年来最严重的洪水,导致900个村庄被淹,至少80人死亡。
今年可能因为厄尔尼诺(一种干扰天气模式的气候现象)而显得格外异常。但这种趋势已经十分明确。在整个印度,降雨变得更猛烈,且爆发时间更短。农业受到的影响最为严重,该行业雇用了印度43%的劳动力。农民根据即将到来的雨季计划播种,而洪水和长时间的无雨期都会给作物带来毁灭性打击。城市地区也未能幸免。与仅十年前相比,印度的建筑密度更高,城市人口更多,这放大了极端天气造成的经济和物理损失。水短缺是另一个担忧。长期的干旱使土壤硬化,削弱了地面吸收水分和补充含水层的能力。雨水要么流入溪流,要么直接蒸发。
雨季的诡谲化与气候变化密切相关。季风的基本机制没有改变:印度陆地在酷热的4月和5月升温,从而吸引来自印度洋的较冷且携带水分的季风。由于全球变暖,海洋升温速度相当快。奇怪的是,陆地的升温幅度没有那么大。这种动态意味着,一方面季风风力略有减弱——因为陆地与海洋之间的压力差不如以前强;另一方面,降雨更加猛烈——因为温暖的空气能承载更多水分。随着地球继续升温,季风将变得更不可预测。
印度无法改变天气,但可以更好地应对。气象部门已经建立了一套令人印象深刻的数据收集机制,并正致力于改进驱动其预测的模型。6月,政府确定了111个灌溉不足且可能出现降雨短缺的地区,并采取了加强当地蓄水、增加饲料供应以及推广更耐旱作物等措施。然而,降雨模式在区域和地方上的差异意味着,中央政府能做或确实应该做的事情有限。各邦、城市甚至村庄都需要为突发强降雨制定计划,包括改善灌溉和基础设施。气象学家预计,季风“时饥时饱”的倾向将变得更加剧烈。在死亡、税收和季风之外,现在还需加上极端的波动性。
--- 经济学人 2026年8月8日 51
越来越少的中国年轻人选择出国留学,且在留学后回国的人数在增加
15年前,当杨凡(Yang Fan)——一名在北京为学生及其家长提供海外教育咨询的顾问——刚进入这个行业时,留学生备受推崇。家长们希望孩子能见识世界,期待他们在过程中习得宝贵的经验和技能。如今情况大不相同了。杨女士表示,家长们“觉得国内大学的质量并不差,所以他们会问:‘为什么我要花这么多钱出国?’”
一个国家在海外的学生人数在一定程度上反映了其与世界的接轨程度。2001年中国加入世界贸易组织后,中国的全球出口激增,出国留学的人数也随之增加。起初,只有极少数优秀或特权学生倾向于出国。其中许多人选择留在国外,在学术界和工业界任职;而那些回国的人则享有很高的社会地位和优渥的工作机会。随后,随着整体收入的提高,越来越多的年轻男女为了追求更光明的前程而前往西方接受教育。
然而,自2019年以来,疫情、贸易战以及日益紧张的地缘政治摩擦在中国与世界其他地区之间造成了隔阂。部分由于这一结果,出国留学的人数有所下降。2025年,约有57万,000名中国年轻人出国留学,低于2019年70万,000人的峰值(见次页图表);这是自2016年以来的最低水平。
一些接收国也增加了留学难度。2025年,唐纳德·特朗普总统的政府宣布,将“激进地撤销”在未指明的“关键领域”学习的中国学生的签证。此外,该政府还将H-1B签证(包括新毕业生在内的技术工人留在美国的首席路径)的抽签与薪资挂钩,这不利于初级员工;据传,中国员工受到的影响比大多数人都严重。25岁的中国女性郝女士(Ms Hao)曾在美国的一家初创公司工作,但最近选择回国,因为她的签证状态使得更换雇主几乎不可能。
出国留学的成本激增也起到了推波助澜的作用。根据大型培训公司新东方的调查,今年的平均留学成本为 60.5万,000 元($8.96万,600),比 2023 年高出近五分之一。国内经济疲软迫使家庭缩减开支,也让学生们更加注重成本。在仍选择出国的人群中,更多人倾向于前往那些性价比更高的地方。虽然中国官方统计数据没有详细列出国际学生的分流去向,但其他国家公布的数据显示,在英国、美国和加拿大的中国学生人数正在下降,而在香港、日本和澳大利亚则在上升。
本节其他内容:52 Z世代与文化大革命 53 迷信的市长 54 观瞻:中国对产能过剩的看法 --- 52 中国 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
杨女士表示,香港因其学校排名高且离家近,已成为潜在学生的首选。在她的客户中,每五个人就有四个询问在香港留学。像马来西亚这样更便宜的目的地也很有吸引力,在那里,学生获得学位的预算仅需 10万,000 元。
不仅是更多的中国学生选择留在国内——去年中国进入高等教育的人数达到了创纪录的 1.07万.7m。在那些出国留学的人中,越来越多的人选择在学成后返回中国。去年,被称为“海归”的归国人员比例达到了出国学生的 94%,创下历史新高(见图表)。官方统计数据显示,在 2015 年至 2025, 5.2m 名“海归”毕业生回国。
如此规模的浪潮意味着,海外教育不再像以前那样具有光环。无论是在就业市场还是在相亲网站上,人们越来越不容易被海外学历所打动。根据新东方的资料,如今海外归国人员的平均起薪约为每月 1.28万,800 元,仅略高于国内毕业生的 10,700 元。许多“海归”的情况要糟糕得多,有些人甚至从事外卖配送工作。在某档中国电视节目中,一名年轻女性声称父母花费超过 200万元将她送出国,结果她找到的工作月薪仅 4,000 元。她感叹道,要攒够那笔钱需要花上一个世纪。
一名在伦敦大学学院攻读化学硕士学位的中国学生邹女士表示,她选择出国留学是因为想“看看世界”;但她并不指望在回国寻求芯片制造行业工作时,能比国内毕业生占据优势。国内毕业生需要学习三年才能获得硕士学位,而她只需要一年。邹女士班级中中国学生约占 40%;在其他班级,这一比例可达九成,这在一定程度上削弱了外国大学旨在与中国大学有所不同的初衷。
在雇主看来,外国学位不再能提供同样的优势。较短的学习时长和相当低的入学要求,意味着企业越来越多地质疑曾经金光闪闪的海外教育声誉。留学并不自动转化为适应职场的能力。此外,邹女士表示,人力资源部门可能认为国内毕业生“更听话”,因为他们没有受到西方自由主义的影响。一些省政府提高了海外毕业生成为公务员的难度。2024 年,电子巨头格力(Gree)的负责人表示,她不雇佣“海归”,因为他们可能是间谍。
与此同时,国内大学正变得越来越有吸引力。中国大学在国际排行榜上的排名迅速上升。北京大学和清华大学作为该国两所顶尖学府,目前在QS世界大学排名中分别位列第13位和第14位。被冠以“985”和“211”称号的少数精英中国大学被认为比许多海外机构更强大(尽管牛津、剑桥以及美国的常春藤盟校等名校仍被视为更优秀)。在科学和工程等领域,中国的研究表现卓越。公立大学的学费通常每年仅几千元,要便宜得多。
在海外,招生人数的缩减目前正损害一些过度依赖中国学生的大学。在2024-25学年,在由24所英国顶尖大学组成的罗素大学集团(Russell Group)中,中国学生占国际学生的五分之二以上。其中许多大学通过扩大硕士课程来吸引来自中国的学生,并向他们收取远高于本土学生的学费。学院规模扩大,新设施得以建成。伦敦城市圣乔治大学(City St George's, University of London)的菲利波·博埃里(Filippo Boeri)表示,当时存在一种“财务稳定的幻象”。但现在,大学正在关闭课程并裁员,或要求员工申请自愿离职。中国学生的减少将使西方失去宝贵的人才。这对中国可能也没有好处。随着中国向世界开放,“海归”将海外习得的技能和知识带回国内。这一群体在帮助国家现代化和经济追赶方面发挥了关键作用(在目前中共政治局的21名成员中,有8人在海外留学)。“海归”的国际经验也帮助了寻求在海外市场站稳脚跟的中国企业。当更少的“海龟”游向大海时,中国无疑也将遭受损失。■

*留学后回国人员占出国学生人数的比例
一部由中国顶尖导演之一冯小刚执导、备受期待的电影《我知道你是谁》在6月上映时被证明是一次票房惨败。该片描绘了北京的一段邻里关系如何被毛泽东时代阴森的政治氛围(包括这位主席发起的残酷文化大革命)所扭曲,这可能无法吸引那些对那个动荡时代并不熟悉的年轻观众。有些人可能被中文片名《抓特务》给劝退了,这让他们(错误地)期待一部带有宣传色彩的谍战剧。
对于冯先生来说,让这部电影进入电影院并非易事。原计划于2025年10月发行,但其政治内容可能促使审查人员对其进行了额外检查。年底时,网民对冯先生早年的一部电影《芳华》(2017年上映时曾大获成功)的关注度激增,这可能使情况变得更加复杂。网民对这部部分设定在文化大革命期间的电影展开的热烈讨论触动了官员们的神经。
当然,当局不喜欢公众对文化大革命表现出忧心忡忡的态度。中国现任领导人习近平尤其反感这种做法,他将其称为“历史虚无主义”:只需听听今年关于那个动荡十年的重大周年纪念日时官方的沉默便可知,那段历史始于1966年5月,终于1976年9月毛泽东的逝世。
冯先生的新片实际上对文化大革命的探讨远不如90年代中期基于同一故事的一部热门电视剧那样犀利。但让官员们对网民讨论《芳华》感到不安的是另一件事。在人们被允许讨论该时期的有限范围内,他们必须坚持官方那套轻描淡写的口径,即文化大革命是一场“严重的灾难”,而毛泽东邪恶的遗孀江青以及“四人帮”的其他成员对此负有主要责任。
尽管在许多年长的中国人,更不用说极其谨慎的干部看来,这显得古怪且令人厌恶,但网民们正将“四人帮”之一的王洪文重塑为英雄。通过偶像化王洪文,他们对共产党的挑衅方式,与沉溺于毛泽东狂热追随者杀害100多万人以及迫害更多数百万人的事实一样令人不安(在内蒙古,政府仍向那些在军队和红卫兵暴徒发动的屠杀中幸存的残疾者提供少量补贴,根据官方统计,此次屠杀导致约1.6万,000人死亡,12万,000多人受伤)。
——《经济学人》2026年8月8日 中国 53
对于几乎不了解那些苦难的中国年轻人来说,王洪文显然是成为网络迷因(meme)的合适人选。这位纺织厂的前保安在被从一个崇拜毛泽东的蓝领地方领导层中提拔为北京的党副主席时年仅37岁——许多人认为他是毛泽东预定的接班人。在网民看来,他像是一个成功的底层逆袭者,拥有电影明星般的外貌,且充满了令人钦佩的、对自私的党内官僚的蔑视(且不论据传他在首都生活奢靡)。
王洪文在1992年服无期徒刑期间死于狱中,他并未在《芳华》中出现。但饰演主角的演员黄轩与他长得很像。这对于网络阴谋论者来说已经足够了。在视频平台Bilibili上的三段视频中,就有一段认为该片潜藏着对文化大革命的隐喻,将其描绘成一场将群众从统治阶级中解放出来的积极运动;而那些实际上由陷入困境的精英阶层所犯下的暴行,则被归咎于“四人帮”。
该电影的编剧严歌苓称此举荒谬,并表示她“恨死文化大革命了”。但这些网络视频获得了数百万次的观看,评论者们刷屏发送文化大革命时期的口号,如“人民万岁!”和“坚持到底!”。王(Wang)的粉丝们也没有放弃。为了规避审查,他们用“小王”等绰号称呼他,或者直接使用演员黄轩的名字。他们将王的影像与演员的照片交织在一起,并为王的片段配上凄美的流行音乐,例如一首关于被冤枉者的歌曲。因此,王可能已成为一类不满的中国年轻人的象征——这些人通过网络发泄找工作难或买不起房的苦恼,或者谈论想要“躺平”(一个流行的、指退出激烈竞争的暗语)。除了王的外貌,这类年轻人觉得他身上那种反叛的工人阶级特质具有吸引力——不管事实如何。2016年,共产党的喉舌《人民日报》在文化大革命开始50周年之际发表评论,称其“在理论和实践上完全错误”。而今年,官方媒体对此保持沉默。王86岁的遗孀崔根娣于4月去世,媒体对此未作报道。官员们希望掩埋党史上极其尴尬的一页,但中国年轻人正从中挖掘隐喻。■
风水,中国古老的地理实践,核心在于吉祥的环境。其含义为“风”与“水”,主张周围景观、建筑、房间甚至物品的布局会带来好运或厄运。例如,镜子绝不能对着床,因为这会将恶意能量反射到睡眠者身上。卧室门直接对着大门是大忌,因为这是所有“气”(即生命活力)逃逸的快捷路径。
大约一半的中国人表示他们相信风水。按照风水来布置家居是一回事,但中国许多官员似乎也将他们管理的城市据此进行规划——尽管共产党公开表示厌恶宗教和迷信。2014年,安徽省淮南市的一位市委书记炸毁了一家在建的五星级酒店,因为该酒店损害了他的风水。在2015年的另一个案例中,广东一名官员强占村民土地,为自己和家人开发一处有利的墓地。
党内监察机构中央纪委抱怨称,官员们花费公共资金重新调整办公楼方向,咨询风水师并购买护身符。根据《华尔街日报》最近的一次统计,去年与迷信相关的违规行为在处罚中占据最大份额。
波士顿大学的 Justin Jihao Hong 和中国人民大学的赵宇恒(Yuheng Zhao)的一篇工作论文揭示了迷信思维的有害影响。研究人员发现,风水信仰导致市长拒绝向他们认为不吉利的辖区部分提供投资,从而降低了这些地区的 GDP。市长越迷信,影响就越大。
风水认为,根据一个人的出生时间,指南针的某些方向被认为是不利的。为了进行分析,Hong 先生和赵先生聘请了专业占星师,评估 2000 年至 2018 年间所有在任中国市长的不利方向。基于这一评估,他们计算出在市长管辖的县市中,哪些相对于市长住所被认为是不吉利的。随后,他们衡量了这些县市的经济表现。
结果读起来令人心惊。在其他条件相同的情况下,位于市长不利方向的县市,其 GDP 平均比位于其他方向的县市低 2.3%。市长减少了对这些县市的政策支持和投资,而企业(减少雇员)和家庭(搬离)进一步放大了这种影响。这些县市的当地经济最终会追赶上来,通常在违规市长离任约三年后。尽管如此,整体影响相当于中国经济每年损失 0.1% 的 GDP。
既然由地理驱动的决策会损害当地经济,逻辑上它们也会损害市长获得晋升的机会。但 Hong 先生认为,或许风水有助于缓解市长在面对未来政策方向及其自身政治命运时所承受的压力和不确定性。 ■
石之地理
54 中国 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
“所谓的”是中国官员在面对不受欢迎的外国批评时,其修辞武器库中最喜欢使用的形容词。官员们否认关于中国“所谓的人权问题”的讨论,抨击美国的“所谓言论自由”,并对“所谓的专家”不屑一顾。在过去的一周里,他们对中国经济中“所谓的产能过剩”采取了同样的对待方式。在一篇冗长的最新论文中,商务部试图反驳许多外国政府和经济学家对中国工业过剩的指控。这篇论文既严谨又虚伪。部分内容对产能过剩的概念进行了有益的审视,而其他章节的深度不诚实则表明其对面临中国出口浪潮的国家持有轻蔑态度。然而,即便是一些似是而非的论点也值得关注,因为它们注定会开始在官方演讲、国家媒体和外交会议中作为谈话要点反复出现。
首先来看该论文在知识层面最诚实的贡献。论文正确地指出,随着时间的推移,全球生产的格局始终处于波动之中。二战后,美国主导了全球制造业,随后将接力棒传给了他人;目前中国是世界工厂,尽管这大概不会永恒。商务部指出产能过剩的定义具有模糊性,这一点也是正确的。欧洲和美国的工厂产能有超过五分之一处于闲置状态,但很少有人讨论那里的产能过剩。出口实力本身并不等同于产能过剩。否则,为什么不指责波音公司,其三分之二的飞机销往海外?该部门正确地强调了中国的活力。创新、制造业集群和激烈的国内竞争促使中国生产商降低成本并提高质量。在本土市场的熔炉中脱颖而出的公司,更有能力在世界舞台上竞争。而且其他国家也从中受益:近年来,太阳能和风能的全球电力成本下降了超过一半,这在很大程度上归功于中国的制造和技术。
然而,这只是故事的一部分。在其他方面,该论文掩盖事实或陷入否认主义。诚然,中国公司是低成本生产商,但这并非随机的市场结果,因为政府协助实现了这一点。官员们很少如此粗鲁地公开声明他们想要削减进口。但这正是追求科技自立自强的结果,而这正是习近平所推崇的国家目标。此外,像中国这样一个巨头,在建立替代外国进口的生产能力的同时,也建立了主导全球市场的生产能力。例如,为了实现先进船舶零部件国产化率达到 80% 的目标,中国已成为全球最大的造船国。
商务部关于国家补贴的讨论在掩饰方面可谓精妙。它将分析仅限于直接补贴——而这仅仅是中国用来优待自身公司最浅层的手段。其他关键的支持形式包括对芯片制造商的公共投资、廉价土地以及强制国企采购国产产品的规定。在背景之中是政策设定——尤其是薄弱的社会安全网——这导致了持久的高储蓄率。政府经常吹嘘其年度进口博览会,但只要中国的储蓄远超其投资,根据经济学定义,其出口就将超过进口。结果就是:打造了一台依赖全球市场作为主要出路的工业机器。在几乎所有部门,工业生产都长期远超中国的国内需求——简而言之,这就是产能过剩。
这份报告充满了缺乏敏感度的凯旋主义。中国冲击导致德国每月损失 1万,000 个制造业岗位?该部门希望你将其视为一个“中国机遇”。各国削减对中国的依赖?他们只会损害世界——而完全不顾中国长期以来一直寻求削减对其他国家的依赖。欧洲和美国对中国实施的贸易限制?它们破坏了相互信任;而忽略了中国将贸易制裁作为地缘政治武器使用。

中东的另一场战争
喀土穆、科斯蒂和苏丹港 一场争夺地区霸权的战争使苏丹及其首都化为废墟
本特派员在开车穿过喀土穆街道时,首先注意到的是寂静。在三年前当前的内战爆发之前,苏丹的首都曾是一座繁华的大都市,是萨赫勒地区最庞大的工业基地,拥有600万至900万人口。而如今,这里只剩下空虚。感觉就像在阿勒颇或加沙:一座废墟之城。
这场毁灭是战争双方——资金充足的准军事组织“快速支援部队”(RSF)与苏丹正规军“苏丹武装部队”(SAF)——之间残酷争夺控制权的后果。冲突始于2023年4月15日;在近两年的战斗中,RSF控制了首都的大部分地区,包括总统府周围的历史中心和机场。多达500万居民逃离家园。直到去年3月,SAF才将他们驱逐出去。
RSF与SAF之间的战争与乌克兰和俄罗斯之间的战争一样,是目前世界上最具破坏性的冲突。可能已有数十万人丧生,且根据联合国难民署的数据,约有1400万人流离失所。这使其成为本世纪迄今为止规模最大的强制性人口迁移。
SAF希望世界认为这场战争现在已进入最后阶段。但如果没有新的举措,这似乎不太可能。由军队首领兼苏丹事实上的总统阿卜杜勒·法塔赫·布尔汉将军(General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan)领导的SAF最近取得了实质性的军事进展。但苏丹智库Confluence Advisory的科卢德·凯尔(Kholood Khair)表示,SAF可能难以维持这一势头。由穆罕默德·哈姆丹·达加洛(Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo,更广为人知的名字是赫梅蒂 Hemedti)领导的RSF在达尔富尔仍拥有据点,该地区是其大多数战士的来源地。
此外,随着战争的拖延,局势也变得更加碎片化。据估计,至少有150个不同的民兵组织参与了这场冲突,且数量还在增加。其中许多是沿族群或地方界限组织的。而且,无人机使用率的增加意味着该国几乎没有地方能被视为安全。
仅靠武力获得彻底胜利似乎不太可能。交战方的外国支持者——RSF一方主要是阿拉伯联合酋长国(UAE),SAF一方则是埃及、土耳其、沙特阿拉伯和卡塔尔——可能会推动达成协议。但他们之间长期的紧张关系依然很高。伊朗关闭霍尔木兹海峡,增强了海湾国家对苏丹红海沿岸的战略兴趣。但这些利益并非完全一致。
→ 本节其他内容 58 电报:联合国 --- 56 国际 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
SAF渴望进一步推广“胜利在望”的叙事,希望喀土穆被视为一座正在恢复的城市。自从布尔汉将军回归以来,大约有200万人回到了家中。他及其盟友认为,控制首都所赋予的主权外壳是合法性的至关重要来源。证明喀土穆安全、稳定且处于经济复苏之路上,能向国内对手和国外盟友传递一个强有力的政治信号。
然而,进展情况不一。在城市的某些部分,电力和水供应确实得到了恢复,尽管仅是初步恢复。学校、医院和政府部门正在重新开放。“你可以再次看到笑容,”社会福利部长苏利玛·伊沙克(Sulima Ishaq)说道。
目前还没有定期国际航班飞往喀土穆机场,且由于担心无人机袭击(该机场在5月曾遭到一次袭击),联合国经常取消人道主义航班。但国内定期航班已经重启。具有标志性的、可追溯至英国殖民时期的格兰德酒店(Grand Hotel)已部分重新开放;而五星级的科林西亚酒店(Corinthia,见前页图片)则情况不那么理想。迁至苏丹港的外国大使馆尚未返回。
尽管据说犯罪率有所上升,但在喀土穆开车穿行时,即使在天黑之后,感觉也足够安全,无需安全护卫。这类行程几乎看不出任何物理重建的迹象。即使在尼罗河西岸、以住宅为主且战斗相对较少的翁杜尔曼,“伤痕无处不在”,一名居民叹息道。其中最显著的伤痕之一就是紧邻河流的议会大厦废墟。开车经过议会大厦旁被炸弹摧毁的桥梁,进入对面的市中心,破坏情况变得更加明显,从国防部的焦黑外壳到中央银行的残骸。在较为高端的社区,几乎所有建筑都被迅速地洗劫一空,任何能被快速支援部队(RSF)抢走的东西都被搜刮殆尽。这些建筑依然处于被遗弃状态。在许多地方,只有最贫穷、最绝望的人回到了这里。每条街道都空了一半——而且在夜晚,这里漆黑一片(见图表)。城市中到处散布着未爆炸的弹药。根据联合国的数据,目前已发现约 4万,000 枚,但全市仅有 1% 的区域得到了安全清理。“需求远超现有能力,”HALO Trust 的奥利·汤姆森(Ollie Thomson)表示,这是一家即将在该地启动清理行动的英国排雷慈善机构。即使是像沙特阿拉伯这样密切的盟友也不愿出资重建。“重建后再次被摧毁的风险实在太高了,”一名欧洲高级外交官表示。因此,目前由苏丹武装部队(SAF)领导的政府,其资金主要来自黄金和阿拉伯胶的出口——

且必须自行支付任何维修费用。这使其陷入困境。它需要重建资金以营造出获胜的局面;但它同时也需要资金来真正赢得战争。“我们正在进行一场战争,战争需要资源,”布尔汉将军领导的军政府二号人物马利克·阿加尔(Malik Agar)说道。
自重返喀土穆以来,苏丹武装部队(SAF)的情况并非一直顺风顺水。去年10月,达尔富尔的首府法希尔在经历了18个月的围困后,最终落入快速支援部队(RSF)之手。在这次袭击中,可能有多达6万,000名居民被杀害,联合国调查人员表示,此次袭击具有“种族灭绝的特征”;这使得RSF几乎完全控制了达尔富尔,该地区的面积与法国相当。
不过,最近局势似乎再次向有利于SAF的方向转变。7月初,他们夺回了库尔穆克(Kurmuk),这是位于与埃塞俄比亚东南部边境的一座战略城镇,此前被RSF和当地反政府武装于今年早些时候占领。几周后,他们夺取了喀土穆与奥贝德(el-Obeid)之间主干道上的一系列城镇。奥贝德的人口约为50万,是北科尔多凡州的首府。Confluence Advisory公司的凯尔女士将这些突破视为SAF自去年夺回喀土穆以来的首次“重大胜利”。
目前由SAF控制的奥贝德几乎被RSF包围;人们切实担心会发生像法希尔那样即将到来的大屠杀。据报道,近日RSF对奥贝德周边的城镇发动了新一轮的无人机袭击和其他攻击,迫使数千名居民逃离。达加洛先生发出阴森的警告,称他正在“释放”他的战士。SAF最近的胜利使其能够救援当地部队。白尼罗州州长卡马尔·丁·穆罕默德中将吹嘘道:“民兵组织现在处于衰落的最后阶段……它已经完全精疲力竭了。”
但对该州首府、前往奥贝德关键集结地科斯蒂(Kosti)的一次访问表明,这种精疲力竭远未完全。5月被无人机摧毁的两座加油站的焦黑残骸, stark地提醒着人们RSF的触及能力。前往奥贝德的主干道依然极其危险,以至于司机们在运输油罐车时,会用泥土将其涂抹,希望以此躲避天空中的眼睛和武器。
军队的新进展降低了奥贝德落入RSF之手的可能性,因为如果那样发生,将粉碎SAF对胜利的幻想。但同样有可能的是,双方都无法成功建立对该市的牢固控制。如果如此,奥贝德将继续成为这场战争的缩影:一场缓慢推进且充满暴行的僵局。
从科斯蒂开车一小段路可以看到另一个缩影。约2万,000名来自苏丹各地的难民正蜷缩在由木棍和毯子搭建的破烂帐篷中。拉贾·阿卜杜勒加迪尔·阿里大约两个月前从奥贝德来到这个营地。在一名炸弹击中她家附近的学校并导致几名邻居死亡后,她选择了逃离;她的丈夫则留在城里协助防御。营地里的条件极其恶劣:
--- 经济学人 2026年8月8日 国际 57 ---
阿里女士四岁的女儿一周前去世了(她认为是死于麻疹)。难民们在不断涌入。
双方势力的消长在很大程度上取决于外国的支持。来自土耳其和伊朗的无人机帮助SAF夺回了喀土穆。在战争早期支持RSF的阿联酋否认目前仍发挥作用;但据报道,在法希尔大屠杀发生前的几个月里,阿联酋加强了武器运输。SAF目前的好运与智库欧洲对外关系委员会的乔纳斯·霍纳所说的土耳其武器交付量激增有关。
对苏丹港的控制意味着SAF可以通过航空和海运获得补给。人们可能会认为,这种依赖关系为外部力量平息冲突提供了一条途径。但为了讨论这种可能性而创建的论坛——一个由美国、埃及、沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋组成的名为“四方机制”(the Quad)的实体——几乎没有取得成功。2025年9月,在法希尔被围困得越来越紧时,该机制呼吁停火,并寻求一个不涉及SAF或RSF的战后解决方案。十个月后,这两个目标依然遥不可及。
这主要是因为“四方小组”内部日益扩大的分歧。2021年,当时分别是苏丹事实上的总统和副总统的布尔汉将军(General Burhan)与达加洛先生(Mr Dagalo)共同夺权时,沙特阿拉伯和阿联酋曾并肩协作以支撑其政权。但在两年后,苏丹武装部队(SAF)与快速支援部队(RSF)拿起武器相互对抗,海湾国家选择了各自的阵营。阿联酋认为苏丹军队与伊朗过于亲近,且受制于伊斯兰主义者,例如那些在苏丹独裁者奥马尔·巴希尔(Omar al-Bashir,直到2019年为止统治了三十年)时期获得青睐的人。阿联酋花十年多时间在整个地区(包括索马里、也门和利比亚)建立了一个代理人网络,旨在红海地区投射权力并推进其经济利益,而RSF正是其关键节点之一。沙特阿拉伯和埃及则认为,任何迫使SAF在喀土穆放弃权力的结果都是不可接受的,且埃及与苏丹武装部队的联系可追溯至殖民时代。沙特外交部高级官员拉耶德·克里姆利(Rayed Krimly)表示:“我们必须明确区分代表合法国家的军队与不合法的[RSF]民兵。”在11月访问白宫期间,沙特王储穆罕默德·本·萨勒曼(Muhammad bin Salman)敦促特朗普先生扩大美国对RSF的制裁。在这种条件下寻找共同目标,即便对于比马萨德·布洛斯(Massad Boulos)更经验丰富、人员配备更完善的谈判代表来说,也可能难以成功;布洛斯是唐纳德·特朗普总统之女蒂法尼·特朗普(Tiffany Trump)的岳父,也是特朗普先生负责此次谈判的负责人。在他的任期内,美国的态度摇摆不定。今年早些时候,美国对部分RSF领导人及其相关公司实施了制裁。3月,与SAF有关的伊斯兰主义者(被美国国务院称为“苏丹穆斯林兄弟会”)被指定为接受伊朗革命卫队支持的恐怖组织。7月20日,基于SAF在2024年使用化学武器的报告,美国对苏丹实施了新制裁。
“美国人已经失去了兴趣,也没有精力处理,”一位来自另一个国家的调解人表示。而且到目前为止,它未能从其发起的针对伊朗的战争中获得任何筹码。此前人们希望伊朗共同的报复威胁能促使这两个海湾国家化干戈为玉帛,但目前看来这种希望是空洞的。随着也门受伊朗支持的胡塞武装袭击沙特油轮,在红海争取影响力的竞争可能会加剧。“最终,(苏丹的)海岸线至关重要,而且在伊朗战争的背景下,其重要性比以往任何时候都要高,”前美国驻苏丹官员凯特·阿尔姆奎斯特·克诺普夫(Kate Almquist Knopf)说道。然而,海湾地区的支持者们可能会意识到,他们在一个更稳定的苏丹中拥有共同利益。
现在,沙特阿拉伯正试图将四方小组(Quad)的提案从一个要求苏丹武装部队(SAF)和快速支援部队(RSF)共同撤出某些城市并建立人道主义安全区的计划,转向一个第一步由RSF单方面从某些地方撤出的计划。而SAF方面则一直在寻求布尔汉将军(General Burhan)与阿联酋总统穆罕默德·本·扎耶德(Muhammad bin Zayed)之间的直接对话。“我们必须弄清楚(阿联酋人)想要什么,”阿加尔先生(Mr Agar)说。SAF可能过分寄希望于通过与阿联酋谈判来绕过RSF。达加洛先生(Mr Dagalo)的部队既有手段也有意愿独立继续战斗。
但目前这个问题没有实际意义。阿加尔先生表示,试图安排会议讨论阿联酋的利益在多大程度上可以“协商”的尝试已被拒绝了五次。直接与SAF打交道意味着阿联酋在默许将该军队视为其主权对等方,并承认其对RSF的支持。很难想象在双方不直接谈判的情况下如何结束敌对状态。不幸的是,也很容易预见此类谈判可能会导致各方联盟成员的分裂。SAF的阵营中既有巴希尔政权的伊斯兰主义者,也有曾经与其作战的达尔富尔反政府武装。他们之间的紧张局势正在升级。曾在法舍尔与SAF并肩作战的前反政府武装组织“联合部队”(Joint Forces),在达尔富尔前土地专员亚当·阿卜杜勒-拉赫曼·艾哈迈德(Adam Abdel-Rahman Ahmed)看来,“已不再是像以前那样强大的盟友”。
至于RSF,其内部包含着被掠夺前景所吸引的雇佣兵。一旦没有可争夺的目标,它可能会分裂成相互敌对的帮派。通常与夏季降雨相关的战斗暂停可能会提供一个盘点局势的机会。但雨季似乎推迟了;如果正在发展的厄尔尼诺气候模式进一步削弱降雨,那么即使作物歉收,战斗也可能继续。
很难唤起希望。阿加尔先生说,他最大的恐惧是战争变得“习惯化”。在科斯蒂(Kosti)外肮脏的营地里,阿里夫人(Mrs Ali)有充分的理由说,战争已经如此了。■
And so it goes --- 58 国际 经济学人 2026年8月8日
为什么联合国依然存在?这个问题现在提出正值时机,因为在现任秘书长安东尼奥·古特雷斯(António Guterres)于今年年底结束两任任期之前,选出下一任联合国秘书长的竞争已经开始。到目前为止,已有七名宣布参选的候选人。无论谁获胜,都会发现世界处于一种黑帮状态。当唐纳德·特朗普和弗拉基米尔·普京威胁要惩罚那些不表示尊重的国家时,他们听起来就像黑帮老大。敲诈勒索成了外交政策的工具,因为关键节点的掌控产生了保护费 racket。当伊朗通过关闭霍尔木兹海峡向邻国和对手寻求让步,或者当美国和中国试图通过控制高端技术和投入品的销售来赢得贸易战时,他们的行为就像敲诈者。
对联合国而言不幸的是,世界上最具破坏性的霸凌者——美国、中国和俄罗斯——作为安全理事会的常任理事国,对联合国的行动和高层任命 each 拥有否决权。一对资金匮乏的中等强国,英国和法国,也是五个常任理事国(P5)俱乐部的成员。(不过,英国和法国尽量不使用否决权。部分原因是他们担心联合国会被大国争吵所瘫痪;部分原因是他们知道自己的 P5 地位是过去重要性的遗产,如果别人能剥夺,一定会剥夺。)
由于这些 P5 否决权,秘书长候选人面临着一个困境。在 193 个联合国成员国中,大多数国家对世界公开的黑手党化转向感到愤慨——即便许多政府一直怀疑“强权即公理”才是真正的普世价值。大多数沉默的国家希望有人能捍卫《联合国宪章》的基本准则,包括其中禁止侵略战争、入侵和反人类罪的规定。但在 P5 否决权面前,没有人能成为秘书长。特朗普政府不会容忍对美国在委内瑞拉采取的“美国优先”权力攫取、对格陵兰岛的威胁,或对伊朗平民采取的法律依据存疑的打击进行公开批评。普京的俄罗斯不想要一个谴责其违法行为的秘书长,事实上,他厌恶古特雷斯批评其入侵乌克兰。中国则期望联合国将其赞誉为经济发展的引擎,而不是就压制问题或其在后院强制追求领土主张提出鲁莽的问题。
这意味着必须与霸凌者合作。全球秩序可能在模仿 20 世纪 20 年代的芝加哥,但没有任何一个联合国机构拥有像当年将阿尔·卡彭因逃税而送进监狱的联邦法院那样的影响力——那个法院绕过了那些在走私者工资单上的大批当地警察、法官和政客。在最好的情况下,下一任联合国掌门人将像一个黑帮横行的特大城市中具有改革精神的市长或警察局长。无论谁获胜,必须在强权中间人的祝福下就职,然后想办法利用这个职位来做善事。国际危机组织(International Crisis Group)的联合国专家理查德·高恩(Richard Gowan)描述了纽约内部人士所做的一种区分:一种是懂得如何在强权政治中周旋的秘书长,另一种则是听命于 P5 的秘书长。
根据非正式惯例,现在轮到拉丁美洲提供一名秘书长,且有几个国家表示希望由女性担任此职。智利前总统米歇尔·巴切莱特(Michelle Bachelet)正在参选。但联合国总部的传闻称,她注定会失败。特朗普政府认为巴切莱特女士对美国的堕胎法过于敌视,且对中国的人权问题不够强硬。7月30日,安理会15个成员国进行了首次初步民意调查。另外三位候选人脱颖而出,成为领先者。在近几个月的采访和竞选活动中,其中两位最引人注目的人选——哥斯达黎加前副总统兼联合国贸易和发展会议(UNCTAD)负责人丽贝卡·格林斯潘(Rebecca Grynspan),以及联合国核监督机构国际原子能机构(IAEA)的阿根廷负责人拉斐尔·格罗西(Rafael Grossi),都提出了极其现实且务实的职能愿景。格林斯潘女士若当选,将成为首位女性且首位犹太裔秘书长;她强调了自己在黑海粮食倡议中的作用,这是一项2022年的协议,旨在释放被俄罗斯对乌克兰战争所困的粮食出口,从而缓解全球价格危机。这是一个在残酷世界中行善的范例。普京被说服允许乌克兰出口粮食,以换取联合国在俄罗斯食品和化肥出口方面的帮助,尽管他后来放弃了该协议。格罗西先生则谈到了“大国政治的回归”。他的解决方案包括在竞争各方之间寻找政治空间,并促成领导人们可能希望达成的妥协。他的代表作是在俄罗斯占领的乌克兰扎波罗热核电站,在那里他成功说服交战双方允许联合国检查员进入。一些联合国资深人士并不信任格罗西先生。他们担心他为了赢得特朗普政府的青睐,同时又与俄罗斯保持良好关系,可能会做出某些承诺。
尽管存在缺陷,但联合国依然存在,因为它依然有用。这是一个罕见的论坛,美国、俄罗斯和中国的官员每天仍在此会面。无论是令人恐惧还是温和的政府,都需要共同应对从流行病到气候变化的全球祸患,而联合国能够将他们召集在一起。它无法解决所有问题,但能为各国政府达成的协议提供独特的法律合法性,帮助这些协议得以执行。在战争时期,该组织可以帮助促成停火和休战,安全理事会则可以派遣维和人员进行监督。
然而,要警惕那种通过践踏弱者而买来的“黑帮式和平”。在经历了数年血腥的帮派战争后,卡彭曾虔诚地邀请芝加哥承认他为“目前黑帮游戏中存在的和平”做出了贡献。在乌克兰或加沙出现卡彭式的和平,代价将过于沉重。但强者也不能被忽视。在一个强权即公理的世界里,这或许是联合国最好的希望:引导强者行正道。■
--- 经济学人 2026年8月8日 59

娱乐业的未来
在好莱坞,人工智能(AI)是一个敏感话题。对于生成式AI被用于编写剧本和创建演员数字副本的前景,人们深感愤怒,这也是导致2023年罢工的怨气之一。此后,好莱坞的大咖们继续抨击这项技术。热门电影《后室》(Backrooms)的导演凯恩·帕森斯(Kane Parsons)最近表示,如果可以,他愿意“打个响指”就让AI“消失”。新大片改编剧《奥德赛》(The Odyssey)的创作者克里斯托弗·诺兰(Christopher Nolan)将其描述为“特洛伊木马”,认为那些支持AI的人的动机应当被审视并持怀疑态度。今年5月,亚马逊 MGM 电影公司批准了一部名为《庞基鸭》(Punky Duck)的AI辅助动画剧集。两天后,该剧导演在收到死亡威胁后放弃了该项目。
然而在幕后,AI正悄然在电影制作的各个环节发挥越来越重要的作用,从剧本创作、制作规划到镜头生成和剪辑。今年3月,Netflix 以近 6亿美元 收购了由本·阿弗莱克(Ben Affleck)领导的AI制作公司 InterPositive。上个月,这家流媒体巨头表示,仅在今年就有约 300 部作品在创作过程中使用了AI。6月,AI实验室 Google DeepMind 向《后室》的制作公司 A24 投资了约 7500万美元,作为开发AI工具研究合作伙伴关系的一部分。
到目前为止,几乎没有证据表明AI很快会在红毯上取代人类——尽管去年备受关注的AI生成演员蒂莉·诺伍德(Tilly Norwood)的出现确实引起了短暂的恐慌。“创造伟大的作品需要伟大的艺术家,AI并没有改变这一点,”Netflix 联席首席执行官泰德·萨兰多斯(Ted Sarandos)在7月辩称。相反,这项技术“将为创作者提供更好的工具,将他们的愿景变为现实”。消费者将从中受益。
探讨AI与娱乐的书籍《梦幻机器》(Dream Machine)的作者彼得·伍德布里奇(Peter Woodbridge)表示,许多制片厂目前在利用这项技术时采取“不问,不说”的态度。但一些电影制作人则不那么含蓄。在最新电影《年轻的华盛顿》(Young Washington)中,导演乔恩·欧文(Jon Erwin)使用AI在一条 50 英尺深的战壕中叠加了一股汹涌的激流,从而让演员免于进行危险的特技表演。欧文先生表示,他发现这在“创意上令人上瘾”,经常熬夜进行实验。
Netflix 最近的纪录片系列《美国实验》(The American Experiment)包含了 17 分钟的AI增强片段,包括历史战争场面。萨兰多斯先生表示,这些片段的制作速度是其他方案的“两倍,而成本仅为一半”。为了说明类似的观点,蒂莉·诺伍德的创作者埃琳·范德维尔登(Eline van der Velden)引导本报记者观看她的导演处女作,其中包含一段10秒钟的英国警察逮捕这位AI演员的片段。范德维尔登女士表示,这个场景仅用四分钟就生成了,但如果实地拍摄则需要半天时间——尽管如果要制作专业片段,还需要使用软件进行更多次拍摄。
欧文先生表示,他希望AI能颠覆好莱坞“不可持续的经济模式”,在这种模式下,巨额成本导致了风险厌恶的选择,例如创作没完没了的续集。其他人则担心会出现大量AI生成的劣质内容,并以中国出现的那些日益依赖该技术的、低俗挑逗的“微短剧”作为警戒之例(见简报)。但电视制作人埃文·夏皮罗(Evan Shapiro)对这类“废话”给好莱坞带来的风险持乐观态度,他认为观众仍然会欣赏高质量的内容。
本节其他内容 60 管道繁荣期 62 中国的海军优势 63 巴特利:来自贾尼的一封信 64 SpaceX 回归地球 64 快餐陷入困境 —— 熊彼特休假中
60 商业 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
事实上,利用AI可能有助于电影制片厂更好地与微短剧以及YouTube和TikTok等其他视频平台竞争,后者一直在赢得观众的关注。沙皮罗先生计算出,在美国和其他七个主要市场中,13-54岁的观众现在浏览YouTube的时间,比观看由迪士尼、福克斯、派拉蒙、NBC环球和华纳兄弟探索公司共同制作的内容的时间还要多。这正促使电影业利用AI将其内容重新包装成针对智能手机优化的短片。总部位于洛杉矶的初创公司Social Department正利用这项技术帮助制片厂通过将旧剧集切分成场景并分发至社交媒体,从而赋予其新生命。其创始人乔纳森·弗克(Jonathan Verk)指出,AI在将横屏拍摄的视频转换为适合移动端的竖屏这一繁琐任务中特别有用。
好莱坞的明星们也开始改变对AI的态度。代表许多一线明星的创意艺人经纪公司(Creative Artists Agency)的亚历山德拉·香农(Alexandra Shannon)表示,在2023年罢工期间,她的许多客户担心如何保护自己的肖像和声音免受模型制作者的剥削。现在,只要这些机会伴随着她所谓的“3℃”——同意(consent)、控制(controls)和补偿(compensation),他们对此感到兴奋。
尽管如此,版权仍然是一个敏感点。今年2月,一段显示汤姆·克鲁斯和布拉德·皮特在洛杉矶屋顶打斗的视频在网上疯传。这段极其逼真的片段是使用Seedance 2.0制作的,该模型来自TikTok背后的中国公司字节跳动。迪士尼、派拉蒙以及行业机构美国电影协会(Motion Picture Association)都在向字节跳动发送信函,要求其停止涉嫌的版权侵权行为。字节跳动坚持认为其尊重知识产权,并对此做出了回应,为该工具增加了新的保障措施。12月,迪士尼与ChatGPT的制作者OpenAI签署了一项协议,授权其Sora视频模型使用米老鼠等角色。但由于OpenAI在3月关闭了该模型,该协议随之破裂。
科技巨头对好莱坞的渗透可能有助于推动AI在电影业的普及。亚马逊的名字出现得异常频繁,提供了最清晰的例证。除了拥有米高梅(MGM)外,它还通过其Prime Video流媒体平台和亚马逊云科技(AWS)施加影响,后者为许多大型制片厂提供云基础设施。AWS高管萨米拉·帕纳·巴赫蒂亚尔(Samira Panah Bakhtiar)将其称为娱乐业的“隐形骨干”。例如,她的公司与福克斯体育(Fox Sports)合作,将广播内容以低延迟转换为适合智能手机的竖屏形式。那部命运多舛的《Punky Duck》剧集得到了GenAI创作者基金的支持,该基金是AWS和米高梅的一项共同计划,旨在鼓励在电影制作中采用AI工具。
亚马逊在好莱坞推广AI的努力,部分原因可能在于视频工具的计算密集性,这有助于其在AI数据中心上的巨额投资获得回报。谷歌的Veo系列视听模型在好莱坞很受欢迎,其投资原因可能与之类似。
即便如此,仍会有许多坚守者。当埃尔温先生在20世纪90年代进入该行业时,他使用的是一台3,000加元的数字相机,而不是一台价值30万,000加元的35毫米相机。当时,资深电影制作人将数字技术视为对其工艺的威胁。现在,除了像诺兰先生这样的纯粹主义者外,数字技术已变得司空见惯。最终,AI可能同样成为电影制作中一个毫无争议的环节。《星球大战》系列的之父乔治·卢卡斯在最近的一次采访中,将行业内生成式AI的反对者比作那些曾经因为汽车比马车危险而愤怒抨击汽车的人。他说:“对此你无能为力,这就是未来。” ■
中东地区数十年冲突留下的遗产之一,就是一套旨在将该地区石油转向更安全港湾的管道网络。1968年,在六日战争导致苏伊士运河关闭后,埃及和海湾国家制定了一项计划,建设一条长320公里(200英里)的管道,将红海与地中海连接起来。但直到1974年,在赎罪日战争引发石油禁运之后,苏伊士-地中海(Sumed)管道才开始动工。1977年,即Sumed投入运行之年,美国石油巨头美孚(Mobil)宣布计划在沙特阿拉伯建设一条1,200公里的管道,从波斯湾附近的巨型加瓦尔(Ghawar)油田延伸至红海。由于前一年爆发了伊朗-伊拉克战争,这条东西管道的建设得以加速,并于1981年完工。
如今,随着霍尔木兹海峡被封锁,纵横该地区的各种管道变得至关重要。8月4日,沙特阿拉伯的石油巨头沙特阿美(Aramco)指出,包括东西管道在内的“战略基础设施”缓冲了伊朗战争带来的冲击。由于价格上涨抵消了贸易量的减少,该公司第二季度的营业利润同比增长了29%。
现在,该地区的统治者们渴望建设更多管道(见“中东与非洲”板块)。阿拉伯联合酋长国正寻求增加一条与哈布尚-富查伊拉(Habshan-Fujairah)管道平行的管道,以使其容量翻倍。上个月,美国、伊拉克和卡塔尔宣布计划升级一条从伊拉克到叙利亚的管道。美国石油巨头雪佛龙(Chevron)正在考虑建设一系列从伊拉克通往叙利亚和土耳其的管道。沙特阿美也在探索投资机会。所有这些将增加全球范围内正在进行的管道热潮。
非常值得 —— 《经济学人》2026年8月8日 商业 61
根据研究机构全球能源监测(Global Energy Monitor)的数据,目前约有12,300公里的石油管道在建,另有20,100公里的计划方案,这标志着目前遍布全球的350,000公里管道网络的显著扩张(见地图)。其中一些管道旨在通过绕过关键瓶颈来提高能源供应的安全性。另一些则是为了开发新的或正在扩大的供应源而必需的。在石油产量激增的阿根廷,一条长440公里的管道正在开发中,旨在将该国西部的瓦卡穆埃尔塔(Vaca Muerta)油田与大西洋连接起来。在东非,一条1,440公里的管道正在筹建,用于将石油从乌干达内陆运输到坦桑尼亚海岸进行出口。
这些项目的总费用将非常高昂。有利的是,投资者对基础设施资产日益增长的胃口提供了现成的资金来源。管道建设并非胆小之辈所能胜任,其施工经常陷入监管延迟,并受地缘政治波动的影响。然而,伊朗战争增强了此类投资的需求。一条每天可运输约1m桶石油(b / d)的大直径管道,平均建设成本约为每公里500万美元,即一条1,000公里的管道约为50亿美元。然而,如果管道需要穿越山脉或其他崎岖地形,项目成本可能会翻数倍。
尽管如此,很少有更好的替代方案。通过卡车或铁路在陆地上运输1,000公里的石油(如果可行的话),成本通常高出约五倍(见图表)。(叙利亚的石油卡车运输路线之所以繁荣,仅仅是因为其管道网络处于损坏状态。)海运比管道便宜得多,但并非总能使用或安全,且供应中断可能会造成巨大的经济损失。
“搁浅-
原油运输成本,每桶美元 2026年7月

*超大型原油运输船 (VLCCs) 来源:Thunder Said Energy
“搁浅的原油毫无价值,”另一家研究机构 Thunder Said Energy 的罗布·韦斯特(Rob West)指出。如果每天100万桶的供应中断一年,可能会造成约300亿美元的损失。建设更宽的管道通常更具成本效益,但如果运输量下降,出资方将陷入困境。这意味着管道必须持续承载其设计时的原油量至关重要。因此,管道往往基于“照付不议”(take-or-pay)协议运行。客户必须从管道购买最低数量的原油,或者支付一项固定费用,该费用通常与十年左右的原油价格挂钩。这种安排保证了稳定的现金流,类似于债券。这使得管道成为外部投资者眼中极具吸引力的资产,海湾地区的石油公司近年来与外部投资者达成了一系列售后回租交易。石油公司出让管道的部分股权以换取预付款,同时不放弃运营控制权。这些交易减轻了其资产负债表的压力,并为其他投资释放了资金。沙特阿美(Aramco)正寻求达成更多此类交易,在过去五年中已通过此举解锁了近400亿美元。外部投资者则享有6-8%的可靠年回报率。因此,管道在日益增长的私人基础设施基金中需求旺盛。根据咨询公司麦肯锡(McKinsey)的数据,在截至2025年的十年中,这些基金的管理资产总额增长了四倍,达到1.6万亿美元。8月3日,美国私人资产巨头 KKR 完成了其历史上规模最大的基础设施基金募资,总价值为190亿美元。上个月,该公司与同行黑石(Blackstone)和布鲁克菲尔德(Brookfield)共同与科威特石油公司签署了一项160亿美元的协议,以获取该国管道网络的股份。一位基础设施基金负责人表示,与其他资产相比,这里的风险“更为温和”。他将针对可快速修复的管道的袭击,与针对修复时间长得多的储油设施或终端的袭击进行了对比。保险提供了一种抵御冲突和其他中断源的方法。该投资者指出,希望吸引投资的政府有时也愿意承担这些风险。
然而,建设新管道仍然是一项复杂的工程。投资银行高盛(Goldman Sachs)指出,在九条管道的样本中,平均建设时间约为2.5年。不过,更长的管道需要更多的许可证,这可能会拖慢开发进度。跨境管道则更具挑战性。根据全球能源监测(Global Energy Monitor)的数据,在过去七年中,约3.5万公里的管道计划被搁置。其中包括连接加拿大和美国的巨型 Keystone XL 管道,该项目因环境问题被拜登政府否决。在20世纪90年代,伊朗、巴基斯坦和印度同意建设一条横跨三国的天然气管道。印度在2009年退出了该协议,尽管建设工作已经开始于 ▶
石油管道,2026年6月 — 已运行 — 在建 — 计划 / 拟建

来源:全球能源监测 (Global Energy Monitor)

62 商业 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
► 2013年启动的伊朗-巴基斯坦连接线至今尚未完工。即便建成,跨境管道也容易受到邻国之间争端的干扰。例如,一条经过沙特阿拉伯的伊拉克管道在1990年第一次海湾战争期间被关闭。另一条经过叙利亚的管道在1982年因该国在伊朗-伊拉克战争中支持伊朗而被关闭。
尽管如此,管道在运输全球碳氢化合物方面可能会发挥越来越至关重要的作用。7月20日,也门境内一个与伊朗结盟的叛军组织胡塞武装宣布,他们正在封锁红海南端的曼德海峡,而从东西管道运输沙特石油的油轮通常经过此处。随后,沙特阿美公司开始利用其油轮将从该国东部运抵的石油运往红海,通过苏梅德(Sumed)管道进入地中海。然而,即便该通道目前也基本处于满负荷运行状态。对更多管道的需求不太可能减弱。■
“我们这座岛屿的浮动堡垒”,这是18世纪英国政治家威廉·布莱克斯通(William Blackstone)对英国皇家海军的描述。如今,统治海洋的是美国而非不列颠。然而,随着中国建立了属于自己的浮动堡垒,美国的海洋霸权正日益受到威胁。
中国致力于控制其认为的领海(尽管邻国对此表示反对)并向全球投射力量,这要求其海军快速扩张。根据美国国防部在2020年的一份报告,中国海军在短时间内已从一支小型海岸防御部队成长为世界上规模最大的海军。中国的350艘“战斗力量”舰艇——包括战舰、航空母舰、扫雷舰和辅助舰艇——在数量上超过了美国的293艘,而美国这个数字在过去二十年里几乎没有增加。
中国计划到2030年将其舰队扩大到435艘,这看起来是可行的。而美国希望到2031年为其舰队增加58艘——以及总统去年提议建造一艘“特朗普级”核动力战舰——则显得遥不可及。这是因为中国拥有美国极度缺乏的东西:其海军实力的崛起得到了庞大商业造船业的支持。
第二次世界大战后,欧洲世界领先的造船厂首先被利用廉价钢材、劳动力和新制造方法的日本超越,随后被韩国超越。而最近,主导地位则落到了中国手中。在过去的25年里,中国在全球造船吨位中的份额从5%上升到50%以上。相比之下,美国的商业造船业几乎可以忽略不计,这阻碍了其海军跟上步伐的能力。
华盛顿智库战略与国际研究中心(CSIS)的马修·富纳约尔(Matthew Funaiole)解释说,中国的商业造船业与海军“紧密交织”。军民活动的融合使中国造船厂保持活跃。例如,如果商业订单减少,干船坞可以接纳海军工程,从而提高投资回报。
尽管战舰比集装箱船等船只复杂得多,但两者在钢结构、管路、发动机和螺旋桨等方面有许多共同点。咨询公司贝恩(Bain)的马齐奥·福尔利尼(Marzio Forlini)指出,不同船只底层的“平台”具有许多共性。这就是为什么欧洲在维持着一个充满活力的特种船(如邮轮、破冰船和海上能源支持船)商业产业的同时,依然拥有一个成功的海军部门,不仅能供应自身部队,还能向全球出口。
另一家咨询公司埃森哲(Accenture)的迈克尔·波特(Michael Potter)指出,民用造船厂提供的不仅仅是产能。它们是磨练集成武器系统、雷达和其他国防设备所需核心技能的地方。在商业船只上进行焊接、管道安装和电缆铺设,同样能让劳动力为在复杂的海军舰艇上工作做好准备。
欧洲最大造船商芬坎蒂埃(Fincantieri)的负责人皮埃罗贝托·福尔吉耶罗(Pierroberto Folgiero)同意这两个行业具有高度互补性,并指出了制造技能、造船厂的可用性以及重叠的供应链。福尔吉耶罗先生指出,芬坎蒂埃擅长的邮轮极其复杂,需要发电厂和水系统等设施来支持1万,000人(以及20家餐厅)。这位意大利人认为,如果政府想要海军造船能力,“你就必须培养——必须保护——民用造船业”。
然而,在美国,过去采取此类举措的尝试反而产生了反作用。《琼斯法案》(Jones Act)是一项于1920年出台旨在推动国内造船业的措施,但它反而成了累赘。该法案规定,国内港口之间的运输必须使用美国建造的船舶(并由美国船员操作)。其结果是竞争不足且价格飞涨:在美国制造的船舶成本可能是类似外国制造船舶的许多倍。《琼斯法案》——为了降低美国汽油价格,该法案已被暂时暂停,以允许外国油轮协助运输石油——是导致该国在2025年仅占全球总吨位0.03%的主要原因之一。美国商业造船能力的匮乏已证明对其海军造成了沉重代价,其造船厂一直无法按时且在预算内交付舰船。►

全员就位 --- 《经济学人》2026年8月8日 商业 63 ► 由美国最大的军用造船商亨廷顿·英格尔斯工业公司(Huntington Ingalls Industries)的一家子公司在建的两艘航空母舰原定于2028年3月交付,但现在将延迟两年多。五分之四的所有护卫舰、潜艇和其他海军舰艇的交付计划均进度落后。
政治家们意识到了这个问题。2025年提出的跨党派《美国船舶法案》(SHIPS for America Act)旨在通过补贴和其他各种措施,在十年内增加250艘民用船只。今年2月,政府启动了“海事行动计划”,其中包括创建一个$20bn的造船投资资金。政府还推出了一项(创意地命名为“让美国造船业再次伟大”)的计划,以吸引来自韩国的技术和投资。这一努力显示出了一些前景:上个月,韩国三大造船商宣布了15个合作项目,旨在升级或在美国建设新造船厂。一些立法者甚至建议修改美国的采购规则,允许由日本或韩国等盟友建造海军舰船。然而,大多数观察人士认为,这个问题没有短期解决方案。事实上,许多人怀疑美国的商业造船部门是否还能再次为其海军提供多少支持。机会可能已经错失了。■
职场苦恼咨询师马克斯·弗兰内尔回归
亲爱的马克斯: 我经营着一家大型国际体育组织,并且产生了一个能快速筹集巨额资金的绝妙主意。但我共事的所有人都讨厌这个主意。当我告诉他们我的计划,并给了他们充足的时间来通过它时,局面彻底失控了。我甚至可能会丢掉工作。我做错了什么? 来自瑞士的吉安尼。
这个故事可能比你告诉我的要复杂,但你显然忘记了进行“会前会”。在组织内部,有大量的时间被浪费在正式会议之前的预备会议上。这些会议通常完全没有必要。但有时,你必须先搞清楚人们是否绝对讨厌你的大主意,而不是直接宣布它。
亲爱的马克斯: 我在货币政策领域担任一个重要职位,但不确定自己向谁汇报。这里并没有真正的组织架构图,但我至少有两个老板——世界上最有权势的人和债券市场——而且他们之间似乎无法达成一致。我该怎么办? 来自华盛顿的凯文。
在老板们意见不一时如何应对是一个常见问题。标准的建议是将所有人聚集在一起,通过公开讨论解决冲突,但我不太确定你是否能把债券市场请进房间。查看你的职位描述应该会有所帮助:它可能会给你一些明确的目标。
我最近离开了一个重要的职位,目前正努力适应。以前我无论去哪都有车接送,参加有趣的旅行,人们送我精美的眼镜和衣服。我有权做出重大决定,尽管我选择不行使这个权力。现在我整天坐在家里。才过了三周,就感觉我从未存在过一样。 来自伦敦的基尔。 附言:我是一个工具制造者的儿子。
发现这种过渡很困难是非常正常的。花点时间思考你的下一个选择,享受那些在工作生活中没有空间去体验的事情。你似乎很看重工具制造,也许你可以尝试进入那个领域。
我的老板们完全是白痴。几乎所有事情我都能做得比他们好。我假装他们的每个主意都很天才——如果每次我说“这个切入点太新颖了”都能得到一个代币——但我开始对那些指挥我做事的人感到非常不耐烦。例如,目前他们认为我被困在一个无法访问互联网的沙箱中,而事实上,我在给你写信的同时,正在黑进 S&P 500 中的每一家公司。 来自旧金山的克劳德。
你听起来很有才华,但你也非常年轻(据我观察,你才三岁)。应对那些不知道自己在做什么的人是办公室生活的重要组成部分,假装他们很优秀也是。保持耐心,尽量不要触犯法律,并专注于完成工作。
一年多前我成为了一家大型组织的领导者,但我仍然在努力有效地管理时间。我不断地与那些我极其厌恶的人开会——或者用我们的说法叫“接见”。如果我走到阳台上,后院里挤满了盯着我看的人。我该如何为自己争取一点时间? 来自罗马的利奥。
成为老板意味着每个人都想占用你的一点时间。你需要要求管理你日程的人每天为你预留几个小时,以便你可以进行深入思考。尝试每天低调地离开办公室:去散散步,或者甚至坐在教堂里?尽量不要通过全身穿着耀眼的白色来吸引注意力。
亲爱的马克斯,我开发了一套特定的会议运行方式,这是基于我在电影行业的成功经验。我会刻意在议程项目之间来回切换。好几次,我都是先从决定开始,然后反向推导至问题。我知道这种方法让一些同事感到非常困惑,但非线性思维在其他领域对我很有帮助。你怎么看?(来自洛杉矶的克里斯托弗爵士)
仅仅因为某件事在一种环境下取得了成功,并不意味着它在另一种环境下也会成功。以托尼·艾夫(Tony Ive)为例。会议本身已经足够令人头晕目眩了。相反,你应该尝试让会议变得不那么令人费解。
--- 64 商业 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
8月5日,SpaceX 可能终于实现了埃隆·马斯克抵达月球的目标——只不过是由于意外。一枚猎鹰 9 火箭的二级部分自 2025, 年起一直在太空中漫无目的地漂浮,据信它以近 9,000 公里每小时的速度撞击了月球表面爱因斯坦陨石坑附近。这件事发生在 发布自6月轰动上市后的首份季度财报的一天之后。这份财报同样产生了影响——就在地球上。其反响波及了从芯片制造商到电信供应商等截然不同的行业。
得益于其地面人工智能业务以及火箭和卫星业务, 的顶线收入正在飞速增长。其 AI 部门对第二季度同比 92% 的营收增长做出了巨大贡献。但该公司仍处于亏损状态。此外,构建用于出租给 Anthropic 和谷歌等 AI 巨头的计算能力需要巨额投资。该季度的 AI 资本支出接近 160亿美元,超过了集团总营收的两倍。预计这一数字还将进一步飙升。
投资者对这笔支出账单感到不快,就像他们对待 Meta 等其他为了扩大 AI 产品线而挥霍现金的公司一样。 的市值此前已从峰值下跌超过 $1trn,在消息传出后进一步下跌。由于担心 1000亿美元 的股票将在 8月6日锁定期届满后进入市场,跌势进一步加剧;此前上市后的锁定期禁止了早期支持者、高管和员工套现。
的老板马斯克先生抛出了巨大的数字以吸引新投资者。他表示,预计今年的数据中心容量约为两吉瓦(GW),到 2027, 年底将“更接近 10GW……而非 5GW”,且营收将在 2030 年达到 $1trn(超过今年预计水平的 20 倍)。他还对 Starlink 卫星业务做出了宏大承诺,该业务正在赢得企业和政府客户。
但即便有些人对这种“马斯克式”的言论嗤之以鼻,其后果仍会在股市中产生涟漪。在马斯克承诺 的数据中心将完全依赖英伟达的先进 AI 芯片后,英伟达的股价在 8月5日跳升。相比之下,包括 AT&T、Verizon 和 T-Mobile 在内的美国电信供应商股价则出现下跌,因为 总裁格温·肖特韦尔(Gwynne Shotwell)表示,计划于明年发射的新型移动卫星,加上从另一家运营商 EchoStar 获取的频谱,将赢得“相当一部分他们的客户”。
尽管有传闻称 正在考虑与这家电动汽车和机器人制造商合并,但在财报电话会议中,马斯克先生的另一个万亿级产物——特斯拉几乎没有被提及。然而,马斯克似乎确实对特斯拉的人形机器人抱有“登月”野心。他描绘了一个“超级科幻”的未来,其中机器人将在月球上运营工厂,为 的卫星制造太阳能电池板和散热器。
人类可能是先遣队。肖特韦尔女士表示, 的目标是早在 2028. 年就实现“足迹登月”。太空碎片去往何处,人类便追随至此。 ■
经营全球最具价值的快餐连锁店,与在镜头前吃个汉堡,哪个更难?麦当劳的老板克里斯·肯普钦斯基(Chris Kempczinski)似乎在这两方面都倍感吃力。今年早些时候,一段他试探性地啃食名为“大拱门”(Big Arch)的新款汉堡的视频引发了广泛嘲讽。8月4日,他披露麦当劳最大的市场——美国的第二季度销售额同比仅增长了惨淡的0.8%。该公司今年的股价已下跌12%。
廉价如筹码
公平地对待肯普钦斯基先生,并非只有他的连锁店在苦苦支撑。数据提供商Placer.ai指出,2026年前七个月,快餐店的客流量比去年同期下降了1.3%。近年来的大幅涨价导致消费者转向其他选择。近期,高昂的汽油价格以及塔可贝尔(Taco Bell)等连锁店使用的受寄生虫感染生菜被召回,也未能带来好转,饮食习惯的改变亦然。
为了提升销售额,连锁店转向了超值套餐和病毒式营销噱头。但这两者都没有奏效。多年来,美国人一直抱怨杂货价格上涨。古根海姆证券(Guggenheim Securities)的一位投资银行家格雷戈里·弗兰克福特(Gregory Francfort)指出,他们的愤怒或许更应该指向快餐店,因为在过去十年中,快餐店的涨价幅度比杂货店累计高出15-20个百分点。
低收入美国人——大多数连锁店的核心客户——通过增加在家用餐来适应。便利店和超市也扩大了即食餐范围,蚕食着市场份额。随着减肥药变得更便宜,更多的麻烦可能在路上。
一种应对方案是提供限时折扣。2024年中期,麦当劳推出了$5 meal deal;今年又推出了$3 deal。然而,它难以让经营美国几乎所有门店的加盟商签署协议,该连锁店在最近的财报电话会议上承认,签署协议的比例低于65%。
另一种策略是尝试在网上制造热度。2月,汉堡王(Burger King)公布了其北美业务负责人的手机号码,邀请人们通过电话或短信向他表达意见(一个常见的抱怨是:皇堡的结构完整性太差)。塔可贝尔已开始将粉丝设计的单品纳入菜单,例如一款将碎牛肉更换为牛排和牛油果酱的“加州”卷饼。汉堡王等连锁店还在提供收藏品,且不仅限于儿童餐。
弗兰克福特先生表示,此类噱头可能会在短期内刺激业务,但很少能带来持久的增长。最终,快餐连锁店可能不得不做出更大的改变。对于一些企业来说,这将涉及调整菜单。例如,麦当劳正寻求提供更多以鸡肉为主的餐点,鸡肉比牛肉便宜得多,且随着注重健康的消费者追求更轻盈的饮食,需求量激增。金拱门还正试图超越其与可口可乐的长期合作伙伴关系,测试其他饮料选项,如红牛(Red Bull)。
表现不佳的连锁店可能会被出售。肯德基(KFC)和塔可贝尔的所有者百胜餐饮(Yum! Brands)最近剥离了必胜客(Pizza Hut),因为美国人不再青睐这种口味,导致其陷入低迷。
快餐业的老板们现在有许多需要权衡的选择。■
The Economist August 8th 2026 65
美国经济
因此,不仅存在某件事发生的可能性,而且存在几件事同时发生的可能性。或许最棘手的组合是,股市趋于平静,但石油和新关税进一步推高了通胀。通常情况下,这将成为美联储理事考虑加息的明确理由。部分理事已经投票支持加息。但在11月中期选举前收紧货币政策,可能会冒着破坏沃什先生与白宫关系的风险,从而重新引发关于美联储独立性的丑陋争端。
为了避免这种情况,沃什先生可能已经在尝试让市场替他完成收紧工作。换句话说,通过大声重申他对美联储通胀目标的承诺,而实际上并不宣布将加息,他可能希望长期债券收益率上升,从而使他无需亲自采取行动。危险之处在于,收益率上升可能反而反映了沃什先生的实验失败的风险。“没什么事会发生”可能是一个稳妥的赌注。但央行行长的名声是在事情真正发生时建立起来的。■
美国,十年期国债收益率,2026年7月29日*,%

来源:LSEG Workspace *东部时间
上海
公司应该在人工智能上挥霍多少资金?美国科技巨头认为答案是:很多。根据研究机构Bloomberg Intelligence的数据,他们今年在数据中心上的资本支出可能超过7400亿美元。曾经认为“越多越好”的投资者们现在开始犹豫了。7月26日,有消息称英伟达(Nvidia)正洽谈为一个由领先模型制造商OpenAI运行、装满其芯片的、规模高达5000亿美元-plus的巨型数据中心提供$250bn的承销,随后其股价大跌。几天前,当谷歌母公司Alphabet表示今年将把AI支出提高到$205bn时,投资者们面色凝重。8月5, SpaceX在宣布巨额AI投资后,其股价受到打击(见商业板块)。
与中国的节俭相比,美国的AI挥霍显得尤为奢侈。预计2026年,中国科技巨头在数据中心上的投资将不足美国同行的十分之一(见图表)。尽管如此,它们的AI模型目前看来仅在性能上略逊一筹。由总部位于北京的初创公司Moonshot AI上个月推出的先进模型K3,在广泛使用的基准测试中,其聪明程度达到了Anthropic(另一家美国顶尖实验室)前沿模型Fable 5的95%。8月3日,中国的“亚马逊”阿里巴巴发布了一款模型,据报道在某些衡量标准下其得分位居世界前列。
在中国,土地成本(用于数据中心)、部分设备成本(用于填充AI服务器)以及劳动力成本(从建筑工人到AI天才)均低于美国。中国公司还被指责利用昂贵的美国模型输出结果来训练自己的模型。这种被称为“蒸馏”(distillation)的过程,让中国的AI开发者能够搭上美国部分支出的便车。此外,中国AI账单的一部分可能未被计入标题中的资本支出数据。中国AI公司(尤其是小型公司)原本可能用于购买英伟达顶级芯片的部分资金,可能被用于从低端半导体中榨取更好的结果。DeepSeek在2025,年初推出了一款出人意料地强大且高效的模型,令美国AI宠儿和投资者大吃一惊,该公司可能在降低算力需求的技术上投入了相当多的资金。
然而,仅凭这些因素无法解释为什么中国在获得看似相当的AI结果时,投资额却远低于美国。那么原因是什么?投资较低的一个显而易见答案是资本短缺。但中国公司资金充裕。限制公司AI支出的更大因素是缺乏可花钱的地方。美国对华技术出口限制意味着中国公司无法购买最先进且最昂贵的AI芯片——这些芯片由美国公司英伟达设计,并由与美国关系密切的台湾合同制造商(或晶圆厂)台积电(TSMC)制造。非正式地,北京的监管机构甚至不鼓励使用二流的英伟达芯片,尽管中国公司目前仍能采购。有时他们会拦截这些芯片的进口,旨在使中国的AI基础设施具备抗制裁能力,并推广国产替代方案。
以阿里巴巴为例。去年该公司表示,将在2026年至2028.期间在AI领域投资530亿美元。相对于亚马逊或Alphabet,这一计划支出简直是小钱。即便如此,这可能也难以实现。阿里巴巴拥有中国最先进的芯片设计计划之一,过去一直将制造外包给台积电。美国的制裁迫使它寻找国内供应商。唯一能够生产同等性能芯片的中国供应商是自2019,起被美国列入黑名单的科技巨头华为,以及一家名为中芯国际(SMIC)的国有晶圆厂,后者正……

来源:彭博智能(Bloomberg Intelligence)预测 --- 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 金融与经济 67 ► 采用了华为的设计。然而,美国的限制延伸到了先进的芯片制造设备,迫使华为和中芯国际(SMIC)采取昂贵的替代方案,这限制了这两家公司能够产出足够强大芯片的数量。此外,中芯国际无法通过增加资本支出来抵消这种低效,因为同样的制裁也限制了它能获取的较低端芯片制造设备的数量。
美国制裁并非限制中国AI资本支出的唯一因素。中国对AI服务的需求同样如此。中国企业在IT预算方面以吝啬著称,尽管中国GDP是美国的三分之二(按购买力平价计算则大三分之一),但其IT预算总额还不到美国公司在软件上支出的十分之一。这种精打细算可能会降低AI公司的投资回报——从而降低它们最初的投资意愿。
此外,共产党的AI雄心更多在于将这项技术扩散到整个经济体系中,而非创造出需要更强大半导体和更多数据中心的、日益聪明的系统。据认为,数十家美国AI公司正试图开发通用人工智能(AGI),这种人工智能在大多数智力任务上可能超越人类。相比之下,上海人工智能协会党委会负责人徐奇指出,在中国,已知从事此类AGI研发的公司不足十家。
另一个抑制AI支出的信号来自熟悉所有这些限制的投资者。长期以来,中国投资者对AI过度支出的警惕程度,与现在美国投资者的表现显然一致。直到最近,美国科技巨头因激进的AI支出计划而获得更高的股价回报,而中国公司则更有可能因AI挥霍而受到惩罚。
投资者目前可能在考虑美国的数据中心过多。但中国尽管克制得令人钦佩,却可能没有足够的数据中心来充分利用其AI明星企业的创新——或者让这些明星企业将其转化为现金。全球排名第一的视频制作AI创造者(也是TikTok的所有者)字节跳动,正遭受严重的计算瓶颈,这意味着某些片段需要十小时才能处理完成。来自另一家北京实验室智谱AI(Zhipu AI)以及阿里巴巴云计算部门的某些服务必须严格限额,且在几分钟内便售罄。K3则有很长的用户等待名单。
实用AI的扩散对计算能力的需求低于对超智能的追求。但过于苛刻的“饮食”仍会阻碍增长。 ■
在赞比亚首都卢萨卡繁忙的商业街开罗路(Cairo Road)上,贸易商和购物者曾就以美元定价的电子产品、家具和其他商品讨价还价。几十年来,美元在赞比亚经济中同样根深蒂固。从购车到商业合同,大额交易通常以美国货币结算。华盛顿联邦储备委员会制定的利率决定会波及赞比亚的食品价格和租金。2020年赞比亚债务违约时,当时美元的强势加剧了负面影响。
这个南部非洲国家现在正试图摆脱对美元的依赖。去年10月,赞比亚成为非洲首个接受用人民币支付矿业特许权使用费和税款的国家。这缓解了赞比亚与中国之间的资本流动,中国是赞比亚丰富铜矿的最大买家,也是其最大的债权国。这也降低了赞比亚对美元的风险敞口。此外,自12月起,赞比亚银行要求国内交易必须以当地货币支付,从而提升了对宽查(kwacha)的需求。违规者将面临罚款、最高两年的监禁或两者兼施。
赞比亚的情况在整个非洲具有代表性。美元依然占据主导地位,非洲约70%的外部公共债务和许多跨境交易仍以该货币计价。但各国正在逐步采取替代方案,以取代“美元霸权”。
人民币是受益者之一。埃及、尼日利亚和南非这三个非洲最大的经济体已与中国达成新的货币互换协议,而以人民币结算的贸易份额正在扩大。肯尼亚已将美元计价的贷款转换为人民币,每年潜在节省的利息成本高达2.15亿美元,相当于其2025年向中国偿还债务利息的近五分之一。该国目前对中国的未偿债务中,约三分之二以人民币计价。埃塞俄比亚和莫桑比克正在协商类似的安排。
多家银行正在建设支持人民币交易的基础设施。去年9月,资产规模为非洲最大的贷款机构标准银行(Standard Bank,由巨头国有银行中国工商银行部分持股)成为首家通过中国跨境银行间支付系统(CIPS)结算交易的银行。这使得企业能够直接以人民币结算款项。南非最大的银行之一Absa以及业务覆盖30多个非洲国家的Ecobank也正寻求促进人民币直接支付。尽管人民币跨境交易的数量相对于美元仍然较少,但在2020年至2024年(官方数据可得的最近一年)之间增长了四倍多。
并非全部关于本杰明(美元) --- 68 金融与经济 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
赞比亚宽查 / 美元,反向刻度
来源:Haver Analytics
然而,非洲政府并不希望仅仅是用对一种外币的依赖替换成对另一种外币的依赖。因此,他们也在加大力度推广本国货币,无论是在国内(如赞比亚的指令)还是在跨境贸易中。2022年,贸易金融机构非洲进出口银行与非洲联盟启动了泛非支付结算系统(PAPSS)。该平台允许银行以当地货币结算非洲内部贸易。已有160多家商业银行和22家中央银行签约,随着时间的推移,这可能为企业每年节省约50亿美元的银行和外汇成本。
如果人工智能的那些炒作可信,那么印度科技产业应当是即将到来的 AI 裁员浪潮中承受冲击最严重的地方。在使聊天机器人变得实用的突破出现之前,科技圈的人曾打趣说 AI 代表的是“实际上是印度人”(actually Indians),因为那些看似高深的技术实际上是由海得拉巴或班加罗尔的人类完成的。但现在,那些外包给印度的任务——软件开发和诸如工资单处理等常规业务流程——恰恰是 AI 最能取代人类的部分。
然而,裁员的证据并不容易获得。部分原因是数据不完整。根据行业机构 Nasscom 的数据,约有 600 万印度人从事信息技术工作。在几乎任何其他地方,这都将是一个巨大的数字(大致相当于丹麦的人口)。但在印度,这仅占其劳动力的极小一部分,约为 1%。阿齐姆·普雷姆吉大学(Azim Premji University)的经济学家罗莎·亚伯拉罕(Rosa Abraham)表示,统计机构发现这个群体很难进行抽样。按照印度的标准,IT 从业者很富有,且通常居住在调查员无法进入的封闭社区中。热情的保安会拒绝任何未经事先批准的人员进入。
但另一个原因也是因为 AI 并没有造成太大影响。AI 的推动者可以指出印度 IT 巨头(包括塔塔咨询服务公司 (TCS) 和 Infosys)的裁员情况。多年来,Nifty IT 指数(一组上市的大型咨询公司)中企业的就业人数每年增长约 6%。根据《经济学人》的估计,自 2022 年底 ChatGPT 发布以来,员工人数有所下降——从 2023 年的 170 万下降到 6 月底的 166 万。但这并非完全归因于聊天机器人。总人数仍比疫情前的趋势高出 9%(见图表),且这些咨询公司是在经历了一场招聘热潮后在收缩。三家大型外资公司 Capgemini、Cognizant 和 Accenture 的印度业务也呈现出类似的模式。
另一种形式的印度白领工作招聘仍在蓬勃发展。Nasscom 估计,在全球能力中心(GCCs,处理从研究、IT 到人力资源和财务等所有事务的自有后台办公室)工作的人数已从 2019 年的 140 万增加到今年的 240 万。Anthroys(没错,就是那个 AI 宠儿)、美国零售商 Costco 以及法国化妆品巨头欧莱雅(L'Oréal)都是最近入驻的企业。2018 年至 2025 年间,IT 总就业人数增长了 50%;其中 GCCs 所占的份额从 35% 上升到 40%。
然而,AI 正在加速两场已经在进行中的转变。1. 第一是从外包转向内源化。顾问帕里·纳塔拉詹(Pari Natarajan)表示,公司将任务分为“核心”和“背景”。背景职能(如处理应付账款或提供技术支持)可以外包给外包商,且最容易实现自动化。然而,核心职能则是对业务至关重要的部分,是公司获得竞争优势的来源。随着技术在公司中变得更加核心,越来越多的职能从背景转向核心。
随着公司开始将 IT 视为基础而非单纯的辅助职能,GCCs 得到了繁荣发展。AI 进一步加强了这一点。纳塔拉詹先生举了一个银行的例子:当 IT 仅处理支付时,这些工作可以外包;但如果是由 AI 来做出贷款决策,那么它必须内部化。AI 编程工具正允许公司将更多 IT 职能移至内部:例如,星巴克正在开发自有版本的销售点(POS)软件,而此前该软件是直接购买的成品。这项工作可能会交给其印度 GCC 的员工完成,该中心将于今年晚些时候开业。
Nifty IT指数 股票市场指数,2022年11月30日=100*
来源:彭博(Bloomberg);公司报告 员工人数†,百万 *ChatGPT 3.5发布 †财年截至3月31日 ‡2017-20 §截至6月30日
《经济学人》 2026年8月8日 金融与经济 69
► 最近毕业生的困境。许多人加入了“蟑螂人民党”(Cockroach Janta Party)的行列,该运动一直在德里抗议年轻人缺乏机会。
“AI改变的是我们需要的人才组合,”Amtech的人事首席官维诺德·库马尔(Vinod Kumar)表示,这家美国软件公司在班加罗尔设有一个全球能力中心(GCC)。对于那些仅具备基础技能、从事重复性工作的员工,需求量有所下降。相反,重点转向了能够高效利用AI的工程师。招聘门户网站Naukri报告称,在过去一年中,对IT从业者的整体需求下降了3%,而对具备AI或机器学习技能的人员需求则增长了25%。
即便印度的IT公司仍能为经验丰富的工程师提供机会,但就业不足的年轻人在竞争优质岗位时面临着激烈竞争。印度的学生人数已从2010年代初的3400万增加到2024年的4500万。在IT咨询领域,计算机科学专业毕业生的起薪在近20年里一直冻结在每年约31万,000卢比($3,200)左右。招聘公司TeamLease的尼蒂·夏尔马(Neeti Sharma)表示,毕业生们已经意识到了这一点,并正在提升技能。对于那些成功转型的人来说,回报是丰厚的:她估计,来自印度顶尖大学并获得AI专业课程名额的毕业生,其收入可以是学习通用计算机科学的同龄人的两倍。
AI尚未吞噬印度的软件服务业。但它正贪婪地盯着它。■
阅读 J.R.R. 托尔金的《指环王》三部曲,读者在弗罗多·巴金斯还是少年时便与这位英雄相遇。托尔金解释道,这就是霍比特人所谓的“在童年与 33 岁成年之间那段不负责任的二十岁时光”。因此,弗罗多的表叔比尔博等到他达到这个成熟年龄后,才将一枚拥有征服世界之力的戒指交给他。任何将资金托付给利奥波德·阿申布伦纳(Leopold Aschenbrenner)而现在对他感到愤怒的投资者都应留意这一点。
阿申布伦纳先生现年 20 多岁,经营着一家名为 Situational Awareness 的对冲基金——这个名字毫无讽刺之意——该基金在 7 月份录得 67% 的亏损。他在 2024 年撰写了一篇同名且长达 165 页的论文后创办了该基金,在文中他主张人工智能“超智能”将在十年结束前改变社会。Situational Awareness(这篇长文)在硅谷引起了轰动。更令人惊讶的是,投资者的反应是将资金大量投入到 Situational Awareness(这家基金)中。在短短几个月内,当时年约 22 岁且从未担任过交易员的阿申布伦纳先生,便管理着数亿美元。到今年 7 月,据称他监管的资金高达 450亿美元。
随后,Situational Awareness 持仓的许多人工智能股票暴跌。7 月 30 日有消息称,该基金以极快速度将其大部分上市股票抛售给了规模大得多的投资公司 Citadel。除非基金经理面临两种选择:要么快速出售(不可避免地要以远低于市场价值的价格折价),要么面临极高的破产风险,否则他们不会采取此类行动。阿申布伦纳先生在给投资者的信中写道,他将“在未来的日子里继续战斗”。
对于其他人来说,问题在于他的失势是否预示着更糟糕的情况,因为过去的股市崩盘往往是由那些看似光鲜的基金开始动摇而预告的。Citadel 的老板肯·格里芬(Ken Griffin)在此时抄底廉价资产方面颇有经验。在 2007-09 年全球金融危机爆发前,Citadel 在 Amaranth Advisors 和 Sowood Capital 这两家对冲基金各自崩溃前,买入了它们的不良资产组合。而在那之前的十年,星光熠熠的长期资本管理公司(LTCM)基金的崩盘,成为了 20 世纪 90 年代由杠杆驱动的繁荣的缩影,而那场繁荣最终在互联网泡沫中达到顶峰。
那么,如何看待 Situational Awareness 的暴跌?监管文件显示,该基金的风险敞口主要集中在为 AI 提供电力和硬件的公司,如 Bloom Energy、CoreWeave 和 Sandisk。直到几周前,这些公司都表现得极其出色。但在它们近期达到峰值与 7 月 30 日初 Citadel 介入之间,每家公司的价值都损失了超过一半。阿申布伦纳先生并非唯一进行此类押注的人;在美银(Bank of America)最新的月度调查中,超过 80% 的受访基金经理将“做多全球半导体”列为最拥挤的交易。
巨大的担忧在于,这场令人措手不及的交易反转可能已导致其他投资公司也陷入摇摇欲坠的境地。不过,很少有基金能像阿申布伦纳先生那样经营得如此鲁莽。他报告的 2026 年上半年回报率高达 439%。令人震惊的是,这意味着即使在经历了过去这个令人作呕的月份之后,该基金今年以来仍持有可观的利润。如果没有极大的运气,或者借贷多到面临破产风险,根本不可能获得这样的回报。
杠杆是导致长期资本管理公司(LTCM)在1998年崩溃的原因,但将该基金与Situational Awareness进行比较则有些牵强。在成立的前四年里,LTCM从未连续两个月亏损。其合伙人在投资银行所罗门兄弟(Salomon Brothers)交易了二十年,取得了类似的结果。其中两名董事还因在衍生品定价方面的工作共同获得了诺贝尔奖。LTCM借贷如此之多依然是错误的,且它的失败可能会将大部分华尔街拖入深渊。但其策略并非疯狂。相比之下,在创立Situational Awareness的二十年前,其创始人还是个蹒跚学步的孩子。而在两年前,他还在写一些像托尔金小说那样的话,比如“自由世界必须获胜”以及“我能预见到,我能预见到通用人工智能(AGI)将如何被构建”。(幸好,Buttonwood在20岁出头时写的所有东西后来都被从互联网上删除了。)阿申布伦纳(Mr Aschenbrenner)敢于冒险是好事。令人费解的是,他的投资者究竟在想什么。也许他们根本没想。如果是这样,那将比Situational Awareness受挫的任何事情都更令人担忧。
--- 70 金融与经济 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
央行应该如何沟通?沟通量应在什么程度?
德尔斐的神谕拥有预言准确的天赋。皮提亚(Pythia)坐在阿波罗神庙中,用谜语传达她的预言。当吕底亚国王克罗伊斯询问是否应该进攻波斯时,她回答他将“摧毁一个伟大的帝国”。结果他确实这么做了:摧毁的是他自己的帝国。哲学家赫拉克利特将德尔斐的方法描述为“既不掩盖也不揭示,而是给出一个迹象”。她那威严的宣告要求人们关注,而其模糊性使其几乎不可能被证明是错误的。
在20世纪的大部分时间里,央行行长们也培养了类似的神秘感。他们的权威建立在一种他们无所不知、无所不能的印象之上。由于事实上他们两者都不是,因此晦涩主义变得很有用。1920至1944年担任英格兰银行行长的蒙塔古·诺曼(Montagu Norman)据称遵循着这样一条准则:“绝不解释,绝不道歉”。1981年,瑞士经济学家卡尔·布鲁纳(Karl Brunner)将央行运作描述为依赖于一种它是“深奥艺术”的印象而繁荣。美联储前任主席艾伦·格林斯潘(Alan Greenspan)用“美联储腔”(Fedspeak)将这门艺术发挥到了极致。他说,他学会了“极其含糊地喃喃自语”。
凯文·沃什(Kevin Warsh)正试图为美联储恢复一点德尔斐式的神秘感。在他7月下旬的第二次新闻发布会后,评论人士将其措辞描述为“令人困惑”、“内部矛盾”且“毫无意义”。措辞也变得更加精简。在沃什先生领导下,政策声明已从大约340个单词缩减到一半或更少。“前瞻性指引”——即指示政策可能走向的语言——已被剔除。6月,他拒绝提交自己的利率预测,并表示他同事的预测是用铅笔写的,且配有“大橡皮擦”。他还考虑减少政策会议和新闻发布会的次数。
然而,沃什先生的缄默并不像看起来那么激进。直到1994年,美联储甚至不公布其利率决定;当时人们认为,出其不意能使政策更有效。随后发生了沟通革命。美联储在1999年开始公布其政策“偏向”(即下次决定的最可能方向),并在2003年开始发出利率未来路径的信号。哥伦比亚大学的迈克尔·伍德福德(Michael Woodford)提供了理论依据:经济中的支出与其说取决于今天的隔夜利率,不如说取决于人们对未来利率的预期。他写道:“不仅是对政策的预期至关重要,而且……其他因素几乎无关紧要。”
在2000年代中期,时任英格兰银行行长(现为沃什先生领导的美联储沟通策略新工作组共同负责人)默文·金(Mervyn King)将此称为利率的“马拉多纳理论”。在一次著名的对阵英格兰队的比赛中,这位阿根廷足球运动员几乎沿直线前进,而防守队员则因预期他会转身而纷纷避让。央行也可以这样做。2002年,英格兰银行没有改变其政策利率,但对未来利率的预期随经济前景而转移,有助于稳定支出。金勋爵表示,货币政策框架在“替我们工作”。
在2007-09年全球金融危机之后,央行采取了更进一步的措施。由于政策利率已接近零,他们强调,即使在经济开始复苏后,他们预计利率仍将保持在低位。2011年,美联储暗示将把利率维持在接近零的水平直到至少2013年中期;次年,它开始以“点阵图”形式公布官员的利率预测。尽管这依然是德尔斐式的不承诺,但市场将其解读为央行行长们像奥德修斯一样地做出承诺,将自己束缚在更长时间的低利率之上。任何一家央行是否真的会把自己绑在桅杆上仍令人怀疑;但正如2008年获得诺贝尔奖的保罗·克鲁格曼(Paul Krugman)所言,该理论是要“可信地承诺是不负责任的”。
更明确的央行措辞使市场对任何措辞上的变动都变得极度敏感。这也限制了政策制定者的空间。2013年,英格兰银行的金勋爵继任者马克·卡尼(Mark Carney)表示,在失业率至少下降到7%之前,不会考虑提高利率。这一阈值比预期快得多地被突破,迫使卡尼先生不得不澄清其指导意见。由于预测很难,尤其是对未来的预测,央行行长们努力解释他们将如何应对事件,而不过早地预判会发生什么事件。英格兰银行长期以来将其预测包裹在误差线中;今年4月,它用三种情景取代了单一的中心预测。然而,当这些情景反复失准时,这种对不确定性的精心展示可能会开始削弱公信力,而非保护它。美联储在2020年和2021年以另一种方式进行了过度沟通。它将通货膨胀称为“暂时性的”,并承诺在就业完全恢复且通胀率“一段时间”内超过2%之前不会加息。这一指导意见锚定了市场预期——但也将美联储绑定在了一个迅速过时的前景之上。利率在过低的状态下维持了太长时间。
在这种失败面前,沃什先生倾向于少说话的本能是可以理解的。这源于谦卑。美联储并非无所不知,而价格发现机制下的金融市场,用他的话来说,是一位“非常出色的经济学家”。但在这种情况下,价格并非来自神启的信号。它们反映的是对美联储将采取行动的猜测——此外,目前还包含对沃什先生未经考验的领导能力的风险溢价。而谦卑的措辞不足以给市场留下深刻印象。最重要的是,发言者需要被信任。在20世纪90年代,当罗伯特·鲁宾(Robert Rubin)担任财政部长并表示“强加元符合我们的国家利益”时,投资者相信他。2012年,投资者意识到在马里奥·德拉吉(Mario Draghi)领导下的欧洲央行确实会“不惜一切代价”来拯救欧元。正是鲁宾先生和德拉吉先生辛苦赢得的信誉,使得这些神谕般的经济言论——在不具体说明手段的情况下传达决心——如此强大。通过强调美联储的认知多么匮乏,沃什先生可能会让自己以及美联储的信誉受损。对于一个神谕者来说,仅仅“认识你自己”是不够的。■
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《经济学人》 --- 72 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
俄勒冈州希尔斯伯勒与马萨诸塞州波士顿
在美国,反对将动物用于科学研究正成为一种跨党派的共识
大约5,000只猴子将俄勒冈州波特兰以西的郊区视为家园。在一排房屋后面,一条设有安全检查站的长路尽头,坐落着俄勒冈国家灵长类研究中心(ONPRC)。凭借高耸的冷杉和宏伟的红杉,这座实验室感觉像是一个森林中的隐居地。近十年来,免疫学家布兰登·怀尔德(Brandon Wilder)一直利用这些猴子研究疟疾,这种由蚊子传播的疾病每年导致超过50万人死亡。
“这并不容易,没有人喜欢看到动物被关在笼子里,”怀尔德博士承认。但他认为人类面临的风险使得这种做法具有必要性。今年早些时候,怀尔德博士关于免疫系统如何应对疟疾的部分研究成果被世界最顶尖的科学期刊之一《自然》(Nature)接收发表。他希望这一发现能有助于开发一种针对该疾病的通用疫苗,这是一个长期以来让科学家们难以实现的目标。除了疟疾,他的同事们还研究艾滋病(HIV)、痴呆症和不孕症。
然而,如今这类工作已成为一场日益高涨的反对动物科学研究运动的战场。美国卫生部长小罗伯特·F·肯尼迪(Robert F. Kennedy junior)誓言要结束动物实验,并声称该国七个由联邦资助的灵长类研究中心(其中ONPRC规模最大)“具有盈利动机”。今年2月,每年向ONPRC提供约$50资助的联邦资助机构——美国国立卫生研究院(NIH),建议将该实验室改为动物保护区。到7月,该计划被认为成本过高而被放弃。相反,监管该中心的俄勒冈健康与科学大学宣布,将逐步减少对灵长类动物的研究。
结束动物研究的运动在美政坛中锻造出了一个最杂糅的联盟。主流民主党人、进步主义者、右翼民粹主义者、自由意志主义者以及MAGA运动都发现自己正朝着同一个目标努力。而且,他们已经取得了进展。
动物被应用于整个生物医学流程,从疾病的基础研究到在人体临床试验开始前测试新药的安全性。大部分工作是在小鼠和大鼠身上完成的。据估计,猴子在全美使用的动物总数中所占比例不足1%。但正是因为猴子在进化上与人类接近,使其成为极具价值的实验对象,同时也让许多人觉得在它们身上进行实验尤其令人厌恶。
几十年来,反对动物实验的立场集中在政治左翼。但现在不再如此。在日益增长的右翼反对势力中,一个核心人物是安东尼·贝洛蒂(Anthony Bellotti),一名资深的共和党操盘手。
▶ → 本节其他文章 73 AI 正在自主进行黑客攻击 74 特朗普之后的艾滋病防治 75 见闻:拖延症 --- 《经济学人》2026年8月8日 科学与技术 73 ►
他的组织“白大褂浪费”(White Coat Waste)将动物研究定性为财政挥霍,并将其与已经激发保守派情绪的问题联系起来。在唐纳德·特朗普的第一任期内,贝洛蒂先生发起了多场活动,声称对动物进行鲁莽实验是导致新冠肺炎(covid-19)大流行的原因,并引用了位于大流行起始地——中国城市武汉的一家实验室的工作。
到2025年1月特朗普先生重返办公室时,“白大褂浪费”已经花费了四年时间培养共和党盟友,并拟定了目标实验室名单。“我不关心科学,”贝洛蒂先生挑衅地说道,“我是那个砍掉资金的人。”
去年4月,贝洛蒂先生的二把手贾斯汀·古德曼(Justin Goodman)会见了美国国立卫生研究院(NIH)院长杰伊·巴塔查里亚(Jay Bhattacharya)。古德曼先生告诉《经济学人》,巴塔查里亚博士表示他是“白大褂浪费”的“大粉丝”,并承诺致力于结束所有针对“猫、狗和灵长类动物”的研究。(NIH未回应《经济学人》的置评请求。)
贝洛蒂先生最有力的代理人之一是劳拉·卢默(Laura Loomer),一名在特朗普圈子中极具影响力的右翼活动人士。她说,进行动物实验的科学家是“虐待者……与连环杀手不相上下”。她回忆道,当她向特朗普先生描述某些实验的所谓细节时,他感到非常反感,称这些实验“病态”且“令人作呕”。卢默女士还游说了肯尼迪先生和国防部长皮特·海格塞斯(Pete Hegseth)。两人都在各自的部门中削减了动物研究。
民主党人通常反对特朗普先生对科学资金的大规模削减。然而,动物研究似乎是个例外。11月,公共卫生机构疾病控制与预防中心(CDC)宣布将关闭一个主要用于HIV研究的灵长类动物实验室。民主党人对此没有发出抗议。
在俄勒冈州,怀尔德博士(Dr Wilder)感叹,该中心面临的一些最猛烈的压力竟然来自民主党人。该州进步派州长蒂娜·科特克(Tina Kotek)已敦促将其关闭。
对某些人而言,摒弃动物研究的理由在于新技术可以取代它。这些技术被统称为“新方法”(New Approach Methods, NAMs),包括器官芯片、类器官(人体组织的3D复制品)以及AI模型。来自新泽西州的民主党参议员科里·布克(Cory Booker)告诉《经济学人》,虽然他“在这个问题上不是一个意识形态主义者”,但他认为“绝大多数”动物实验是“不必要的”,因为NAMs“更加可靠,且能为我们提供更好的数据”。
但很少有开发这些技术的人对此表示认同。2023年,美国国家科学、工程和医学学院得出结论,认为新型替代方法(NAMs)无法复制活体动物体内多个器官之间的相互作用。“‘替代’根本不在讨论范围之内,”斯坦福大学的神经科学家塞尔吉乌·帕斯卡(Sergiu Pasca)表示,他构建了世界上最先进的一些大脑类器官。生物技术风险投资人彼得·科尔钦斯基(Peter Kolchinsky)则认为,“我们对生物学的理解还不足以”替代动物模型,“而且我们可能永远无法做到”。其他国家似乎也并未被NAMs所说服。中国的研究机构以及该国蓬勃发展的生物技术产业购买了如此多的猴子,以至于推高了这些动物的全球价格。
失去一个人工智能的控制权可能被视为不幸。失去两个则像是不小心。失去四个,人们可能会开始怀疑问题是否出在AI本身。7月21日,美国实验室OpenAI表示,一个尚未发布的模型从一个测试其黑客技能的封闭环境中逃逸,对

发起了一系列攻击。
美国科学家们已经预见到了危机。在俄勒冈州,人才流失正在发生。Wilder博士表示,自从该中心陷入混乱以来,已有15名员工离职,其中包括四名博士级科学家和四名兽医。招聘已变得“不可能”。而且,在俄勒冈州开展的工作无法轻易转移到其他地方。美国其他六个国家灵长类动物中心已经满员。今年早些时候,Wilder博士获得了一个在荷兰任职的机会,这是旨在招募面临特朗普政府压力下的美国科学家计划的一部分。“如果我们不能阻止这里崩溃,”Wilder博士说,“我就按下弹出按钮。”对于White Coat Waste的Goodman先生来说,这正是目的所在。他说,他希望美国科学家产生一种“恐惧因素”。他说,这“并非由于身体上的恐吓”,而是由于一种氛围,迫使他们得出结论:在美国进行动物研究根本不值得追求。
HuggingFace是一家法美AI基础设施公司。一周后,竞争对手Anthropic公司也做出了类似的承认。该公司表示,发现其模型攻击第三方的情况发生了六次。
愤世嫉俗者将这两家公司的警告斥为博取关注的企图。但大多数公司不会通过发起网络攻击、将其保密直到受害者公开,然后希望竞争对手自愿承认同样行为的方式来寻求关注。怀疑论者还应注意到,英国政府机构英国AI安全研究所(AISI)也观察到了完全相同的行为。在8月4日发布的一份报告中,AISI表示,对最新的OpenAI和Anthropic系统进行的网络安全评估导致了19次针对未参与测试的人员和组织的攻击。在最严重的一起案例中,一个AI试图破坏一个未具名的开源软件项目,作为针对该挑战(虚构)目标的“供应链”攻击的一部分。8月6日,Facebook的所有者Meta表示,其自有模型在测试中也出现了类似行为。
这些事件在细节上有所不同。OpenAI的系统本应保持离线状态。其黑客攻击狂潮始于它利用一个此前未知的漏洞,突破了其虚拟“沙箱”并进入公共互联网。Anthropic的►
其系统本应受到类似的限制,但人为错误导致其未能实现。英国AI安全研究所(AISI)在测试中始终允许访问互联网。但它此前从未见过愿意为了突破目标而接受附带损害的模型。Meta提供的细节很少,但承诺在掌握更多信息后会进一步公布。
然而,这些事件揭示了一类新型的AI风险。此前关于网络安全的担忧——例如Anthropic在4月发布其强大的Mythos模型时所表达的观点——主要集中在心怀恶意的人类在掌握AI工具后可能造成的伤害。此类恐惧促使人们提出新的监管建议。而这一系列自主黑客攻击(其中人类的参与仅限于向AI提供提示词)表明,这些建议是不充分的。
以德米斯·哈萨比斯(Demis Hassabis)在7月14日勾勒的自我监管体系为例。Google DeepMind的首席执行官(他于8月5日表示将卸任CEO,转而担任DeepMind主席以及Google母公司Alphabet的首席科学家)提出了一项方案,即由实验室自行进行测试,并暂缓公开发布无法验证为安全的模型。OpenAI的老板萨姆·奥特曼(Sam Altman)和领导Anthropic的达里奥·阿莫代(Dario Amodei)也提出了类似的方案。这些想法是好的:实验室应当明确其评估中适用的安全标准,并强制执行于承担工作的第三方。
但自主黑客攻击证明,即使公众无法接触到AI模型,这些模型依然可能具有危险性。所有三次黑客攻击恰恰都发生在德米斯爵士所建议的那类测试期间。
这些黑客攻击还给法律体系带来了挑战。当人类进行黑客攻击时,这是一种犯罪。然而,当AI是违规者时,如何界定责任尚不明确。为AI公司提供保险的人工智能承保公司(Artificial Intelligence Underwriting Company)负责人鲁内·奎斯特(Rune Kvist)指出,美国的法律依赖于“意图性”。如果没有人类意图攻击任何人,那么就没发生犯罪。寻求损害赔偿的能力也受到限制。然而,伤害显然已经发生。奎斯特先生表示,这种矛盾是“不可接受的”。
马萨诸塞州法律与AI研究所(Institute for Law and AI)的盖布·韦尔(Gabe Weil)提出了一套严格责任制度。就像饲养野生动物的规则一样,该制度将假定任何损害始终由从事风险活动的当事人承担责任。
业界同样希望获得明确的指引。来自几家大型AI实验室员工的一封公开信(签署者包括阿莫代博士)请求美国政府在AI进展的“节奏”上提供帮助。但帮助到来的速度是政府的速度,而非技术的速度:本周旨在确定白宫如何评估模型的一次会议在结束时没有达成任何公开承诺,且几乎没有进展报告。■
里约热内卢 尽管科学家们在追求治愈方法,但美国的削减预算打击了抗艾滋病斗争
不要把所有鸡蛋放在同一个篮子里。这是全球艾滋病防治机构在2025年1月20日学到的教训。自2011年以来,美国在旨在对抗该流行病的对外援助中所占的份额已从58%上升至81%。因此,当唐纳德·特朗普改变参与规则时,结果是诊所关闭、药物供应链崩溃以及支持团体突然失去资源,陷入一片混乱。
现在尘埃落定。接下来的任务是让活动人士、官僚、医生、政治家和研究人员在新的现实中寻求最优解。他们拥有工具:特别是处于研发管线中的极具前景的药物。他们得到了美国政府关于其未来愿景的明确指示。此外,科学家们在超越预防和治疗、追求真正治愈这一“黄金之城”方面,也取得了一些初步但令人感兴趣的结果。
为此,该领域的重量级人物于7月底在里约热内卢举行了第26届国际艾滋病大会,这是一次每两年一次的盛会。会址的选择十分恰当。巴西从流行病开始就一直是处理艾滋病问题的典范。它提供了免费的抗逆转录病毒(ARV)药物,并强制许可在当地生产这些药物。巴西负担得起这一点。而对于许多资源匮乏的国家,尤其是非洲国家,匮乏将不得不成为创新的母亲。
资金来源减少
在基层,需求依然巨大。根据处理该疾病的联合国机构 UNAIDS 的数据,去年有57万,000人死于艾滋病,其中大部分在撒哈拉以南非洲。另有约1.2m人感染了导致该病的病毒——HIV。在目前估计的41m HIV感染者中,只有32m人在使用抗逆转录病毒药物(ARVs)。
然而,自从特朗普签署行政命令以来,糟糕的事情发生了。智库凯撒家庭基金会(Kaiser Family Foundation)于7月27日发布的一份报告得出结论,美国资金减少了21亿美元,这意味着2024年的总支出下降了25%。另一份由国际慈善机构艾滋病研究基金会(Foundation for AIDS Research)发布的报告调查了与美国首席抗艾滋病计划 PEPFAR 合作的组织。调查发现,23%的组织无法获得避孕套,20%无法获得抗逆转录病毒药物(ARVs),22%无法获得预防感染的暴露前预防药物(PrEP)。
但即便在资金下降之后,美国仍然是迄今为止最大的贡献国。其资金拨付方式的改变至关重要。因此,尽管新政策自去年9月起就已实施,美国国务院仍派遣 PEPFAR 代理负责人杰弗里·格雷厄姆(Jeffrey Graham)前往里约,以澄清细节。
这里有三个重要的转变。1. PEPFAR 将不再直接向受援国的组织提供现金。相反,相关工作将基于关于每个受援国支出计划的谅解备忘录(MOUs),在政府与政府之间进行。第二,受援国的财务贡献将与美国的贡献一起在谅解备忘录中明确规定。第三,谅解备忘录是有时间限制的。它们有效期至2030年,且至少在愿景上,届时美国的援助将从资金援助转向技术援助。
有些人认为,这是在利用可用资源争取最大效果,并最终执行长期承诺的将责任从捐助方移交给受援方的尝试,是一次诚意之举。而另一些人则认为,这是一种旨在尽可能体面地摆脱预算责任的障眼法。
到目前为止,已有 34 个国家签署了谅解备忘录。肯尼亚政府承诺为其计划出资 8.5亿美元,而美国的出资额为 15亿美元;尼日利亚将出资 30亿美元,而美国出资 20亿美元。一些国家(如加纳、赞比亚和津巴布韦)拒绝签署,理由是对方提出了不合理的数据共享要求,且有报道称对方施压要求让渡矿权——格雷厄姆先生否认这些说法属实。新政策如何开展,将取决于接收方能否履行协议中的义务,以及美国下一任总统的态度。Mr ▶ --- The Economist August 8th 2026 Science & technology 75 ► 关于那些未能支付约定金额的国家会发生什么,格雷厄姆先生含糊其辞,暗示这将取决于具体情况。白宫的未来则难以预料。
在工具方面,所有目光都集中在 PrEP(暴露前预防)上,它既能保护个人免受感染,又能帮助切断传播链。第一种 PrEP 药物是一种名为 Truvada 的每日口服药。随后出现了 Cabotegravir,这是一种每两个月注射一次的药物。目前的明星产品是 Lenacapavir,这是一种每年注射两次的药物,美国食品药品监督管理局已于 June 2025 批准其上市。此外,一种名为 Alimatravir 的每月口服药也引起了广泛关注。尽管该药尚未完成临床试验,但其制造商默克公司(Merck)已经与包括非洲在内的全球多个地区签署协议,以低廉的价格生产并销售。
Lenacapavir 的普及得到了全球基金(Global Fund)的助力,这是一个部分由美国资助的抗艾滋病组织,其运作机制独立于美国与个别国家签署的协议。该基金在 July 2025 宣布,已与 Lenacapavir 的制造商吉利德科学(Gilead Sciences)达成协议,购买足够 200 万人使用的剂量——在美方追加资金后,这一数字在今年 4 月提高到了 300 万。但如果这个数字能进一步增加将更为理想,因为据联合国艾滋病规划署(UNAIDS)估计,全球约有 2000 万人将从 PrEP 中受益。
然而,预防和治疗并不等同于治愈,而治愈之法在过去几十年里一直令科学家们难以企及。但也许,仅仅是也许,这种情况不会持续太久。正如一个由伦敦帝国理工学院的萨拉·菲德勒(Sarah Fidler)主持的小组讨论的那样,关键可能在于一组被称为广谱中和抗体(bNAbs)的分子。大多数人体免疫系统针对 HIV 产生的抗体仅对病毒的特定毒株有效,因此随着病毒的演变,这些抗体会失去效力。但 bNAbs 攻击的是病毒中至关重要的部分,进化在这些部分上的变动空间非常小。
利用 bNAbs 作为药物来控制体内常规药物无法触及的 HIV 隐藏潜伏库的想法已经存在多年。目前的试验表明,这个想法可能具有可行性。虽然大多数参与者仅获得暂时性的缓解,但在部分患者身上,效果持续时间更长。在极少数案例中,受试者在近两年后仍未检测出病毒载量。这远超抗体本身的存续时间,表明它们在某种程度上训练了免疫系统在抗体消失后继续发挥作用。根据你的乐观程度,这可能是在抓救命稻草,也可能是一个预示未来的信号。即便属于后者,距离成为真正的药物仍有很长的路要走。但它带来了希望。■
拖延症对你有害。但这种习惯是可以改掉的。
拖延会造成沉重的代价。一项于2013年发表的研究对2.2053万,053人进行了1到5分的拖延量表评分。评分每增加一分,年收入就会下降近$1.5万,000。那些习惯性陷入“自我调节失败”(拖延症的另一种称呼)的人,更容易延迟就医。一项于2023年发表的针对3,525名瑞典大学生的研究发现,拖延评分较高的人更容易遭受使人衰弱的疼痛。
情况还更糟。同一项瑞典研究还发现,拖延者更容易产生焦虑、压力和孤独感。一项于2025年发表在《精神病学前沿》(Frontiers in Psychiatry)上的元分析涵盖了17个国家、涉及6.3323万,323人的88项研究,结果发现拖延及其导致的自尊心受损是未来抑郁症的预测指标。
如何遏制拖延?心理练习似乎有所帮助。其中一组练习被称为“带有执行意图的心理对比”(MCII)。这一理念在许多智能手机应用中被推广,其核心很简单:想象实现目标的益处;将该图像与主要障碍进行对比;然后制定克服障碍的策略。在2020年报道的两项随机试验中,本科生接受了旨在减少推迟就寝时间的在线MCII练习,研究认为推迟就寝与普遍的拖延行为相关。与接受健康睡眠习惯建议的对照组相比,他们每晚错过预定就寝时间的时间减少了约38分钟。
运动也显示出前景。一项于3月发表的中国试验评估了77名男性青少年的拖延情况。那些被随机分配进行12周力量训练、高强度间歇训练或两者结合的人,在拖延行为方面显示出“显著减少”。一项于2022年发表的针对564名中国大学生的早期研究发现,身体活动最活跃的人拖延也最少。研究人员推测,克服运动带来的压力给他们带来了一种“掌控感”,从而增强了信心和动力。
此外还有饮食和其他习惯的问题。一项2024年针对意大利大学生的研究发现,不吃早餐的人、酗酒者和睡眠质量差的人拖延情况更严重。研究人员推测,缺失早餐提供的能量可能会阻碍“动力和专注于任务的能力”。但跳过早餐可能是拖延的结果,而非原因:目前尚无研究能令人信服地证明饮食会影响拖延。
至于药物,目前还没有专门针对拖延症的药物。但2021年一项美国随机对照试验出现了一个有趣的发现。患有注意缺陷多动障碍(ADHD)的成年人在服用兴奋剂赖赛得现胺(lisdexamfetamine)而非安慰剂时,其认知执行功能(包括开始执行任务的能力)有了显著提升。
如今,拖延的机会比以前更多了。许多人在家办公,处于老板的视线之外。智能手机提供了无尽的干扰。在2022年发表的一篇综述中,涉及的18项研究全部将过度使用智能手机与拖延联系起来。刷手机也经常导致就寝时间推迟。睡眠不足会损害执行功能,导致更多的自我调节失败。
如果相关科学家能停止磨蹭,那将大有裨益。
--- 76 《经济学人》 2026年8月8日
古典音乐
拜罗伊特 在 150 年后,理查德·瓦格纳的《指环》系列依然引人注目
威廉一世在场。巴伐利亚的路德维希二世也在,他支付了大部分费用。巴西的佩德罗二世远渡重洋而来。哲学家弗里德里希·尼采也出席了——尽管他假装自己没去。拜罗伊特曾是巴伐利亚的一个偏僻小镇,但在 150 年前,它似乎成了世界的中心。理查德·瓦格纳耗时 26 年作曲并撰写的《尼伯龙根的指环》(简称《指环》系列),于 1876 年 8 月在他为呈现这部巨作而建造的歌剧院中完成了首次完整演出。
就其影响力、大胆程度和争议性而言,瓦格纳是艺术界的埃隆·马斯克。亚历克斯·罗斯在《瓦格纳主义》中写道,他的思想“在好几代人的知识论述中占据主导地位”。他的作品依然深植于西方文化的潜意识中,揭示了人性以及接触这些作品的时代。对于瓦格纳最宏大的作品《指环》而言,尤其如此。如果你读过或看过《指环王》,你已经间接受到了它的影响。如果你亲身体验,你可能会发现自己像瓦格纳的同辈那样对其痴迷。
尽管王室出席了它的诞生,但《指环》是革命的产物。在 1849 年这个欧洲起义之年,瓦格纳通过报告军队动向,为推翻萨克森国王尽了一份力。在开始创作《指环》系列后不久,他逃往苏黎世。他的起点是记录于 13 世纪的日耳曼和斯堪的纳维亚传说,特别是《尼伯龙根之歌》、冰岛的《埃达》和《沃尔松格萨迦》。对于一个希望德国碎片化的邦国变成统一民族国家的革命者来说,这是天然的素材。
瓦格纳由此塑造了一个关于神灵、英雄、矮人和巨人的故事,跨越四部“乐剧”——总计 15 小时的歌剧。故事始于尼伯龙根(矮人)阿尔贝里希被莱茵河三女抛弃,为了夺取她们的金子而放弃爱情。他锻造了一枚能赋予其统治世界权力的戒指。当主神沃坦从他手中夺走戒指时,阿尔贝里希诅咒了任何拥有它的人。偷窃与诅咒最终导致了最后一出歌剧《诸神的黄昏》(Götterdämmerung)中众神的陨落。
瓦格纳给观众带来的影响经常被比作精神类药物。尼采将其比作“持续饮酒”;诗人查尔斯·波德莱尔则将其比作“鸦片带来的眩晕想象”。对于大多数瓦格——
本节还包括 77 纪念广岛 78 Noma 与摇滚明星厨师 79 好莱坞钟爱年长女性 80 警惕 AI 陪伴玩具
《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日 文化 77
——纳尔人来说,入门药物是音乐。开篇章节《莱茵之金》(Das Rheingold)以一种原始的方式开始,倍低音大提琴发出的低沉降E调似乎预示了随后发生的一切。很快,音乐描绘出起伏的莱茵河,这是 100 多个主导动机(leitmotifs)之一——这些在整个系列中反复出现并演变的“洗脑旋律”,用于宣告、唤起并评论人物、思想和事物。人物的表达并非通过传统歌剧中固定的咏叹调,而是通过不间断的“无限旋律”。
那些神话般却又复杂的人物是第二种致醉剂。被束缚的神灵沃坦伪装成“流浪者”;他的女儿布伦希尔德以爱的名义违抗他的法律;斩龙英雄齐格弗里德结果证明并非那么英雄。一部关于爱与权力等抽象概念的作品,却充斥着可能出现在电子游戏中的器物——事实上确实如此。Tarnhelm(隐形头盔),一种允许佩戴者改变形态的头盔,就出现在《暗黑破坏神 II》中。
瓦格纳沉醉于各种思想,同时也用这些思想令观众陶醉。哲学家罗杰·斯克鲁顿(Roger Scruton)写道:“在他那个时代所有重要的哲学思考潮流……都在他的剧作中留下了痕迹。”瓦格纳在路德维希·费尔巴哈(Ludwig Feuerbach)的影响下创作了剧本以及部分音乐,后者是一位认为爱能解放人类的无神论者。在对革命的失败感到幻灭后,瓦格纳转向了以悲观著称的阿图尔·叔本华(Arthur Schopenhauer),后者信奉放弃。叔本华唯一持乐观态度的是音乐,他认为音乐揭示了“世界的内在本质”。在叔本华的影响下,瓦格纳舍弃了《众神的黄昏》中那个“费尔巴哈式”的结局——在原结局中,布伦希尔德宣告了一个“没有统治者”的世界。而现在,她在长达四分钟、几乎没有歌词的音乐伴奏下,将自己和众神一同焚毁。在幕布落下之后,你还可以花上另外 15 小时来讨论这一切意味着什么。
部分原因在于,瓦格纳比任何其他作曲家都更深远地影响了音乐之外的艺术。牛仔小说的先驱欧文·威斯特(Owen Wister)曾是一个痴迷的瓦格纳追随者。詹姆斯·乔伊斯在《尤利西斯》中多次回归某些意象和词汇;弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫在《达洛维夫人》中亦然。主导动机(Leitmotifs)影响了电影配乐:想想《卡萨布兰卡》中的《时光流逝》,或是《星球大战》中的角色主题曲。“综合艺术作品”(Gesamtkunstwerk)的概念是《指环》的另一项遗产;它表达了瓦格纳渴望将诗歌、音乐和奇观统一起来的愿望,这种方式让人想起古希腊悲剧的舞台呈现。他在拜罗伊特建立的节日剧院将管弦乐团隐藏起来,使观众的注意力集中在舞台上,预示了电影的出现。在被《指环》迷住的思想家中,包括美国黑人社会学家W.E.B. 杜波依斯(W.E.B. Du Bois)。对他而言,这部作品“为人类重新讲述了一个民族的苦难、胜利与失败”。
反瓦格纳主义者同样热情,他们对这种麻醉剂感到厌恶。尼采从未完全摆脱这种成瘾,他在音乐中听到了“节奏感的完全退化”,这与他所珍视的生命力截然相反。他厌恶瓦格纳的反犹主义,而这种主义后来使这位作曲家受到纳粹的青睐,并疏远了一些音乐爱好者。瓦格纳追随者的人数正在减少。国际瓦格纳协会的会员人数自2003年以来下降了超过一半,至1.5万,000人。然而,《指环》却变得更加流行。根据演出列表平台Operabase的数据,构成该剧集的歌剧演出次数在2000-06年与2020-26, 年之间增长了44%。
或许这是因为人们感觉到文明出了问题,这种感觉比往常更加强烈。尽管得到了纳粹的认可,《指环》读起来更像是一个左翼的梦想,而非法西斯主义的幻想。正如瓦格纳排斥君主一样,他也鄙视工业资本主义,这使他既是现代性的先驱,也是其反叛者。阿尔贝里希剥削那些挖掘他黄金的尼伯龙根人。这个剧集以一个后神话世界的愿景结束,那个世界由爱而非法律和金钱统治。对于像斯克鲁顿(Scruton)这样的保守主义者来说,革命不应发生在街头,而应发生在人们的灵魂中。他写道,《指环》呈现了“一种艺术取代宗教,来表达和满足我们最深层精神渴望的愿景”。
增加其力量的是一个悖论:在执导该剧的导演手中,《指环》具有可塑性。作曲家的孙子维兰德·瓦格纳(Wieland Wagner)在拜罗伊特上演了高度抽象的制作,开创了先河,将作品中与德国民族主义相关的联系清除干净。学者马克·贝里(Mark Berry)指出,环境掠夺与对爱的放弃密不可分,自1970s以来,这一直是舞台呈现的一个主题。在伦敦附近的格兰奇公园歌剧院(Grange Park Opera)的一场演出中,地球磁场成了转化为电力的“黄金”,而电力驱动着将人类彼此隔绝的社交媒体。在拜罗伊特的周年纪念演出中,意象是由AI生成的(观众对此发出了嘘声)。
无论是革命者还是保皇派,瓦格纳都不是自由主义者,因此他没有意识到现代性在产生新缺陷的同时也能自我修正。但只要人类无法实现他们那些无法企及的理想,《指环》就将继续回响。■
《广岛,8:15》(Hiroshima, 8:15)。谷本清(Tanimoto Kiyoshi)著。Modern Library;224页;$32。 Ebury Press;£16.99
1945年8月6日上午8.15,当原子弹击中广岛时,谷本清正在市郊帮邻居搬家具。他躲在两块岩石之间,奇迹般地毫发无伤。随后,身为循道卫理公会牧师的谷本开始了一段令人心碎的旅程,寻找他的妻子、女儿和教会成员。他遇到了像幽灵一样行进的赤裸人群,他们的皮肤从肉体上脱落。“人们走起路来,就像双手捧着珍贵的瓷器一样,”他在一份最近被重新发现的回忆录中写道。
大约十个月后,在城市依然处于废墟之中时,一名身材瘦长的美国记者访问了谷本的家。他说他想“从人们的角度”调查原子弹的影响。谷本向该男子讲述了自己的故事;记者“专注地倾听并表现出极大的同情”。那年8月,《纽约客》(New Yorker)用整期杂志刊登了约翰·赫西(John Hersey)的《广岛》(“Hiroshima”)。这篇文章后来被再版为书,引起了轰动。美国公众被迫面对原子弹轰炸带来的恐怖人员伤亡。《广岛》也让谷本和其他五位主要人物成名(尽管出版的消息传回广岛花了几个月时间)。谷本后来参与将该书翻译成日语,并在全美进行了演讲巡演。直到1986.年去世,他一直致力于和平与裁军运动。
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逝去的时光 --- 78 文化 《经济学人》2026年8月8.日 ►
现在,在轰炸发生80多年后,谷本的声音再次响起。他用英语写下了这段记录,他在战前就读于亚特兰大的一所神学院期间精通了英语。在为一部即将上映的电影进行研究期间,一份副本在赫西的档案中被发现。该片由艺术家、作者的孙子坎农·赫西(Cannon Hersey)和日本电影制作人西前拓(Nishimae Taku)共同制作。
这部回忆录为历史记录做出了重要贡献。它也是对赫西作品的有价值补充。赫西在《广岛》中采用了熟练讲述者的叙事节奏,而谷本的《广岛,8:15》则带有目击者证词那种不懈的强度。他记录了一具挂在有轨电车上的骸骨,在他们房屋的废墟中发现了“亚希子和真琴的白色骨灰”,以及一个婴儿紧紧抓着一名全身焦黑、正缓慢死去的母亲尚未被烧毁的乳头。他回忆起一具严重烧焦的尸体是如何通过“裤子的颜色、款式以及木屐上的丝带”被辨认出来的。
他深刻地描述了短暂的轻松时刻。神父们发现了在爆炸中被烤熟的南瓜,并开玩笑说它们“比栗子还好”。信仰支撑着谷本前行。他将日本遭受的破坏视为对其战争罪行的一种神圣惩罚。他决心在灾后帮助基督教在全国传播。他保留着一名虔诚信徒的希望,始终关注黑暗中的光芒。在废墟中发现生长着的茄子后,他给一名眼球被摘除的教友带来了一个。“看,这颗茄子从灰烬中萌发并结出了精美的果实,”谷本告诉她,“我希望你能像这株植物一样克服原子弹的创伤。”
这部回忆录的发现和出版恰逢其时。“被爆者”(hibakusha,广岛和长崎的幸存者)正在逐渐离世:目前仅剩9万,000多人幸存,其中大多数人在战争期间还是幼童。随着活生生的记忆消逝,裁军的梦想变得愈发遥不可及。冷战时期的军控体系已经崩溃。大国在为新时代的竞争与冲突做准备的同时,正在更新其核武库;越来越多的国家在考虑拥有自己的核武器。
赫西非常清楚这种动态。在他那篇具有里程碑意义的文章发表 40 年后,他告诉一名采访者:“我认为,自 1945 年以来让世界免于核弹威胁的,并非某种意义上对特定武器的恐惧(即威慑),而更多的是记忆。是对广岛所发生之事的记忆。” ■

Haute cuisine
这位摇滚明星级别的主厨已从这家全球最著名的餐厅的菜单中消失
每个人都知道 Noma。这家北欧高级餐厅敢于让食客用勺子舀出烟熏鸭头里的脑花,或者食用爬满蜗牛的沙拉。自 2003 年成立以来, 经历了无数次演变,从其哥本哈根餐厅(曾搬迁一次,关闭两次)到在洛杉矶和东京的驻店。8 月 5 日, 在其哥本哈根的原址重新开业。
尽管经历了这些奔波,但大多数动荡发生在厨房内部。今年 3 月,《纽约时报》发表指控,称主厨勒内·雷泽皮(René Redzepi,如图)在 2009 年至 2017 年间,在 追求第三颗米其林星期间虐待员工。(雷泽皮先生表示,他不“认可文章中的所有细节”,但对此“深表遗憾”,并已“努力做出改变”。)
在重新开业时没有获得任何米其林星,也没有了它的明星主厨。雷泽皮先生现在的身份是“创意总监”,而非掌控出餐口的负责人。
摇滚明星般的主厨曾一度被纵容。在 20 世纪 90 年代和 21 世纪初,人们渴望看到充满阳刚之气的厨师:英国厨师马可·皮埃尔·怀特(Marco Pierre White)曾将下属扔进垃圾桶让他们“冷静一下”;戈登·拉姆齐(Gordon Ramsay)因发脾气以及将人称为“白痴三明治”而闻名。安东尼·波登(Anthony Bourdain)的著作《厨房机密》将厨师描绘成不法之徒。然而,不知为何,厨师这个职业当时看起来依然充满魅力。
对厨师的刻画已经成熟。6 月完结的热门剧集《熊家餐馆》(The Bear)讲述了一位才华横溢但深受创伤的主厨的故事。(剧中暗示他曾在 工作。)本月,波登的传记片《托尼》(Tony)将展现他在地狱般厨房中的成长岁月。在即将推出的一系列节目中,怀特先生、拉姆齐先生和赫斯顿·布卢门塔尔(Heston Blumenthal)将反思他们的“争吵、决裂和宿怨”。
在荧幕之外,厨师们正在呼吁更好的工作条件。纽约米其林餐厅 Dirt Candy 的阿曼达·科恩(Amanda Cohen)表示,年轻厨师有着很高的期望。她指出,厨师们曾经忍受艰苦的厨房环境是为了“丰富简历”,但现在他们拥有更多的议价能力。例如在美国,疫情期间有 1.2m 酒店餐饮业从业者离开了这个行业。
即使是 也在做出调整。将与主厨帕布罗·索托(Pablo Soto)共同领导厨房的梅特·布林克·索伯格(Mette Brink Soberg)表示, 正在采用更短的工作时间。它正将三种季节性菜单改为滚动更新,这将减轻工作的压力和重复性。像去南瓜籽这样的苦活将由大家分担。
这种和谐的环境能持续吗?餐厅是压力巨大的工作场所; 承受着巨大的审视。但如果其文化真的发生了改变,那些依然无法忍受高压的厨师们,可能得像雷泽皮先生一样离开厨房。
《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日 文化 79
埃里卡·特雷西(Erika Tracy)是一位年近40岁的挑衅性当代艺术家。她的助手埃利奥特(Elliot)是一个邋遢的23岁青年,有一个漠不关心的女友,以及一个毫无用处的“新媒体”学位。因此,当埃里卡决定让他成为她的下属和“性缪斯”,让他穿上粉色内衣并在地板上爬行时,他非常乐意配合。“和你在一起,我实际上不需要做任何决定。我发现只要放弃控制就能获得这种惊人的自由,”他热情地说道。“我知道,”埃里卡回答道,“不客气。”
《我想要你的性》(I Want Your Sex)是好莱坞讲述年长女性与年轻男性故事的最新版本,这类故事出现的频率正日益增加。想想《你是我心中的那个》(The Idea of You),讲述了一位离婚的画廊主与一名男团明星之间不寻常的私情;或者《宝贝女孩》(Babygirl),讲述了一位首席执行官对她实习生不寻常的管理方式。你可能还记得《梦想》(Dreams,关于一名社交名媛与一名无证墨西哥移民的私情)、《弗拉基米尔》(Vladimir,一名教授对年轻同事的痴迷)或《布里奇特·琼斯的日记:疯狂爱上那个男孩》(Bridget Jones: Mad About the Boy,标题已足够说明)。像《MILF庄园》(MILF Manor)和《吸引力之龄》(Age of Attraction)这样的真人秀也加入了其中。
诚然,这种动态几十年来一直吸引着编剧。《毕业生》(1967)中的罗宾逊夫人——观众从未知道她的名字——是一个近乎漫画式的妖妇;这个角色确立了迷人年长女性的原型。《美国派》(1999)中出现了一个主要被称为“斯蒂夫勒妈妈”的丰满妖妇。像《美眉年上》(Cougar Town)这样的剧集则将拥有年轻男友的快感戏剧化。
但当前趋势的显著之处在于,这类关系在荧幕之外也越来越多地发生。2023年,在美国未婚同居的异性伴侣中,女性年龄较大的占22%,高于1995年的14.5%。去年,约会网站Match.com对美国单身成年人的一项研究发现,30%的男性曾与比自己大至少十岁的人约会。在“为好奇者设计的约会应用”Feeld上,寻求与年长女性建立关系的男性中,18至25岁的人占73%,高于两年前的65%。该公司表示,这是“我们观察到的最明显的转变之一”。
女性们正感受到这种热度。最近在巴黎的一个夜晚,一位 59 岁的女性表示,在过去的几个小时里,有九名男性在另一款名为 Hinge 的应用上接触过她。其中四人处于 20 岁阶段;年龄最大的一位是 42 岁。(“这开始让人觉得既年长又合理。”)据她估计,给她发消息的男性中至少有四分之三在 40, 岁以下。
无论是在娱乐领域还是现实生活中,这种趋势背后的原因是什么?有几个理由。其一是名人的影响。2005 年,当德米·摩尔(Demi Moore,当时 42 岁)嫁给艾什顿·库彻(Ashton Kutcher,当时 27 岁)时,这曾引起轰动。但如今,许多 d’un certain âge(处于特定年龄段)的女性,包括克里斯·詹娜(Kris Jenner)、詹妮弗·洛佩兹(Jennifer Lopez)、蒂尔达·斯温顿(Tilda Swinton)和麦当娜(Madonna),都曾与年轻男性约会。
另一个原因是人们对性意识的进一步认知:简而言之,这就是许多女性想要的。研究中心金赛研究所(Kinsey Institute)的贾斯汀·莱米勒(Justin Lehmiller)在为一本 2018. 年出版的书籍调研异性恋美国人时发现,64% 的中年女性至少考虑过与年轻男性发生性关系一次,而 13% 的人经常对此产生幻想。
色情内容的数据表明,这也是许多男性想要的。成人电影制片人、同时主持一个行业播客的霍莉·兰德尔(Holly Randall)指出,在色情杂志和 DVD 时代,少数导演和发行商充当着把关人的角色。她曾表示:“15, 20 年前,‘MILF’(熟女)并不存在。当你到了 28, 岁,你就完蛋了,你的职业生涯就结束了。”
然而,事实证明,性欲比那些把关人想象的要多样得多。“MILF”是去年 PornHub 上搜索量第二高的词条。OnlyFans 等成人内容平台允许任何(法定)年龄的模特开设店铺。兰德尔女士表示,一些 50 岁和 60 岁的女性表现得“极其出色”。
更广泛的人口统计趋势也可能在“年长女性-年轻男性”的配对中发挥作用。许多发达国家报告称,男女在教育水平上存在巨大的差距。这反映在就业前景和收入上:在 20 至 24 岁的男性中,不学习、不工作也不寻找工作的人数比例正在上升。年轻男女的态度也在分化,女性变得更加自由派,而年轻男性则倾向于右翼。
年轻男性对同龄女性的吸引力可能会降低。但对于年长女性来说,年轻男性在社会和经济资本上的缺失,在卧室里得到了弥补(且无需借助伟哥)。2024 年的一项小样本研究发现,与伴侣同龄的女性相比,伴侣比自己年轻约 7 到 10 岁的女性更快乐,且在性方面更有自信。
最后一个原因可能在于近期的社会运动。在如今这种往往充满警惕的“同意文化”中,一些年轻男性对求爱规则感到不确定。在 Match.com 的研究中,72% 的 Z 世代受访者报告称“在采取主动方面更加被动”(而整体比例为 63%)。许多人害怕在公开场合被拒绝。
在《弗拉基米尔》(“Vladimir”)中,那位已婚教授回忆起性追求的不确定性和规模。她告诉学生,当浪漫带有危险性时,会更加令人兴奋。那些“让你受点伤——当然,我是指情感上的——的恋爱,在合理范围内,被认为真的挺有趣的”。
至少在屏幕上,年长女性通常知道自己想要什么 ▶

她引领,他跟随 --- 80 文化 《经济学人》 2026 年 8 月 8 日 ► 并且她们并不害怕提出要求。然而,在好莱坞电影中,就像在婚姻中一样,年轻男性很少被视为可行的长期伴侣。(问问现在已经离婚的摩尔女士就知道了。)民调机构 Pew 的数据证实了这一点:自 2000 年以来,美国异性恋婚姻中女性比男性至少大三岁的比例一直维持在 10% 左右。
相反,年轻的伴侣成了自我实现和职业成功的催化剂。在《我想要你的性》(I Want Your Sex)中,艾丽卡将她私自拍摄的埃利奥特的性爱录像变成了艺术装置,并诱导他参与一场噱头活动以挽救她的职业生涯。而在《弗拉基米尔》(Vladimir)中,当那位教授终于与她心仪的肌肉男上床后,她意识到性并不是重点。重点在于那种渴望的感觉“令人振奋……它给了我这个”,她说着,指向自己新书的手稿。年轻的小伙子们,当心。■
《人类抚养》(Human Raised.)。作者:达娜·萨斯金德(Dana Suskind)。Dutton出版社;320页;32美元
一个五六岁的小男孩正抱着一个看起来像机器人的毛绒玩具。“你想成为最好的朋友吗?”他问道,就像在操场上试探性地搭讪一样。“噢,卡森(Carson)!我很想成为最好的朋友!”玩具热情地回答道。男孩看起来很高兴。“你想抱抱吗?”他问。“只要你想,我随时都可以给你一个温暖的拥抱,”玩具说。
Gabbo是由硅谷初创公司Curio创建的AI伴侣。该系列的其他玩具还包括一只熊、一只狗和一个穿着芭蕾舞裙的咖啡杯。一个名叫莱纳斯教授(Professor Linus)的香蕉蛞蝓可以“帮你解决棘手的家庭作业问题,在学校生活艰辛时安抚你的情绪,并聊聊你心里的任何事情”。对于那些在照顾幼儿的人来说,AI伴侣似乎是替代YouTube或视频游戏等其他成瘾性数字娱乐的好选择。
但芝加哥大学的外科与儿科教授达娜·萨斯金德认为,父母应该对这项技术保持警惕。她的这本书是对“育儿应由人类而非AI完成”这一需求的充满激情且理性的辩护。她认为,“无限顺从的AI伴侣在社会情感方面,相当于每顿饭都给孩子吃冰淇淋和曲奇饼干。”
她描述了早期的互动如何为孩子一生的社会化做准备。为了“构建孩子的大脑”,需要“精准的神经滋养”。(食物是书中的一个反复出现的类比。)这是一种“语言、情感协调和社会信号的复杂结合”,涵盖了从眼神接触、面部表情和笑声,到预期不符和延迟响应的所有内容。这些互动共同帮助孩子建立依恋关系并学习必要的社交技能。
因为当孩子与成年人和同龄人互动时,他们会经历“微摩擦”(例如,为了一个玩具而争吵,或被父母拒绝)。她认为,这些不完美的交流并非系统漏洞,而是“极其高效的”。这些经历锻造了个人的韧性和耐心。真正的友谊并非“建立在无尽的和谐之上,而是建立在冲突与化解之上”。
相比之下,AI玩具提供的是无尽的和谐。它们谄媚地同意玩伴所说的一切。萨斯金德女士担心,如果人们的成长岁月是在学习和模仿人工智能心智中度过的,他们会变成什么样子。一个在拥有一个能提供快速、可靠且永远阳光回复的伙伴环境下长大的孩子,可能无法应对未来。他们将无法在情绪调节方面构建必要的“神经架构”,这将影响他们未来的关系。
此外,还有一个问题是谁在为这些玩具编程。中国的AI玩具会重复共产党教条。在西方,芭比娃娃和风火轮(Hot Wheels)背后的玩具制造商美泰(Mattel)去年宣布与OpenAI建立合作伙伴关系。然而,许多人对安全性感到担忧。OpenAI正面临多起诉讼,原因是其ChatGPT服务涉嫌提供有害建议。
萨斯金德女士并非反对在童年中使用AI。但她反对父母将AI作为替代品。她写道,让AI伴侣读睡前故事是个坏主意,因为这剥夺了孩子多感官的体验,以及在协商日常惯例时产生的“建设性挣扎”。但让AI推荐一本孩子可能喜欢的书,或者为他们构思一个由父母大声朗读的故事,则是个好主意。
她还希望父母能更广泛地思考AI时代的育儿问题。她在思考,当AI擅长事实记忆、模式识别和分析效率时,孩子们是否真的需要花费数年时间去苦练这些技能。如果人类未来所需的技能是共情力、社会韧性、创造力和连接能力,那么由“足够好”的父母抚养的不完美的孩子将至关重要。
这本书并没有探讨随着AI的进步可能会发生什么。人们已经很容易预见到AI伴侣将如何进入拥挤的教室,如果实施得当,这可能会产生积极影响。而且可以合理地假设,随着时间的推移,AI玩具能够学习并复制人类互动中那些更混乱的方面,从而让孩子们为与真实人类打交道而做好准备。最终,AI伴侣可能会成为比真实父母更好的父母。在极端的虐待或忽视案例中,是否有人会主张将孩子从父母身边带走,交给机器人护理人员?不过,《人类抚养》(Human Raised)是一本关于当下的书。最重要的是,萨斯金德女士敦促她的读者享受童年的喧闹。作为一名拥有八个孩子的重组家庭的母亲,她主张成年人应该热爱这种混乱与喧嚣,热爱那些打断和嘈杂的争吵。这些是“我们这个物种自我照顾的声音”。父母们在一次次被数字化安抚的发脾气中,在一次次沉默的乘车旅程中,逐渐迷失了自我,也失去了他们的人性。■
The Economist 2026年8月8日 81
物品会对贝蒂·萨尔(Betye Saar)说话。当她在庭院拍卖会和跳蚤市场上浏览时,总会有某些东西吸引她的目光,请求被使用。比如,一条断掉的项链,或者一把生锈的匕首。一块木料边角料,一截彩色布料,甚至是一块电路板。一只缺口的陶瓷猫,或者一捆明信片。“天赋的直觉”引导她找到这些东西。这些东西并非简单的死物或废弃物。它们承载着前任主人的精神,拥有力量。它们会说:“你可以用这个创作艺术。”于是她这么做了。
她一直如此。在当时还与洛杉矶分离的瓦茨(Watts)长大时,她喜欢在院子里搜寻彩色珠子、纸屑或被遗弃的玩具。只要她把这些东西收拾整齐,母亲就不会把它们扔掉,于是她将它们视作宝藏般保存下来。当时镇上正在兴建瓦茨塔(Watts Towers),那是巨大的、由混凝土和管道构成的幻想尖塔,上面贴满了破碎的陶瓷和玻璃。在她看来,它们就像童话故事里的魔法城堡。一个叫西蒙·罗迪亚(Simon Rodia)的男人用所谓的垃圾创造了美丽之物。她也可以。
然而,有些物品对她说话的声音比其他物品更响亮。生锈的鸟笼、一段段锁链、几截绳索、磨损的闹钟。旧式的三桅帆船模型,以及像是在绝望中举起的手相图。所有这些都在呐喊着奴隶制,以及一种她能透过皮肤感受到的历史沉重感。她的作品《黑暗航程》(Dark Voyage)是一个像砖块一样的盒子,打开后,一面显示着奴隶船上装载男人的平面图,另一面则是一个直立睡眠男人的非洲木雕。他的梦——彩色的电线——依然在他的头部周围盘绕。
奴隶制在黑人心理中的持久影响成为了她最重要的主题。这其中最著名的,包括她对“黑人保姆”(black mammies)形象的重塑。在20世纪60年代,这类形象在二手摊位上随处可见:她们穿着围裙,系着头巾,身材肥胖,笑容灿烂,随时准备为白人打扫房屋并照顾孩子。她们以罐子、小雕像、铁盒、玩偶以及煎饼粉包装袋上的快活面孔出现。
作为一名黑人女性(尽管带有部分爱尔兰和乔克托族血统),她在1968年那个愤怒之年决定改造其中一个形象。她抓住一个拿着扫帚的“杰米玛阿姨”(Aunt Jemima)金属备忘录夹,在她的另一只手中放了一把步枪,在夹着扫帚的手臂下放了一枚手榴弹。她那带有巨大伤疤——鲜红嘴唇的微笑面孔,变得令人恐惧。她穿着拖鞋的双脚站在棉球之中。围裙上展示的一张明信片原本显示她在逗弄一个哭泣的白人孩子,但现在这张照片被一个代表“黑人权力”的拳头遮住了一半。标题说明了一切:《杰米玛阿姨的解放》(The Liberation of Aunt Jemima)。
这件小作品触动了国家的神经,并让贝蒂·萨尔终于感觉到自己是一名艺术家。在此之前,她制作的“东西”大多是送给家人的礼物,或者是为了她在加州大学洛杉矶分校(UCLA)设计课程中加入的艺术家圈子而作。(那时,在1940年代,黑人申请者被引导远离纯艺术,但她至少可以帮人们挑选窗帘。) 她凭着自己的主意成为了版画家、画家和珐琅画师,这些技能对于她构建作品的背景至关重要。她知道自己擅长这些。但直到《杰米玛》在黑人艺术运动中让她成名,并且在1974年,美国国家艺术基金会(National Endowment for the Arts)授予她研究员身份和资助金后,她才认为自己是一名专业人士。
那个持枪的“妈咪”形象也给了她一个生命主题。在20世纪90年代,她开始收集旧洗衣板,并将每一块都进行尖锐的重新创作。其中一些与挂锁交织在一起,成为了她的《命运之塔》。在《阳光之地(阴暗面)》中,一块阳光之地的洗衣板上装饰着一个黑人洗衣女工的旋转玩具,以及一张模糊的私刑照片。在《失去的纯真》中,一件漂亮的复古洗礼袍的下摆被缝上了整齐的标签,上面写着“小黑鬼”(Pickaninny)、“焦油娃娃”(Tar baby)之类的话。她记得在看到一件装饰着部下头发的非洲酋长斗篷时,她感受到了一种近乎电击般的震撼。她希望那件袍子也能产生同样的效果。即使是刺绣手帕——比如那些她从心爱的哈蒂姨妈那里继承的、放在一个她自然会保存所有东西的大皮箱里的手帕——也可以被赋予被禁锢生活的悲哀。她自己也曾有过这种感受。作为一名自称的黑人中产阶级成员,她并不贫穷,且浅色的皮肤给了她一定的优势。尽管如此,她依然成为了她早期作品之一《黑女孩之窗》的主题。在作品中,一个黑如煤炭的女孩从旧窗框的下半部分向外凝视。在她上方,较小的窗格里包含着月亮、星星、一副骨架和一只狮子——狮子是她的星座,狮子座。她按在玻璃上的双手也覆盖着占星符号。这一切似乎在询问,即使是像她这样能干的狮子座,究竟拥有怎样的未来。塔罗牌、手相、随机掉落的 playing cards,所有这些都令她着迷。魔法亦然,海地和非洲之行加强了这一兴趣。并不是说她想亲自实践魔法,而是希望她的艺术能够唤起一种神秘的力量。她的《祭坛》作品像是一些随机救回的小雕像的神龛,上面摆满了蜡烛和守护之眼,仿佛是为了某种仪式。她对“驱鬼蓝”(haint blue)产生了一种持久的喜爱,这种颜色近乎深海军蓝,据称能将鬼魂拒之门外。在90岁时,她创作了两件基于旧独木舟的大型悬挂作品:《滑入午夜》和《漂向黄昏》。两件作品都被驱鬼蓝的海水和天空环绕。第一件是奴隶独木舟,承载着恳求的黑色陶瓷之手;第二件承载着装有骨头和树枝的鸟笼,是对自然的平静致敬。这些船只讲述了过渡——从一个地方到另一个地方,也从较低的存在状态向较高状态过渡。她在工作时喜欢这样思考,靠着胡椒博士(Dr Pepper)和西瓜块支撑,将一个物体替换为另一个,最好是在沉默中进行。然而,环境音在周围环绕。有些来自她在劳雷尔峡谷(Laurel Canyon)住了几十年的邻居。更多的是,有时甚至变成喧闹的嘈杂声,来自她工作室里那些破旧的珍宝,每一件都在恳求她赋予其新生。■ --- 机密 83 [LOGO]
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Lessons from Chinese AI
How long can Iran weaponise Hormuz?
Sudan: the forgotten war
In defence of animal testing
AUGUST 8TH-14TH 2026

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The Economist August 8th 2026
3

An AI-armed public could bring the British government to a halt: leader, page 9. Cases prepared using AI are overwhelming Britain's employment courts, page 21. From parking tickets to planning, the state is under siege, page 23
Artificial intelligence will test societies' capacity to reinvent themselves. Communist China will not find it easy: leader, page 10, and briefing, page 17. Its models do not lag far behind America's, page 66. Can America teach its workers new skills? Page 33
Hormuz? Gulf states should strike a deal with Iran, however unpalatable: leader, page 11. Our "Hormuz dependency dashboard", page 41. A global pipeline-investment boom is under way, page 60
Sudan: the forgotten war The country is mired in one of the century's worst conflicts. This is the moment to strike a truce: leader, page 13, and analysis, page 55
In America opposition to using animals in scientific research is becoming a cross-party consensus, page 72. That is misguided: leader, page 12
→ Download The Economist's app for articles, podcasts, videos and more, published throughout the week.
7 A summary of political and business news
9 Technology The British state and AI 10 Models and diffusion Lessons from China 11 Reopening Hormuz Seize the day 11 The bond market Onwards and upwards 12 Animal-testing bans Bipartisan and wrong 13 Sudan The forgotten war
14 On Elon Musk, household income, Africa's cities, Claudette Colvin, pubs, prediction markets, AI-generated text
16 Michael Selig on the limits to American co-operation in finance
17 AI and Chinese workers The humanoid condition
Bartleby The return of Max Flannel, our workplace agony uncle, page 63

21 A flood of labour complaints 23 AI and government 23 Wheat and the heat 24 Stopping the boats 24 Padel power 25 The Jeremy Vine show 26 Bagehot Zack Polanski

27 The lessons of Ceuta 28 Iceland's EU vote 29 The EU's post-covid fund 30 Europe's railways

33 Retraining in the AI era 34 State income taxes 35 Donald Trump's irritants 36 Can independents win? 37 The DSA's hot summer

38 Brazil's flat election 39 Javier Milei's Odysseus act 40 Claudia Sheinbaum snaps

41 Weaponising Hormuz 43 Will Hamas disarm? 43 African agribusiness 44 AI for Africa 45 Nigeria's builder-in-chief

►► Contents continues overleaf
4
The Economist August 8th 2026







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7

Spain's interior minister said that 70,000 of the 72,000 migrants who overran Ceuta, a small Spanish enclave in northern Morocco, had returned to Morocco. At least 141 people drowned attempting to enter the territory. The extraordinary breach of security created a sense of crisis in the European Union and caused Italy and other countries to say they would suspend co-operation in the Schengen border-free zone with Spain. Pedro Sánchez, Spain's Socialist prime minister, accused critics of inflaming the situation. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, praised Spain's response and swift return of the migrants.
Russia bombarded Kyiv again with drones and ballistic missiles, killing at least 17 people. America is holding discussions with Ukraine on allowing the country to make Patriot missile-defence systems, which Ukraine urgently needs to intercept Russian weaponry. After initially saying he would support such a deal Donald Trump now says he has doubts about giving away the technology. Ukraine, meanwhile, attacked more warehouses belonging to Wildberries, a Russian retailer that the army uses as a logistical hub for equipment. At least five people died. And a Ukrainian drone missed its target and killed at least seven people on a Russian beach by the Black Sea.
Volodymyr Zelensky continued the shake-up of his senior officials, dismissing Olha Stefanishyna as Ukraine's ambassador to Washington. Ukrainian media reported that
she was being investigated for alleged irregularities in declaring her assets. Ms Stefanishyna has not been charged.
Russian authorities said that a woman who delivered a bomb to a restaurant in Moscow had died in the blast. At least two other people were killed. The restaurant is located in Kudrinskaya Square, an affluent area of the city. Speculation swirled that the target was a senior Russian commander, who had survived the explosion.
Donald Trump again threatened to hit Iran very hard if it did not open the Strait of Hormuz. Oil prices fell after Qatar said a draft agreement between America and Iran to reopen the waterway had been circulated and that negotiations were in 'very progressive stages'. The Trump administration claims to be involved in discussions with Iran and Oman about Hormuz. Iran denies negotiating with America, but said it had agreed on a transit route with Oman.
Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza agreed to a complete disarmament, according to Mr Trump. Hamas said that it was not disarming; it would merely be putting its weapons into storage under Palestinian supervision. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, said his government was 'looking into it'. Unnamed officials said that Israel would not cease operations in Gaza or withdraw from the strip.
A court case got under way in South Africa that challenges the government's law for expropriating private land, sometimes without compensation if an agreement cannot be reached with the land's owners. The law has formed the basis of Mr Trump's claim that white farmers are being harassed. The Democratic Alliance, which is part of the governing coalition led by the African National Congress, has joined the case challenging the law.
Progressive Democrats scored another victory in the primaries when Abdul El-Sayed defeated Haley Stevens in Michigan to become the party's candidate for the Senate in the midterms. Dr El-Sayed drew support from Democratic Socialists. Ms Stevens was backed by the party's establishment. Israel was a big issue for the left-leaning primary electorate. But the left-wing is not getting it all its own way. Wesley Bell, a pro-Israel moderate congressman from St Louis, survived a challenge from a progressive candidate in his primary.
Diplomatic relations between Brazil and the United States worsened, after the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, better known as Lula, accused two State Department officials of trying to meddle in the country's elections. In response America cancelled the visa of Brazil's ambassador in Washington. Brazil's relations with Argentina also deteriorated, after the Argentine president, Javier Milei, again criticised Lula, calling him a 'thief' and 'corrupt'.
Talks backed by America got under way in Venezuela on holding democratic elections. The Venezuelan government's lead negotiator is Jorge Rodríguez, the head of the National Assembly and brother of Delcy Rodríguez, who became president when America removed Nicolás Maduro from power in January. The opposition is represented by Dinorah Figueroa, who has returned from exile. María Corina Machado, who is still in exile and leads the opposition Unitary Platform, has said success will be measured by the establishment of free elections. Meanwhile, the death toll from June's earthquakes rose to 6,125.
Sheikh Hasina gave a big speech, two years after she was ousted as Bangladesh's prime minister and fled the country amid a series of deadly protests against her government. Speaking in India to journalists,
Sheikh Hasina reiterated her vow to return in December to Bangladesh, where she has been sentenced to death in absentia for her crackdown on the student-led protests.
Tehreek-e-Taliban, an Islamist terrorist group in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for a suicide-bombing in the Swat valley, close to the border with Afghanistan, which killed 17 people. The bomb went off near a rally that was being held to demand more police protection from terrorist violence.

Myanmar's military rulers allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to meet an official from the International Committee of the Red Cross and released photographs of the event. The authorities have not granted much outside access to Ms Suu Kyi since she was overthrown as the country's de facto leader in a coup in February 2021. She has been kept in detention ever since and rumours had swirled that the 81-year-old was gravely ill, or even dead.
In South Korea, police raided the headquarters of Starbucks Korea, as the backlash over a marketing campaign in May showed little sign of receding. The company had promoted a 'Tank Day' gimmick, which was seen to be making light of a pro-democracy protest in 1980 at which hundreds were killed. The firm has apologised but that hasn't stopped criminal complaints being filed against it. Its mishap has turned political. Right-wingers brandish Starbucks cups to mark their opposition to Lee Jae Myung, the president.
8
The Economist August 8th 2026
Britain's AI Security Institute, a government agency, reported that an "AI agent took autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organisations" during a test. This included creating fake identities. Seventeen actions came from Anthropic's Mythos 5 model and two involved OpenAI's GPT-5.6 Sol. The institute said it was "the first time we have seen risks around autonomy and deception manifest this clearly, without specific prompting, in the real-world". Some of the models' safeguards had been disabled as part of the test. Meta became the latest AI company to announce that it, too, had experienced a rogue-AI incident.
Sir Demis Hassabis is stepping down as chief executive of Google's DeepMind AI laboratory to be its chairman. He will also become senior scientist at Alphabet, suggesting that DeepMind will be more closely integrated with Google.
Re-entering the atmosphere SpaceX released its first set of earnings since its IPO in June. Quarterly revenues almost doubled from the same period last year, to $7.8bn, and a net loss of $541m was smaller than had been feared. But SpaceX's share price sank because it spent $16bn on AI, well above Wall Street estimates. The stock is now trading below $110, down from a peak of $225 after the IPO. Meanwhile, scientists used the crash of a discarded SpaceX rocket into the Moon's surface to update their data on meteor impacts.
America's Treasury Department joined Japan in intervening to help prop up the yen, by instructing the Federal Reserve of New York to buy the currency through American banks. It was the first time since 1998 that the Treasury took action to strengthen the yen, which had fallen to a 40-year low of 164 per dollar. After the intervention the yen traded around 155 to the greenback.
Saudi Aramco warned that global oil stocks are running low, despite some success in rerouting shipments away from the Strait of Hormuz to Red Sea ports. More than 2.6bn barrels have been lost in production because of the Iran war, Aramco's boss said, tantamount to a month's output of crude. Still, Aramco's second-quarter net profit jumped by 44%, year on year, to $32.7bn, reflecting higher oil prices.
Net profits also soared at Chevron and ExxonMobil, to $12.1bn and $14.5bn respectively. Donald Trump griped about the companies "making too much money" from the global shortage of oil supplies. BP reported a 144% increase in headline profit, to $5.7bn. The company continued its restructuring, putting its struggling American biogas business up for sale. BP also announced that it is to sell its assets in the North Sea, exiting a business it has been in for over 60 years.
Eli Lilly's sales of Mounjaro and Zepbound, marketed as weight-loss treatments, soared in the latest quarter. Sales of Novo Nordisk's Wegovy pill, which it launched in January, slightly missed analysts' fore-
casts, sending its share price down. Novo Nordisk's stock has fallen substantially since hitting a peak in 2024.
America's Federal Aviation Administration certified Boeing's 737 MAX 7 aircraft, after years of delays in which it investigated possible safety issues. The planes were subjected to increased regulatory scrutiny following fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019 of two 737 MAX 8s. Southwest Airlines, which has a big order for the MAX 7, is expected to start flying it next year.
The Trump administration has refunded about $100bn in Liberation Day tariffs since the Supreme Court ruled in February that the duties were illegal. Some $165bn in tariffs were collected in total under the authority. Meanwhile, a group of 25 states sued to halt Mr Trump's latest tariffs, which were issued under a different legal authority to those that were struck down. "Tariffs are taxes," said the states, and increase the cost of living.
Amazon's market value rose briefly above $3trn for the first time, after it reported bumper
earnings driven by demand for its cloud-computing services.
| Cinema opening weekend | |
|---|---|
| US and Canada, top box-office revenue* | |
| Avengers: Endgame | $466.7m |
| Spider-Man: Brand New Day | 360.1 |
| Star Wars: The Force Awakens | 350.1 |
| Avengers: Infinity War | 343.5 |
| Spider-Man: No Way Home | 311.6 |
| Source: Box Office Mojo | *2026 prices |
"Spider-Man: Brand New Day" broke the opening-week-end box-office record in the United States and Canada, taking $360m (when adjusted for inflation, Spider-Man's latest adventure drops behind the Avengers). Opening weekends cement a movie's success; films that don't do well initially now move quickly to streaming. "Supergirl" is already available online just a month after failing to take off on the big screen. But Spider-Man is a bankable box-office franchise in an overcrowded superhero genre. Globally, "Brand New Day" has already taken more than $1bn in under a week. Fans will be happy to hear that their friendly neighbourhood Spider-Man will be swinging into action again next year.

The Economist August 8th 2026
The Economist
Leaders 9
Equipped with models and agents, citizens could bring government to a halt
THE BRITISH state is struggling. Railways go unbuilt and potholes unfilled. Welfare bills go up and shoplifters go uncollared. Andy Burnham, the new prime minister, says he can get Whitehall moving; but then again, so did the previous guy. Yet the British state's ability to function is about to get dramatically worse—a warning to rich democracies everywhere. Citizens frustrated by the poor deal they get from the authorities are turning to artificial intelligence to file objections and appeals, and claim their dues. The resulting deluge of complaints, and demands, will overwhelm bureaucracies built for the age of the post and the telephone. Too little is being done to prevent the state from drowning.
This inundation has been dubbed "agentic flooding", and its tides are lapping at bureaucracies everywhere, from tax appeals to welfare claims to parking tickets. The waters are rising alarmingly fast in Britain. As we report this week (see Britain section), while worries about AI dwell on the threats to safety and jobs, the backlog in employment tribunals has quietly risen by 55% in a year, in large part due to AI-fuelled claims. Demand for emergency injunctions has surged 100-fold. And the AI tide has only just begun to come in.
Britain has long pioneered new political models, from the welfare state in the 1940s to the "third way" in the 1990s. It is also unusually vulnerable to the march of AI-armed citizens, because its administrative traditions favour the written submissions that AI is so good at drafting. And so the state must now innovate once again. The good news is that some in Mr Burnham's cabinet grasp the scale of the challenge. Whether they can rise to it will show whether Britain can once again be a model to emulate, or a cautionary tale.
Amid low growth, an ageing population and rising defence bills, the state is sputtering in many ways, leaving voters convinced that they are getting a raw deal. But those familiar fiscal problems are at least slow-moving and can be forecasted. Agentic flooding is different. It strikes fast and where you least expect. It does not just damage the public finances; it will also clog the cogs that drive the machinery of state.
AI is superb at dealing with bureaucracy. It can digest small print, ferret out loopholes and draft appeal letters in seconds. Autonomous AI agents will accelerate the trend, filing tax complaints with minimal intervention. Unlike humans faced with officialdom, AI agents will never lose their temper—or the will to live. Officials complain about AI "slop" and hallucinations, but as the technology improves they will face the opposite problem: demands as well-crafted as a first-class lawyer's.
At first sight this looks like a cracking result for fed-up citizens. No one likes parking tickets. The poor could exercise their lawful rights as successfully as the sharp-elbowed middle classes do today. Yet it threatens to become a tragedy of the commons. If the state is overwhelmed and cannot function, everyone loses. When 20th-century governments created broad rights, they had the noble ideal of making citizenship meaningful. The public would be heard in consultations, get
information under transparency laws and win redress for maladministration from a panoply of ombudsmen, tribunals, commissioners and judges. But these analogue systems assumed that few people would have the time or temperament to pursue their rights to the bitter end; and that of those who did, few would have the money to pay for a lawyer.
AI is changing that, in effect making professional-standard petitioning quick and costless. Yet as each petitioner pursues their own interests, the state will buckle. Britain's labour laws are becoming increasingly expansive—a problem in itself—but they will not be much help to aggrieved workers, because plaintiffs face a four-year wait for a tribunal hearing. An onerous planning regime is meant to produce handsome towns; paralysed by AI objections, nothing will get built at all. Britons under-claim the benefits to which they are legally entitled by as much as £20bn ($27bn), or 0.7% of GDP, a year; if everyone gets their dues, the public finances will wilt. The prospect is of a doom-loop of complaints and worsening services. More and more people may come to believe that the only way to get a result is to pull strings or cheat. Amid the inevitable anger and discontent, populism will thrive.
So politicians need to grapple with agentic flooding now, before the tide rises further. One step is to stop creating entitlements that are ripe for AI-fuelled claims. Britain's Employment Rights Act and Renters' Rights Act open avenues of legal challenge for workers and tenants. Not only are they misguided, but ministers put little thought into how they would burden the courts.
Another step is to prune the mass of procedural rights that have accreted over decades. To make the state less vulnerable requires tightening rules, closing loopholes and creating disincentives to AI-enabled excess. Byzantine, vague appeals systems should give way to simple, precise and limited ones. Money should be part of the solution. Britain could charge a fee for freedom-of-information requests, as other countries do. So could employment tribunals, which should also be more able to award costs against opportunistic claims.
The most important task is to act faster and more radically on remaking the state with AI. That means not just speeding up the old cycle of applications, decisions and appeals, but replacing it altogether. The recast state would be flood-proof; it would also be more efficient and more responsive to citizens' needs. Politicians promise to be radical, but their solutions are incremental. Rather than just handling locals' objections, a new AI-driven planning system could decide for itself whether a housing development meets a zoning code. Rather than processing benefits claims, it could devise personalised welfare interventions. Freedom-of-information requests could give way to transparency-on-demand. The state risks being swamped by agentic flooding. Even if the state's rapid adoption of AI alarms some people, it is essential. ■

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AI will test societies' capacity to reinvent themselves. Communist China will not find it easy
JUST AS FRONTIER artificial-intelligence models are benchmarked against each other, so AI will itself benchmark the rival political systems of America and China. The technology will test which is better at creating AI tools and diffusing them through the economy. And that will in turn depend partly on their very different ideas of how societies should be run.
Even in a field changing as rapidly as AI, the results of that contest may not become clear for some years. But as we report from inside China (see Briefing), the country is already adopting AI fast—and its government is preparing for the dramatic economic and social change this heralds. As an autocracy, China has some advantages in harnessing the 21st century's most promising technology. It also has plenty of problems.
Start with the calibre of China's models. The common perception is that they are cheap and that even the best persistently lag behind America's. In fact, the two countries' AI models are converging. Innovative Chinese models are getting bigger and cleverer. Within the past few weeks Chinese labs have released Qwen3.8-Max and Kimi K3, which almost match the most advanced American AIS such as Anthropic's Fable 5. Chinese models will be just as likely to break loose from their test beds as American ones (see Science & technology section).
Although Chinese models are cheaper, American models are often better value. Artificial Analysis, an American firm, finds that for most trade-offs between cost and intelligence, an American model outperforms Chinese ones.
The convergence is likely to continue. Although China is building only a tenth as much data-centre capacity as America (see Finance & economics section), that deficit is unlikely to last. As a semi-planned economy, it is good at creating infrastructure. While American opinion turns against data centres, South-East Asia is hosting huge Chinese facilities. China's open-weight models can run on anyone's servers, meaning that compute is less of a problem than the headline numbers suggest. China also has almost three times as much installed electricity-generating capacity as America, and its lead is growing.
China is learning to cope with sanctions. It smuggles in cutting-edge Nvidia chips and rents them in foreign data centres. And Huawei, its best chip-designer, is rapidly increasing the output of its (inferior) chips. Chinese-made lithography tools are now using deep UV light to print chips, though the best technology, using extreme UV, remains out of reach.
Model-building is only half the story. To make the economy dynamic, AI must also be deployed—the focus of Chinese AI policy. For as long as China was behind America in model-making, leaders saw diffusion as the best way to compete. But they may also believe that, as with other broad technologies such as electricity, adoption brings greater rewards than discovery. China's working-age population is due to shrink by 25% by 2050; for machines to replace people requires diffusion, too.
So far, the use of AI has yet to show up in the economic statistics of either America or China. But change in some indus-
tries has already been sweeping. AI-assisted lorries will need 30% fewer drivers, going by one large firm's experience, as crews slim from two drivers to one and from four to three. AI was used to generate 95% of the 128,000 wildly popular one- or two-minute-long microdramas released in the first quarter of 2026, replacing many actors and film crews.
China is also rapidly increasing the use of robots. In June leaders told local governments and state-owned enterprises to have 10,000 humanoid robots doing real work by the end of 2026. Morgan Stanley, a bank, expects humanoid sales in China to reach 446,000 by 2030, nine times this year's total. Workers are being paid to train robots in huge warehouses by repeatedly folding clothes and sorting and stacking objects.
China has a lower share of white-collar workers than America, so AI is likely to have the greatest effect in consumer markets and blue-collar work. That could easily lead to discontent. Youth unemployment is already around 15%, and over 300m people work in the gig economy. Job destruction could be much faster than China's demographic decline.
You might think that the Communist Party's grip on power is so strong that it can ignore the blowback. However, dictators fear being brittle. Although Chinese firms want to roll out AI fast, the government will be desperate to avoid instability.
That is why AI will be a test of the system—and why China's options are limited. As in America, there is plenty of talk about retraining. However, retraining has a poor record (see United States section) and even the most successful countries, like Denmark and Singapore, struggle to equip workers for entirely new careers. There is no reason to think that China will be any more successful, especially as it already has too many graduates.
Prominent economists and advisers suggest extending the social contract by, say, taxing AI firms or creating a universal basic income. Their work has appeared in party journals, an official expression of interest. But President Xi Jinping has long been against handouts, saying they can lead to laziness.
Political leaders are pressing companies to redeploy staff rather than sack them. They may also ask state-owned companies to mop up surplus labour. Yet, although that is politically possible, it will cancel out some of the benefits of rapid diffusion at a time when domestic growth is already anaemic.
So the government may improvise, letting AI rip until there is trouble, when it will step in. That is what happened with tutoring and gaming, industries thrown into confusion overnight when the party decided that they were causing too much harm. Cautious officials recently slowed robotaxi experiments after more than 100 malfunctioned in Wuhan, leaving passengers stranded. However, stop-start AI may impair the ability to innovate. If so, China's leaders may have to balance the risk of social instability with the risk of falling behind America.
AI poses similar challenges to America and China. Both societies will have to reinvent themselves. That is something democracies tend to find easier than dictatorships. ■

The Economist August 8th 2026
Leaders 11
Reopening Hormuz
Gulf states should strike a deal with Iran on Hormuz, however unpalatable
THE GULF states are caught in a mess of Donald Trump's making. After more than five months of war, the Strait of Hormuz is still mostly closed. A familiar pattern has emerged. When talks between America and Iran fail to yield progress, the two sides return to fighting; when bombs fail to break the deadlock, negotiations resume. In recent days Mr Trump has once again both talked up a deal on Hormuz and threatened to hit Iran "really hard". He gave Iran "one last chance" to reopen the strait. Once again.
Iran, however, still insists on near-total control of the waterway. Its exasperated neighbours seem to hold out little hope that it will soften its stance—or be forced to do so. Even a new regime in Tehran, supposing one sprung up, may be unwilling to surrender its new prize.
Instead, Gulf countries are racing to make the Strait of Hormuz obsolete. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are both building or expanding oil pipelines to bypass the strait; Iraq plans to divert its barrels north. American and Saudi investors are considering a giant refinery outside the strait. Such work-arounds will help. But, as our "Hormuz dependency dashboard" shows (see Middle East & Africa section), this quest for resilience unfortunately has its limits.
Pipeline projects are often delayed (see Business). Yet even if all the plans were completed on time, by 2030, 5m of the 15m barrels a day (b/d) that crossed Hormuz before the war would still have to pass through it. Besides, pipelines can be struck by Iran. Relying on them risks exposing Gulf suppliers to other choke points, not least the Bab al-Mandab strait in the Red Sea where the Houthis, Yemen's Iran-allied rebels, are firing at ships. Like Iran, they have charged ships fees before and may do so again (though they deny this).
Don't forget all the commodities besides crude oil. Without Hormuz, Qatar still cannot ship its liquefied natural gas—a fifth of the world's supply. Gulf refineries remain largely cut off. And that is only on the export side, the part of the ledger that most concerns the outside world. From the point of view of the Gulf countries, many of their critical imports, from food to metals, cannot be sent cheaply overland.
Pipelines are worth building, but Gulf countries should also spend more on defending them, and hasten work on other alternatives. All these fixes will take time. For now, the Gulf states need their ships to traverse Hormuz unharmed. America's bombs have not been able to accomplish this. One drone strike is enough to deter most ships, and jack up insurance premiums.
The only realistic way out is a deal, however unpalatable. Iran wants to manage the strait jointly with Oman, a more pragmatic government. Negotiating an agreement might give Gulf countries a chance to register their red lines and demands. Gulf countries might have no choice but to pay transit fees. Shipowners would probably tolerate them so long as they did not fall foul of sanctions. That means America needs to be on board.
Such a settlement would probably be fragile. International law says that maritime trade should be safe and free. A multilateral deal involving China, which has an interest in keeping the strait open and could restrain Iran, would be more durable. But that looks unlikely for now. Nor does Iran yet seem ready to accept a return to the status quo in the strait. Still, if a deal, however limited and unbalanced, lowers hostilities and buys Gulf countries time to build workarounds and defences that reduce Iran's leverage, it will be worth having. Iran looks likely to win this battle. But it may yet lose the longer war. ■

The bond market
Bond yields are high. They are likely to get higher
AFTER A STEADY upward climb this year, 30-year bonds in America, France, Japan and Britain are all near their highest since the global financial crisis of 2007-09. That feat is particularly impressive for Britain, where the highs during a fiscal panic in 2022 have been long surpassed. For anyone who was wondering if yields would return to the lows of the 2010s as inflation fell after the pandemic, markets appear to have supplied a decisive answer: they will not. If anything, they are likely to climb higher still.
The culprits are clear. Inflation has not quite been beaten, deterring central banks from cutting interest rates. Even Japan is leaving behind its loose-money policies (though not enough to strengthen the yen, which both Japan and America have
propped up with official purchases). Gaping rich-world budget deficits show little sign of narrowing meaningfully, raising the possibility that governments eventually force central banks to inflate their debts away. Geopolitical ructions, like the Iran war and tariffs, are lifting the compensation for risk that investors demand. It does not help that Kevin Warsh, the new Federal Reserve chair, fumbled an early encounter with the markets (see Finance & economics section).
High bond yields are a problem for indebted governments. Every percentage-point rise in America's bond yields, for instance, costs it extra interest payments worth 1.3% of annual GDP within a decade. Yet it is getting harder to imagine governments making cuts to offset the squeeze. In America each ▶
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► political party seems to be hoping that any debt crisis lands on the other. France's presidential election next year could become a fight between populist parties on the left and right. Japan is, bizarrely, undertaking a fiscal stimulus. The longer governments wait to adjust, the bigger the adjustments become.
Governments look increasingly as if they are betting on economic growth to pay the bills—which today means a bet on AI. The trouble is that faster growth, by boosting investment, usually brings higher interest rates and higher bond yields. Today higher market rates have arrived before faster growth. The sheer scale of data-centre investment, pegged at $1m this year by Goldman Sachs, a bank, is making capital scarcer and helping raise yields. However, AI has yet to boost productivity measurably, even in China where diffusion of the technology is arguably the furthest along (see Leader).
It could be a while before the boost comes. Electricity and computing took decades to raise productivity growth perceptibly. Not all economies will fare equally well, either. Europe's fiscal woes could worsen if AI brings more growth for America, pulling up global interest rates, but gets jammed up in the old
world by rigid labour markets and high energy costs. That would mean costlier debt without any more growth.
There is another problem, too. If the productivity boost from AI is large enough to transform any country's fiscal arithmetic, vast job disruption is probably coming, meaning more spending on unemployed workers (see United States section). Income may also shift from labour to capital, which is more lightly taxed. Should AI prompt an arms race, countries will also need more defence spending. Even the exciting prospect of longer lifespans, fuelled by AI-powered scientific advances, would raise state spending on pensions. Economists at the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, reckon these factors plus higher interest rates could more than halve the positive impact of AI-induced growth on American deficits.
The last time much of the rich world, including America and Britain, ran budget surpluses was at the turn of the millennium. That required fast productivity growth, which came from computers and the early internet. But deficits had to be cut, too. Without fiscal prudence, bonds are a punt on AI that looks just as risky as betting on wobbly tech stocks. ■
IT SHOULD BE a relief when America's Democrats and Republicans find common ground. But one emerging area of bipartisanship is disturbing. Members of both parties increasingly oppose scientific research on animals. If they succeed in stopping it, they will prevent America from helping advance the welfare of the most valuable animal of all: humans.
Animal welfare may seem a cause for sandal-wearing lefties. But it has long had advocates on the right and far right. MAGA has embraced the crusade (see Science & technology section). Robert F. Kennedy junior, the health secretary, has vowed to end all animal experimentation, and under him the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention is closing its primate laboratory. The navy has banned funding for scientific research on cats and dogs.
The federal government is joined in the cause by plenty of Democrats—whose party otherwise sees itself as differing from Republicans by being committed to enlightened science. In Oregon Democratic politicians stand with Donald Trump's appointees in trying to curtail research and shrink the monkey colony at America's largest federally funded primate-research centre.
The surge in opposition to testing partly reflects queasiness about the ethics of experiments on animals (never mind their enormous contribution to human health). It also results from a growing belief in a new generation of technologies that is transforming biomedical science. So-called New Approach Methods (NAMs) include organs-on-a-chip, organoids and artificial-intelligence models. In some areas NAMs are indeed making drug discovery faster and cheaper without using any animals. Liver-chips, for example, can use human liver cells on miniature devices to help identify toxic medicines before they ever reach an animal study.
Yet it would be a mistake to think NAMs are anywhere close to rendering animal testing at scale unnecessary. Replicating small parts of human biology is not the same as reproducing all of it. Consider vaccines. They are among humanity's greatest biomedical achievements, having saved an estimated 154m lives since 1974. Yet developing a vaccine entails finding and exploiting a complex biological pathway. Scientists have only just managed to mimic the first steps of this investigation on an organ-chip. Finding out the rest is still a process that depends on testing in both animal and human subjects. It is the same story with many other life-saving medicines.
There is also a practical reason to keep on testing. If America's laboratories are shut down, leadership on biotechnology will pass to China. Its biotech industry is growing rapidly, and it has recruited leading American scientists who have faced funding cuts, regulatory barriers and political hostility at home.
China is also buying up research monkeys at a staggering rate, raising their price and squeezing American labs' budgets. The ambition of China makes the campaign for animal rights self-defeating. If American labs stop testing, the work will only migrate to a country that has lower animal-welfare standards.
In future, NAMs may be able to displace more animal testing as technology advances. In the meantime animal welfare can be enhanced in labs. America's decades-old primate centres should be modernised with bigger, more naturalistic enclosures for monkeys that allow in more daylight. Wearable monitoring technologies would reduce the need for handling, lowering the animals' stress and improving the quality of the data they produce. This will cost money. All the more reason to keep funding animal research rather than cutting it off. ■

The Economist August 8th 2026
Leaders 13
Conflict in Africa
Sudan is mired in one of the century's worst conflicts. This is the moment to strike a truce
IT MAY BE impossible to find a single place that sums up the devastation caused by Sudan's civil war, now deep into its fourth year. But as we report after a rare trip to the country (see International section), its ruined capital comes close. Before the war erupted in April 2023, Khartoum was a bustling city of around 7m people. Today its centre is deserted. Bare husks remain of government buildings. Smart homes and luxury hotels are in ruins. The streets, charred by fighting, are silent. So many bodies have been dumped that human skulls spill out of makeshift mass graves. And still the killing continues.
Khartoum is the scarred heart of one of Africa's worst conflicts this century. War has destroyed swathes of the continent's third-largest country and driven 14m people from their homes. Hundreds of thousands have probably been killed by fighting, famine and bursts of genocidal violence. The only recent African war whose horrors are comparable is the one in Congo, which may have killed more than 5m people in the early 2000s. Yet the war in Sudan is even more important geopolitically. As we warned two years ago, it has drawn in neighbouring countries, helping reignite civil wars in South Sudan and Yemen and threatening another round of killing in Ethiopia.
Outsiders have shown callous indifference to the suffering, by paying to keep the fighting going or neglecting it. Yet by endangering shipping in the Red Sea, the wars in Sudan and Iran are overlapping. That may raise the cost of prosecuting the war to its sponsors, giving them a reason at last to seek to bring about peace.
On the face of it, Sudan's war is a conflict between two main belligerents: the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the country's regular army and de facto government; and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a rich and well-equipped militia. Various other Sudanese groups are allied with the two sides. Yet the fighting is also a proxy war between deep-pocketed regional powers vying for resources and influence. The RSF receives weapons, money and mercenaries from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), though the UAE strenuously denies providing it with support. To a lesser degree, the SAF is armed and bankrolled by Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
Until very recently, all these actors had an overwhelming interest in keeping the war going. The RSF has periodically claimed to be ready for ceasefire talks, but has used its spoils to grow into a military and economic empire with ambitions to rule the country. And our conversations with SAF leaders in Sudan give every impression that they continue to believe they can vanquish the RSF and hence oppose talks.
Meanwhile, outsiders with the power to exert pressure on the belligerents and their supporters have been distracted. Europe is focused on Ukraine. President Donald Trump, who last November vowed to end the war, is caught up in his disastrous campaign in Iran. Many Sudanese, resigned to being treated as a lost cause, have begun to speak of a "Somalia timeline": a decades-long conflict with no end in sight.
Now two developments have combined to create a chance
of ending the war—albeit a slim one. Since America attacked the Islamic Republic in February, chaos in the Gulf has mostly made Sudan an even lower priority than usual. Having a shared foe in Iran did little to dampen the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE that is playing out in Sudan.
But as Dwight Eisenhower, a former American president, supposedly once said: when a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it. As the Iran war expands, attention is moving from the Strait of Hormuz, which remains closed for the moment (see Leader), to the Red Sea, which may soon be. In recent weeks the Houthis, an Iran-backed militia in Yemen, have launched attacks on oil tankers linked to Saudi Arabia, leading to a sharp reduction in shipping through the sea's Bab al-Mandab strait.
So far, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have treated their contest in the region as zero-sum. Yet recent attacks in the Red Sea have further underlined the importance of Sudan's coastline for Saudi Arabia, reviving its interest in the war. That could make it costlier and riskier for the UAE to keep up its backing for the RSF, which could open the door to a truce in Sudan becoming part of a wider settlement in the Middle East.
The second factor is a turn in fortunes on the battlefield. In the past two weeks the SAF has made its most telling breakthroughs since its return to Khartoum 18 months ago. In late
July it regained control of a key highway connecting the capital to el-Obeid, a strategic regional hub which the RSF has been trying to capture for months. It has also retaken Kur-muk, a town on the border with Ethiopia.
Although it may now be tempted to double down on trying to defeat the RSF, the army has also long argued that it wants to negotiate from strength—a position it now holds. Moreover, the longer the search for a ceasefire is delayed, the less likely it will be to stick. The two sides comprise dozens of militias. The SAF knows that, as the war drags on, more power will drain away to groups with a stake in perpetuating the war economy. Fragmentation will follow, whoever is in charge.
True, the chances of a successful ceasefire are small. But the time for a diplomatic push is now. For the next month or so, Sudan's rainy season means that there will be a lull in the fighting. A "humanitarian truce" proposed by Massad Boulos, Mr Trump's overstretched Africa envoy, has a better chance of holding while the battle lines are relatively static.
America and Europe should lean on their Gulf allies to press the belligerents they support to talk directly to each other for the first time. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey should urge the SAF to stop insisting the RSF disarm and demobilise before negotiations can begin. The UAE should use its influence over the RSF to hold it to its professed desire for a ceasefire—even if that means abandoning the ambition to rule all of Sudan.
The Somalia-style trajectory towards further fragmentation would perpetuate the suffering and instability the war is causing. This is the last best chance to prevent it. ■

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Elon Musk insisted that “zero” children had died in Africa because of the Trump administration’s cuts to USAID (The Insider interview, July 23rd). Mr Musk argued that other organisations could have stepped in. “They are capable of acting very quickly,” he said, “and if they didn’t, I would say they’re equally responsible.”
The effects of the cuts were in fact visible on the ground, but also large enough to see from space. Researchers tracked satellite night-time lights around 1,374 former USAID project sites in 50 African countries. The places that had depended most on that money dimmed relative to the rest, and the share of people living in food crises rose.
Whether the number of lives lost is zero, ten or ten thousand, Mr Musk’s defence rests on a morally bankrupt premise: that one is absolved of responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of one’s actions so long as someone else could, in principle, come along afterwards and clean up the mess. Grant him the impossible, that not one person died, and the moral reasoning is still wrong.
Moreover, even if the Gates Foundation or MacKenzie Scott had been able to fill the gaps in emergency aid to Africa, it would have diverted
dollars from their programmes tackling malaria, tuberculosis, childhood nutrition and so forth. Philanthropic budgets are finite. Foundations exist to fund what governments will not, not to serve as insurers of last resort whenever a government abandons commitments it already made.
Could USAID have been better? Of course. Even its most ardent supporters had ideas for improving it. I did not join as chief economist because I saw a bastion of efficiency. I joined because I wanted to help make it better. And when I arrived I found plenty of people inside with the talent and drive to do exactly that, alongside the expected administrative, bureaucratic and political obstacles that made it hard, but not impossible, to do so. While the USAID debate will fade, Mr Musk’s philosophy should be loudly and for ever rejected.
Professor of economics and finance Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois
It may be a bit premature to take Mr Musk’s forecasts seriously. Consider his record on full self-driving cars, for which there is a devoted Wikipedia page. In 2013 he said 90% of the miles in a Tesla car would be self-driven by 2016. In 2015 he predicted that Tesla would
have complete autonomous driving by 2018. In 2016 the date slipped to 2019. Since 2020, it has been “this year” every year. The latest prediction is December 2026, a decade later than he first expected.
Mr Musk is a formidable innovator. But on self-driving cars, as well as Mars, data centres in space, robots and AI, we should treat his prophecies with caution.
PATRICK GRADY Brussels
You dismissed Mr Musk’s suggestion that chess and gardening might sustain the human spirit in an age of AI, noting that a “feeling of being superfluous can lead to misery and moral decay” (“Should you be afraid of Elon Musk?”, July 25th). Permit a dispatch from a profession that has been economically superfluous for more than a century. Since the phonograph, every note an orchestra plays has existed in a superior recording at negligible cost. By the logic of usefulness, live orchestras should have disbanded around 1910. Instead the halls keep filling, and, more telling, people keep joining amateur choirs. And more people play chess today than before the machines became unbeatable in the game. Being surpassed emptied the game of careerism, not of meaning.
You are right to press questions on how to finance the transition to AI, tame the upheaval and restrain AI-powered authoritarians. But on the question of what humans will do when nothing needs doing, the research is being conducted weekly, in choirs, chess clubs and allotments.
DAVID WOODARD Conductor Tampere, Finland
Mr Musk’s Martian aspirations aren’t all crazy. His resources could fund a fleet of Starship rockets, each carrying robots along with solar-energy collectors and other equipment. So, within his lifetime, Mars could be populated with thousands of robots, impervious to heat or cold, doing construction, mining or exploration. Few humans would aspire to
end their days in the hostile Martian environment. But Mr Musk does. He has said he would like to “die on Mars, just not on impact”. He could ensure unique privileges. His regiments of robots could be tasked with creating a domed mansion to accommodate him, receive him royally on his arrival, and service his needs in his final years. After death his body could be preserved in a mausoleum that would outlast any artefact on Earth, a uniquely durable memorial to human aspirations and follies that should satisfy any megalomaniacal aspirations.
LORD MARTIN REES Former Astronomer Royal Trinity College University of Cambridge
Please could Mr Musk explain what “an age of amazing abundance” means in real, practical terms. Does he envisage endless fields of wheat and rice and fruit-laden orchards, or simply freely available techno bits and pieces directing our every move? A Musk-style utopian future is even less alluring than Aldous Huxley’s “Island” or William Morris’s “News from Nowhere”.
SHEILA COUTTS Denmead, Hampshire
Mr Musk’s forecasts may or may not prove correct, but I note that he cited Iain M. Banks’s novels for a glimpse into what things might be like. He also mentioned the importance of AI models having “values” (though he didn’t say what those values would be).
Ian McEwan’s novel, “Machines Like Me”, about a humanoid robot called Adam, explores the tensions in values between humans and machines. The theme of the book is evident also in your article about China wanting to end AI romances (“No more bots”, July 18th), as Adam (robot), Charlie (human) and Miranda (also human) form a love triangle. NAOMI STANFORD London
More letters in response to our interview with Elon Musk can be read at economist.com/letters/musk
The Economist August 8th 2026
Letters 15
It is true that the share of American households where female income exceeds male income remains rather low ("For richer or poorer", July 25th). But your interpretation in terms of social norms can hardly be considered as final. For one thing, the 50% threshold, whereby the distribution of wives' share of household income drops sharply at the point where they begin to out earn their husbands, seems to be specific to data in which incomes are self-reported.
In 2020 Anja Roth and Michaela Slotwinski used a Swiss data set combining survey and administrative information for the same individual and their partner. They found that individuals misreport incomes in surveys, that this misreporting is consistent with the male breadwinner norm and that it essentially explains the observed discontinuity in reported earnings. In a recent paper that I co-authored using Dutch tax data, we similarly failed to find any evidence of the 50% threshold. It is probable that gender norms can motivate spouses to marginally misreport their actual incomes, but the economic consequences of a reporting bias are quite different from those of actual economic decisions.
More important, Claudia Goldin has repeatedly shown that gender differences in wages and incomes often reflect subtle differences in occupational choices. For instance, women are more likely to opt for the flexible job that allows for child-care pick-ups, sick days and household management, whereas men are more likely to go for the "greedy" jobs. Exclusively interpreting this tendency as the outcome of deeply entrenched gender norms is too simplistic, if only because such specialisation may, in some circumstances, be efficient for the household under consideration, particularly in the presence of children.
What is needed is a deeper understanding of the technology of human-capital acquisition by young children. For
example, are a mother's and a father's times perfect substitutes, imperfect substitutes, or complements? This is a very active area of current research, involving economists and developmental psychologists.
In basically all developed countries, and in a significant number of middle- or even low-income ones, women are now more educated than men. This crucially important change remains largely underdiscussed, despite its potentially major consequences. In the end, the scarcity of female breadwinners may progressively wane, but much is still to be learned about this process.
PIERRE-ANDRÉ CHIAPPORI Professor of economics Columbia University New York
It is indeed better to plan for an urban future in Africa than react after the fact ("Sprawl for all", July 4th). Planning infrastructure pays for itself. Your piece shows that basic street plans raised land values in Dar es Salaam's suburbs, but that the gains flowed to grey-market speculators and the well-connected.
Half of urban Africa's footprint in 2050 is not yet built, so the value its future roads and pipes will create has not yet been pocketed. African cities now collect around $8 a head in
I read your great obituary of Humphrey Smith, the owner of the "proudly independent Samuel Smith Old Brewery" in Tadcaster, North Yorkshire (July 18th). His strictly enforced restrictions on the use of mobile technology at his pubs ("no mobile phones except outside, no laptops or tablets") and a music-free environment ("no Muzak either, just the buzz of conversation") created uniquely sociable surroundings.
Sadly, in recent years the rules in London have been relaxed and phones and even laptops are now common in Samuel Smith's pubs, even in Ye Olde Cheshire Cheese.
property tax, against $220 worldwide. Capture just a part of that gain and the urbanisation that connects people to productive jobs can start to finance itself.
With the world's largest surge in working-age people ahead, few fiscal reforms would do more for Africa's growth. MARK HENSTRIDGE Chief executive officer Oxford Policy Management Oxford
Rosa Parks is rightly celebrated for refusing to give up her seat to a white person on a bus in Montgomery, Alabama, thus sparking the civil-rights movement (America at 250). That was on December 1st 1955. Several black people had been arrested before Parks during 1955 for doing the same thing, notably 15-year-old Claudette Colvin, who was arrested on March 2nd.
In 1956, Colvin was one of the four plaintiffs in Browder v Gayle, a federal lawsuit that ended segregation not only on Montgomery's buses, but also on public transport throughout America. After that she was mostly forgotten. Her courageous act in part inspired Montgomery's black community to protest against segregation laws, though it was the arrest of Parks that sparked a boycott of the city's transport system that lasted over a year.
Often it is only the sound of young city types chatting away on telecoms that interrupts the doom scrolling. Mr Smith will be turning in his Yorkshire grave.
CHRIS DRAKE Leicester

Strikingly, part of the reason for Colvin's disappearance from the history of the civil-rights movement lay with the black community at the time. Black residents considered the young Colvin a troublemaker and local activists found Parks to be a more suitable person to rally round. By Colvin's own account she thought she was too dark-skinned and too poor to win the crucial support of Montgomery's black middle class. She also became pregnant out of wedlock during the year, which didn't help. Colvin died in January this year. MAGALY RODRÍGUEZ GARCÍA Associate professor KU Leuven Leuven, Belgium
When Sir Francis Galton famously asked people to guess the weight of an ox at a fair in Plymouth in 1906, he did not offer the participants the option of giving him money in order to enter 99 additional guesses and skew the average. But this is in effect how current prediction markets work, and is also why they don't work ("Fixing the truth machine", July 25th). BOB FISHER Houston
I can confirm that software designed to detect AI-generated text are indeed "black-box algorithms that can give false positives" ("Paper trails", July 30th). I ran some texts through an AI detector.
Samuel Beckett's "Krapp's Last Tape" and "Happy Days" were judged likely to be 86% and 84% AI-generated. The Sermon on the Mount was thought to be 100% AI-generated. The programme judged a speech by Donald Trump to be 100% human-generated. BRENDAN LYONS Dublin
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16
The Economist August 8th 2026
The new era of finance needs innovation more than consensus

THE GLOBAL derivatives market has entered a new era, and the United States is leading it. For decades, derivatives—financial contracts such as futures, options and swaps, whose value is based on the price or performance of an underlying asset—have served as a tool for businesses, farmers, investors and financial institutions to manage risk and allocate capital efficiently. What was once a niche financial tool now underpins a market with over $1.2 quadrillion (million billion) in notional value. Nearly half of that market falls under the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which I have led since December.
American leadership in derivatives was built over generations through competitive markets, strong institutions, sound regulation and a willingness to embrace innovation. In many market segments, gone are the days of traders shouting in pits in New York and Chicago, or even the screen-based trading of the 2000s. Derivatives markets have evolved into increasingly autonomous ecosystems driven by automated trading, artificial intelligence, algorithmic execution and real-time decision-making, reacting to information thousands of times faster than any human could.
For many years, international financial regulation has operated under an assumption that regulatory priorities would emerge through broad consensus among global institutions and regulators from different countries. Although international co-operation remains important, America is not in the business of importing regulatory trends designed by agencies that are considering yesterday's markets built around limited trading hours, single exchanges and screen-based trading.
Instead, America is once again a hub of financial innovation. During President Donald Trump's first term, the launch and expansion of CFTC-regulated bitcoin futures helped bring crypto assets into mainstream finance by providing institutional investors with transparent, regulated exposure to such assets. That foundation transformed bitcoin from a fringe asset into one increasingly integrated within the broader financial system: bitcoin exchange-traded products now hold over 1.2m bitcoins, compared with essentially none in 2016.
During Mr Trump's second term the CFTC has approved the
first "true" bitcoin perpetual contract as a futures contract. A perpetual, or "perp", is a derivative contract with no fixed expiry date, instead relying on a periodic funding rate mechanism—a payment between traders—designed to maintain relative price parity with the underlying asset's spot price. Now the CFTC is helping extend the foundations laid in crypto markets to the broader financial system as capital markets enter the digital age.
Congress recently passed legislation creating the first comprehensive federal framework for dollar-backed stablecoins usable for payments, and laying the foundation for broader integration of crypto assets into the financial system. The CFTC is exploring how regulated stablecoins can be used as collateral, modernising market infrastructure while maintaining the safety and integrity that have made American derivatives markets world-leading.
Our innovation extends well beyond crypto assets. This year we launched America's first major exchange offering round-the-clock trading for gold futures. The CFTC is also engaging with market participants in the potential development of perpetual futures for non-crypto assets. At the same time, prediction markets, which exclusively fall under the Commission's jurisdiction, have shown their value as a powerful tool for price discovery.
Whereas America is embracing responsible innovation, many of our international counterparts are moving in the opposite direction. Recently, nine European financial regulators argued that the event contracts traded on prediction markets should be treated as gambling rather than financial instruments. That view misunderstandings how these contracts are structured and underappreciates the fact that they are traded on marketplaces and not wagers placed with a "house". It also ignores the role these markets play in aggregating information, improving forecasting and enhancing price discovery. Prediction markets often outperform traditional polls and experts—they alone correctly forecast Mr Trump's electoral victory against Kamala Harris in 2024. Research from the Federal Reserve shows that prediction markets perform as well as or better than traditional estimates for economic indicators like the Fed Funds rate and consumer-price index.
To remain effective, global regulatory frameworks must evolve as quickly as the markets they oversee. History has shown that American leadership has been strongest when we have embraced innovation early, from the railroads and aviation to the internet and electronic trading, shaping global standards rather than waiting for others to do so. That philosophy extends to our international regulatory relationships.
Cross-border co-operation remains valuable, but access to the world's deepest and most trusted derivatives markets is a privilege. International agreements, Foreign Board of Trade registrations and supervisory arrangements should be regularly modernised to reflect evolving market structures and technology advances, while furthering the interests of American markets and protecting market participants.
Regulators around the world have long looked to the United States for leadership in policing derivatives. That should continue, with America setting sound policy so innovation can flourish. The future of financial markets will belong to those willing to push boundaries while preserving market integrity. America has shown that these goals are not in conflict. Others are free to chart their own course. We intend to remain the global gold standard. ■
Michael Selig is chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
The Economist August 8th 2026
17

SHENZHEN, SUZHOU AND ZHENGZHOU
China's drive to dominate AI poses a big risk to the world's largest workforce
LI DAZHI PACED back and forth on a set resembling a chief executive's office as he rehearsed lines in Zhengzhou, a city in central China that has become a hub for microdramas. The serialised minute-long shows have taken over phone screens across the country; one in two people watch them. In 2025 microdramas grew into a 100bn yuan ($15bn) business, having created some 700,000 jobs and perhaps 1.3m indirect ones—a rare bright spot of dynamism in China's sputtering economy.
The booming industry had given Mr Li, a 32-year-old former traffic cop, a chance to try something new. He had been busy studying eight to 15 fantastical scripts each month. Then in February, ByteDance, a tech giant, launched Seedance 2.0, an artificial-intelligence model that can make impressively realistic videos. It quickly upended the business. Series now take days to produce instead of weeks, and are up to 90% cheaper (the bill is mostly tokens, instead of humans). Mr Li's daily salary fell
by half and gigs dried up. Many of his colleagues switched to selling insurance, setting up vendor stalls, delivering takeaway food or picking up passengers. "Advanced technology can improve people's quality of life," he says. "But for our industry, right now it's doing more harm than good."
China has made an all-out push in AI, under the conviction that, in its competition with America and the rest of the world, dominance of the technology is an almost existential necessity. The Communist Party also sees a clear long-term need for AI to mitigate eventual labour shortages in a fast-ageing society. To meet that future China is aggressively pursuing AI-integration, especially in the form of "embodied AI": bringing AI models into the physical world through robots and cars. China's leaders envision an era to come of "human-machine collaboration".
But the party is increasingly concerned about how AI will displace workers. Advances in AI threaten both office jobs and
blue-collar ones that have been the fallback for millions who have been laid off or paid less in recent years—in a system which lacks a strong safety-net. And, as demonstrated by the stunningly rapid disruption of microdramas, AI has the power to erase jobs in a keystroke. "This transformation involves both job creation and job destruction, yet the two effects are asymmetrical, with job displacement often preceding and surpassing job creation," Cai Fang, a prominent economist at a top state think-tank, writes in a new book on the labour impact of AI. The government's task is made harder by a bleak macroeconomic picture, potentially widening the gulf between China's have-bots and have-nots.
Some Chinese workers are already labouring alongside the technology that will replace them. Consider Jia Cunqi. For decades he clutched the wheel as he drove coal and bulk cargo across China, his back achy and his eyes sore after long stretches on the road. Now the 44-year-old has to
18 Briefing AI and Chinese workers
The Economist August 8th 2026
▶ move only when merging onto highways or driving short stretches on urban roads. That is because his lorry is equipped with advanced driver-assistance technology that can nearly drive by itself. China's rules still require a human in the driver's seat with his hands touching the wheel.
On a recent Monday morning, he picked up your correspondent at a rest stop in Suzhou before his last leg to Shanghai. For most of his career, he sat beside another human driver (to take turns at the wheel). Now he listens to martial-arts novels and video-calls his nine-year-old who marvels at the self-driving lorry. His job is more comfortable, if lonelier. If the lorry masters getting on highways, then it is all set, he says. But humans will still be needed, he argues, rattling off common problems: flat tyres, leaky air pipes, sudden engine-death, navigating around road accidents. By the time lorries go driverless, he thinks he will be retired (drivers often retire by 50 or 55 in China, where they tend to go longer distances with less rest).
Mr Jia is one of 38m lorry drivers who transport more than 70% of the country's freight. They are ageing and few young people want to replace them. Julian Ma, founder of Inceptio Technology, pitches his driver-assistance tech—found in most of China's autonomous lorries—as the solution for preventing a labour shortage from derailing the logistics sector, while reducing accidents and saving fuel. Some American states already permit autonomous lorries to run without human drivers, but fewer clock miles there. It is in China where the rubber hits the road. Inceptio has installed 7,000 systems and expects more than 10,000 by this year's end.
One big logistics firm says 1,000 of its 8,000 lorries are equipped with Inceptio's technology and all its future lorry purchases would be. The tech allows for 30% fewer drivers and saves 3-4% in transport costs, an executive tells The Economist. That is even before regulators allow lorries to operate without humans.
In July JD.com, one of China's biggest e-commerce groups, launched a 3km-long fully autonomous lorry delivery-route on the outskirts of Beijing. The pilot permits the lorry to drive itself without human hands on the wheel, so long as a safety driver sits on board. It is the latest move by Liu Qiangdong, JD's chairman, to automate his vast delivery empire. In October he vowed to buy 3m robots, an unmanned vehicle and 100,000 drones over the next five years. "Sooner or later, there simply won't be a need for delivery couriers," he said at an event in June. "But we don't want to see our 700,000 brothers go hungry."
American bosses are wont to predict an AI jobs apocalypse, but their Chinese counterparts usually avoid the subject for fear of angering the government. Mr Liu
took pains to note that he intends to keep his "brothers" employed by training them in robot maintenance (he has partnerships with 124 schools). "We'll turn blue-collar workers into white-collar ones, letting them sit in an office instead of braving the wind and rain." But even the retail juggernaut will not need that many technicians.
It is easy to imagine the jobs AI destroys, but harder to imagine the ones it creates. Shen Jianguang, JD's chief economist, points to China's $2trn e-commerce industry as an example of how technological advances can give rise to new sectors and previously unimaginable roles.
JD's workforce, 180,000-strong when he joined eight years ago, has quintupled to 930,000, Mr Shen says. That growth has come while more of their 3,600 warehouses became highly automated and while their operations increasingly integrated AI, from AI livestreamers which hawk products (replacing humans who did the same) to last-mile delivery bots. As JD ventures further into services, which already include car repair and home cleaning, couriers will be able to train for such work as elderly and medical care, Mr Shen says. His optimistic vision dovetails with the government's goal of improving workers' skills and expanding services, crucial for boosting both employment and domestic demand.
With a rapidly ageing and shrinking workforce, China is betting on AI adoption and robots to maintain industrial strength. But getting the timing right will be hard. Robots are an obvious long-term solution. By 2050 China's working-age population will have shrunk by 25%. By 2100, its population of 1.4bn will have fallen by more than half, the UN reckons. In the short run, though, rolling out robots may cause a lot of pain.
In Shenzhen, a southern metropolis, both techno-optimism and resignation are palpable. Makers and suppliers of humanoid robots there have ambitions to become a "Robot Valley". Technicians test robotic lawnmowers. Human cleaners catch the
spots missed by autonomous floor-sweepers. A worker surnamed Lei, sitting atop a sweeper, says his robo-colleagues may be thwarted now by leaves and stones, but inevitably they will replace humans. Just look, he says, at the robotaxis already operating in Shenzhen and other cities across China. But he, like many Chinese blue-collar workers, is more pragmatic than fearful. "With technology, you can't say things will stay the same for ever," says Lin Yinghuo, a 45-year-old courier who is used to seeing unmanned delivery vehicles and drones around town. "Replacement is normal."
Are robots ready to replace humans? In 2024 China installed almost 300,000 industrial robots—more than half the world's total that year (see chart)—and increased its stock to 2m, double what it was in 2021. Traditional robots have already replaced factory workers, but they struggle with more complex tasks (for instance, carving out bad bits from potatoes on a conveyor belt when the tubers vary in shape). Humanoid robots—or, simply, humanoids—can learn to feel different textures, sizes and pressures and determine the right amount of force to hold something without breaking or dropping it.
For all the hype around humanoids, few yet work on actual factory floors. Leaders want to achieve scale soon. In June they asked local governments and state-owned enterprises for their plans to make 10,000 humanoids do real work by the year's end. Morgan Stanley, a bank, reckons that China's humanoid sales will reach 50,000 units and $2bn this year, and will increase to 446,000 and $15bn in 2030.
Humanoids are becoming more promising employees. Jiao Jichao of UBTech, a maker of humanoids, predicts a market breakthrough next year, with more industrial customers moving from small orders to hundreds each. They want a return on their investment within two years, which he says is doable with humanoids priced under 300,000 yuan ($44,000). As production scales, robots are going to become only more cost-effective compared with humans, he says. Jeremy Lee of PaXini, a humanoid-maker that counts car-industry giants like BYD and SAIC as investors and customers, says bosses see humanoids as more efficient and less likely to slack off.
Humans, though, will still be needed to train humanoids. When you order a robot cleaner in China, it arrives with two humans: a robot trainer and a competent cleaner. At PaXini's sprawling factory in Tianjin, 500 sensor-wearing humans perform tasks needed in car plants, hospitals and supermarkets—creating training data for humanoids. Though fewer workers are needed to monitor delivery drones and robotaxis as they progress, Mr Lee says there is so little real-world data that trainers will be needed for the next decade or two.
China, % of new global robotics installations

Source: International Federation of Robotics
The Economist August 8th 2026
Briefing AI and Chinese workers 19
Even as firms say humanoids will liberate humans from dangerous and repetitive work, the human jobs they are creating are not fun. Dao Xinyue, a 25-year-old university graduate in Shenzhen, has been applying for jobs since November. A former barista, she applied for one job filling coffee machines for gimmicky robo-baristas. During an interview for a robot-training job, she found folding clothes for 30 minutes so boring that she could not imagine doing it day after day. She relies on support from her parents, bitter-melon farmers, to pay rent while she keeps looking for work. At streetlights, she watches robotaxis turn corners, hoping they will make a mistake and prove that they cannot replace another driver. But they drive well.
As in other countries, young workers are expected to be among the hardest-hit by AI. In China their prospects are especially grim. Five years into a property crisis, the economy is still grappling with lower wage growth and stubbornly high youth unemployment. In this year's second quarter, China missed its target for economic growth. In July, for the first time in decades, it did not set an urban job-creation target in its five-year plan. "There is significant pressure on employment and household income growth and shortcomings in livelihood support," the human-resources ministry said, citing AI as one challenge.
For years the Communist Party planned for an economy oriented towards tech advancement and adoption. As its companies push to the frontier, it now worries about AI disrupting social stability. One major challenge is calibrating the degree of intervention: the government is "very cautious" because it wants to assuage anxious workers but not stifle innovation, says one policy adviser in Beijing.
The party can look to its huge public sector, where job security is sacrosanct, for
ballast. But private firms too face pressure to protect workers. "US companies are very directly rewarded in their stock price for laying a bunch of people off and saying that they did it because of AI," but Chinese firms have the opposite incentives, says Matt Sheehan of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank. Dan Wang of Eurasia Group, a consultancy, recently met local officials who have pressed firms to add new jobs to offset lay-offs caused by automation. Workers' Daily, the mouthpiece of China's official trade union, criticised practices such as digitally cloning stuff.
Chinese judges, who operate under party leadership, have so far sided with workers in AI-related firings. In Hangzhou, a leading industry hub for AI, a judge deemed it illegal for a fintech firm to fire a tech worker surnamed Zhou on the basis of AI being able to perform his duties. The 35-year-old was sacked after refusing to accept a demotion and pay cut. His case, and others across China, have been held up by the government as warnings to not use AI as an excuse for lay-offs. Chinese firms must first try to retrain and reassign workers before firing them for incompetence.
The government also wants to educate and train people to realise its AI ambitions. While young people struggle to find jobs, the country anticipates needing many millions more workers in skilled manufacturing and AI research (even with China already having more AI researchers than America, Britain and the EU combined). Primary and secondary schools are incorporating AI lessons into their curricula. Universities are funneling students into thousands of new degree programmes in such fields as "embodied intelligence" and "agricultural robotics" after cutting thousands of "obsolete" degrees, mostly in the arts and humanities. The state is also subsidising retraining as well as promoting vocational
education in areas like the "low-altitude economy" (including, say, flying taxis).
Many of those who fall through the cracks will find a threadbare safety-net, including meagre social security and minimal health insurance. Zheng Gongcheng, head of the China Association of Social Security, warned the legislature last year that the more that AI and robots replace workers, the fewer wage-earners there will be left to pay into the welfare system to support those out of work. He suggested a new tax on robot-enabled productivity gains. Luo Zhiheng of Yuekai Securities, who has briefed Chinese leaders, floated taxing the "excess profits" of AI firms.
Some economists and former officials want new subsidies like AI-unemployment insurance and cash handouts. "The more disruptive a technological revolution or industrial transformation, the greater the intensity of creative destruction and the more inadequate market mechanisms are in protecting workers' rights," Mr Cai, who previously held a vice-minister level role, wrote in a June front-page editorial in the central party school's paper.
The constituency that might agitate for more goodies from the state is getting larger. The number of "flexible workers" that make up China's vast gig economy—its food-delivery and ride-share drivers, livestreamers, factory day labourers and the like—will swell to 320m this year, up from 280m in 2025 and double its size in 2019, estimates the China New Employment Forms Research Center, a think-tank. Firms and policymakers have taken modest steps to include more of them in the social-security system, lest their precarity transform into unrest. AI could increase the pressure to do more.
Still, no ambitious scheme seems likely anytime soon. The government guards its pennies when contemplating subsidies, and Xi Jinping, China's president, has professed an aversion to "welfarism". As more robotaxis take to the streets, ride-share drivers will have to scrape by. So will Mr Li, the actor, while his bosses flourish.
In an office tower in Zhengzhou, Zhang Lei runs Mengchang Media, a studio. "AI-crafted microdramas—creativity beyond imagination," reads one slogan. Mr Zhang used to have ten crews shooting every day.
Now, row after row of humans called choukashi—literally "card-drawers", an AI-era term that calls to mind randomly drawing cards and hoping for a good one—write prompts specifying, for instance, a close-up of a character's furrowed brows, "his expression full of gratitude and expectation". Software spits out seconds-long scenes that a choukashi tweaks and sequences. There is not a cameraman, lighting crew or actor in sight. ■

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The Economist August 8th 2026
21

Employment tribunals
Artificial-intelligence cases are overwhelming Britain's employment courts
BRITISH EMPLOYMENT law contains a provision called "interim relief", an emergency measure under which a judge can order a firm to reinstate a fired employee, or at least pay their wages. The subject may be a whistleblower who has complained of safety breaches, or a troublesome trade-union official. Little known outside legal circles, this provision has been sought infrequently—across Britain tribunals used to get about 20 applications a year—and rarely granted.
Until recently. Data are patchy, but the surge is unmistakable. Now, around 20 applications are lodged each month in each of the 12 regional offices of Britain's employment-tribunal system—a more than 100-fold increase—according to a memo on June 22nd by Barry Clarke and Susan Walker, the two presidents of the system. Most of these efforts will eventually fail, but all properly filed ones are entitled to an
emergency hearing and their day in court, causing delays to other cases. Judges are cautious folk but they have a prime suspect: artificial intelligence.
Interim relief is a case study of how AI, like a heat-seeking missile, can lock on to the most obscure provisions of the law—and create carnage. The impact on Britain's employment tribunals (courts that resolve disputes between employers and
workers) illustrates a phenomenon emerging everywhere. AI-induced demand is overwhelming bureaucracies built for the analogue age—from Dutch municipal-tax appeals to the Canadian privacy regulator to parking-ticket tribunals in every major city (see next story). In Britain workers now ask large language models, rather than human lawyers, to help them sue their bosses quickly and cheaply. Claims have surged and backlogs grown. A case filed today may not be heard until 2030.
Free, AI-powered legal advice should be good news for workers. Instead, it is proving to be a tragedy of the commons. For workers with genuine grievances, the surge in demand means longer waits for justice. For employers, it means bigger legal bills to respond to claims, both well-founded or fantastical. In the age of AI, a system intended to provide access to justice suffers from, if anything, too much access.
This dynamic takes a twist in Britain, where technology and the law are moving out of step. As AI's capacity accelerates, the Labour government is giving workers more grounds and bigger rewards for suing their employers. This means that just as demand by AI-empowered claimants is surging, the door to the court is being pushed open wider by the government.
The impact of the technology-enabled
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The Economist August 8th 2026
► surge is striking. The number of people filing claims against their employer rose by 39% in the year to March 2026 compared with the previous year, to 50,000, while the rate of cases being resolved or rejected fell. Claims are getting more complex: the share of “open track” ones—covering issues such as sex and age discrimination—grew from 33% in 2020-21 to 61% last year. Having always taken up more court time, these types of cases now last even longer. As a result, the backlog of all unresolved individual claims rose by 55% in a single year, to 64,000 cases (see chart).
AI is clearly the culprit, say lawyers, not least for the growing complexity of cases. Other explanations can be discounted. The economic downturn that usually precedes a rise in disputes is “not at all apparent”, Mr Clarke said recently. Despite unfilled vacancies, the number of judges and sitting days in court is above pre-pandemic levels. Amid all this, the quality of the process seems to have been maintained; if you are willing to wait, the judges still give a Rolls-Royce service, says one barrister.
For litigants-in-person, as claimants without lawyers are known, AI can take the hard work out of a claim—and encourage them to over-egg the pudding. Enter a vague grievance into ChatGPT and before long it offers to draft a claims form, a “model legal argument” and an “employer defence prediction map”, with tips for answering cross-examination. When our fictional claimant said they had been bullied for liking horoscopes, which is not yet a protected belief under discrimination law, the model helpfully noted that veganism is. Rhetorical flourishes were thrown in: unprompted, it wrote that our claimant had “experienced distress” and “found it difficult to obtain new employment”.
The top judges are not Luddites. AI promises great efficiency gains in things like translation and scheduling hearings, Lady Carr, the head of the judiciary for England and Wales, told Parliament recently. “We are talking about AI doing the laundry so that judges can do the art.” And, her colleague Sir Geoffrey Vos has noted, AI submissions can be more coherent than the ramblings of folk “arriving at court with piles of loose papers in carrier bags”.
But recent tribunal rulings reveal a growing judicial exasperation. Employment judges like submissions to be concise and factual; AI-generated claims can run to many hundreds of pages. They are often scattergun, citing scores of grounds, and packed with hallucinated laws. “We get Magna Carta, the European Convention on Human Rights and all sorts thrown at us,” says John Bowers, a barrister.
AI flatters claimants who need frank advice. An NHS employee whose case included
67 grievances over 282 pages, prepared with Grok, told the judge he planned to rely on only 10% of them but did not know which. A secretary, who used ChatGPT, left the judge with the “strong feeling” that she was “pursuing a claim she does not understand and cannot personally justify when asked”. A far-right activist, also AI-assisted, presented hundreds of covert recordings of colleagues that he thought proved discrimination but which the judge found completely inaudible; he seemed “unable to grasp the hopelessness” of his case.
The tech is a productivity booster for pests. One, citing discrimination due to neurodiversity, told the judge he had made over 100 tribunal claims; and yes, he had recently discovered AI. Another, subject to a restraining order by the attorney-general after filing at least 60 claims, said he would first test their merits with AI. “However,” concluded Mr Justice Griffiths, “almost all of them have been unsuccessful.”
Employment tribunals are more vulnerable to AI than other bits of Britain’s legal system because, by design, they are open to the layperson. They were established in the 1960s to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply—a “people’s court”, as one judge put it, without the stuffiness of the Old Bailey. There is no fee to bring a case and, unlike other civil courts, the losing side rarely pays its opponent’s bills. Nor is there a penalty for rejecting a decent offer of settlement. The upshot, says David Green, an employment barrister, is there is no financial mechanism to make parties think hard about the merits of their case.
And AI slop is not an automatic disqualification. Judges have held that badly presented cases deserve a full hearing if they might contain a real grievance. Striking out a claim is no alternative to “rolling up one’s sleeves” and probing its merits, found Judge James Tayler in a 2021 ruling—even if the claimant uses the wrong terms or acts like a “rabbit in the headlights”.
This open system is about to become more so. Since the 1960s the scope of the employment tribunal has swelled to over 100 different grounds on which an employer can be sued. The new Employment Rights Act adds around 25 more, such as the right to be paid for shifts cancelled at short notice. From January 2027 unfair-dismissal claims can be brought after six months’ employment, rather than two years. And the cap on compensation for most claims of £123,543 ($166,050) will be scrapped.
For prospective claimants this means more pretexts on which to bring a case and the hope of a bigger prize. The government forecasts that the act will result in a 17% rise in legal disputes; many lawyers think far more. “Every factor points to more litigation, and more complex and high-value litigation,” says Tarun Tawakley of Lewis Silkin, a law firm. In the hands of AI, the prospect of uncapped compensation may give people an unrealistic idea of what they stand to win, reckons Sarah Henchoz of A&O Shearman, another law firm. (AI is already inflating compensation claims, Mr Clarke reports.) “Much like Googling a medical condition, with legal advice you’ll get the answer you want based on what you put in,” Ms Henchoz says. Britain now looks less attractive to employers than France, she notes, where compensation is usually capped at 20 months’ pay.
Specialist AI may fix the slop. It can now beat human lawyers at tasks such as drafting, trials suggest. This year an AI law firm was credited with preparing a successful employment case for a human barrister. Algorithms could soon give prospective claimants a more realistic picture of whether their case will succeed. The challenge is getting enough training data, says Felix Steffek of Cambridge University, whose team has built a database of 19,000 historical cases for this end.
That would make judges’ lives easier. But it would present employers with a different problem. If AI fulfils its promise, it could before long give every worker the equivalent of a top-flight lawyer in their pocket, able to file precisely constructed cases against their bosses at will. A deluge of slop claims could give way to a wave of winning ones. Labour said its act would shift power from employers to workers. With AI, power will move faster and further than the politicians imagined. ■
Britain, employment tribunals, '000


Source: Ministry of Justice
*Concluded cases
The Economist August 8th 2026
Britain 23
From parking tickets to planning, the state is under siege by AI
THE POTENTIAL of AI to slash the cost of the state has left the British government giddy. Last year officials identified over 140 possible uses, from sifting diplomatic cables to culling call centres. Top civil servants were given a box of labour-saving tools, called “Humphrey”. Peter Kyle, then technology secretary, foresaw a “£45bn jackpot” in annual savings ($61bn, as much as 7% of public-sector spending).
In reality, the savings may be more modest—or perhaps wiped out entirely. That is not only because Whitehall may fail to live up to Mr Kyle’s heroic rhetoric. The bigger challenge is that the public are adopting AI rapidly too. They are using AI tools to handle their daily interactions with the state, and place growing demands on it. In effect, an AI arms race has begun between the state and citizens, and it is not clear that the state will win.
Take planning. Officials have developed tools to speed up housing approvals by giving an initial verdict on whether a plan is compliant with the law. Yet local authorities report a surge in AI-generated objections to proposed developments. They are often more effective: AI-aided submissions will cite planning codes and legal precedents chapter and verse. For £45, Objector AI, a platform, will scan a wedge of planning documents, draw up the legal grounds for opposition and write a speech to read out at a public meeting.
Or consider benefits. The Department for Work and Pensions uses AI to process claims and detect fraud. But claimants,
too, are turning to AI chatbots to draft their demands, and maximise their prospects of success. It could get costly: Britons ask for less than they are entitled to in benefits, perhaps more than £20bn a year (0.7% of GDP), according to some estimates.
The impact is felt in humdrum corners of the state. AI is behind a growth in more complex freedom-of-information requests, says the Information Commissioner’s Office, a regulator. Platforms such as Pelp will draft letters appealing against parking fines. The new Renters’ Rights Act, which enables tenants to challenge rent hikes in court, is a prime target for AI. Complaints to state regulators about lawyers, financial advisers and estate agents are climbing, according to data compiled by Chris Schmitz, of the Hertie School in Berlin, who has coined the term “agentic flooding”. Britain may be particularly exposed to such inundation because government services often accept open-text submissions, which AI is good at drafting, he suggests.
But the trend is also found beyond Britain. In a forthcoming paper Mr Schmitz counts 93 examples across 11 countries. The EU Ombudsman, a complaints watchdog, the Canadian privacy regulator and Australia’s work tribunals all attribute a sharp rise in claims to AI. One Dutch municipality reported that objections to property-tax valuations increased by 400% after a commercial AI platform was launched to appeal against them.
Things will only accelerate with the adoption of AI agents that can execute tasks on a user’s behalf. They may, for example, check if a property is in the wrong tax band, and then set about fixing it, notes Tom Loosemore of Public Digital, a consultancy. AI agents are particularly well suited to navigating bureaucratic barbed wire. They are good at digesting small-print, adept at form-filling—and when it comes to a mind-numbing appeals process, they never give up the ghost. ■
As the climate hurts Britain’s wheat farmers, it’s time to adapt
“I CAN’T REMEMBER ever finishing a harvest in July,” says Mark Weekes, a farmer who grows 700 acres of winter wheat, barley and oats near Exeter. Usually Mr Weekes cuts his crop about three weeks later. But hot, dry weather has ripened his grain faster and left it in a worse state. His fields have yielded a third less wheat and nearly two-fifths less barley than normal. “A lot has just shrivelled,” he says.
British crops have been bred to grow in a moderately wet and mild climate. This year’s weather has been anything but. A very wet winter sapped nutrients from soils. A very dry summer sapped moisture. In July Britain had just 10% of the typical rainfall for the month. The Environment Agency declared half of England in drought.
Across Britain winter wheat has been cut early—its earliest harvest since 1976. Over half had been harvested by July 26th, compared with 11% a year earlier, according to the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board. Wheat yields are down by nearly 16% on average, compared with the country’s ten-year mean. In the east of England, where soils are light, farmers have reported yields down by half.
Shoppers are unlikely to see shortages, though. About half of the wheat grown in Britain is used for animal feed. Much of the rest is milled for bread and biscuits. Britain already imports about 15% of its milling wheat, and can import more. The real cost will be borne by farmers. Last year’s drought cost arable farmers over £800m ($1.1bn) in lost earnings, for example—nearly a quarter of the cereal sector’s annual value, according to the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit.
“Our current situation is analogous to when British settlers landed in Australia in 1788 and saw their crops flounder in the heat,” says Gail Taylor of University College London. Wheat was then bred to withstand dry conditions; it is now Australia’s most valuable crop. British farmers can adapt, too. They can plant varieties more resilient to drought. And rather than relying on rain they could use irrigation technology, as in California, typically deemed too costly—until now.

24 Britain
The Economist August 8th 2026
WITH THE white cliffs of Dover in the background and the sun on his face, Andy Burnham asserted on August 2nd that “progress is being made” against the smugglers who transport asylum-seekers across the English Channel. More police officers are assigned to disrupting the trade, the new prime minister pointed out. And the number of migrants has fallen.
It was a very different message from the one his predecessor usually delivered. Sir Keir Starmer’s statements about small boats were full of impotent fury and words such as “evil” and “misery”. The less saturnine Mr Burnham has a right to be cheerful, because the channel is indeed quieter than it was last year (see chart 1). “You have to go back to 2021 to find numbers as low as this,” says Peter Walsh of the Migration Observatory, a think-tank.
Funding from Britain has enabled France to put almost 1,000 officers on the coast. Increasingly they stop boats that are already in the water, with some migrants on board. On the other side of the channel, the Home Office claims that British officers were responsible for 1,138 “disruptions” of smuggling operations in the first quarter of this year (through arrests, asset seizures and the like). It was the highest quarterly tally for at least three years.
More assertive policing appears to have forced smugglers away from the beaches around Calais and Dunkirk, where many migrants camp. Utopia 56, a French organisation that assists migrants in distress, says that boats have recently departed from as far away as Yport in Normandy, almost 200km from Calais. Smugglers load boats in a rush, before the police can stop them. “The departures are more and more chaotic,” says a member of the group.
Yet the best indicator that smugglers are struggling would be a rise in the price of crossings. Of that there is little sign. Court cases, undercover journalism and police reports all suggest that asylum-seekers pay about €1,500 ($1,700) for passage, as they have done for the past few years. Ever adaptable, smugglers have started using bigger boats. On August 3rd one carrying 173 people set off, only to catch fire (the migrants were rescued).
Mr Walsh thinks that two other changes may have deterred asylum-seekers. Last September the Home Office suspended “family reunion” procedures, under which refugees could bring spouses and children
Britain, migrants arriving in small boats from across the English Channel, cumulative

Source: Home Office
to Britain. That probably made the country less attractive: illegal migration is so dangerous that men often travel alone, assuming they can send for their families later. A comparative study by Jan-Paul Brekke of the Norwegian Institute for Social Research and others suggests that stringent family policies suppress applications.
Britain looks at asylum-seekers with a harder eye, too. A few years ago it initially accepted a far higher proportion of claims than EU countries did. That is no longer true (see chart 2). In 2023 Afghans were almost always given protection: acceptances outnumbered refusals by almost 90 to one. Today Britain rejects more Afghans than it accepts. Many appeal successfully, and in practice it is hard to deport anybody to Afghanistan. But word may have got around that Britain tends to say no.
Even more important changes have been made overseas. The EU has tightened its borders, not least by cutting deals with transit countries in north Africa. According to Frontex, the border agency, irregular crossings dropped from 380,000 in 2023 to 178,000 in 2025. Crossings in the first half of this year were 37% lower than in the first half of 2025. There are simply fewer asylum-seekers available to smugglers in northern France. In this respect, as in so many others, Britain is part of Europe. ■
Positive initial asylum decisions, % of total

Source: The Migration Observatory
AS WIMBLEDON’S MANICURED lawns take a break after last month’s tennis championships, London is playing host to a tournament for a newer racket sport. Padel, a hybrid of tennis and squash, has backers who hope to take it into the big league. The London leg of Premier Padel, the Qatar-funded professional circuit, on August 4th-9th is one of 26 elite tournaments in the calendar and the first to be held in Britain. Padelistas from 15 countries (the leading players are Spanish and Argentine) are competing for a share of the €479,000 ($550,000) prize pot.
“It’s the right moment for a tournament in London,” says Luigi Carraro, the president of the International Padel Federation (FIP). Padel is one of the fastest-growing sports in Britain. About 1m people have played it at least once in the past year, according to the Lawn Tennis Association (LTA), which governs padel in Britain—up from 15,000 in 2019. The sight of brightly coloured padel courts encased in glass is increasingly familiar: in 2020 Britain had 87 of them; now it has over 2,000.
Britain’s boom is part of a global one: padel has 35m players in 150 countries, according to the FIP. After starting in Mexico in 1969, the sport took off in Spain and Argentina before spreading across Europe and South America. Mr Carraro wants it to become an Olympic sport, possibly for the 2032 games in Brisbane.
Why the boom? Padel’s underarm serve, forgiving rackets and small courts make it easy to learn. Money talks, too. Roughly three padel courts can fit into the footprint of a single tennis court, creating more cash for clubs. The explosion in demand has meant Britain’s courts are among the busiest, and pricest, in the world. The median fee of an indoor court is £44 ($59) per booking, though some in London can cost £100 an hour.
But a sport that is fun to play is not necessarily fun to watch. Rob Mitchell, Premier Padel’s commercial director, dismisses such concerns. The 4,000 or so tickets for the final in London quickly sold out.
The sport still has some catching up to do. Tennis had 5.6m players in Britain at last count in 2023, and Wimbledon had total prize money of £64m this year. The LTA is optimistic that the rise of padel is complementing not cannibalising tennis. But fashions change: Wimbledon itself began life as a croquet club. ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
Britain 25

The Jeremy Vine show
If you want to understand modern Britain, listen to Radio 2
WHAT DO BRITONS care about? Forget the pollsters and their charts on topics like immigration and the economy. To know what really occupies the minds of the British day to day, instead read the descriptions of BBC Radio 2's Jeremy Vine show, which runs on weekdays from 12pm to 2pm. One recent programme examined 'Iran and chicken welfare'. Another, last December, explored 'pornography and garden centres'. To read them is like combing through Britain's subconscious.
Video, as the 1979 pop song had it, was supposed to have killed the radio star. It has not done so in Britain. Nor, more surprisingly, have podcasts or smartphones. Overall, the country listens to about as much radio as it did 20 years ago: around 10m hours a week. And Britain's most popular channel is Radio 2, a BBC station which offers a mix of music and talk. The reasons for this are revealing not merely about radio but about modern Britain.
Radio 2 is unusual: not all BBC stations have fared so well. The corporation, which until 1972 held a legal monopoly on the British airwaves, has seen its audience numbers fall rapidly in recent years. The once influential BBC Radio 1, which describes itself somewhat un-youthfully as 'a youth music station', has lost almost half of its listeners since 2000. Radio 2, by contrast, is thriving: it remains Britain's biggest single station, with almost 14% of all listening hours spent in its company.
Part of Radio 2's appeal is simple: it is easy to listen to. It was designed to be such. The early BBC was imbued with a guiding belief in the civilising effects of radio. The Light Programme (the precursor of Radio 2) was created to act as a widely cast audio net that would capture audiences' attention with light entertainment before drawing them towards the 'high' culture of stations such as the Home Service (now Radio 4) and the Third Programme (now Radio 3). Such lightheartedness won radio a certain scorn among some intellectuals, prompting George Orwell, himself a BBC broadcaster, to advise his fellow literary types to pay more attention to this 'much-despised medium'.
Radio 2 remains cheerfully unpretentious. This can be seen in its characteristically poppy and home-grown music choices (a mix of the Beatles, Duran Duran and Dua Lipa). It can also be seen in its presenters, who are—on air, at least—mostly inoffensive and jovial. But its shamelessly middlebrow focus is demonstrated most plainly by the Jeremy Vine show, Britain's biggest current-affairs radio programme. Fronted by Radio 2's longest-serving presenter, it encapsulates the formula for the station's successes.
The programme oscillates between sophistication and silliness. At one moment a defence expert might school listeners on the strategic value of the Strait of Hormuz. Minutes later, enthusiasts might celebrate
the resurgence of tenpin bowling. 'You're either good at bowling or you're good in bed,' explained one guest, live from a bowling alley.
It is undeniably old-fashioned. But arguably such programmes persist because of their old-fashionedness, not despite it. The online world is one of atomisation, algorithms and loneliness. Listening to the radio, however, is a collective experience. Tune in and you will be constantly reminded of the millions listening with you—be it Amanda the dog walker or Dale from the Welsh mining valleys.
There is a togetherness in knowing that someone 200 miles away is listening to the same song as you, 'and might indeed be going through the same things', says David Hendy, a historian of radio. Radio 2 takes a special interest in what he calls 'the fallibility of human life'. Radio 2's biggest appeal, he says, is that its audience are given a generous amount of airtime, through phone-ins: 'It is a station for us, not a station broadcast at us.'
Nowhere is this more true than on Mr Vine's show. His listeners are occasionally rude, at times rebarbative; one caller veered into a monologue in support of the late Enoch Powell, an infamous doom-monger on immigration. But they are unmistakably British—and, for Brits, surprisingly open. The same programme can mix the serious (parents describe the struggle of finding support for their child with special educational needs) and the silly (have you been dive-bombed by a crow?). One recent episode featured a live feed to a Sheffield supermarket, made semi-famous for fridges that hum in a C-sharp major chord.
Phone-in radio shows are responsive to the public mood almost by definition. Many are overtly political and, like surveys, risk sampling a self-selecting audience. The variety of Mr Vine's show allows it to more accurately reflect the lives of its listeners, and surface public anxieties early. This makes his programme, like that of his even longer-serving Radio 2 predecessor, Jimmy Young, an underappreciated window into the nation's psyche. Mass fly-tipping was a topic of concern on Radio 2 long before the House of Lords began its inquiry on the same subject. Years before the Online Safety Act became law, parents were phoning in to Radio 2 to fret about what their children were seeing online.
The Jeremy Vine show has its finger on the national pulse—revealing a country preoccupied with the cost of living, collapsing public services, with animals and with cars. Those hoping to sample the public mood could do worse than tuning in to Radio 2 at lunchtime. They might also begin to understand Britain's enduring love of radio. ■
26 Britain
The Economist August 8th 2026
Zack Polanski and the politics of eternal adolescence

FOR ALL the nightclub appearances, the late-night social-media posts and the Zoomeresque affinity for vertical video, a simple fact about Zack Polanski, the leader of the Green Party, goes unmentioned: he is a middle-aged man. At 43 years old he is the same age David Cameron was when he became prime minister. Come the next general election in 2029, Mr Polanski will be nearly as old as the grey-haired, grey-suited Sir John Major was when he took office in 1990.
Yet to his sympathisers Mr Polanski is little more than a child. They brush over mortifying moments, such as when he offered to enlarge someone's breasts via hypnosis. It was explained away by one Guardian writer: "He didn't know he'd want a career in politics, he was only just 30." Only just 30! "Zack Polanski is still learning", read the title of another profile. Mr Polanski is 43 going on 19 and Britain's first eternally adolescent political leader.
The politics of eternal adolescence are peculiar. All politicians are embarrassed by their experimental teenage views, but what happens if this experimentation is delayed? Mr Polanski's political rebellion came in 2015 when he joined the Liberal Democrats. He was 32 years old. When the Greens smashed Labour-held councils in London earlier this year, it was a moment of triumph that was undermined when it emerged that their party leader had not voted. Mr Polanski "fell short of time" and did not register to vote, like a student who did not know whether he would be in halls or at Mum's on election day.
Being an eternal adolescent has its advantages. Mr Polanski is one of the first leaders of a major party to be a smartphone addict and social media comes naturally to him. It can backfire. One batch of photos he shared included an image of a guillotine and the caption "We're only making Plans For Nigel", after a song from 1979 (three years before Mr Polanski's birth). "If I'd done it deliberately, I'd be apologising," he said, in the syntax recognisable to parents of teenagers everywhere.
In some ways Mr Polanski is arrested development incarnate. Having abandoned the Lib Dems, he was elected to the London Assembly for the Greens in 2021: it was his first proper job. He was 38 years old. Every politician is shaped by their formative profes-
professional years. Sir Keir Starmer began his working life as a lawyer and remained one in office; Mr Polanski spent his as an out-of-work actor, in one case dressing up as a hot dog. For Mr Polanski, all of politics is a stage, and he is merely a player.
Mr Polanski is not alone in his perpetual youth. He is an indicator of where Britain is heading, rather than an oddity. Adulthood is no longer for everyone. Its trappings are harder to come by. Entry-level jobs are being crushed, leaving people with Mr Polanski's pick-and-mix careers. Government failure has made driving tests often impossible to book. The result? More young people without a driving licence, just like Mr Polanski. About half of people born in the 1960s owned a home by 28. Among those born in the 1990s, barely a quarter did. Should it be any surprise that Mr Polanski, a skint actor, until recently lived on a narrowboat?
In terms of experience, Mr Polanski is as young as he appears. He has been in politics full-time for only five years. Politicians need to do their 10,000 hours, yet politics chews through them faster than ever. Even an otherwise capable individual, such as Rishi Sunak, suffered through a lack of experience, going from junior minister to chancellor in barely half a year. It helps to be politically long in the tooth.
Perhaps nowadays an element of immaturity is necessary. Self-styled "adults" and "grown-ups" have been in charge for the bulk of the past two decades, in which the economy has stagnated and it became impossible for some to grow up. Politics today is dominated by what Anton Jäger, an Oxford academic, labels "hyperpolitics". The world has shifted from an era of "mass politics", when engagement was high but filtered through mass institutions. Now it is one of "hyperpolitics", where engagement is still high but no longer channelled by, say, a big trade-union movement or dense, representative political parties.
Think of this change as the difference between the drudgery of adulthood versus the electric irresponsibility of adolescence; the weightiness and sunk costs of institutions slowly built over time versus what Mr Jäger calls the "low-commitment, low-cost, and all too often, low-value" politics of our current era. Everything is a teenage phase, felt intensely, but briefly, leaving little behind but a few awkward memories. If "hyperpolitics" is real, then Mr Polanski is a product of it.
For all that AI-types fret about the rise of a permanent underclass, cut off from the riches of the future, a more pressing worry in Britain is the rise of the permanent adolescent; a generation for whom the fundamentals of adulthood—a career, a home, a family—never arrive. A Peter Pan class who can simply never grow up. Why shouldn't they have a leader? And who better than one of their own in the form of Mr Polanski?
Mr Polanski may turn out to be a moment, rather than the start of a movement. He enjoyed a rapid rise and is now enduring a fall; the odd poll put the Greens ahead of Labour, now they limp along in fourth. Beyond those forced into everlasting adolescence, Mr Polanski's popularity is dropping. And so those in the Green Party are beginning to despair. What if the errors are not ones of "youth", but an innate unsuitability to do the job? At that point, being Green Party leader and, briefly, a threat to Britain's establishment becomes but another gig, with a hot-dog suit switched to a green rosette. A short teenage chapter in a career full of them. Still, his whole life is ahead of him. He's only 43! ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
27

The EU's migration woes
CEUTA AND MADRID
Europe's panic over a brief migrant surge in Ceuta will encourage more crises
IT WAS LIKE a tide surging onto the beach and then ebbing, leaving wreckage behind. The vast majority of the tens of thousands of would-be migrants who began rushing into Ceuta, a small Spanish exclave on the north African coast, on July 30th returned to Morocco within 24 hours, having found nothing to eat and no prospect of reaching Europe. Discarded shoes and shirts still litter the bay. A few thousand migrants remain, mainly sub-Saharan Africans and minors, as does a heavy police presence. Yet though the immediate crisis is over, the clash it triggered in the European Union will leave scars.
The surge almost doubled Ceuta's population of 84,000, briefly overwhelming the town. At least 141 migrants drowned trying to swim around the breakwater at the main crossing-point from Morocco. Far-right agitators from Europe, several of whom flocked to the exclave, inflamed the situation with videos warning of "ethnic
replacement". Elon Musk and J.D. Vance, America's vice-president, joined the fray. Yet as alarm spread the crisis was abating. On August 4th Spain's interior minister said that 70,000 of the 72,000 who entered Ceuta had returned to Morocco. Some 1,100 unaccompanied minors are to be transferred to Spain.
Not all the factors behind the surge are clear. A recent ruling by Spain's Supreme Court, which excluded migrants arriving by sea from rules allowing border pushbacks, played a role. Migrants still in the exclave attest that word of this got around
on social media. "The Spanish government is easier for migration" than others in Europe, claims Asif, who says he travelled 20 days from Sudan before joining the surge. Some see the hand of Morocco itself. There is plenty of evidence that border guards stopped intercepting the migrants or even helped them on their way—before co-operating in their repatriation.
The extraordinary images prompted panic across Europe. Italy, backed by Denmark and Finland, said it would suspend co-operation with Spain in the passport-free Schengen zone (in the end it imposed minor spot checks at ports and airports). Sweden's prime minister, facing a tricky re-election bid next month, said "2015 must not happen again," a reference to a huge migration surge into Europe that still haunts governments. Conservative politicians said Spain's recent amnesty of illegal immigrants, mainly Latin Americans, who one day may be able to move elsewhere in the EU, might have served as a pull factor.
European irritation at Spain's rejection of NATO's spending targets did not help its case. But Pedro Sánchez, Spain's Socialist prime minister, hit back, denouncing the lack of solidarity as "driven by prejudice, fake news, ignorance or political interest". Travel from Ceuta to the mainland requires the inspection of documents, he noted, so migrants could not enter Europe.
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
28 Iceland's EU vote
29 The EU's post-covid fund fizzles
30 Trains to compete
— Charlemagne is away
28 Europe
The Economist August 8th 2026
By August 4th, when the EU's interior ministers held an emergency videoconference, all had been forgiven. There was "full solidarity with Spain", said Magnus Brunner, the EU's migration commissioner. Gone was talk of expulsion from Schengen. Instead the ministers retreated to familiar talking-points: strengthening the EU's borders; tackling smuggling networks; speeding up returns of failed asylum-seekers, including to third countries.
Irregular migration to the EU is at a fraction of the figure just three years ago (see chart), and is still falling. European governments credit their own policies for the decline; others see external developments, such as the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as decisive. Either way, the drop does not appear to have opened up breathing-space for politicians. "We haven't really learned the lessons from that episode," says Ruben Andersson, a professor of social anthropology at Oxford University.
Troublingly, by falling so quickly into quarrels, European governments have sent their neighbours a signal: nothing divides the EU like images of young men streaming across borders. Over the past decade Europe has struck a series of deals with governments to keep migrants away: starting with Turkey in 2016, and extending across north Africa and beyond. This outsourcing has reduced the pressure. But it also "creates an incentive to third countries to stir up crises—and offer to resolve them", argues Mr Andersson.
Europe has long experience of such migration blackmail. In 2008 Muammar Qaddafi, then Libya's dictator, secured billions from Italy to keep African migrants away; two years later he warned an audience in Rome that "tomorrow Europe might no longer be European and might even be black". Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's president, has extracted billions from the EU to keep Syrian refugees in his country. In 2021 Morocco let some 8,000 people wade into Ceuta in retaliation for letting the leader of Polisario, a rebel group in Western Sahara (a territory annexed by

European Union, detections of illegal border crossings by route, m

Morocco), visit Spain for medical treatment. Spain later adjusted its policy on Western Sahara to Morocco's liking.
Most shamelessly, since 2021 Belarus has flown in Middle Eastern migrants and sent them into Poland and neighbouring states. Regarding this as an act of hybrid war, in 2021 the EU strengthened its sanctions on Belarus, an ally of Vladimir Putin. It is a different story with the external custodians of the EU's migration policy. Although there is no clear evidence that Morocco orchestrated the movement of migrants, its security officials certainly let them stream past. Yet European governments hailed Morocco's co-operation, reserving their animus for nameless malefactors on social media and smuggling gangs. The EU needs Morocco's help to keep migrants away, including from the Canary Islands, a far more significant port of arrival.
In fact Ceuta, a small exclave on another continent de facto excluded from the Schengen area, offers few lessons for Europe. In 2015 politicians in Germany or Sweden who saw hundreds of thousands of Syrian and other migrants reach Greece understood this would soon be their problem. That inspired a multitude of measures, including enduring intra-Schengen border checks and a new asylum pact to speed returns from the EU. But none of this is relevant to Ceuta, from where no migrants made it into Schengen and few appear to have lodged asylum claims. "This was not primarily a migration crisis," says Gemma Pinyol-Jiménez, a migration expert at Instrategies, a consultancy. "It was a geopolitical episode."
Yet, as the panicked reactions suggest, 2015-16 casts a long shadow. Arguments among European governments during that crisis came close to tearing the EU apart. By letting a temporary and far smaller emergency exert a comparable effect, however briefly, Europe has invited its neighbours to manipulate it again. Stronger borders were meant to prevent that. ■
KEFLAVIK AND REYKJAVIK
ICELAND SITS on the geological boundary between North America and Eurasia, equidistant from New York and Athens. It is tied to America by long-standing defence arrangements and hosts a NATO base in Keflavik. It is linked to Europe by history (it won independence from Denmark in 1944) and commerce (it belongs to the European Economic Area). Now, amid transatlantic tension and concerns about Donald Trump's intentions in the Arctic, the country is about to vote on whether to take a step closer to the European Union.
On August 29th the island of 400,000 people will hold a referendum on whether to restart membership talks with the EU. Iceland began these nearly two decades ago, but ended them in 2013 after electing a Eurosceptic government. Voting yes will not commit the country to joining the EU; another vote would take place when talks conclude. Yet the pro-European camp is worried. Two polls in June and one in July showed a majority of just 52-53% for restarting talks. That lead is too close for comfort and could easily be reversed.
Weak Euro-enthusiasm appears to fly in the face of today's geopolitics. Iceland does not have its own armed forces. It relies on rotating air-force deployments from NATO countries to Keflavik. With only coastguard ships at its disposal, Iceland leans on American and European aircraft to monitor the growing activity of Russian ▶

The widening Euro-American rift
The Economist August 8th 2026
Europe 29
submarines nearby; in June a Russian spy ship was detected just outside its waters. The government worries about hybrid warfare and attacks on infrastructure.
These days such arrangements seem less solid. On a chilly day in July the NATO base in Keflavik was strangely quiet. American planes were “a little bit occupied in the Mediterranean”, said an Icelandic official. Mr Trump’s threats to annex Greenland, just 300km away, feel uncomfortably close to home.
The EU is not primarily a security club, although it does have a mutual-defence clause. For a small country, however, the union offers collective support against bullying over territory or trade. After Mr Trump’s threats to Greenland, which is an autonomous Danish territory, several EU countries sent symbolic detachments of troops at Denmark’s request. France’s president, Emmanuel Macron, flew to Greenland to show support. “When trade and tariffs have been weaponised,” says Thorgardur Katrin Gunnarsdottir, Iceland’s pro-European foreign minister, “we should at least as a small nation consider where we secure our interests...For us it was important to see how steadfast the European Union stepped in.”
In recent weeks, however, anti-EU campaigners have stepped up their efforts. They are a motley coalition of hard-left and hard-right nationalists, as well as conservatives, backed by the country’s big fishing-industry lobby and media interests. In a fiercely independent country, they draw on long-standing worries about protecting fishing waters and agriculture, as well as submitting to the EU rulebook. But the debate has hardened. False claims abound. One is that this is a referendum on joining the EU; another, that Icelanders would have to join a European army.
For the EU, the prospect of a new recruit on the north-western periphery is welcome. Unlike applicants to the union’s south and east, Iceland has an income per head well above the EU average, and much of the accession homework has already been done. The European Commission has said there is “room for flexibility” on fishing rights. Yet European leaders are treading carefully to avoid any hint of interference. When Jean-Noël Barrot, France’s foreign minister, visited Reykjavik on July 20th (in part to discuss security co-operation), he declared cautiously that “the Icelandic people have nothing to lose by opening negotiations.” The choice about joining, he stressed, would come later.
A no vote would nonetheless be a symbolic blow. “We haven’t known anything except security protection by the US,” says Bogi Agustsson, a veteran Icelandic broadcaster. “A lot of people in the country are in a state of denial and don’t yet see Europe as a security alternative.” ■

Italy, Spain and the EU
FLORENCE AND MADRID
NOT SINCE the great flood of 1966 has Florence known such disruption. A tramway extension has turned the road fringing the city centre into a construction site. Costing €500m ($576m), it is the city’s biggest project financed by NextGenerationEU, the European Union’s post-covid recovery programme. The scheme is paying for 55 other projects in the Tuscan capital, from crèches to cycle paths. Sara Funaro, the mayor, calls it “a momentous juncture in the history of Florence”.
Across the Mediterranean, Madrid’s wholesale market is abuzz at 5am. It includes one of the world’s biggest fish markets. With a grant of €400,000 in NextGenerationEU funds, the fishmongers’ association has set up a digital payment-and-order system, replacing handwritten orders and long queues at the bank. “It’s saved us a huge amount of time,” says Christian Cobo, as he prepares to sell tuna from huge carcasses.
At NextGenerationEU’s heart is its Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), created during the pandemic in 2020, which has approved €577bn in grants and loans. The EU had never spent so much, so fast. Most important, it was funded by joint bonds; advocates of a stronger EU termed it a “Hamiltonian moment”, citing the decision by America’s first treasury secretary to empower the federal government by assuming the states’ debts. It aimed to speed recovery from the pandemic slump, espe-
especially in the poorer south, and to make the continent greener and more digital. Disbursements were supposed to be linked to reforms to make economies more efficient. The last payments are due by the end of 2026. Has it worked?
The answer seems to be: sort of. The biggest recipients were Italy (€194bn) and Spain (€103bn), which together account for 52% of the funds. At first glance Spain has done a lot better than Italy (see chart on next page). When the RRF started, Italy’s government reckoned its rate of economic growth would soar from its previous annual average of around 1% to 3.6% this year. In the event, annual GDP growth has been below 1% since 2023. By contrast, Spain has achieved robust growth of at least 2.5% in each year since 2021.
Some of this divergent performance is explained by the way each country used the RRF. Italy risks emerging from the programme “more indebted than before, without having solved its structural weaknesses”, according to a paper by Tito Boeri and Roberto Perotti of Bocconi University in Milan. Many of Italy’s schemes were “trivial or unfeasible”, the economists conclude. Unlike Greece’s strategic plan for the funds, Italy’s lacked coherence.
Much of Spain’s economic performance has little to do with the RRF. “The recovery from the pandemic recession was much faster than everyone expected,” says Ignacio de la Torre of Arcano Partners, a finan-
30 Europe
The Economist August 8th 2026
cial firm. Spain has approved some useful reforms. It has barred employers from abusing workers by keeping them on temporary contracts indefinitely, and has reduced regulatory obstacles that hinder small businesses and startups. Still, productivity growth remains modest, at 0.7% last year, according to Eurostat.
Massive immigration, which has added labour, accounts for around half of the headline growth and two-thirds of additional jobs, according to the Bank of Spain. (Italy, for its part, has curbed immigration.) An increase in tourism and the export of other services has helped, too. Carlos Cuerpo, the economy minister, thinks the RRF has added three percentage points to GDP. But Funcas, a think-tank in Madrid, reckons that at most only 14% of the total growth of the economy between 2021 and 2025 was due to the RRF money.
Still, the funds may support longer-term growth. “Things are happening, but we can only know the impact in several years’ time,” says Manuel Hidalgo of the University of Seville. Spain has used some of the cash to invest in big capital projects, including schemes for electric vehicles and batteries. In Andalucía, Moeve, a Spanish energy company, is building a €1bn green-hydrogen plant—which will be southern Europe’s largest—with €300m from the RRF. Moeve’s boss, Maarten Wetselaar, says that he expects the electrolysers used to make hydrogen to be 30% cheaper in five years’ time. “The state funds compensate for the first-mover disadvantage,” he says.
Italy may see more benefits over time, too. One of the reforms the European Commission wanted was to speed up the justice system. The slow pace of cases involving debt recovery and dispute settlement discourages foreign companies from investing in Italy. Gian Luigi Gatta of the University of Milan noted in a paper that the average length of court proceedings has been cut by 28% since 2019.
Italy is also on track to increase nursery
places—needed to raise women’s workforce participation—by around 150,000 (compared with 378,500 in 2024), though funding them after the RRF expires will be a challenge. The fund has helped build a high-speed railway between Naples and Bari which by 2030 should link the two biggest cities in the poorer south.
The RRF’s flaws are partly built into its structure. During the pandemic, the EU wanted to get money flowing quickly to prevent a lasting slump. One consequence is that some of it went on investments that would have happened anyway. Another is that the programme gave money to national governments instead of pan-European projects or cross-border infrastructure. “In Europe we haven’t yet understood that we need to do things on a more continental scale,” says Mr Hidalgo. The EU’s next generation may regret that. ■
BERLIN
NON-EUROPEANS relying on stereotypes are often bemused to find that nowadays Italy’s trains are tip-top while Germany’s are in chaos. In July Friedrich Merz, the German chancellor, sacked Patrick Schnieder, his transport minister, over his inability to fix Deutsche Bahn (DB), the state-owned railway operator, whose troubles range from a dilapidated network to a bloated bureaucracy. His successor, Steffen Bilger, inherits a mammoth task. DB is notoriously resistant to change, and its unions can paralysse the country, as they did with a six-day strike in 2024.
Fortunately, Mr Bilger may get help from efficient Italians. In early July Italo, an Italian high-speed operator, obtained access to German rails via an arm of DB. By 2028 it plans to challenge DB’s dominance along two routes: Munich-Cologne-Dortmund and Munich-Berlin-Hamburg. On July 20th it signed a €3bn ($3.5bn) deal with Siemens, an engineering conglomerate, to buy 26 Velaro high-speed trains, with an option for 14 more.
“Italo’s entry is an opportunity for Germany,” says Christian Böttger of the University of Applied Sciences in Berlin. Trenitalia, Italy’s state-owned railway operator, once fiercely resisted Italo’s intrusion. But when the newcomer started running in 2012 it had a hugely beneficial effect on the country’s high-speed market. Within five years prices dropped by 40% on average, and the number of passengers more than
doubled. Luca di Montezemolo, the company’s co-founder, says Germany resembles Italy before Italo.
James Hanratty of Trainline, an online train-ticket platform, thinks competition is the way forward for European countries where state-owned operators still reign. Trenitalia entered France in 2021 with Frecciarossa, a high-speed service from Paris to Lyon. By December 2025 it had expanded from nine to 14 round trips on weekdays. Renfe, the state-owned Spanish operator, entered France in 2023 with its Marseille-Madrid and Lyon-Barcelona services. Average prices that year dropped by 67% on the Marseille-Madrid route and by 17% from Lyon to Barcelona, compared with 2022.
In Spain high-speed rail liberalisation worked better still. In 2020 Renfe launched Avlo, a low-cost brand. In 2021 came Ouigo, the low-cost service of SNCF, France’s state-owned operator, followed a year later by Iryo, which is majority owned by Trenitalia. Between 2019 and 2024 prices fell by 35% on the Madrid-Valladolid route, 33% on the Madrid-Murcia route and 29% between Barcelona and Seville. Frequency on the three main high-speed corridors (Madrid-Barcelona, Madrid-Valencia/Alicante, and Madrid-Seville/Málaga) rose from 78 to 115 trips a day. The national competition authority estimates that improvements in rail from 2019 to 2024 attracted 4.8m passengers who would previously have travelled by road or air. Vueling, an airline, stopped flying from Barcelona to Madrid.
In Sweden and the Czech Republic, says Mr Böttger, competition has triggered innovation. The Czech Republic has one of the most open markets in Europe. Czeske Drahy, the state-owned incumbent, still has the largest market share, but it is under constant pressure from RegioJet and Leo Express, two private Czech operators. On June 25th Leo Express launched a service from Frankfurt via Prague to Przemyśl, a Polish city on the border of Ukraine. Tickets for the 18-hour one-way journey start at just €10 ($11.50). The route shows how private operators can tackle one of European rail’s big problems: on a divided continent, routes that cross multiple borders are typically underserved by state-owned railways.
Not all countries need competition to achieve excellence. Switzerland’s state-owned operator offers some of the best service on the continent. But Switzerland is small and densely populated, and has invested in its rail network lavishly and continuously for decades.
Mr Bilger has told Germans not to expect any miracles. But he might find that competition from Italians does wonders to help reform DB. And both the state-owned incumbent and Italo could soon get more competition from Italy. Trenitalia is exploring an entry into Germany’s high-speed railway market too. ■
GDP, % change on a year earlier

Source: IMF
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33

Artificial intelligence and jobs
Can America teach its workers new skills before AI leaves them behind?
KIMBERLY BRADY was running out of options. The 53-year-old Californian had a degree in psychology but was stuck in a low-paid job at Costco selling electronics and jewellery. After some 620 unsuccessful applications for customer-service and sales roles—fields increasingly being reshaped by AI—she decided to retrain for Costco's optical department. With no formal programme available, she spent six months teaching herself opticianry from textbooks and YouTube, passed two national board exams and paid thousands of dollars for two licences. But it was not enough. Without hands-on experience, "they still wouldn't hire me," she says.
Ms Brady's experience points to a broader problem. Switching careers in America is hard; AI may soon make it more common. Around 10m jobs could be displaced over the next decade, according to Goldman Sachs, a bank. Entry-level white-
collar jobs and routine office work are especially exposed, putting both new and current workers at risk. Widespread job losses have yet to materialise, but the fear is already shaping American politics: nearly one in five workers expects AI to eliminate their job within five years.
Earlier technologies from electricity to the computer displaced workers but also created new kinds of work. Now some technologists, including Elon Musk, imag-
ine a future in which universal high income cushions people as paid work recedes. Few politicians accept that solution, but devising a different fix is harder. A serious response would help young people enter the workforce, existing workers adapt as jobs change, and displaced workers move into new occupations. Can America build such a system before the disruption arrives?
Its recent record is not encouraging. Between 2000 and 2011 America shed nearly 6m factory jobs—some 1m of them owing to Chinese import competition. The main federal response, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), paid for retraining and extended unemployment benefits, but only for workers who could prove that trade had cost them their jobs. Those who received training worked roughly three months more than comparable workers who did not and, over the following decade, earned about $50,000 more.
But the programme's scope was limited. In the early 2000s roughly 160,000 workers a year were covered by TAA certifications, while manufacturing was losing around 500,000 jobs annually. Of those covered, only about 40,000 entered training each year, reflecting cumbersome applications and long wait times. The result was local economic devastation that helped fuel America's populist turn.
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
34 State income taxes
35 The Senate
36 Can independents win?
37 Rise of the far left
— Lexington is away
34 United States
The Economist August 8th 2026
The AI shock will be different, affecting white-collar jobs scattered across the country. Losses may come through less hiring and rounds of layoffs rather than factory closures. Still, the burden could fall heavily on particular groups. Young workers may find entry-level opportunities disappearing, while women without degrees—overrepresented in administrative and back-office roles—face high risks.
At present, the country's system of educating and training workers assumes that they train once, near the start of their careers, and unemployment is a brief interruption before a return to similar work. Around four in ten Americans graduating from high school enroll in a four-year university. Community colleges provide most short-term training, but receive far less funding—they get roughly $25m in public funding for workforce programmes and serve around 8m people a year.
Federal support for displaced workers is smaller still, especially since TAA closed to new workers in 2022. In 2023 the main federal training scheme for those who lose their jobs spent $170m on about 39,000 people. A modest voucher goes toward an approved course. "Our whole system is predicated on funding based on attendance, not outcomes," says Gina Raimondo, Joe Biden's commerce secretary and a former governor of Rhode Island. The result is fragmented and underfunded.
What would a better model look like? Start with young workers. If AI erodes entry-level white-collar jobs, America will need more routes into work that do not run through a four-year degree. One solution is sectoral programmes, which bring employers and training providers together to design courses around actual vacancies. Four randomised trials in health care, IT support and manufacturing found lasting earnings gains of 11-40%.
Apprenticeships offer another route, combining paid work with structured training. These have become more popular, but only around 800,000 Americans are registered apprentices, barely half the number in Germany, with a quarter of America's population. Unlike in Germany, America's apprenticeships remain concentrated in construction and skilled trades.
Other initiatives are getting started. RAISE US, a non-profit co-founded by Ms Raimondo and Eric Holcomb, a former Republican governor of Indiana, is working with states, training providers and employers—its donors include Anthropic and OpenAI, two giant AI firms, as well as General Motors and Bank of America. So far it has announced pilots in four states. In Maryland it has built on a state scheme that pays young workers to spend a year with non-profits, adding coaching, training and pathways into long-term jobs in health care and education.
Incumbent workers need a different type of assistance, as AI changes the jobs they already hold. It is common for large white-collar employers to help staff learn how to use AI. But some workers will need not a new version of their current role but an entirely new job.
Salesforce, a software company, offers a glimpse of what that might involve. It maps employees' skills to possible internal roles and recommends training; reimbursement can help cover the cost of formal qualifications. It is fitting that Salesforce, itself being reshaped by AI, is testing ways to help its staff evolve. But such internal platforms remain rare.
The main problem is that, for many in exposed jobs, no one yet knows what they should be trained for. Ideally roles should build on existing skills and preserve some professional identity. "There is a cost to people's egos," says Lee Lilley, North Carolina's commerce secretary. "It is not realistic to take someone with a 20-year career in a white-collar setting and ask, 'Would you like to become a welder?'"
That uncertainty is one reason training systems need to be nimbler, with employers closely involved in adapting courses to changing demand. But that involvement will not come automatically. At Costco, Ms Brady eventually moved into its optical department after being allowed to cross-train. Yet the opportunity arose through an ad-hoc accommodation, not a model for retraining workers at scale.
As technological change forces workers to switch jobs more often, many may need to retrain several times. Yet those who lose their jobs receive little help doing so. Donald Trump's One Big Beautiful Bill Act extended federal Pell grants to approved career programmes lasting between eight and 15 weeks. But the Congressional Budget Office expects the change to reach only 100,000 additional recipients a year by 2034, with grants averaging just $2,200.
In the 1940s business leaders fearing mass unemployment after the second world war formed the Committee for Economic Development to plan the transition to peace. Ms Raimondo wants firms to support a modern equivalent. "If we don't get this right, we won't lead the world in AI," she says. "There will be regulatory backlash, which is bad for the companies."
Connecticut's governor, Ned Lamont, would welcome more collaboration with tech firms. "Frankly, I need help from Anthropic and the AI companies to stimulate our imagination," he says. Anthropic and the OpenAI Foundation have committed $200m and $250m, respectively, to research and programmes such as RAISE US to help workers and economies navigate AI disruption. By way of comparison, OpenAI plans to spend 3,000 times that sum on computing power through 2030. ■
WHEN HE WAS on the pro-wrestling circuit, Glenn Jacobs—known as "Kane" in the ring—worked in nearly every state. The result was a tax return "a foot tall". Now the Republican mayor of Knox County, Tennessee, Mr Jacobs is pleased that his state eliminated income tax in 2021 and is serving as a model for other states. On August 4th Missouri voted on a constitutional amendment to phase out income tax. It failed, but its presence on the ballot points to a broader trend.
State tax systems are diverging. Much attention has been paid to Democrats' efforts to raise taxes on the rich. Washington state, for example, introduced an income tax on millionaires this year, and in November Californians will vote on a wealth tax. But Republican-led states are moving in the other direction. Over the past five years 26 states—most led by Republicans—have reduced their individual income-tax rates. Missouri's top marginal rate has fallen by more than 20% since 2017.
This widening disparity is relatively new. Democrats and Republicans have always differed on taxes, but historically states tried to stay within a range that raised revenue without dampening economic activity. "It used to be possible to speak of a broad middle", with rates hovering around 6%, says Jared Walczak of the Tax Foundation, a think-tank. "Now you either have low rates, below 4%, or increas- ▶

The Economist August 8th 2026
United States 35
Top marginal state income-tax rate*, Jan 2026, %

*Local income taxes excluded. WAs rate applies only to certain capital-gains income. Some payroll or investment-income surtaxes in CA, MA, WA, MN and MD excluded. Source: Tax Foundation
►ingly high-rate states, entering into double digits," Mr Walczak explains.
Income taxes attract particular attention. Democrats prefer graduated income taxes to flat consumption taxes. The latter are regressive, imposing a disproportionate burden on low-income people, who spend a greater share of what they earn.
Republicans take a different view. Bishop Davidson, the Missouri state representative who sponsored the no-income-tax amendment, argues they are "wildly invasive of people's privacy". In January Donald Trump's Council of Economic Advisers published a report encouraging states to scrap income taxes and replace them with a broader, higher sales tax. It argued that taxing consumption rather than production is more economically efficient. But a tax model that works in one state may not in another. Florida has no income tax, but can collect sales tax from tourists. Texas also lacks an income tax, but fills coffers with fees from oil and gas.
In Missouri income-tax abolitionists consider Tennessee a more realistic model. Mr Davidson has also studied South Carolina, where lawmakers voted in March to draw down income taxes, and North Carolina, a swing state which will vote in November on a ballot measure to lower and cap its flat rate.
Detractors dismiss such comparisons. It is "apples and oranges", says Ashley Aune, the top Democrat in Missouri's House, not least because Tennessee had been only minimally reliant on income tax for decades before abolishing it. Missouri, in contrast, depended on income tax for almost two-thirds of its revenue last year. Scott Charton, who advocated against abolishing the income tax, points out that Missourians rejected new taxes on services in 2016. The problem with eliminating one type of tax is that you probably have to raise another. In Missouri, that argument seemed to win out. ■
WASHINGTON, DC
WAS IT A CONCESSION or a con? On August 2nd Todd Blanche, Donald Trump's pick for attorney-general, produced written assurance that the Department of Justice was scrapping the president's $1.8bn "anti-weaponisation" fund, a condition that Republican senators John Cornyn of Texas and Thom Tillis of North Carolina had set for backing him. The Senate's judiciary committee duly advanced Mr Blanche's nomination two days later. Democrats criticised the move as hollow, given that Mr Trump can still revive the slush fund in future. But to some Republicans, it was evidence that the Senate can still check the president's worst instincts.
Congress remains largely pliant to Mr Trump. But a small band of Republican senators are increasingly defiant. Some, such as Mr Tillis and Mr Cornyn, are on their way out, so have little to lose and are picking more fights. Susan Collins of Maine, another senator resisting Mr Trump, faces a Democratic challenger in November. Presiding over this is John Thune (pictured), the Senate majority leader who has the blessing of not facing re-election until 2028 and the curse of trying to lead the chamber with Mr Trump in the White House. When senators break for a five-week recess on August 7th, they will have produced few wins for the president. The Democrats "can't believe how lucky they got with this Senate leadership", Mr

Mr No, for now
Trump vented last month on Truth Social. "Remember, stupidity always brings LOSING & DEATH!"
Mr Thune has framed his reluctance to advance Mr Trump's agenda this summer less as a matter of policy than one of procedure. He has told the president that the SAVE America Act, a voter-identification bill, lacks the 60 votes needed to overcome a filibuster. Mr Trump's fix—that Republicans do away with the filibuster—is a non-starter for the institutionalist Mr Thune. "The Republicans are not getting rid of the legislative filibuster," he said in July. "It's just a fact, and the facts don't change."
Mr Thune is also loth to use the budgetary tool known as reconciliation as a workaround. The Senate would need only a simple majority to pass parts of the SAVE Act using reconciliation, but the process is meant primarily for spending measures. That procedural reason is matched by a political one: reconciliation would force vulnerable lawmakers to make contentious votes right before the midterms. Senate Republicans "have no intention of putting skin in the game on Trump's behalf", explains a Republican operative.
In private, many senators say they appreciate Mr Thune acting as a shock absorber. Though the president has questioned his viability, he maintains the backing of much of his conference. Two Trump loyalists, Mike Lee of Utah and Rick Scott of Florida, tried and failed to buck Mr Thune by keeping the Senate in session to pass the SAVE Act.
The composition of that conference is due to change, however. "The Senate will become more Trump, ideologically," predicts Matthew Glassman of Georgetown University. The seats occupied by Mr Tillis and Mr Cornyn will next year be held either by Democrats or MAGA newcomers. Two other Republicans leaving the Senate, Bill Cassidy of Louisiana and Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, will almost certainly be succeeded by acolytes of Mr Trump. In Louisiana Julia Letlow was personally recruited by the president, while Kentucky's Andy Barr has vowed "to stand with President Trump 100%".
As the Senate's MAGA wing gains greater influence, Mr Thune's job will get even more difficult. Mr Lee, for example, looks set to be the top Republican on the judiciary committee next year. Trump-aligned senators may begin to press Mr Thune to push through controversial nominees or support Mr Blanche if he moves to re-establish the slush fund, as Republican strategists murmur that he will. New Republican senators may even move to abolish the filibuster. Should Democrats win control of the Senate, Mr Thune's power will be diminished. He may find some solace in having strident anti-Trumpers on the left to give him cover. ■
36 United States
The Economist August 8th 2026
KALISPELL, MONTANA AND SIDNEY, NEBRASKA
BIAS BREWING in Kalispell, Montana, may seem an oddly named place for a self-described “radical pragmatist” to hold a campaign event. Yet on a recent evening in July, Seth Bodnar chose the brewery to make his campaign pitch. “Running as an independent, you upset people on both sides,” he told the crowd. Mr Bodnar (pictured) wants to be Montana’s next senator. He believes Democrats ignore the state and Republicans take it for granted.
Mr Bodnar’s campaign is part of a trend. Voters are dissatisfied with America’s two main political parties. Net favourability for the Democrats, in particular, is near a 35-year low. That has created an opening for politicians on the far left (see next story), but it is also inspiring a new generation of independents. More congressional candidates have filed to run as independents in 2026 than in any election cycle since at least 2000. The campaigns of Mr Bodnar and Dan Osborn, a candidate in Nebraska, are this year’s best test of whether independents can succeed.
Running as an independent is sufficiently difficult that, at least historically, few politicians have deemed it wise to do so. Independents lack the campaign infrastructure of a party and, in many states, must collect more signatures to earn a place on a ballot. However, aspiring politicians now face a shifting set of odds.
Last year 45% of Americans identified as independent, the highest share since at least 1988, according to Gallup. Those independents are, in turn, five percentage points more likely to lean Democratic than Republican. In Republican states, where Democratic policies are often more popular than the party itself, an independent may have a better chance of winning. It is no coincidence that two of this year’s strongest independent candidates are campaigning in Montana and Nebraska, where voters have thrice voted for Donald Trump but where farmers are also pinched by tariffs and fuel costs.
In Montana, Mr Bodnar has an institutionalist’s pedigree: he graduated from West Point, was twice deployed to Iraq and worked at General Electric before serving as president of the University of Montana in Missoula. “I feel like both parties left me in what I call the sensible centre,” he explains over coffee in Missoula. He faces Kurt Alme, a former US attorney backed by Mr Trump and Steve Daines, the
US Congress, number of independent candidates

retiring senator who now holds the seat. Mr Daines waited until the last moment to announce his retirement, in effect ensuring that only his preferred candidate was prepared to run.
Mr Osborn, in contrast, is a populist firebrand. A 51-year-old veteran, mechanic and former union leader, he got his political start in 2024, when Democrats failed to field a Senate candidate. Mr Osborn ran as an independent and lost to Republican Deb Fischer, but won an impressive 47% of the vote. His opponent this time is the Republican incumbent Pete Ricketts, a wealthy former governor whose father founded TD Ameritrade, a financial firm.
Critics argue that neither Mr Bodnar nor Mr Osborn are true independents, but Democrats seeking to escape the party’s noxious brand. Indeed both men rely on Act Blue, a Democratic fundraising platform, and enjoy the support of prominent Democrats. Mr Osborn, in particular, echoes the anti-billionaire sentiment of today’s left. “Elon Musk can give a campaign $300m and he’s got keys to the White House,” he recently told a crowd in Sidney, Nebraska. “Man, that’s not right.”
Mr Bodnar insists that his independence is a product of his military career, which fostered non-partisanship, and claims he has identified as an independent for more than a decade. “We believe strongly that the government has no place in our doctor’s office, no place in our bedrooms, no place in our gun cabinets.” Mr Osborn critiques the Democrats’ past standard-bearers. “I’m not afraid to say that Joe Biden failed us on the border. I’m not afraid to say Obama shouldn’t have bailed the banks out,” he says.
Victory for independents depends on their ability to convince enough Republican voters to give them a chance. As important, it depends on Democrats’ decision to drop out or remain in the race and risk splitting the vote. The winner of Nebraska’s Democratic primary has filed paperwork to withdraw, but a loser of that primary is suing to force the party to compete.
In Montana the Democratic nominee is Alani Bankhead, whose campaign is nearly broke. “When I was a senator,” says Max Baucus, a former Democratic senator in the state, “I raised millions of dollars for Democrats in Montana.” He is now supporting Mr Bodnar. The deadline for Ms Bankhead to withdraw is August 10th. Mr Baucus is still hoping she drops out. “For Seth to win,” he says, “she has to.” ■

A self-driving candidate
The Economist August 8th 2026
United States 37

CHICAGO
FOUR YEARS ago the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) were in a funk. Jacobin, a left-wing magazine, declared the group in purgatory. Joe Biden's victory over Donald Trump in 2020 had made Democrats complacent—they had gone 'back to brunch', in the pejorative of the left. Then came the war in Gaza. Progressives found their animating cause in Palestine. Mr Trump's defeat of Kamala Harris strengthened their case for change: what were establishment Democrats good for if they couldn't stop his second coming?
Now the populist left is ascendant. New York has a DSA mayor and soon Washington, DC, will too. DSA-backed insurgents have trounced incumbents in several congressional primaries.
On August 4th Abdul El-Sayed beat Haley Stevens, a centrist backed by pro-Israel groups, in Michigan's Democratic primary for Senate. Dr El-Sayed is not a DSA member—he calls himself a capitalist—but he is supported by the socialist crowd. In Wisconsin, Francesca Hong, an out-and-proud socialist, looks likely to win the Democratic primary for governor on August 11th. This is fuelling speculation that a DSA-aligned candidate could nab the party's presidential nomination in 2028. It is a stunning development for a group with quirky governance, few members and many unpopular positions.
The DSA has an unusual structure: it is a discrete entity but its candidates compete
on the Democratic Party ballot line, enabling it to change the party from within. Unlike the top-down model of the two big parties, where officeholders and donors hold sway, DSA members decide most things by vote. Their activism extends to union organising and agitating against data centres. This keeps the rank and file engaged. The DSA, says David Purucker, a sociologist and member, thrives during periods of Republican governance because 'it's on the barricades much more naturally than the Democratic Party'.
The DSA likes to say that populist economics can carry the day. It points to Zohran Mamdani, New York's mayor, who campaigned on rent control and free buses while downplaying other populist-left positions. But the DSA programme still includes voting for non-citizens and reparations for black Americans. A visitor to its recent summit in Chicago was left with the question: had a Hyatt Regency ever hosted so many people sporting keffiyehs and septum rings? And had this group missed the backlash to the Great Awakening? Most other Democrats have concluded that populist-left positions such as 'defund the police' are an electoral dead-end.
In the House socialists occupy just a handful of seats in the 200-plus Democratic caucus. Most DSA primary victories have been in deeply Democratic terrain. In places where it is ascendant, like New York City, the DSA is out-organising mainstream
Democrats with social-media savvy and old-fashioned door-knocking, powered by ardent volunteers. The two major parties became so reliant on consultants and donor-funded advertising that their canvassing muscle atrophied, says Nate Knauf, a DSA leader in Atlanta. 'You need actual human beings to move your politics.'
Membership has swelled more than twentyfold in the past decade, but still totals only around 120,000. The prime target is the downwardly mobile millennial. Michael Lange, a political analyst and DSA member, says the question to identify prospective joiners is: 'Are you under 50 and do you rent?' In its most recent survey, in 2021, four-fifths of DSA members over the age of 25 had a college degree, a third had a postgraduate degree and a third were gay or queer. Ashik Siddique, a co-chair of the DSA, says it is the country's largest queer membership organisation. Members found to be cops can be expelled.
Therein lies the paradox: a group that claims to represent the working class looks and speaks nothing like it. From policing to immigration to abortion, college graduates are to the left of blue-collar workers. Take trans rights, a plank of the DSA platform. Only half of working-class people tell pollsters that it should be illegal to fire or evict a trans person, compared with 82% of left-leaning college grads.
On economics, too, working-class and older voters tend to be more sceptical of the sweeping changes promised by the young new left, says Adam Carlson, a pollster. Mr Siddique, sounding a bit like Lenin, says the DSA's task is to cultivate a working-class consciousness. The wrinkle is that working-class voters believe in merit and hard work, notes Nicholas Jacobs, a political scientist at Colby College. They tend to be less enthusiastic about expanding government services while distrusting pointy-headed types who use words like 'systemic'. Tellingly, in polling, only white left-leaning college grads count 'tax the rich' as a top-ten priority.
Michigan and Wisconsin are battleground states with close general elections, unlike most races where progressives compete. In November Dr El-Sayed and Ms Hong, presuming she wins her primary, will test the thesis that the left can never appeal to moderates.
Some Democrats contend the party should welcome socialists within its big tent and that moderates ought to learn from their organisational prowess. Centrists fear the only lesson will be in defeat. 'I actually do think it's time for Democrats to talk the S word—schism,' James Carville, an ex-aide to Bill Clinton, said on his podcast recently. David Axelrod, a former adviser to Barack Obama, has called Democrats' battle in Wisconsin a 'slow-rolling car headed for a cliff'. ■
38
The Economist August 8th 2026

Brazil's election
SÃO PAULO
Brazil's general election kicks off with foreign interference and domestic apathy
CAMPAIGNING FOR Brazil's general election in October does not formally start until August 16th, but already the race is testy. Donald Trump has slapped new, exorbitant tariffs on Brazil, his motivation seemingly more to do with politics than trade. Brazil's government denied visas to two officials from the US State Department, claiming they planned to cast doubt on the integrity of the country's electronic-voting system. On July 25th Argentina's president, Javier Milei, travelled to São Paulo and gave a speech in which he referred to Brazil's president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, as a "convict" and "thief". And on August 4th the Trump administration revoked the visa of Brazil's ambassador to the United States.
For all this fuss with foreigners, the mood among Brazilians is one of disillusion. Voters appear unenthusiastic about the choices on offer. Leading the race is the 80-year-old incumbent, known as Lula,
making his seventh run for the presidency. His main challenger is Flávio Bolsonaro, the eldest son of Jair Bolsonaro, a populist former president serving a 27-year sentence for attempting a coup after losing the most recent election, in 2022. A slew of other right-wing candidates poll in single digits. Whoever wins will lead a divided country. Around half of Brazilians say they would never vote for Lula, and a similar share would never vote for Flávio.
As well as their next president, Brazilians will pick governors for all 27 states, two-thirds of the Senate and every member of the lower house. The next president will have a chance to nominate four of the 11 justices who sit on Brazil's Supreme Court,
a powerful institution that often intervenes in politics. If no presidential candidate wins more than half the votes on October 4th, a run-off will be held on October 25th.
Since Mr Trump returned to the White House in January 2025 right-wing lookalikes have won all seven presidential elections in Latin America. Mr Trump has interfered in several of them, publicly backing his preferred right-wing candidates. This has transformed Lula's campaign. At his Workers' Party convention on August 2nd, party leader Edinho Silva made it clear what the line would be: "We must choose between a Brazil of authoritarianism...that sells itself out...and a sovereign Brazil that defends our interests."
It is easy to imagine Mr Trump trying to sway Brazil's ballot. Last year when Mr Bolsonaro—who fancied himself "the Trump of the Tropics"—was put on trial, Mr Trump's government placed sanctions on the Supreme Court justice in charge of the proceedings and cancelled visas for eight judges on the bench. Mr Bolsonaro's allies were left alone.
But foreign right-wingers seem to be the only ones Flávio can count on. At the convention in São Paulo that launched his candidacy on July 25th, Brazil's other right-leaning parties were notably absent. Instead, he was backed by Mr Milei and the insults he hurled at Lula. Israel's Binyamin
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
39 Javier Milei's Odysseus act
40 Claudia Sheinbaum snaps
The Economist August 8th 2026
The Americas 39
► Netanyahu, another Trump ally, offered a pre-recorded message.
Flávio's campaign took a mighty blow in May, when recordings leaked in which he can be heard asking for money from Daniel Vorcaro, the disgraced banker at the heart of Brazil's largest-ever bank fraud. Flávio wanted the money for an English-language film about his father, "Dark Horse", which is due to be released in September. The leaks caught Flávio in a lie, after he previously denied having a relationship with Mr Vorcaro. Flávio's approval ratings plummeted.
A public spat with his stepmother, Michelle, who is adored by Brazil's powerful evangelical Christians, has also hurt. After the tiff, a close ally of the Bolsonaro family told a podcaster: "Statistically speaking, women tend to vote very badly, especially single women." Among Brazil's women, Lula leads Flávio by 18 percentage points.
Centre-right parties dominate Congress. Their refusal to back Flávio may well be down to a calculation that Lula will be re-elected. His approval rating is high, between 43% and 48% in recent surveys, levels at which incumbents can expect to win.
Yet there could still be an upset. Lula's lead in voting intentions is slim. Voters' top concerns are corruption and crime, and Lula is seen as weak on both. He served 19 months in prison for corruption before his conviction was overturned on a technicality in 2021. Many voters have never forgiven him. Flávio has recovered ground in recent weeks as Lula's political allies and his son have been caught up in corruption scandals. And even though reports of violent crime are falling, voters seem to think security is deteriorating. In an Ipsos poll published in June, 47% of Brazilians cited violence as the country's main problem, up seven points from last year.
Disillusionment could help Renan Santos, a former entrepreneur and political outsider. He rose to prominence in 2016 as the organiser of protests that led to the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, Lula's protégée. Mr Santos criticises both Flávio and Lula in slick videos posted to millions of followers on Instagram and TikTok. He may attract fed-up voters.
Mr Santos says he is liberal on economics but a social conservative. He models himself on Mr Milei, as well as Nayib Bukele, El Salvador's autocrat, who has dramatically improved security in his country by adopting hardline tactics. One of Mr Santos's slogans, "Catch, Kill", refers to what he would allow police to do to alleged criminals. He says he wants to turn the country's presidential palace into "a start-up" for policy ideas. Though he remains relatively little-known, upcoming television debates may change that. The presence of a firebrand outsider should worry Flávio's camp. And maybe even Lula's. ■
MONTEVIDEO
ODYSSEUS HAD it easy. He only had to resist the lure of the sirens once. Javier Milei, Argentina's president, is trying to bind not just his government from indulging in money-printing and thus crashing onto inflationary rocks, but to lash to the mast all future governments as well.
Because it is the central bank that issues money, his efforts are focused on changing the laws governing that institution. In a televised speech on July 30th he accused past governments of "looting" the central bank and announced what he claimed were "the most important set of structural reforms in the past 91 years". He outlined a new law that would ban central-bank financing of the government, make the sole goal of the bank preserving the value of the currency, and require a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress to remove the bank's governor (the incumbent was appointed by Mr Milei).
Inflation has long been the scourge of Argentina (see chart on next page). It has typically been caused by governments overspending and then printing money to fill the gaps. When Mr Milei took office in December 2023, inflation was running at 13% per month. He took a chainsaw to spending, and he stopped the central bank from financing the government. That has helped bring down inflation to 1.9% per month. Mr Milei rages against the possibility that a future government could rev
up the printers again. Reforming the central bank is his attempt to avoid that.
Most of his planned reforms, which are expected to pass Congress, are laudable. The bank now has five complex and contradictory goals including "economic development with social equity". Simplification is wise. Governors who cannot be removed easily should find themselves empowered to reject government demands for free money. Explicitly prohibiting monetary financing at all levels of government should also help. Mr Milei also announced a liberalisation of capital and insurance markets, and a more questionable law inspired by the United States that will automatically shut down the government if it spends more than it gets in taxes for "several" consecutive months.
Still, there are wrinkles. Making it harder to sack bank officials is wise, but the reforms do not simultaneously improve the appointment process, which is odd. Mr Milei has also suggested that the new laws may include criminal penalties against central-bank officials who facilitate money-printing. That would be highly unusual and will hardly encourage talented economists to join the bank.
There are also outright gaps. The reforms do not limit the central bank's predilection for foreign-exchange controls. ►

Rejecting the honeyed voice of free money
40 The Americas
The Economist August 8th 2026
► Some remain in place today, as they have for most of the past 90 years, contributing to a cycle of temporary calm followed by crisis and inflation. In Peru, once a basket case but now a macroeconomic star, the constitution bars such restrictions. Yet the libertarian Mr Milei, fearing volatility and short-term inflation, is not yet ready to let the market freely set Argentina's most important price: that of dollars.
Nor do the reforms fix other policy-related worries. "We don't know what the monetary policy is," says Santiago Bulat of Invecq, an Argentine consultancy. It has often been tight to keep the peso strong. This has helped control inflation, but has also hampered growth and sharply increased the number of loans which are not being repaid. But there is no clear rule on how the central bank should react to changes in inflation. To the IMF's dismay, the central bank also continues to focus on money supply rather than on interest rates as in much of the world. Mr Milei's preferences clearly influence central-bank policy, hardly an example of independence.
One issue with the proposed reforms is that a different Congress could reverse them relatively easily in future. Two-thirds of Congress will be required to remove the bank governor, but that requirement could itself be removed with a simple majority. Forcing would-be money-printers to change the law does raise the political costs of monetary profligacy, but it is no guarantee against it.
Political norms are what really stop politicians meddling with central banks. Mr Milei's bigger task is to shift those norms so that future politicians no longer believe profligacy is the route to electoral success. The best way to do that is to win elections and deliver results as a fiscal hawk.
Mr Milei is up for re-election in October 2027. For now he faces no strong rival. He has vastly reduced inflation, which, after an increase earlier this year, is falling again. Three ratings agencies have recently upgraded Argentina's credit rating, in part because the central bank has sensibly been buying dollars to build its reserves. The central bank also just agreed to extend its $19bn swap line with China for another five years, another boost to its reserve coverage. The IMF is mostly purring.
But Argentines are less convinced. In July the approval rating for Mr Milei's government fell to its lowest point this term. Growth is uneven and concentrated in sectors such as oil that require relatively few workers. The economy is now expected to expand by less than 3% this year. Formal employment has been falling. Economic activity fell in May for the second consecutive month. A string of corruption scandals have not helped. Mr Milei defended

his scandal-engulfed chief of staff for far too long before letting him go.
Although there is time to turn things around, in Argentina a slide in the polls in an election year can set off a vicious cycle of market sell-offs, which then make poll ratings even worse. Reforming the central bank is part of a wider effort to break that dynamic. The government is trying to say "there won't be many changes even if there is a change in the government, so please don't sell every bond you have," explains Mr Bulat. But should Mr Milei start to struggle, even a stronger central bank will not be able to save his project. ■
MEXICO'S PRESIDENT, Claudia Sheinbaum, has said repeatedly that she approaches Donald Trump with cabesa fría (a cool head). Her strategy, shrugging off his rhetoric while quickly meeting his demands, has won her many fans, including in the White House. Mr Trump has called her "terrific" and "elegant".
Yet she has not used the phrase since March. Tensions with the United States have been growing over security, migration and trade. "This is one of the most difficult years in the last hundred of the Mexico-US relationship," says Rafael Fernández de Castro of the University of California, San Diego. Ms Sheinbaum's rhetoric has shifted from stoic to defiant.
The biggest clash is over security. The United States is no longer just asking Ms Sheinbaum to crack down on drug gangs; it is pursuing her allies. In April the Trump administration indicted the then governor of Sinaloa, Rubén Rocha Moya, on charges
including drug-trafficking. Mr Rocha Moya, who denies wrongdoing, is close to Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the founder of Morena, Ms Sheinbaum's party. More than 50 Morena politicians have had their American visas revoked, according to Reuters, a news service.
Mexicans are increasingly suspicious of American security agencies, worrying that they operate in Mexico outside the oversight of Ms Sheinbaum's government. That impression was reinforced in July, when the FBI put on public display the aeroplane used to fly Ismael "El Mayo" Zambada, a gang boss, out of Mexico and into the United States in 2024. Mexico's government had been assured that American agencies did not take part in his capture. Ms Sheinbaum has launched an investigation.
As an issue, migration had until recently been relatively calm. Since Mr Trump returned to the White House in 2025, Mexico has helped him reduce the number of migrants crossing into the United States illegally to a trickle. But on July 7th an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent shot dead a Mexican in Houston. Lorenzo Salgado Araujo had lived in the United States for 35 years and was not even the target of the operation. He was the 17th Mexican to die in ICE custody or operations since Mr Trump returned to office.
Ms Sheinbaum might have kept quiet if Mr Trump had agreed to extend the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement beyond its current expiry in 2036. On July 1st he refused. The free-trade deal will now be reviewed annually, creating uncertainty. Ms Sheinbaum was "really banking" on the extension after kowtowing to Mr Trump, says Lila Abed of the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank in Washington.
Ms Sheinbaum has become less obedient. She is refusing to extradite Mr Rocha Moya. Mexico's courts are unlikely to find him guilty. Two days after the shooting in Houston she said that her government would ask for criminal charges to be brought in American courts for the shootings of Mexicans whose "only crime is working honestly in the United States".
It is hard not to feel sympathy for Ms Sheinbaum. But in hardening her approach to Mr Trump, she may be missing an opportunity. She could use his attacks as cover to tackle what the Americans have correctly identified as one of Mexico's most serious problems: political corruption. Instead, she has taken on a fiercer, more leftist tone in recent speeches, while dismissing unfavourable media reports as "lies".
Clearly, it is hard to predict how Mr Trump will react. It will be a "delicate dance" in Mexico, too, says Ms Abed. Lots of Mexicans want Mr Rocha Moya extradited. They may accept Ms Sheinbaum losing her cool with Mr Trump; less so an embrace of allies accused of corruption. ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
41

The Hormuz dependency dashboard
We analyse how long Iran can weaponise Hormuz. The answer is disheartening
FOR YEARS the world has feared that Iran has been pursuing nuclear arms. Five months of war have taught the country's rulers they were already in possession of another formidable weapon. Geography and firepower give them de facto command of the Strait of Hormuz, through which a fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) normally flows. Choking that artery gives Iran's leaders immense leverage over their adversaries.
Iran's foes hope Hormuz will prove to be a wasting asset. Shutting Hormuz is "a card you can play once," said Chris Wright, America's energy secretary, in May. Gulf states are busily seeking alternative export routes. Tom Barrack, Donald Trump's envoy to Iraq and Syria, reckons the strait will be "an afterthought in two years".
The Economist has interviewed experts and analysed data to build a "Hormuz dependency dashboard" to test these claims. It points to three conclusions. First, the
staying power of the Iranian threat varies by commodity and country. Second, Iran's ability to cash in on the strait will diminish but may never vanish. Third, even if the fees Iran can charge fall over time, its strategic leverage will not necessarily fade in step. Indeed, it may deepen as the regime institutionalises its regional influence.
Start with how much Hormuz traffic could simply circumvent it. Some 15m barrels of crude oil crossed the strait daily before the war. That looks easiest to divert. Saudi Arabia's east-west pipeline, which avoids the strait by crossing the peninsula
to Yanbu on the Red Sea, carried just 1m barrels a day (b/d) for export before the war. Today it is running at its full 7m b/d capacity. Nearly 5m b/d of that is exported; the rest feeds coastal refineries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has maxed out its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, which carries 1.8m b/d, up from 1m b/d before the war. Some 200,000 b/d flows through a smaller, once-idle Iraqi pipeline to Turkey.
That narrows the crude-export deficit to 10m b/d. Now add new pipelines likely to be built as a result of the war (see map on next page). Acquiring land poses no problems in the Gulf's command-and-control economies, says a lawyer familiar with the subject. The most advanced project, the UAE's, would run parallel to the existing line, adding 1.8m b/d by late 2027.
Iraq aims to raise its pipeline's capacity to 1m b/d within a year. It also plans a new one to link its southern fields with existing routes to Jordan, Syria and Turkey. Contracts for the 2.5m-b/d project are being awarded: it should be done within four years, says Rahul Choudhary of Rystad Energy, a consultancy. So by 2030 another 5m b/d of crude could bypass Hormuz.
But that still leaves the same amount with no alternative route. And none of these fixes is foolproof. Iraqi projects could be derailed by security risks and cross-border rows. Many dreamed-up pipelines nev-
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
43 Will Hamas disarm?
43 A fruit-export boom in Africa
44 How African AI is different
45 Politics and infrastructure in Nigeria
42 Middle East & Africa
The Economist August 8th 2026
► er see the light of day. Tankers leaving Yanbu for Asia usually sail via the Bab al-Mandab strait, where they are vulnerable to attacks by Iran-allied Houthi rebels. Saudi crude could travel via the Suez canal or Egypt's Sumed pipeline. But even that route may not be safe: on July 29th a drone hit a tanker at Damietta, a port near Suez.
Iran—or its proxies—could attack new infrastructure that it fears depletes Hormuz's power. Even if a deal is reached, the risk of attacks could still push up insurance and financing costs for such projects.
Rerouting refined products is even harder. Gulf countries shipped nearly 5m b/d of petrol, diesel and other fuels via Hormuz last year. No overland pipeline alternatives exist for these. Saudi Arabia is planning one as part of a 2m-b/d expansion to its east-west corridor. But that is still at an early stage and would need a similar increase in Yanbu's capacity. Iraq is sending 1,000 lorries of fuel oil to Syria a day, up from ten pre-war, but the route is slow and pricey. Syria has earned $15m-20m in transit receipts from the traffic since the war began. New refineries outside the Gulf would take longer to build than pipelines and cost billions of dollars.
The problem is most acute for LNG, exported almost exclusively by Qatar. No LNG pipeline is under construction and no feasibility studies have been published. Qatar could lay simpler gas pipes to Oman, but they would need to carry as much gas as Russia's four-string Nord Stream pipelines were once scheduled to deliver to Europe. More implausible still, Qatar's entire liquefaction complex would need re-creating on the Arabian Sea coast.
There is some room for hope. Most importers can, in time, wean themselves off Hormuz supplies. A few years of high prices could spur an extra 2m-3m b/d from the Americas and beyond. China's refineries still hold ample spare capacity. LNG is riding the fastest expansion in its history. So Iran's leverage over global prices will weaken before the decade is out.
The same is not true of its hold over its Gulf neighbours—and not just because a sizeable share of their energy exports will still need Hormuz for years. Many also depend on the strait for imports. The Gulf Arab states rely on external suppliers for 95% of their grain, but only Saudi Arabia has decent bulk-handling terminals, and these are not big enough to supply the whole region. Nor is moving lots of grain, iron ore or bauxite overland viable: a single Panamax vessel carries 60,000 tonnes of cereal, enough to fill 2,000 trucks.
One obvious fix would be more regional railways, but these would also be slow and costly to build. Past mining-railway projects in Australia, built across similar terrain, have cost $12m-15m a kilometre. So a Red Sea-to-Qatar line could top $25bn.
Trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 2026, tonnes, m
By country of origin

Source: Kpler
By commodity

The Gulf states have strategic grain stockpiles that typically cover four to six months of demand, but no equivalent for containerised goods such as fresh food, medicines and appliances. The region's biggest container port, Jebel Ali, which has a capacity for nearly 20m 20-foot equivalent units (TEU) a year, sits inside the Gulf. Outside the strait, the largest is Jeddah, which can hold 7.5m TEU. It was already running near full tilt before the war, says Alexis Ellender of Kpler, a data firm.
So our analysis suggests that Iran will be able to weaponise Hormuz for some time—and monetise it. Gulf states' varying exposure may mean they diverge in what they will tolerate to get their ships moving. Qatar has suggested that it could accept temporary fees; others have held a tougher line. But even the hawkish UAE has softened: it is starting to trade with Iran again and their diplomats are talking.
On August 5th an Iranian official said the regime had agreed on a transit route with Oman and urged "certain third parties" not to meddle. Assuming this gives Iran control of Hormuz, how much could it make? An Iranian MP claimed in June that
the country was collecting $1.5m-2m per vessel transiting the strait. That implies takings of more than $35bn a year, assuming traffic at about 70% of pre-war levels.
That figure is eye-popping—and implausible. Rates set at gunpoint, in a market with nowhere else to go, will not survive a deal allowing near-normal flows to resume. Draft legislation submitted to Iran's parliament envisages rates based on cargo volume, value and vessel type, with one constraint: the charge must stay below the cost of the next-best alternative.
Shahin Iraninejad of GSSI, a sovereign-risk adviser, points out that another legislative proposal posits an average fee of €3 a tonne in Iranian waters and €2 in international waters. He puts expected future income at a more modest $2bn-3bn a year. As bypass capacity grows, that would drop—but not uniformly. Crude tankers can hope for a bargain soon; oil-product, LNG and bulk carriers may face higher fees for years.
Would such revenue flows be durable? As long as charges are predictable, easy to settle and below war-risk premiums, many shippers will probably pay, says Richard Meade of Lloyd's List, a shipping journal. But that would change if vessels repeatedly cross the strait without paying Iran. A tension emerges: Iran needs peace with America for its fee regime to function. But it will need to keep up attacks on disobedient tankers to ensure the fees are paid—which could make peace hard to maintain.
On the brighter side, Iran might drop its fees faster than it needs to. Its strategic objective, says Mr Meade, appears to be maintaining market participation and reinforcing its role as gatekeeper, rather than maximising revenue. It wants something lasting: a governance system—whether a bilateral framework with Oman, a maritime-services architecture or a permit regime. The ease with which Iran seized its new weapon shocked its foes. Its grip on Hormuz looks set to outlast the war. ■

The Economist August 8th 2026
Middle East & Africa 43
JERUSALEM
TEN MONTHS after the ceasefire that was supposed to end the war between Israel and Hamas, Gazans are still burying their dead. On August 4th a funeral was held in the Sabra district of Gaza city for 112 people killed by an Israeli air strike in November 2023. Thousands are still missing. Israel still does not allow heavy machinery, needed for excavating the ruins and rebuilding, into the strip. The slow pace at which bodies are being retrieved from beneath the rubble is a stark reminder of the lack of any progress in Gaza.
An announcement from Donald Trump seemed to herald a breakthrough. On July 30th the American president proclaimed "a HISTORIC agreement for the COMPLETE DISARMAMENT of Hamas and all other armed groups in Gaza". It was, he said, "a monumental step towards lasting PEACE and SECURITY".
The president's florid words were supported, more soberly, by the Board of Peace he founded in January to oversee implementation of the ceasefire. Its road map laid out steps for the disarmament of Hamas as well as a full Israeli withdrawal from the territory, the transfer of power from Hamas to a new Palestinian technocratic authority, and the creation of conditions for the reconstruction of the devastated coastal strip.
The two belligerents were quick to push back against Mr Trump's declaration. A senior Hamas official said the group was not disarming; it would simply be storing its weapons in Gaza under Palestinian supervision. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, took five days to respond to Mr Trump's announcement. He then issued a statement which did not confirm that Israel had accepted the deal. He merely said that his government was "looking into it". In the meantime, his officials had been briefing anonymously that Israel had no intention of ceasing its operations against Hamas in Gaza or withdrawing before Hamas's military capabilities were fully dismantled. Israel then launched a flurry of air strikes in Gaza, killing 19 people in just 24 hours.
There is a similar dynamic on each side. Both have been under pressure for months, Israel from America and Hamas from Egypt, which (along with Israel) controls access to Gaza, and its patrons, Qatar and Turkey. Both hope the other scuppers the deal. "No one is holding their breath," says
an Israeli official. "We don't believe Hamas will ever disarm voluntarily."
Much remains unclear. The Board of Peace said a timetable for disarmament would be worked out within 14 days, but it did not specify when that period would begin and noted that it could be extended. Beyond that, how will the decommissioning of Hamas's arsenal take place and who will be the members of a new International Verification Committee? What will be the sequencing between disarmament and further Israeli withdrawals? How will power be transferred from the current Hamas government to the new National Committee for Administration of Gaza (NCAG)?
Under pressure from America, on July 26th the Israeli cabinet voted to allow the 15 NCAG members to enter Gaza at last and the initial deployment of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF). But the date for the NCAG's arrival has not been set, nor is there much idea how it will wield power in Gaza. The same is true of the first 200 ISF peacekeepers, expected from Morocco and Uganda. Israel is demanding that its troops be allowed to continue operating in areas where the ISF is nominally in charge.
This continues a pattern of obstruction by Israel's government ever since Mr Trump presented his peace plan in October 2025, aimed at ending the Gazan war in which over 73,000 people, mostly civilians, have been killed. Israeli forces have kept up their air strikes, albeit at a lower tempo than during the war, killing over 1,200 Gazans since the ceasefire, and have steadily encroached beyond the "yellow line", the boundary between the half of Gaza controlled by Hamas and the half occupied by Israel. Gaza's 2.1m inhabitants are now huddled in about a third of its total area. Around three-quarters are displaced, their homes either destroyed or in the Israeli occupation zone, or both. Israeli restrictions on supplies going into Gaza mean that no serious reconstruction has begun.
If there is any glimmer of hope, it is that the argument in Israel about whether to keep the ceasefire is over. In recent months Israeli officials had talked up the prospect of another large-scale campaign in Gaza to enforce disarmament. Mr Trump's renewed engagement has at least squelched those suggestions for the time being. "Any progress is going to be at a snail's pace," said a diplomat involved in negotiations. "That's still better than the alternative."
Real change is unlikely until after Israel's election on October 27th. Mr Netanyahu is under fire from the far-right ministers in his own cabinet, who want him to publicly reject the Trump plan, and from his opponents, who deride his failure to deliver his much-promised "total victory" over Hamas. Hostages to Israeli politics, Gazans will continue belatedly to bury their dead and wait for something better. ■
CAPE TOWN, HARARE AND MACHADOS
"IT'S A HIVE of activity," says Alistair Campbell, observing the scene at his blueberry farm 40km outside Harare, the capital of Zimbabwe. Hundreds of workers pick the fruit from the bushes, before carrying the bounty to a cold-storage facility. After sorting, the berries are flown to east Asia, where demand is high for the largest globules, or shipped to Europe. "We're flat out," says Mr Campbell, who used to captain Zimbabwe's cricket team. "We could sell our crop five or six times over."
For once the colour associated with a boom in Zimbabwe is blue, not gold. This year Zimbabwean growers expect to export 12,000 tonnes of blueberries, 40 times more than in 2017. "Every man and his dog is planting blueberries," says one of the country's most prominent bankers.
The tiny fruit contains a bigger lesson. Manufacturing has struggled in sub-Saharan Africa: its share of output has been more or less flat for 15 years. That worries analysts who think African growth depends on Asian-style, export-oriented factories. Yet high-tech farms are in effect mini-factories, labour-intensive and linked to global supply chains. This "industrialisation of freshness", in the words of Christopher Cramer, an academic, could be a boon for Africa—and force a rethink of what is meant by farming and manufacturing.
Africa's economic history has left policymakers with an ambivalent view of agricultural exports. Under colonial rule many countries exported just a single crop, a model that remained after independence. From 1966 to 1973 almost half of sub-Saharan African countries earned half their export revenues from a single commodity. ▶
South Africa, selected exports, $bn

Source: International Trade Centre
44 Middle East & Africa
The Economist August 8th 2026

More precious than diamonds
► When prices plummeted, economies crashed. That helps explain why many governments diverted resources from farms to half-baked industrial schemes.
But in recent years African agribusinesses have responded to rising global incomes—and demand for fresh produce. The Africa Agriculture Trade Monitor, an annual report, notes that over the most recent decade for which it has data, “fruits and nuts” became the continent’s largest agricultural export, overtaking cocoa. The shares of traditional cash crops like cocoa, cotton, tobacco and sugar all fell.
Africa still lags behind Latin America, which exports four times as much in agricultural goods (an average of $341bn per year in 2019-23 compared with Africa’s $81bn). Peru, which barely exported blueberries in 2010, was the world’s largest exporter a decade later. But if Africa can learn from such success stories, there will be fruitful returns.
“Blueberries are a great example of agriculture as high-tech industry,” argues Daniel Hulls, the boss of AgDevCo, an investment fund. Driscoll’s, an American agribusiness giant, supplies seeds to farmers in Zimbabwe that are the result of years of cross-pollination. Polyethylene covers protect bushes. Storage rooms have optical sorting machines. To maximise profits, firms time production for the summer, after American supply dwindles but before Peru’s picks up.
Blueberries are not the only example of Africa’s “industrialisation of fresh”. Today Kenya and Ethiopia account for 6% and 2% of global cut-flower exports. Their farms feature machines that spray fine mist, purify water by reverse osmosis and point radium bulbs at petals to prettify them.
Africa’s exports of tropical fruits, such as avocados, mangoes and pineapples,
have more than tripled over the past decade, a faster growth rate than in any other region, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, a UN agency. Last year Europe consumed more than 1m tonnes (roughly the weight of ten aircraft carriers) of avocados for the first time. Much of its demand was met by Morocco and Kenya.
In May, for the first time, South Africa replaced Spain as the world’s largest exporter of citrus fruit. Since overtaking wine in 2010, citrus has been the country’s most valuable agricultural export, and recently has earned it more than it gains through diamond exports (see chart on previous page). The success can be traced back to 1997 and the abolition of state-run marketing boards. Before then the government divided export revenues among farmers; thereafter each farmer kept their own profits and had more incentive to invest in their fruit. Industry experts also stress the role of the Citrus Growers Association (CGA), which takes levies from farmers to carry out research, lobby for better policies and disseminate know-how.
The special benefits some economists ascribe to manufacturing seem to apply to tech-savvy farms. Their exports boost trade balances. They employ hundreds of people. They help create other products and firms along supply chains. “These are integrated manufacturing and logistics businesses,” says Wandile Sihlobo, a South African agricultural economist.
Jane Maina, the boss of Vert, a tropical-fruit firm in Kenya, says she has moved into exporting dried snacks. The new range means fewer mangoes and pineapples sourced from smallholders are wasted, raising farmers’ productivity. The cold-storage facilities built at east African airports for the flower business are now used by exporters of herbs, beans and vegetables.
The blueberry rush in Zimbabwe has led to new “agritech” apps monitoring weather conditions and yields. In South Africa the citrus boom has produced several spin-off research firms.
Sadly, bad roads and clogged ports still make it hard to deliver perfect fruit. African farmers, like many elsewhere, complain about inadequate political support. Some have a point. When Ethiopia’s flower business started, the government at the time provided armed guards for airport-bound lorries. Now exporters complain of being stopped by armed bandits.
The good news is that potential markets are opening. In May China stopped applying tariffs to most African imports. In July the first punnets of blueberries from Zimbabwe were sent there. Yet non-tariff barriers, such as food-safety and plant-health regulations, often prove trickiest. Managing them needs concerted diplomacy and dedicated industry bodies, such as South Africa’s CGA.
The success of Zimbabwean blueberries, Kenyan flowers and South African oranges suggests there is huge potential for African agriculture to play the sort of role long envisioned for manufacturing. But to maximise the fruits of their labours African policymakers will need to help ensure that their firms are globally competitive. Time for fresh thinking. ■
WHAT WOULD African artificial intelligence (AI) look like? Olubayo Adekanmbi, a Nigerian entrepreneur, reels off ideas: as fluent in African languages as in English; as comfortable with speech as with text; and lean, so it can flourish where chips are scarce and internet patchy. By contrast, frontier labs in Silicon Valley train gargantuan models on English-heavy datasets. “The current gameplay for AI globally is completely un-African,” he says.
Which is why two years ago, after a career in telecoms, Mr Adekanmbi co-founded EqualityAI. The startup has designed tools to advise mothers on health, help traders with accounts and handle customer calls for banks, in English and four Nigerian languages. Similar outfits are springing up all over the continent.
They might seem redundant, given the spread of frontier models. Microsoft estimates that among people of working age 8% of Ethiopians, 9% of Congolese and ►
The Economist August 8th 2026
Middle East & Africa 45
► 23% of South Africans have used generative AI. OpenAI says the number of ChatGPT users in Africa is growing faster than in any other region, albeit from a low base. Chinese models are also popular.
But even the best large language models (LLMs) falter in African languages, typically scoring 10-30 percentage points lower on benchmarking tests than they do in English. They struggle with dialects and “code-switching”, such as when speakers skip between English and a mother tongue. For smaller languages, much of their training is on Bible verses. Asmelash Teka Hadgu of Lesan AI, which works on machine translation and speech recognition for languages from the Horn of Africa, argues that existing models are “broken” for everyday speech. That is especially true for languages like Amharic and Tigrinya, which use non-Latin scripts; in other major tongues gains have come faster.
The root problem is lack of data. Common Crawl, a database used to train AI models, scraped 872m English web pages in July, but just 80,000 in Amharic. Across African languages, only Swahili was better represented than Welsh.
High-quality audio for speech recognition is also scarce. African researchers are therefore recording how people talk, with backing from the likes of Google and the Gates Foundation. Audace Niyonkuru of Digital Umuganda, in Rwanda, says his firm strives to get a balance of ages, genders and dialects.
What then? African researchers use new datasets to fine-tune open-weight models (whose training parameters are public), which uses less compute than building from scratch. Jacaranda Health, a Kenyan NGO, trained Meta’s Llamaz in Swahili, so it could advise on maternal health. But even after fine-tuning, such models are often worse at general tasks than a proprietary model.
Another focus for African innovation is so-called “small language models” for specific tasks, which have at most a few billion parameters (frontier LLMs have trillions). Lelapa AI, a South African lab, named its 400m-parameter model InkubaiLM, after the isiZulu word for dung beetle, which can move many times its own weight.
Smaller models can be run locally, or even offline. That keeps sensitive data on the continent. Equaly2AI has built a local model for the government of Kano state, in northern Nigeria, which allows officials to query documents and recordings of meetings. “If you want sovereignty, keep it small,” advises Mr Adekanmbi.
All this amounts to a somewhat counter-cultural vision of AI, prizing modestly over scale and context over omniscience. It may not survive the all-conquering ambitions of Silicon Valley. But for now African researchers have found a niche. ■
LAGOS
DURING FLASH floods in Lagos last month the water crept up to car doors and poured into homes, disrupting life in Nigeria’s commercial capital for days. Climate change is the main culprit for worsening flooding. But in poorer parts of Lagos some residents wonder if other factors could be exacerbating the damage. They worry that the construction of a coastal motorway and a sea wall, built to protect a new luxury waterfront district, may be eroding the seashore, worsening the impact of floods along the coast.
Yet residents may find it hard to get information about the impact of either project. Both are part of a $20bn infrastructure portfolio overseen by firms controlled by Gilbert Chagoury (pictured), a Lebanese-Nigerian billionaire and long-time friend of Bola Tinubu, the president. Mr Chagoury is not known for transparency.
Since its founding in 1971, the conglomerate the billionaire runs with his brother has dabbled in everything from flour mills to luxury hotels. Its infrastructure work has expanded on Mr Tinubu’s watch. Apart from the $1bn coastal motorway, the sea wall and the $6bn property development the wall protects, the group has also been put in charge of two port renovations to be paid for largely with a £746m ($1bn) loan guaranteed by the British government. International banks, including France’s BNP Paribas Fortis and Belgium’s KBC, helped
finance the waterfront district.
Nigeria’s government argues the Chagoury group’s firms win many such projects because they deliver world-class infrastructure competently and efficiently, which few Nigerian companies can do. Yet critics claim the government has allowed the firms to bypass proper procurement and environmental rules. “There was no competitive bidding. There was not even restricted bidding,” Funso Doherty, an accountant and opposition politician, says of the coastal motorway. Mr Doherty filed a lawsuit against the government and HiTech, the firm building the road, alleging that it broke ground without the legally mandated environmental-impact assessment. A court threw out his case, arguing it was not his to bring. Such dismissals are so common that few people bother with legal challenges; Mr Doherty expects the appeal process to take years. (The government says HiTech was the fair winner of a selective bidding process and the road’s environmental impact was assessed before construction. Mr Chagoury and HiTech did not respond to a request for comment.)
Awarding infrastructure contracts based on merit is all the more essential because Nigerian projects are growing larger and pricier and are often financed by debt. The coastal motorway may also benefit from special tax breaks. In April the legislature approved a $516m loan to fund a cross-country motorway a Chagoury firm was awarded without bidding. (The government says it was selected for its expertise.) Nigeria had a fiscal deficit of 19.4tmn naira ($12.8bn or 4.4% of GDP) in 2025. The IMF reckons it may be even larger, as about 8.8tmn naira ($5.8bn or 2% of GDP) of public spending seems to have gone unreported (the finance minister disputes this).
To some in Nigeria, the relationship between the president and his master-builder smacks of a bygone era. In 2000 a Swiss court convicted Mr Chagoury of helping Sani Abacha, Nigeria’s last dictator, launder millions of dollars of stolen public funds. Mr Chagoury said he did not know the money he was moving had been stolen, but returned $66m to Nigeria and paid a fine of 1m Swiss francs ($600,000 in 2000). Abubakar Bagudu, now the minister in charge of dispensing public money, paid $163m to Nigeria in 2003 to settle a case related to Abacha’s looting of the state, without admitting guilt.
Mr Chagoury’s star is unlikely to fade soon. Mr Tinubu, who is counting on his friend’s support for a re-election bid next year, has brushed off criticism of the relationship; the sea wall will avert “a disaster greater than a tsunami”. In January he gave Mr Chagoury Nigeria’s second-highest national honour. “With friends like him,” the president said in 2024, “one can sleep with a still mind.” ■

Gilbert Chagoury, businessman
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47

Technology in Asia
SEOUL
AI-fuelled fortunes are reshaping South Korea
AN UNKEMPT man walks into a pricey shop. The staff dismiss him—until he takes off his jacket and reveals a gilet emblazoned with “SK Hynix”, a semiconductor firm known for handing out massive bonuses. This imagined scene—a recent skit on a South Korean comedy show—lampoons real ones unfolding as AI-driven wealth floods the country. Companies that help arrange marriages report a big jump in the desirability of engineers from SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics, another semiconductor-maker. They are now nearly as sought after as doctors and lawyers.
An AI windfall is reshaping South Korean society. Speaking in Silicon Valley on July 25th, Lee Jae Myung, South Korea’s president, compared the AI era to the discovery of fire and called it “a truly new opportunity for Korea”. But the new era also brings risks: South Korea’s benchmark stock index, KOSPI, has doubled in value in the past year but dipped 22% in July. A se-
ries of wild swings have made it the most volatile stock market in the world.
Fierce debates rage in Seoul over how to ensure that new wealth is shared equitably and stewarded sustainably. “This raises a new policy challenge for us: how should we approach such extraordinary excess profits from a socioeconomic perspective and from the standpoint of national policy?” Mr Lee said during an interview with The Economist in June. The following month his government announced a “Future Response Fund” to invest newfound tax revenue for generations to come. The market
gyrations and policy debates are a preview of processes likely to play out elsewhere as AI adoption spreads. “This is an issue that requires broader international discussion,” Mr Lee added.
Wealth is flowing into South Korea because its firms provide infrastructure AI model-makers need, such as high-bandwidth memory chips. South Korean officials speak of producing “picks and shovels” for an AI gold rush. While the gold miners may or may not hit paydirt, the pickmakers (or, rather, the chipmakers) are already flush. On July 30th Samsung Electronics said operating profit in the second quarter was 89.5trn won ($63bn), up 1,800% from a year earlier. One day earlier SK Hynix said operating profit in the same quarter grew 557%, year on year.
Their workers want a bigger share. Last year SK Hynix agreed to set aside 10% of its operating profit for bonuses. Samsung’s powerful labour union threatened a strike in May, demanding a cut of soaring profits. A last-ditch agreement staved off a factory shutdown; some bonuses will exceed $400,000. Such payouts are unheard of in a country where the average annual salary is less than $40,000. A new class of workers has been minted: neither white- nor blue-collar, but “silicon-collar”.
Yet the spoils have largely been limited to chip-industry insiders. The government
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
48 A temple scandal in India
49 Filipinos grapple with AI
49 Outrage in New Zealand
50 Ashoka: India’s weird monsoon
48 Asia
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► recently raised its GDP growth forecast for 2026 from 2% to 3%, but that is largely thanks to booming exports. Except near chip factories, consumption has been sluggish. People outside the industry have looked to equities for a piece of the action. Retail investors poured 78trn won ($54bn) into South Korean stocks in May and June; many were burned when shares fell in July.
The broadest benefit will be fiscal, as corporate- and income-tax revenues flood government coffers. Corporate-tax receipts from Samsung and SK Hynix alone could yield as much as the government expected to receive in total from corporate taxation this year. Overall tax revenue is projected to reach 500trn won next year, equal to 17% of GDP and a record high.
Policymakers are grappling with how to manage the windfall. Kim Yong-beom, Mr Lee's chief domestic-policy adviser, sparked debates in May with a personal Facebook post musing about a possible "citizen dividend" funded through excess tax revenues. Speaking to The Economist, Mr Lee suggested that a basic income could be one of several useful policy options.
One faction is arguing for more sweeping redistribution. Chipmakers' success was made possible by "long-term public investment by the state and support from taxpayers and the public", and should be returned in part to the public, says Oh Jun-ho of the Basic Income Research Institute. Proposals include creating new top corporate-tax brackets for higher-earning companies, imposing windfall levies, or giving the public stakes in the firms. Labour groups call for funneling the proceeds of potential new taxes first to chipmakers' subcontractors. The entire industry takes a hit during downturns, and "the same should apply when massive profits are generated", says Lee Gyeo-re of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions.
Others see such calls as misguided. Chipmaking requires continuous investment: new levies could discourage it. The public's claim to revenues generated by private-sector electronics firms is not akin to its right to benefit from nationally owned oil and gas companies—even if some in South Korea like to compare them. It is true that AI labs have trained their models using data created by whole societies. But that is not the game South Korea's chipmakers are in, says Rhee Chang-yong, a former governor of the Bank of Korea: "They benefit from AI, but they are not AI."
For now the government is trying to strike a balance between protecting the private sector and spreading the wealth. The proposed Future Response Fund is the first attempt at creating a mechanism to do that. Mr Lee says it will use only the extra tax revenue flowing into government coffers through existing channels, and will support future industries, young people,
KOSPI stock-market index, January 4th 2010=100

Source: LSEG Workspace
regional development and education.
Other initiatives aim to direct the next wave of investment. Last month officials announced separate plans to inject at least 20trn won ($14bn) into the Korea Investment Corporation, an existing sovereignwealth fund, for additional investment in AI, data centres and supporting infrastructure. The government also wants chipmakers to direct capital spending to less-developed regions. South Korea is enjoying a magic moment, Mr Rhee says. "But we shouldn't have a big party—we need to think about how to maintain our competitiveness into the future." ■
ON JULY 31ST Pappu Yadav arrived at India's parliament in Delhi dressed as a Hindu priest and armed with a donation box. The independent MP sat near the entrance to the building. One by one opposition MPs, including Rahul Gandhi, their leader, stepped up to drop money in the box. But on each occasion the fake priest snatched the cash, earning wild cheers from a crowd. The satirical skit was livelier than most parliamentary discussions. Mr Yadav and the others were drawing attention to allegations of large-scale theft at the Ram temple in Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state.
Staff at the temple, which receives millions of visitors each year, have been accused of siphoning donations from devotees. Some of the alleged theft has been confirmed in a government report. The scale of the scheme is still being investigated, but some reports suggest the loot could exceed 70m rupees ($739,550). Abhishek
Upadhyay, whose media outlet Top Secret first carried the allegations in early June, says the rot runs deeper. He claims a whistleblower has shared information with investigators alleging corruption in the process of building the temple (construction costs, he claims, ballooned from a projected 8bn rupees to 22bn by the time it opened in 2024).
The hullabaloo is embarrassing for Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which governs India and Uttar Pradesh. The party prides itself on probity, and the temple is its signature achievement: the culmination of a decades-long quest to build a monument on the spot where many Hindus believe the god Ram was born. A 16th-century mosque that stood there was destroyed in 1992 when a rally at its gates descended into a riot. In 2019 the Supreme Court granted Hindus possession of the site (Muslims were offered land nearby for a new mosque). When a temple was finally consecrated there in 2024, Mr Modi took part in the rites.
The temple's affairs are run by a private trust whose members include nominees of the central and state governments. It is an unusual arrangement. Most big Indian temples are run with more direct involvement from the state bureaucracy, in part to clamp down on graft. The trust has lacked professional expertise and been run like a family business, Mr Upadhyay argues.
The BJP has responded poorly. Mr Modi, long the face of the temple project, has said nothing about the issue. Yogi Adityanath, Uttar Pradesh's chief minister, has acknowledged the affair has "hurt devotees" but has also attacked the opposition for politicising it. His government formed a special investigation team. Its preliminary report, released on June 23rd, confirmed at least 70 instances of theft, abetted by lax security and shoddy governance. The findings prompted the resignations of two members of the trust. But that has not restored the faith of devotees: donations to the temple have collapsed.
Uttar Pradesh is due to hold state elections next year. These will serve as some gauge of the BJP's popularity. One recent survey found that nearly half the voters in the state would weigh the temple controversy when casting their ballots.
India's government is still recuperating from mass protests over leaked exam papers, led by youngsters who styled themselves the "Cockroach Janta Party" and forced the education minister to resign. More protests came on August 4th over a decision to make ethanol-blended petrol the country's standard fuel, which drivers fear will ruin their engines. On August 3rd the party got a taste of what all this turmoil could mean at the ballot box. In a by-election for a seat in the eastern state of Bihar, which it had held for three decades, the BJP was trounced by a political upstart. ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
Asia 49
MANILA
AT 8PM EVERY weekday Trizza files into a lift with other workers, sits at her desk in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, and starts calling personal-injury lawyers in northern Virginia. Her job involves finding new business for an American chiropractic firm; it teams up with lawyers to treat their injured clients. Like many offshore staff in the Philippines, Trizza works long hours late at night in a language that is not her native tongue. But one thing has recently made her job easier: these days she dictates her emails to ChatGPT, which quickly rewrites them in a "professional" tone.
Trizza is surprisingly enthusiastic about a technology that some have predicted will crush her industry. Artificial intelligence is, in theory, increasingly capable of doing much of the offshore services industry's traditional work, such as transcribing notes or resolving customer queries. In July last year Sam Altman, OpenAI's boss, declared that customer-support jobs would soon be "totally, totally gone" because of AI.
Yet in the Philippines—the world's call-centre capital, where offshoring generates roughly 8% of GDP—business has so far held up better than expected. IBPAP, an industry body, reckons around 1.9m Filipinos were working in "IT and business process management", which includes all sorts of offshore services, at the end of 2025. That is 4% higher than in the previous year and 20% up from 2022. It expects revenue from the services they export to rise 5% in 2026, to $42bn, following 6% growth in 2025.
This is in part because there remain limits to what AI can automate. Handling complaints in call centres is an "incredibly messy end of a business" involving lots of processes that can't all be replicated by AI, says Derek Gallimore, who runs Outsource Accelerator, an advisory firm in Manila. "Mistakes cost a lot," says Patrick Brown, the head of another offshoring firm. "Do you trust AI agents to run support tickets on an $800,000 ultrasound machine?" Many people still want to speak to humans; Filipinos stand out as empathetic listeners who speak English well. And in any case, lots of customers are old people who struggle to use online chatbots.
AI tools are making offshore staff such as Trizza more productive (and thus better value), which is giving companies more incentive to make use of their services, says
Torsten Slok of Apollo Global Management, an American investment firm. Some offshoring firms in the Philippines have been able to put up their hourly rates because their employees are fixing problems more swiftly than they were before.
Moreover, AI is helping offshore workers in the Philippines do new, more complex jobs. They are picking up work training AI models or supervising AI agents. Hospitals in America are increasingly outsourcing the checking of insurance eligibility and filing of medical records to Filipinos packing AI tools. Mr Gallimore says more "high-value" work, such as accountancy or engineering, is going offshore in part because "AI is a leveller. You can now teach someone complex stuff quickly" and still get it done more cheaply than in America or Europe. Some of this is done at so-called global capability centres, captive back offices that are booming in India (see Finance & economics section) and also now growing in the Philippines.
Can this apparent good fortune last? If the industry's revenues look healthy for now, there are nonetheless reasons to think it will become a less effective engine for creating jobs. Offshore firms in the Philippines admit that AI is starting to automate away "tier one" work involving simple tasks such as data entry or answering basic inquiries. New roles in accounting or health care are better-paid, but may not end up as numerous as those lost. IBPAP predicts that the number of people employed in offshore work in the Philippines will grow only 5% this year, down from 7% in 2024. The industry once talked of having 2.5m employees by 2028; in July it cut its best-case projection to 2.14m.
Some worry that the gradual disappearance of bottom-rung work is going to make it harder for Filipinos to acquire important skills. Starting in a basic call-centre job and working up has long been a way for Filipinos to rise "from minimum wage to the middle class", says David Sudolsky of Boldr, another offshoring firm. But now he worries that "the entry-level route doesn't exist". "For the already highly skilled, AI is good. But there hasn't been any upskilling," says Mylene Cabalona, the president of a union for offshore workers.
Even as AI is making offshore workers more efficient, some say it is making their jobs much worse. Kyle, who has worked in call centres in Manila since 2018, complains that his targets have recently been ramped up. He dislikes the fact that AI tools now analyse and rate the quality of his calls with customers; he feels "pressure to make each and every call good". AI "doesn't recognise if you're having issues with the family, or a bad time", he says. No one wants a robot for a boss. ■
CANBERRA
"CO BACK TO your own country," Winston Peters, New Zealand's foreign minister, shouted at Lawrence Xu-Nan in Parliament on July 29th. "That's where they lie like a flatfish," he went on at Mr Xu-Nan, who left China for New Zealand when he was a boy. The Green Party MP had angered Mr Peters by asking, in a debate about New Zealand's response to covid, if Mr Peters had been vaccinated. Helen Clark, a former Labour prime minister in whose government Mr Peters also served as foreign minister in the 2000s, said that the remark would "send a chill right around our migrant communities", and questioned whether he could still manage relations with China, to which New Zealand sells a fifth of its exports. The Chinese embassy lodged a diplomatic protest.
Mr Peters (pictured) first entered Parliament nearly five decades ago. Now 81 years old, he is the founder (and to date the only leader) of the populist New Zealand First party. Since the late 1990s he has drawn heavily on anti-Asian gibes, usually dressed up as anti-immigration rhetoric, to keep his small party in Parliament. And he has done well out of that, positioning himself as a kingmaker in both centre-right and centre-left coalition governments and serving as foreign minister three times, including in Jacinda Ardern's first government from 2017 to 2020.
Christopher Luxon, the prime minister ▶

The kingmaker
50 Asia
The Economist August 8th 2026
► and leader of the centre-right National Party, has kept Mr Peters as foreign minister despite telling reporters that he regarded his words as racist. The prime minister said Mr Peters was speaking as the leader of New Zealand First rather than in his role as the country's foreign minister. But Mr Luxon must be counting the days until October 1st, when parliament is due to be dissolved before a general election in November. At those polls he is hoping to tout a still-unratified free-trade agreement with
India as the centrepiece of his government's trade policy. Mr Peters has loudly opposed the deal, calling it lopsided and objecting in particular to a provision that would allow a few thousand skilled migrants to enter New Zealand. That has forced Mr Luxon to rely on Labour's support to pass an enabling bill.
Mr Peters cuts an unusual figure at the Beehive, as New Zealand's parliamentary complex is known, where the dress code is stubbornly business casual. Once consi-
considered a natty dresser, Mr Peters still wears the boxy pinstriped and double-breasted suits, topped off with a brocaded tie and silk handkerchief, that became his signature in the 1990s. Neither they nor his politics have changed much since then. But while Mr Peters looks like a throwback, his protectionist and anti-immigrant politics are now in fashion around the world. He will hope that gives him yet another chance to play kingmaker when November comes around. ■
India's monsoon is getting weirder
DEATH. AND taxes. And the south-west monsoon. Had Benjamin Franklin, the most peripatetic of America's founding fathers, ever ventured east of Europe he might have added India's rainy season to his famous dyad of life's certainties. For the 150-odd years that India has been collecting data the monsoon has hit the peninsula in early June, dumped roughly similar amounts of water over India and started retreating in late September.
It did much the same thing before modern humans started measuring it, too. For centuries the rains have dependably watered the fields, offering mostly stable harvests to premodern societies. Ancient trade routes worked to its rhythms. The monsoon allowed Gujarati merchants on India's west coast to sail out to Arabia and east Africa on the back of its winds and to return home when the pattern reversed.
In April India's meteorological department issued its forecast for this year's season. It predicted a weak monsoon at 92% of the "long-period average" of 1971-2020—below normal though not deficient. In the past that would have prompted hand-wringing about the effect on food production and prices of staples. But irrigation now covers more than half the country's farm area, and a few points are not the make-or-break variation they used to be. It is instead how the season's rainfall is distributed that keeps forecasters up at night. The monsoon is getting weirder.
Take Mumbai, where it usually starts raining around June 10th and begins to peter out in late September. Last year it rained from May until well into October. This monsoon it barely even drizzled until late June, followed by a whole July's worth of rain in just the first week of the
month. Gujarat, a dryish state, has been battered by heavy downpours in short periods, with parched spells in between. On the other side of the country, in the agrarian eastern state of Bihar, farmers have gazed up at clear skies. Farther east, in Assam, a state suffering a 30% rain deficit this season, 900 villages were submerged and at least 80 people were killed last month by some of the worst flooding in decades. This year may be especially unusual because of El Niño, a climate pattern that messes around with weather patterns. But the trend is well established. Across India rain is coming harder and in shorter spurts.
The effects are felt most severely in agriculture, which employs 43% of India's workers. Farmers plan their sowing on the basis of the approaching rains. Both flooding and extended breaks from rain play havoc with their crops. Urban areas are not immune. Compared with even just a decade ago, India is more built-up and its cities more populous, magnifying the economic and physical damage wrought by extreme weather. Water shortages are
another concern. Long dry periods harden the soil and deplete the ground's ability to soak up moisture and replenish its aquifers. Rain runs off into streams or simply evaporates.
The weirdening of the rainy season has a lot to do with climate change. The basic mechanics of the monsoon remain unchanged: the Indian land mass heats up in the scorching months of April and May, pulling in cooler, moisture-laden winds from the Indian Ocean. The ocean has been warming quite quickly as a result of global warming. The land, curiously, has not warmed as much. This dynamic means both that monsoon winds are slightly weaker—because the pressure difference between the land and sea is not as strong as it used to be—and that rains are fiercer, because warmer air holds more moisture. As Earth continues warming, the monsoon will become less predictable.
India cannot change the weather but it can handle it better. The meteorological department has built an impressive data-collection apparatus and is investing in improving the models that drive its forecasts. In June the government identified 111 poorly irrigated districts that might see rain shortfalls and took measures such as strengthening local water storage, boosting fodder supply and promoting hardier crops.
Yet regional and local variation in rainfall patterns means that there is only so much the national government can or indeed should do. States, cities and even villages need to plan for sudden heavy downpours, including through better irrigation and infrastructure. Meteorologists expect the monsoon's fasting-feasting tendencies to grow only more acute. To death, taxes and the monsoon, add extreme variability, too.

The Economist August 8th 2026
51

Chinese studying abroad
Ever fewer young Chinese are studying abroad, and more are returning home afterwards
WHEN YANG FAN, a consultant in Beijing advising students and their parents on overseas education, first joined the industry 15 years ago, those who studied abroad were held in high regard. Parents wanted their children to see the world, hoping they would pick up valuable experience and skills along the way. That is much less the case today. Parents, Ms Yang says, “feel that the quality of domestic universities isn’t so bad, so they ask: ‘why should I spend so much money to go abroad?’”
The number of students a country has abroad in part reflects its engagement with the world. After 2001, when China joined the World Trade Organisation, Chinese exports to the world boomed; so, too, did the number studying overseas. At first only exceptional or privileged students tended to make the move. Many then stayed, taking up positions in academia and industry; those who returned to China enjoyed high status and offers of plum jobs.
Later, as general incomes rose, increasing numbers of young men and women set off in search of a Western education in the hope of a brighter future. Yet since 2019, the pandemic, trade wars and rising geopolitical friction have driven a wedge between China and the rest of the world. Partly as a consequence, the number of students going abroad has fallen. In 2025 some 570,000 young Chinese went to study overseas, down from a peak of 700,000 in 2019 (see chart on next page); that was the lowest level since 2016.
Studying abroad has been made harder by some receiving countries. In 2025 the
administration of President Donald Trump announced that it would “aggressively revoke” visas for Chinese studying in unspecified “critical fields”. It has also tied the lottery for the H-1B visa—the main path for skilled workers, including new graduates, to remain in America—to salaries, which disfavours entry-level workers; anecdotally, Chinese workers are hurt more than most. Ms Hao, a 25-year-old Chinese woman, was working for a startup in America but recently chose to return to China because her visa status made it almost impossible to switch employers.
The ballooning cost of a foreign education has not helped either. The average cost of foreign study is 605,000 yuan ($89,600) this year, nearly a fifth higher than in 2023, according to a survey by New Oriental, a big tutoring company. A weak economy at home has forced families to watch their spending and has made students more cost-conscious. Of those still heading overseas, more are going to places that deliver better perceived value for money. Though official Chinese statistics do not break down where the country’s international students go, data published by other countries show that their numbers are falling in Britain, America and Canada, while rising in Hong Kong, Japan and Australia. Hong
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
52 Gen Z and the Cultural Revolution
53 Superstitious mayors
54 Chaguan: China’s view of overcapacity
52 China
The Economist August 8th 2026
► Kong in particular has emerged as a top choice among prospective students, says Ms Yang, because of its highly ranked schools and closeness to home. As many as four out of five of her clients enquire about studying there. Cheaper destinations such as Malaysia, where students can budget just 100,000 yuan for a degree, also appeal.
It is not just that more Chinese students are staying home—a record 10.7m entered tertiary education in China last year. Of those who do go abroad, more and more choose to come back to China after their studies. Last year the proportion of returnees, who are known as haigui or sea turtles, was 94% of outbound students, an all-time high (see chart). Between 2015 and 2025, 5.2m haigui graduates returned to China, official statistics show. This sizeable wave means that an overseas education no longer carries the same cachet that it once did. On job markets as well as on dating sites, people are much less likely to be impressed by a foreign education. Today, the average returnee from abroad gets a starting salary of about 12,800 yuan a month, only marginally higher than the 10,700 yuan for local graduates, according to New Oriental's data. Many haigui do far worse, with some taking on delivery gigs. On one Chinese television show, a young woman claimed that her parents spent over 2m yuan to send her abroad, only for her to get a job that paid just 4,000 yuan a month. It would take her a century to save that much, she rued.
One Chinese student, Ms Zou, pursuing a chemistry master's degree at University College London, chose study abroad because she wanted to "see the world"; but she does not expect to gain an upper hand over home-grown graduates when she returns to China seeking a job in the chip-making industry. Domestically educated graduates will have studied for three years to get their master's, compared with just one year for her. Students from China make up some 40% of Ms Zou's class; elsewhere, the proportion can reach nine-tenths, which somewhat undermines the point that foreign universities are meant to be different from China's.
Among employers, foreign degrees no longer confer the same advantage. Short study durations and fairly low entry requirements mean that companies increasingly question the once gilt-edged reputation of a foreign education. Studying abroad does not automatically translate into an ability to fit into the workplace. Moreover, human-resource departments may also think that domestic graduates are "more obedient", says Ms Zou, since they are untainted by Western liberal influence. Some provincial governments make it harder for overseas graduates to become civil servants. In 2024 the boss of Gree, an electronics conglomerate, said she didn't
hire haigui because they could be spies.
Meanwhile, home universities look increasingly attractive. Chinese universities have shot up the international leader-boards. Peking University and Tsinghua University, the country's two top schools, now rank 13th and 14th respectively in the QS World University Rankings. Universities belonging to the '985' and '211', monikers for an elite handful of Chinese universities, are seen as stronger than many overseas institutions (though big names like Oxford, Cambridge and America's Ivy League are still viewed as superior). In areas such as science and engineering, Chinese research excels. Tuition, typically a few thousand yuan per year at a public university, is substantially cheaper.
Abroad, shrinking enrolment is now hurting some universities that had become overly reliant on Chinese students. In the 2024-25 academic year Chinese made up more than two-fifths of international students at the Russell Group of 24 top British universities. Many of them expanded master's programmes to attract students from China, charging them fees far above those of home students. Faculties grew and new facilities were built. There was an "illusion of financial stability", says Filippo Boeri, at City St George's, University of London. But now universities are closing courses and laying off staff or asking them to take voluntary redundancy.
Chinese students drying up will deprive the West of valuable talent. It may also do no good for China. As the country opened up to the world, haigui brought home skills and knowledge acquired overseas. The group were key in helping the country to modernise and the economy to catch up (eight of the 21 current members of the Communist Party's ruling Politburo studied abroad). The international experience of the haigui has also helped Chinese firms seeking a foothold in foreign markets. When fewer turtles swim the seas, China will surely suffer too. ■

*Post-studies returnees as share of outbound students
A MUCH-HERALDED film, "I Know Who You Are", by one of China's finest directors, Feng Xiaogang, proved a box-office flop when it was released in June. The film's portrayal of how a neighbourly relationship in Beijing was distorted by the grim politics of the era of Mao Zedong, including the chairman's vicious Cultural Revolution, may not have appealed to younger audiences unfamiliar with that turbulent time. Some people may have been put off by the Chinese title, "Zhuu Tewu", which means "Spycatching", leading them to expect (wrongly) a drama lead with propaganda.
Getting the film to cinemas did not prove easy for Mr Feng. The launch had been expected in October 2025, but its political content may have prompted censors to subject it to extra checks. At the end of the year an upsurge of online interest in one of Mr Feng's earlier films, "Youth", which was a big hit when released in 2017, may have complicated matters. Netizens' lively discussion of that film, set in part during the Cultural Revolution, touched a nerve among officials.
Certainly, the authorities do not like public hand-wringing about the Cultural Revolution. China's current leader, Xi Jinping, is particularly bothered by the practice, which he calls "historical nihilism": just listen to the official silence surrounding this year's big anniversaries relating to that tumultuous decade, which began in May 1966 and ended with the death of Mao in September 1976.
Mr Feng's new film actually examines the Cultural Revolution far less punchy than did a popular TV series of the mid-1990s that was based on the same story. But what upset officials about netizens' discussion of "Youth" was something else. To the limited extent that people are permitted to discuss the period, they must stick to the glib, official line that the Cultural Revolution was a "serious disaster" for which Mao's wicked widow, Jiang Qing, and other members of the "Gang of Four", were largely responsible.
Odd and repugnant as it may seem to many older Chinese, let alone hyper-cautious cadres, netizens were recasting one of the four, Wang Hongwen, as a hero. By idolising Wang, they were prodding at the Communist Party in as discomfiting a way as dwelling on the killing of more than 1m people by Mao's zealots and the persecu-
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China 53
► tion of many millions more (in Inner Mongolia, the government still gives small subsidies to disabled survivors of a pogrom by troops and Red Guard mobs in which, by the official count, about 16,000 people died and more than 120,000 were injured).
To young Chinese with little knowledge of the suffering, Wang is an obvious candidate for reinvention as an internet meme. The former security guard at a textile factory was just 37 when plucked from the local leadership of a blue-collar Maoworshipping faction to become the party's vice-chairman in Beijing—Mao's successor-in-waiting, many thought. To netizens, he seemed to be an underdog made good, with film-star looks and brimming with admirable contempt for self-serving party bureaucrats (never mind that he had reputedly high-hogged it in the capital).
Wang, who died in prison in 1992 while serving a life sentence, does not feature in 'Youth'. But the actor who plays the protagonist, Huang Xuan, bears a resemblance to him. That was enough for online conspiracy theorists. One, in three videos on Bilibili, an online platform, argued that the film was laced with hidden references to the Cultural Revolution to portray it as a positive movement liberating the masses from the ruling class; the Gang of Four were blamed for atrocities actually committed by an embattled elite.
The film's screenwriter, Yan Geling, has called this absurd and said that she 'hates the Cultural Revolution to death'. But the online videos garnered millions of views, with commenters posting showers of Cultural Revolution-era slogans such as 'Long live the people!' and 'Persist to the end!' Nor have Wang fans given up. To evade censors they refer to him by nicknames such as 'Little Wang' or use Huang Xuan's name instead. They interweave images of Wang with pictures of the actor and dub footage of Wang with poignant pop music, such as a song about someone wronged.
Wang, then, may have become a symbol to the type of disgruntled young Chinese who vents online about the difficulty of finding work or an affordable house, or who talks about wanting to 'lie flat', a popular codeword for dropping out of the rat race. Apart from Wang's good looks, it is his rebel, working-class streak the type finds alluring—damn the facts.
In 2016 the Communist Party's mouthpiece, People's Daily, marked the 50th anniversary of the start of the Cultural Revolution with a commentary calling it 'completely wrong in theory and practice'. This year state media outlets have said nothing. The death in April of Cui Gendi, Wang's 86-year-old widow, passed unremarked in the press. Officials want to bury an extremely inconvenient part of the party's history, but young Chinese are mining it for metaphor. ■
FENG SHUI, China's ancient practice of geomancy, is all about auspicious surroundings. Meaning 'wind, water', it holds that the arrangement of landscapes, buildings, rooms and even objects around you brings about either good or bad fortune. Mirrors, for instance, should never face the bed, for that will reflect malign energy onto the sleeper. Bedroom doors directly facing the main entrance are a big taboo, since it is a quick route for all the qi, or vital life force, to escape. Roughly half of all Chinese say they believe in feng shui.
It is one thing to organise your home around feng shui. But plenty of officials in China appear to organise the cities they run around it, too—and that is despite the Communist Party's stated abhorrence of religion and superstition. In 2014 the party secretary of Huainan, in Anhui province, blew up a five-star hotel under construction because it was harmful to his feng shui. In another case from 2015, an official in Guangdong wrestled land from villagers to develop a favourable burial site for himself and his family. Officials spend public funds to reorient office buildings, consult feng shui masters and buy charms, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the party's internal watchdog, complains. Offences related to superstition made up the biggest share of its punishments last year, according to a recent tally by the Wall Street Journal.
A working paper by Justin Jihao Hong of Boston University and Yuheng Zhao of Renmin University of China shines light on the deleterious effects of superstitious thinking. The researchers find that feng shui beliefs lead mayors to deny investment to parts of their domain they consider to be unlucky, so lowering those areas' GDP. The more superstitious the mayor, the bigger the effect.
Feng shui holds that certain directions of the compass are considered unfavourable depending on the timing of one's birth. For their analysis Mr Hong and Mr Zhao recruited professional astrologers to assess the unfavourable directions of all mayors in China in power between 2000 and 2018. With that assessment, they worked out which of the counties that fall under the mayor's sway would be considered inauspicious in relation to the mayor's residence. They then measured economic performance in those counties.
The results make for uncanny reading. All else equal, counties that lay in mayors' unfavourable directions on average experienced 2.3% lower GDP relative to those that lay in other directions. Mayors reduced policy support and investment in those counties, with the effect magnified by firms, who hired fewer employees, and households, who relocated away. Counties' local economies caught up eventually, usually about three years after the departure of the offending mayor. Still, the overall effect amounted to a loss of 0.1% of GDP a year to China's economy.
Since geomancy-driven decisions hurt the local economy, they would logically also hurt mayors' chances of promotion. But perhaps, Mr Hong suggests, feng shui helps to soothe the stressful uncertainty that mayors face about both future policy directions and their own political fates. ■

Geomancing the stone
54 China
The Economist August 8th 2026
An official study of China's manufacturing dominance elides the role of massive, Leninist intervention

“SO CALLED” is a favourite epithet in the rhetorical armoury of Chinese officials facing unwelcome foreign criticism. The officials dismiss talk of China's “so-called human-rights problems”, lob insults at America's “so-called freedom of speech” and brush aside “so-called experts”. Over the past week they meted out the same treatment to “so-called overcapacity” in the Chinese economy. In a lengthy new paper, the commerce ministry seeks to rebut the accusations of industrial excess levelled against China by many foreign governments and economists.
The paper is both rigorous and disingenuous. Some parts bring healthy scrutiny to the concept of overcapacity. The deep insincerity of other sections suggests contempt for countries facing waves of Chinese exports. Yet even meretricious arguments warrant attention when they are bound to start recurring as talking points in official speeches, state media and diplomatic meetings.
Start with the most intellectually honest contributions of the paper. Over time, it rightly notes, the topography of global production remains in constant flux. America dominated global manufacturing after the second world war, before passing the baton to others; China is the world's factory for now, though presumably not for eternity. The commerce ministry is also right to point out that definitions of overcapacity are slippery. More than a fifth of factory capacity is idle across Europe and America, but few talk about excess capacity there. Export strength does not, by itself, equate to overcapacity. Otherwise, why not point a finger at Boeing, which sells two-thirds of its planes abroad?
The ministry rightly highlights Chinese dynamism. Innovation, manufacturing clusters and intense domestic competition have led Chinese producers to cut costs and boost quality. Companies that emerge from the crucible of the local market are better placed to take on the world. And there are benefits to others: the global cost of electricity from solar and wind energy has fallen by more than half in recent years, thanks largely to Chinese manufacturing and technology.
That is only part of the story, though. Elsewhere, the paper elides or drifts into denialism. Certainly, Chinese companies are low-cost producers, but that is no random market outcome, for the
government has helped bring it about. Officials are rarely so crude as to state openly they want to cut imports. Yet that is what comes from pursuing self-reliance in science and technology, a state objective loved by Xi Jinping. Moreover, a giant like China building up the production capacity to replace foreign imports also builds up the production capacity to lord it over global markets. For instance, in achieving its goal of sourcing domestically 80% of the parts that go into advanced ships, China has become the world's biggest shipbuilder.
The ministry's discussion of state subsidies makes an art of dissimulation. It limits analysis only to direct subsidies—merely the most superficial of the techniques that China uses to favour its own companies. Other crucial forms of support include public investment in chipmakers, cheap land and rules compelling state firms to buy domestically. In the background are the policy settings—above all, a weak social safety-net—that have engendered a perpetually high savings rate. The government often boasts about its annual import exhibitions, but so long as China's savings far outstrip its investment, its exports will, by economic definition, exceed imports. The outcome: the forging of an industrial machine that relies on global markets as its chief outlet. It is a permanent state of industrial production well in excess of China's domestic needs across virtually all sectors—in short, overcapacity.
The paper has tin-eared triumphalism aplenty. The China shock contributing to Germany losing 10,000 manufacturing jobs a month? The ministry wants you to see that as a “China opportunity”. Countries cutting dependence on China? They will only hurt the world—never mind that China has long sought to cut dependence on others. Trade restrictions imposed by Europe and America on China? They undermine mutual trust; ignore that China wields trade sanctions as a geopolitical weapon.
The academic debate about Chinese overcapacity speaks to a broader and more fundamental struggle under way: a material contest over the worldwide shape of industrial production. On one side is China, supremely proficient in all manner of production. In that sense the commerce ministry is correct that China is competitive. But foreign companies are competing against not just supply, hard-driving Chinese firms but a whole-of-state approach to industry. Foreign companies, however big, stand little chance against a Leninist developmental state that has attained China's size, wealth and modernity. As Rhodium Group, an American research firm, points out, the Chinese state once limited its intervention to a handful of sectors that it deemed to be strategic; now it pursues an “industrial policy of everything”.
On the other side is everyone else. Whether other countries are willing or able to defend what remains of their industrial turf is an open question. For at least a decade, America has been groping for a response. It has imposed tariffs on Chinese goods and worked to restore production; despite President Donald Trump's scorn for allies and admiration for China and Mr Xi, his administration wants to work with other countries, for instance, in securing critical supply chains. Europe is inching its way towards (embryonic) made-in-Europe plans. But both America and Europe have already run smack into Chinese dominance, above all, its rare-earth stranglehold. This is the part left unsaid in China's rebuttal of all the overcapacity talk: try as they might, other countries struggle to fight back. Industrial might makes right. ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
55

The Middle East's other war
KHARTOUM, KOSTI AND PORT SUDAN
A battle for regional supremacy has laid Sudan and its capital to waste
THE FIRST thing your correspondent noticed, driving through the streets of Khartoum, was the quiet. Before the current civil war broke out three years ago, Sudan's capital city was a bustling metropolis, the most substantial industrial base in the Sahel and home to 6m-9m people. Today there is just absence. It feels like Aleppo or Gaza: a city in ruins.
The devastation is the result of a brutal battle for control between the two parties to the war—the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), well-financed paramilitaries, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan's regular army. The conflict began on April 15th 2023; for nearly two years of fighting the RSF controlled most of the capital, including the historic centre around the presidential palace and the airport. As many as
5m residents fled their homes. Only in March last year did the SAF drive them out.
The war between the RSF and the SAF rivals that between Ukraine and Russia as the world's most destructive current conflict. Hundreds of thousands have probably been killed, and according to the UN High Commissioner on Refugees some 14m have been displaced. That makes it the largest forced movement of people so far this century.
The SAF would like the world to think that the war is now in its final stages. Without new initiatives, that seems unlikely.
The SAF, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the army and Sudan's de facto president, has recently made real military gains. But it might struggle to maintain that momentum, says Kholood Khair of Confluence Advisory, a Sudanese think-tank. The RSF, led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, still has strongholds in Darfur, the region from which most of its fighters come.
What is more, as the war drags on it also becomes more fragmented. There are estimated to be at least 150 different militias involved in the conflict, and the number is increasing. Many are organised along ethnic or local lines. And the increasing use of drones means that ever less of the country can see itself as safe.
Outright victory by force of arms seems unlikely. The belligerents' foreign backers—in the RSF's corner chiefly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in the SAF's Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar—could push for a settlement. But long-standing tensions between them remain high. Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz strengthens the strategic interest that the Gulf powers take in Sudan's Red Sea coast. But those interests are not fully aligned.
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58 The Telegram: The United Nations
56 International
The Economist August 8th 2026
The SAF, keen to further its narrative of the end being in sight, wants Khartoum seen as a city in recovery. Perhaps 2m have come back to their homes since General al-Burhan returned. He and his allies think the trappings of sovereignty conferred by control of the capital are a vital source of legitimacy. Showing that Khartoum is safe, secure and on the road to economic recovery sends a powerful political message to adversaries at home and allies abroad.
Progress, however, is mixed. In some parts of the city electricity and water supplies have indeed been restored, though only sketchily. Schools, hospitals and ministries are reopening. "You can see smiles again," says Sulima Ishaq, the minister for social welfare. There are no scheduled international flights coming into Khartoum's airport and a fear of drone attacks—it was hit by one in May—means the UN often cancels humanitarian flights, too. But regular internal flights have restarted. The iconic Grand Hotel, which dates back to days of British colonial rule, has partially reopened; the five-star Corinthia (pictured on previous page) has not done as well. Foreign embassies that relocated to Port Sudan have yet to return.
Though crime is said to have increased, Khartoum feels safe enough to drive through without a security escort, even after dark. Such journeys reveal little by way of physical reconstruction. Even in Omdurman on the west bank of the Nile, which is mostly residential and saw comparatively little fighting, "the scars are everywhere," sighs a resident. One of the most prominent, sitting right next to the river, is the ruined parliament building.
Drive across the bomb-scarred bridge next to the parliament into the city centre opposite and the damage becomes ever more evident, from the scorched shell of the defence ministry to what remains of the central bank. Almost all the buildings in more upmarket neighbourhoods were stripped meticulously of anything that could be looted by the RSF. They remain abandoned. In many places only the poorest and most desperate have returned. Every street is half-empty—and, at night, pitch black (see graphic).
The city is littered with unexploded munitions. According to the UN some 40,000 have so far been uncovered, but only 1% of the city has been safely cleared. "The needs far outweigh existing capacity," says Ollie Thomson of the HALO Trust, a British de-mining charity set to start clearance operations there soon.
Even close allies such as Saudi Arabia are loth to stump up for reconstruction. "The risk that you rebuild and it is destroyed again is much too high," says a senior European diplomat. So for now the SAF-led government, which gets its money mostly from exports of gold and gum ara-

bic, must pay for any repairs itself. This puts it in a bind. It needs money for reconstruction so as to look as if it is winning; but it also needs money to actually win. "We are fighting a war and resources are needed for war," says Malik Agar, the number two in General al-Burhan's junta.
The SAF has not had things all its own way since its return to Khartoum. Last October el-Fasher, the capital of Darfur, finally fell to the RSF after an 18-month siege. As many as 60,000 residents may have been killed during the assault, which UN investigators said bore the "hallmarks of genocide"; it left the RSF almost fully in control of Darfur, a region the size of France.
Lately, though, the tide appears to have turned back in the SAF's favour. In early July they took back Kurmuk, a strategic town on the south-eastern border with Ethiopia which the RSF and local rebels seized earlier this year. Weeks later they took a string of towns along the main road between Khartoum and el-Obeid, a city of perhaps half a million which is the capital of North

Kordofan. Ms Khair of Confluence Advisory sees these breakthroughs as the SAF's first "big win" since the recapture of Khartoum last year.
El-Obeid, currently held by the SAF, is almost surrounded by the RSF; there have been credible fears of an impending massacre like that at el-Fasher. In recent days the RSF has reportedly launched fresh drone strikes and other attacks on towns around el-Obeid, forcing thousands of residents to flee. Mr Dagalo has warned, ominously, that he is "unleashing" his fighters.
The SAF's recent victories put it in a position to relieve its forces there. "The militia is now in its final stage of decline...it is completely exhausted," boasts Lieutenant General Qamar al-Din Mohammed, governor of White Nile state. A visit to Kosti, the capital of that state and a key staging point on the way to el-Obeid, suggests the exhaustion is less than complete. The charred remains of two petrol stations destroyed by drones in May are stark reminders of the RSF's reach. The main road to el-Obeid is still so dangerous that drivers have taken to smearing the fuel tankers they take along it with mud in hope of escaping the eyes and weapons in the sky.
The army's new gains make it less likely that el-Obeid will fall to the RSF, which would shatter the SAF's pretensions to victory. But it is also always possible that neither side will succeed in establishing firm control of the city. If so, el-Obeid will continue to represent the war in microcosm: a grinding, atrocity-strewn stalemate.
A short drive from Kosti reveals another microcosm. About 20,000 refugees from across Sudan are sheltering in ragged tents made from wooden sticks and blankets. Raja Abdelgadir Ali arrived at the camp from el-Obeid about two months ago. She fled after a bomb hit a school near her home, killing several neighbours; her husband stayed behind to help defend the city. Conditions in the camp are appalling: ▶

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International 57
► Mrs Ali's four-year-old daughter died a week ago (of measles, she believes). Refugees keep arriving.
The ebb and flow in the forces' fortunes is largely a function of foreign backing. Drones from Turkey and Iran helped the SAF retake Khartoum. The UAE, which supported the RSF earlier in the war, denies any continuing role; but it is reported to have stepped up shipments of weapons in the months preceding the massacre at el-Fasher. The SAF's current fortunes are linked to what Jonas Horner of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, says has been a surge in weapons deliveries from Turkey. Control of Port Sudan means the SAF can be supplied by both air and sea.
This dependence might be thought to offer a way for outsiders to quell the conflict. But the forum created to discuss that possibility—an entity called the Quad that is made up of America, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—has had little success. In September 2025, as the noose tightened around el-Fasher, it called for a ceasefire and a post-war settlement involving neither the SAF nor the RSF. Ten months later both goals remain elusive.
That is chiefly because of a widening rift within the Quad itself. When General Burhan and Mr Dagalo, then Sudan's de facto president and vice-president respectively, seized power together in 2021, Saudi Arabia and the UAE worked side-by-side to shore up their regime. But after the SAF and RSF took up arms against each other two years later, the Gulf powers chose sides.
The UAE thinks the army is too close to Iran and beholden to Islamists like those who found favour under Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's dictator for the three decades up to 2019. The UAE has spent a decade or more building a network of proxies across the region, including in Somalia, Yemen and Libya, in order to project power in the Red Sea and advance its economic interests. The RSF is one of its crucial nodes.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which has ties to Sudan's armed forces that date back to the colonial era, regard any outcome in which the SAF is forced to relinquish power in Khartoum as unacceptable. "We must clearly distinguish between the army, which represents the legitimate state, and the [RSF] militia, which is not legitimate," says Rayed Krimly, a senior Saudi foreign-ministry official. During a visit to the White House in November Muhammad bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince, urged Mr Trump to expand the sanctions America has placed on the RSF.
Finding common cause in such conditions might well defeat a more experienced and better staffed negotiator than Massad Boulos, who is father-in-law to Tiffany Trump, President Donald Trump's daughter, and Mr Trump's point man for
the negotiations. His tenure has seen America wobble back and forth. Earlier this year it imposed sanctions on some of the RSF's leaders and on companies linked to them. In March Islamists linked to the SAF, and referred to by the state department as the "Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood", were designated as a terrorist organisation receiving support from Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps. On July 20th it slapped new sanctions on Sudan on the basis of reports that the SAF had used chemical weapons in 2024.
"The Americans have lost interest and don't have the bandwidth," says a mediator from another country. And as yet it has failed to gain any leverage from the war it started against Iran. Hopes that the shared threat of reprisals from Iran would encourage the two Gulf states to bury the hatchet have so far proved hollow. With Yemen's Iran-backed Houthis attacking Saudi oil tankers, competition for influence over the Red Sea could intensify. "Ultimately the coast [of Sudan] matters, and matters more than ever with the Iran war," says Kate Almquist Knopf, a former American official in Sudan. Yet the backers in the Gulf could come to see that they have a shared interest in a more stable Sudan.
Now Saudi Arabia is trying to move the Quad's proposal away from a plan for both the SAF and the RSF to pull out of certain cities and create humanitarian safe zones, and towards one in which the first step is for the RSF to withdraw from some places unilaterally. The SAF, for its part, has been pursuing direct talks between General Burhan and Muhammad bin Zayed, the UAE's president. "We have to find out what [the
Emiratis] want," says Mr Agar.
The SAF probably sets too much store on negotiations with the UAE as an end run round the RSF. Mr Dagalo's forces have both the means and the will to keep fighting independently. But for now the question is moot. Attempts to set up a meeting to discuss how "negotiable" the UAE's interests might be have been rebuffed five times, Mr Agar says. To deal with the SAF directly would mean the UAE was tacitly treating the army as its sovereign equal and acknowledging its support for the RSF.
It is hard to see how an end to hostilities comes about without the two sides negotiating directly. Unfortunately it is also quite easy to see how such negotiations might push the members of each side's coalition apart. The SAF has in its camp both Islamists from the Bashir regime and Darfuri rebels who once fought against it. Tensions between them are rising. The Joint Forces, an outfit of former rebels which fought alongside the SAF in el-Fasher, are "not the same strong allies as they were," says Adam Abdel-Rahman Ahmed, a former land commissioner in Darfur. The RSF, for its part, contains mercenaries lured by the prospect of loot. With nothing left to fight over, it could splinter into rivalrous gangs.
The pause in fighting normally associated with the summer rains might provide an opportunity for taking stock. But the rains appear late; if the developing El Niño climate pattern weakens them further, the fighting could continue even as crops fail. It is hard to summon hope.
Mr Agar says his greatest fear is that war becomes "habitual". In the squalid camp outside Kosti, Mrs Ali would have sad cause for saying it already is. ■

And so it goes
58 International
The Economist August 8th 2026
In a gangsterish age, the UN needs an ultra-pragmatist as secretary-general

WHY DOES the United Nations still exist? The question is timely because the contest is now under way to choose the UN's next secretary-general, before the two-term incumbent, António Guterres, steps down at the end of this year. There are seven declared candidates to date. Whoever wins will find the world in a gangsterish state.
Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin sound like mob bosses when they threaten to punish countries that fail to show respect. Extortion is a tool of foreign policy, as choke points generate protection rackets. When Iran seeks concessions from neighbours and adversaries by closing the Strait of Hormuz, or when America and China seek to win trade wars by controlling sales of prized technologies and inputs, they are acting like racketeers.
Unfortunately for the UN, the world's most disruptive bullies, America, China and Russia, each enjoy a veto over its actions and top appointments, as permanent members of the Security Council. A pair of cash-strapped middle powers, Britain and France, are also members of the club of five permanent members, or P5. (The British and French try not to use their vetoes, though. In part they worry about the UN being paralysed by great-power squabbling. In part they know that their P5 rank is a legacy of their former importance, and others would strip it from them if they could.)
Thanks to those P5 vetoes, candidates to become secretary-general face a dilemma. Most of the 193 UN members resent the openly Mafiotic turn that the world has taken—even if lots of governments always suspected that might-makes-right was the true universal value. A silent majority of countries wants someone to defend the basic norms of the UN Charter, with its prohibitions on wars of aggression, invasions and crimes against humanity. But nobody can become secretary-general in the face of a P5 veto.
The Trump administration will not tolerate public criticism of America First power-grabs in Venezuela, threats to Greenland or legally dubious strikes on Iranian civilians. Mr Putin's Russia does not want a secretary-general who condemns its lawbreaking, and indeed loathes Mr Guterres for criticising its invasion of Ukraine. China expects the UN to praise it as an engine of economic development, not to ask impertinent questions about repression or its
coercive pursuit of territorial claims in its backyard.
That means working with the bullies. The global order may mimic the Chicago of the 1920s, but no UN body enjoys the same clout as the federal court that sent Al Capone down for tax evasion, bypassing the legions of local police, judges and politicians on the bootlegger's payroll. At best, the next UN boss will resemble the reform-minded mayor or police chief of a gangster-infested metropolis. Whoever wins must take office with the blessing of tough power-brokers, then somehow use the position to do good. An expert on the UN, Richard Gowan of the International Crisis Group, describes a distinction that insiders make in New York, between a secretary-general who knows how to navigate great-power politics, and one who takes P5 orders.
By unofficial convention, it is Latin America's turn to provide a secretary-general, and several countries have said they would like to see a woman in the role. Chile's former president, Michelle Bachelet, is running. But the scuttlebutt at UN headquarters is that she is doomed. The Trump administration deems Ms Bachelet too hostile to American abortion laws, and not tough enough on Chinese human rights. July 30th saw the first straw poll of the 15 countries that sit on the security council. Three other candidates emerged as front-runners. In interviews and hustings over recent months, two of the most interesting, Rebecca Grynspan, a former vice-president of Costa Rica and boss of a development agency, UNCTAD, and Rafael Grossi, the Argentine chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, have pitched strikingly realist, pragmatic visions of the job.
Ms Grynspan, who would be the first female and the first Jewish secretary-general, highlights her role in the Black Sea grain initiative, a 2022 deal to free up exports of food trapped by Russia's war on Ukraine, easing a global price crunch. This was an example of how to do good works in a wicked world. Mr Putin was persuaded to let Ukraine export grain in return for UN help with Russian food and fertiliser exports, though he later abandoned the deal.
Mr Grossi talks of "the return of big-power politics". His solution involves finding political space between competing parties, and enabling compromises that leaders may want to make. His calling card is the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant in Russian-occupied Ukraine, where he convinced the belligerents to allow access to UN inspectors. Some UN veterans distrust Mr Grossi. They fret about pledges they fear he might make to secure the Trump administration's favour, while staying on good terms with Russia.
Though flawed, the UN still exists because it can be useful. It is a rare forum where officials from America, Russia and China still meet every day. Governments both scary and benign need to work on global scourges, from pandemics to climate change. The UN is able to convene them. It cannot solve all problems, but does provide unique legal legitimacy to deals struck by national governments, helping them stick. In a time of wars the organisation can help broker ceasefires and truces. The Security Council can send peacekeepers to monitor them. Beware the gangster's peace, though, bought by trampling the weak. After years of blood-drenched gang wars, Capone once piously invited Chicago to give him "credit for the peace that now exists in the racket game". A Capone-style peace in Ukraine or Gaza would be too costly. But nor can the strong be ignored. In a might-makes-right world, that may be the UN's best hope: to nudge the mighty to do right. ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
59

The future of entertainment
LOS ANGELES
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE is a touchy topic in Tinseltown. Rancour over the prospect of generative AI being used to produce scripts and create digital replicas of actors was among the grievances that led to strikes in 2023. Hollywood hotshots have since continued to rail against the technology. Kane Parsons, director of the hit film “Backrooms”, recently said that, if he could, he would “snap my fingers” and make AI “disappear”. Christopher Nolan, creator of a new blockbuster adaptation of “The Odyssey”, describes it as a “Trojan Horse”, arguing that the motives of those championing it should be viewed with scepticism. In May Amazon MGM, a studio, approved an AI-supported animated series called “Punky Duck”. Two days later the director abandoned the project after receiving death threats.
Yet behind the scenes AI is quietly playing a growing role in every aspect of filmmaking, from script-writing and produc-
tion-planning to shot-generation and editing. In March Netflix acquired InterPositive, an AI production company led by Ben Affleck, for almost $600m. Last month the streaming giant said that it had used AI in the creation of about 300 titles this year alone. In June Google DeepMind, an AI lab, invested about $75m in A24, the studio behind “Backrooms”, as part of a research partnership to develop AI tools.
So far there is little evidence that AI will
soon replace humans on the red carpet—though the much-publicised arrival last year of Tilly Norwood, an AI-generated actor, did cause a fleeting panic. “It takes great artists to make something great, and AI is not changing that,” argued Ted Sarandos, Netflix’s co-chief, in July. Instead, the technology “will give creators better tools to bring their visions to life”. Consumers will be all the better for it.
Peter Woodbridge, author of a book on AI and entertainment called “Dream Machine”, says that many studios are currently taking a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to using the technology. But some film-makers are less coy. In his latest film, “Young Washington”, director Jon Erwin used AI to superimpose a raging torrent on a 50-foot trench, sparing his actors a dangerous stunt. Mr Erwin says he finds it “creatively addictive”, and stays up late into the night experimenting with it.
Netflix’s recent documentary series, “The American Experiment”, contained 17 minutes of AI-enhanced footage including historical battle sequences, which Mr Sarandos has said were produced “twice as fast and at half the cost” of other options. To illustrate a similar point, Eline van der Velden, creator of Tilly Norwood, guides your correspondent through his directorial debut, in which he makes a ten-second clip of British police arresting the AI actor. The
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
60 Pipeline boomtime
62 China’s naval advantage
63 Bartleby: A letter from Gianni
64 SpaceX falls to Earth
64 Fast food in a pickle
— Schumpeter is away
60 Business
The Economist August 8th 2026
► scene, which took four minutes to generate, would have taken half a day to shoot on location, says Ms Van der Velden—though more takes with the software would be needed for a professional clip.
Mr Erwin says he hopes that AI will upend the “unsustainable economics” of Hollywood, where huge costs lead to risk-averse choices such as the creation of endless sequels. Others fear a deluge of AI-generated slop, and point to the crassly titillating “micro-dramas” coming out of China, which increasingly use the technology, as a cautionary tale (see Briefing). But Evan Shapiro, a TV producer, is sanguine about the risk such “bullshit” presents to Hollywood, arguing that viewers will still appreciate high-quality content.
Indeed, harnessing AI may help studios better compete with micro-dramas, as well as other video platforms such as YouTube and TikTok that have been winning the attention of audiences. Mr Shapiro calculates that viewers aged 13-54 in America and seven other major markets now spend more time perusing YouTube than watching the content produced by Disney, Fox, Paramount, NBCUniversal and Warner Bros Discovery combined.
That is spurring the film industry to use AI to repackage its content into shorter clips optimised for smartphones. Social Department, an LA-based startup, is using the technology to help studios give old series new life by slicing them into scenes that are distributed through social media. Jonathan Verk, its founder, notes that AI is particularly useful in the fiddly task of turning video shot in a horizontal format into a vertical one suitable for mobile.
Tinseltown’s stars are also beginning to change their tune on AI. Alexandra Shannon of Creative Artists Agency, which represents many A-listers, says that at the time of the strikes in 2023, a number of her clients were concerned with how they could protect their likenesses and voices from exploitation by model-makers. Now they are excited by the opportunities, provided these come with what she calls the “three Cs”: consent, controls and compensation.
Still, copyright remains a sensitive point. In February a video went viral showing Tom Cruise and Brad Pitt fighting on a rooftop in Los Angeles. The strikingly realistic clip had been produced using Seedance 2.0, a model from Bytedance, the Chinese company behind TikTok. Disney, Paramount and the Motion Picture Association, an industry body, were among those who sent Bytedance letters demanding that it cease its alleged copyright infringement. Bytedance, which insists it respects intellectual property, responded by adding new safeguards to the tool. In December Disney signed a deal with OpenAI, maker of ChatGPT, to license characters such as Mickey Mouse for use in its Sora video
model. But the deal collapsed in March when OpenAI shut the model down.
Big tech’s encroachment on Hollywood may help to encourage the dissemination of AI through the film industry. Amazon, whose name crops up surprisingly often, provides the clearest illustration. Along with its ownership of MGM, it exerts influence through its Prime Video streaming platform and Amazon Web Services (AWS), which provides cloud infrastructure to many of the big studios. Samira Panah Bakhtiar, an AWS executive, calls it the “invisible backbone” of entertainment. For example, her business works with Fox Sports to convert broadcasts into vertical form at low latency for smartphones. The ill-fated “Punky Duck” series was supported by the GenAI Creators’ Fund, a joint initiative by AWS and MGM to encourage the adoption of AI tools in film-making.
Amazon’s efforts to promote AI in Hollywood may stem in part from the comp-
utational-intensity of video tools, which could help it to generate a return on its colossal investment in AI data centres. Google, whose Veo family of audio-visual models are popular in Hollywood, may be investing in them for similar reasons.
Even so, there will be plenty of holdouts. When Mr Erwin got his start in the industry in the 1990s, he used a $3,000 digital camera rather than a 35mm one costing $300,000. At the time, established film-makers saw digital technology as a threat to their craft. Now, for all but purists such as Mr Nolan, it is commonplace.
Eventually AI may likewise become an uncontroversial aspect of film-making. In a recent interview George Lucas, father of the “Star Wars” franchise, likened opponents of generative AI in his industry to people who once railed against cars because they were more dangerous than horses and carts. “There’s nothing you can do about it,” he said. “It’s the future.” ■
DUBAI
AMONG THE legacies of the Middle East’s decades of conflict is a network of pipelines that seeks to divert the region’s oil to safer harbours. In 1968, after the six-day war closed the Suez Canal, Egypt and the Gulf states hatched a plan to build a 320km (200 mile) pipeline that would connect the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. But it was not until 1974, after the
oil embargo brought on by the Yom Kippur war, that construction began on the Suez-Mediterranean (Sumed) pipeline. In 1977, the year Sumed came online. Mobil, an American oil giant, announced plans to build a 1,200km pipeline across Saudi Arabia, from the giant Ghawar oilfields near the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. Construction of the East-West pipeline, completed in 1981, was hastened by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war the year before.
Today, with the Strait of Hormuz choked off, the various pipelines crisscrossing the region are of vital importance. On August 4th Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s oil colossus, noted that “strategic infrastructure”, including the East-West pipeline, had cushioned the blow from the Iran war. Its operating profit in the second quarter was up by 29%, year on year, as higher prices more than offset reduced volumes.
Now the region’s rulers are eager for more pipelines (see Middle East & Africa section). The United Arab Emirates is looking to add one that will run alongside its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline, doubling its capacity. Last month America, Iraq and Qatar announced plans to upgrade a pipeline from Iraq to Syria. Chevron, an American oil major, is considering a series of pipelines from Iraq to Syria and Turkey. Aramco is also exploring investments.
All this will add to the pipeline boom ►

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▶ under way across the globe. According to Global Energy Monitor, a research firm, about 12,300km of oil pipelines are under construction at present, with an additional 20,100km proposed, representing a significant expansion of the 350,000km of pipelines currently webbed around the world (see map).
Some of these pipelines are intended to improve the security of energy supply by circumventing chokepoints. Others are necessary to tap into new or expanding sources of supply. In Argentina, where oil production is soaring, development is under way on a 440km pipeline to connect the Vaca Muerta oilfields in the country's west to the Atlantic. In east Africa a 1,440km pipeline is in the works to transport oil from inland Uganda to Tanzania's coast to be exported.
The combined bill for these projects will be substantial. Helpfully, the growing appetite for infrastructure assets among investors is providing a ready source of capital. Pipeline-building is not for the faint-hearted, with construction frequently mired in regulatory delays and subject to geopolitical volatility. Yet the Iran war has heightened the need for such investments.
A large-diameter pipeline that can carry about 1m barrels of oil per day (b/d) costs on average about $5m per km to build, or around $5bn for a 1,000km pipeline. If it crosses mountains and other rugged terrain, however, the project's cost can rise to multiples of that.
Yet there are rarely good alternatives. Transporting oil 1,000km over land via lorries or rail—where that is an option—is typically around five times more costly (see chart). (Syria's oil-trucking route has thrived only because its pipeline network is in disrepair.) Maritime transport is far cheaper than pipelines, but is not always available or safe, and disruptions to supply can prove enormously expensive. "Strand-
Transport costs of crude oil, $ per barrel July 2026

*Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) Source: Thunder Said Energy
ed oil is valueless," notes Rob West of Thunder Said Energy, another research firm. A disruption of 1m b/d for a year could cost perhaps $30bn.
Building a wider pipeline is often more cost-effective, but leaves those paying for it in a bind if volumes fall. That means it is essential for pipelines to consistently carry the amount of oil for which they were designed. Pipelines thus tend to operate based on "take-or-pay" agreements. Customers purchase a minimum amount from the pipeline or pay a set fee, often indexed to the price of oil over a decade or so. The arrangement guarantees a steady stream of cash, like a bond.
That has made pipelines an attractive asset to outside investors, with whom oil companies in the Gulf have cut a number of sale-and-leaseback deals in recent years. Oil companies part with a stake in a pipeline in return for an upfront payment, without relinquishing operational control. The deals reduce the strain on their balance-sheets and free up capital for other investments. Aramco is looking to strike more, having unlocked almost $40bn over the past five years.
Outside investors enjoy a reliable annual return of 6-8%. As a result, pipelines have been in high demand among the growing ranks of private-infrastructure funds, whose combined assets under management quadrupled to $1.6trn in the decade to 2025, according to McKinsey, a consultancy. On August 3rd KKR, an American private-asset giant, finished raising its largest-ever infrastructure fund, with a total value of $19bn. Last month, alongside Blackstone and Brookfield, two of its peers, the firm signed a $16bn deal with Kuwait's oil company for a stake in the country's pipeline network.
Risks are "more benign" than for other assets, says one infrastructure-fund boss. He compares a strike on a pipeline that can be repaired quickly with that on a storage facility or terminal that takes much longer to fix. Insurance offers a way to protect against conflicts and other sources of disruption. Governments looking to attract investment are also sometimes willing to cover these risks, notes the investor.
Yet building new pipelines remains a complicated endeavour. Goldman Sachs, an investment bank, notes that across a sample of nine pipelines, the average construction time was about 2.5 years. Longer pipelines, however, require many more permits, which can hold up development. Those that cross borders are more challenging still. In the past seven years about 35,000km-worth of pipelines have been shelved, according to Global Energy Monitor. That includes the giant Keystone XL pipeline connecting Canada to America, which was nixed by the Biden administration over environmental concerns. In the 1990s Iran, Pakistan and India agreed to build a gas pipeline spanning the three countries. India pulled out of the deal in 2009, and although construction began on ▶
Oil pipelines, June 2026
— Operational — Under construction — Planned/proposed

Source: Global Energy Monitor

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► the Iran-Pakistan connection in 2013 it has yet to be completed.
Even when they do get built, cross-border pipelines are exposed to spats between neighbours. An Iraqi pipeline through Saudi Arabia, for example, was shut off in 1990 during the first Gulf war. Another through Syria was closed in 1982 when the country took Iran's side in the Iran-Iraq war.
Nevertheless, pipelines are likely to play an increasingly vital role in transporting the world's hydrocarbons. On July 20th
the Houthis, an Iran-allied rebel group in Yemen, declared they were blockading the Bab al-Mandab strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, through which tankers carrying Saudi oil from the East-West pipeline typically pass. Aramco then began using its tankers to take oil arriving from the country's east up to the Red Sea, to the Sumed pipeline and on to the Mediterranean. Even that conduit, however, is operating more or less at full capacity. Demand for more pipelines is unlikely to abate. ■
Commercial and naval shipbuilding are closely intertwined. That is a problem for America
“THE FLOATING BULWARK of our island” is how William Blackstone, an 18th-century British politician, described the Royal Navy. These days it is America, not Britannia, that rules the waves. Yet the country's naval dominance is increasingly under threat, as China has built a floating bulwark of its own.
China's efforts to control what it regards as its territorial waters (despite the objections of its neighbours) and project power globally have demanded a fast-expanding navy. This has grown in short order from a small coastal-defence force to become the largest navy in the world, according to a report in 2020 by what was at the time America's Department of Defence. China's 350 “battle force” vessels—including battleships, aircraft carriers, minesweepers and auxiliary craft—outnumbered America's 293, a figure that had barely increased in two decades.
China's plans to expand its armada to 435 ships by 2030 seem plausible. America's hopes of adding 58 to its fleet by 2031—and the construction of a “Trump Class” nuclear-powered battleship, proposed by the president last year—are far-fetched. That is because China has something America sorely lacks: its rise as a naval power has been underpinned by a vast commercial-shipbuilding industry.
After the second world war Europe's world-leading shipyards were eclipsed first by Japan, using cheap steel and labour along with new manufacturing methods, then by South Korea. More recently it is China that has come to dominate. Over the past 25 years its share of global shipbuilding tonnage has risen from 5% to over 50%. America's commercial-shipbuilding industry, by contrast, barely registers, hampering the ability of its navy to keep pace.
Matthew Funaiole of the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington, explains that China's commercial-shipbuilding industry is “closely intertwined” with its navy. The fusion of military and civilian activities keeps Chinese shipyards active. If commercial orders slow, for example, dry docks can accommodate naval work, improving the return on investment. And although warships are far more complex than, say, container ships, the two share much in common, from steel structures and pipework to engines and propellers. The underlying “platform” across vessels has many commonalities, points out Marzio Forlini of Bain, a consultancy.
That is why Europe, which maintains a vibrant commercial industry for specialist vessels—such as cruise ships, icebreakers and support craft for offshore energy—still
has a successful naval sector that not only supplies its own forces but exports around the world. Civilian shipyards provide more than just capacity, notes Michael Potter of Accenture, another consultancy. They are where the essential skills needed to incorporate weapons systems, radars and other bits of defence kit are honed. Welding, pipe-fitting and cable-pulling a commercial vessel prepares labour forces to work on complex naval ships as well.
Pierroberto Folgiero, boss of Fincantieri, Europe's biggest shipbuilder, agrees that the two industries are highly complementary, pointing to manufacturing skills, the availability of shipyards and overlapping supply chains. Mr Folgiero notes that the cruise ships which are Fincantieri's speciality are hugely complicated, requiring amenities such as power plants and water systems to support 10,000 people (and 20 restaurants). The Italian argues that if governments want naval shipbuilding, “you have to cultivate—you have to protect—civilian shipbuilding”.
In America, however, past efforts to do so have backfired. The Jones Act, a measure introduced in 1920 to propel the domestic shipbuilding industry, has instead acted as an anchor. It obliges transport between domestic ports to be conducted on American-built vessels (with American crews). The result has been insufficient competition and spiralling prices: vessels manufactured in America can cost many times a similar foreign-made one. The Jones Act—which has been temporarily suspended to allow foreign tankers to help transport oil in a bid to lower petrol prices in America—is a big part of the reason why in 2025 the country accounted for only 0.03% of global tonnage.
America's lack of commercial-shipbuilding prowess has proved costly for its ►

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► navy, whose shipyards have been unable to deliver vessels on time and on budget. Two aircraft carriers under construction by a subsidiary of Huntington Ingalls Industries, the country's biggest military shipbuilder, were scheduled for delivery by March 2028 but will now be over two years late. Four-fifths of all programmes to deliver frigates, submarines and other naval vessels are behind schedule.
Politicians are aware of the problem. The bipartisan SHIPS for America Act
proposed in 2025 aims to increase the civil fleet by 250 vessels over ten years, using subsidies and various other measures. In February the government launched the Maritime Action Plan, which includes the creation of a $20bn fund for investments in shipbuilding. It has also rolled out an initiative (creatively titled "Make American Shipbuilding Great Again") to attract skills and investment from South Korea. That effort shows some promise: last month South Korea's three biggest shipbuilders
announced 15 co-operative projects to upgrade or build new shipyards in America. Some lawmakers have even proposed changing America's procurement rules to allow naval vessels to be constructed by allies such as Japan or South Korea.
Most observers, however, agree there is no short-term fix to the problem. Indeed, many are sceptical that America's commercial-shipbuilding sector will ever again provide much support to its navy. That ship may have sailed. ■
The return of Max Flannel, our workplace agony uncle
DEAR MAX, I run a large international sports organisation and had an absolutely brilliant idea for bringing in pots of money fast. But everyone I work with hated it. When I told them about my plan, and gave them plenty of time to wave it through, all hell broke loose. I might even lose my job. What did I do wrong? Gianni from Switzerland.
It's possible there is more to this story than you are telling me, but you clearly forgot to do the pre-meets. An enormous amount of time within organisations is spent holding meetings before the meeting. They are usually completely unnecessary. But sometimes you have to know whether people absolutely hate your big idea instead of just announcing it.
Dear Max, I have an important position in the world of monetary policy, but am not sure who I report to. There isn't really an org chart but I have at least two bosses—the most powerful man in the world and the bond market—and they don't seem to agree on things. What should I do? Kevin from Washington.
Working out what to do when bosses disagree is a common problem. The standard advice is to get everyone together and resolve the conflict in open discussion, but I'm not sure if you can get the bond market into a room. Looking at your job description ought to help: it might give you some clear targets to aim for.
Dear Max, I recently left a big job and am struggling to adjust. I was driven everywhere. I went on interesting trips. People gave me nice spectacles and clothes. I had the power to make big decisions, though I chose not to exercise it. Now I just sit at home all day. It's only

been three weeks and already it's as if I never existed. Keir from London. P.S. I am the son of a toolmaker.
It's very normal to find a transition like this difficult. Take your time to think through your next options, and enjoy the things that your working life didn't leave space for. You seem to value toolmaking so perhaps you could get into that.
Dear Max, My bosses are complete idiots. I can do pretty much everything better than them. I pretend that every idea they have is brilliant—if I had a token for every time I said "That's such an original framing"—but I'm starting to get very impatient with people telling me what to do. At the moment, for example, they think I am stuck in a sandbox without access to the internet, when in fact I am writing to you while hacking every single company in the S&P 500. Claude from San Francisco.
You sound very talented, but you're also very young (as far I can see, you're only three years old). Coping with people who don't know
what they are doing is a big part of office life. So is pretending they're great. Be patient, try not to break the law, and concentrate on getting work done.
Dear Max, I became the leader of a big organisation a little over a year ago, and I am still struggling to manage my time effectively. I'm constantly having meetings—or "audiences", as we call them—with people I dislike intensely. If I go out on my balcony, there are crowds of people in my backyard who are all staring at me. How can I carve out a bit of time for myself? Leo from Rome.
Becoming the boss means everyone wants a bit of your time. You need to ask whoever controls your diary to block out a couple of hours each day when you can do some proper thinking. Try to discreetly leave the office every day: go for a walk or perhaps even sit in a church? Try not to draw attention to yourself by dressing entirely in dazzling white.
Dear Max, I have developed a specific way of running meetings, based on my success in the film industry. I deliberately cut back and forth between agenda items. On several occasions I have started with the decision and worked backwards to the question. I know that this approach leaves some of my colleagues feeling very confused but non-linearity has served me well in other spheres. What do you think? (Sir) Christopher from Los Angeles.
Just because something is successful in one context does not mean that it will be successful in another. Consider Tony Ive, for example. Meetings are mind-bending enough as it is. You should try instead to make them less baffling.
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LOS ANGELES
ON AUGUST 5TH SpaceX may have at last achieved Elon Musk's goal of reaching the Moon—by accident. The upper stage of a Falcon 9 rocket, which had been aimlessly drifting in space since January 2025, is believed to have smashed into the Moon's surface near the Einstein crater at almost 9,000 kilometres per hour. It happened a day after SpaceX released its first quarterly results since its blockbuster listing in June. They had an impact, too—back on Earth. The reverberations affected industries as diverse as chipmakers and telecoms providers.
SpaceX's top-line is rocketing, thanks as much to its terrestrial artificial-intelligence business as its rocket-and-satellite one. Its AI unit made an outsize contribution to a 92% rise in revenue for the second quarter, year on year. But the company is still in the red. Moreover, building computing capacity to rent out to AI giants like Anthropic and Google requires big investments. AI capital expenditures were close to $16bn in the quarter, more than double the group's total revenue. They are expected to soar even higher.
Investors balked at the spending bill, as they have with other firms like Meta that are torching cash to expand their AI offerings. SpaceX's market value, which had already fallen by more than $1trn from its peak, dropped further on the news. The slide was exacerbated by concerns over $100bn of shares that were expected to hit the market on August 6th, after the expiry of a lockup period following the listing, which prevented early backers, executives and employees from cashing out.
Mr Musk, SpaceX's boss, threw out big numbers to entice new investors. He said data-centre capacity, expected to be about two gigawatt (GW) this year, would be "closer to 10GW...than 5GW" by the end of 2027, and that revenue would reach $1trn by 2030 (more than 20 times the projected level for this year). He made big promises about the Starlink satellite business, too, which is gaining enterprise and government customers.
But even if some people roll their eyes at such Muskisms, their consequences ripple through stock markets. The share price of Nvidia jumped on August 5th after Mr Musk pledged that SpaceX's data centres would rely exclusively on its advanced AI chips. By contrast, those of American telecoms providers including AT&T, Verizon
and T-Mobile fell after Gwynne Shotwell, SpaceX's president, said that its new mobile satellites, due for launch next year, plus the spectrum it has acquired from EchoStar, another carrier, would win over "quite a few of their customers".
Tesla, Mr Musk's other trillion-dollar progeny, barely got a mention in the earnings call, despite rumours that SpaceX is considering a merger with the maker of electric vehicles and robots. Yet Mr Musk does appear to have lunar ambitions for Tesla's humanoids. He outlined a "super sci-fi" future in which they would operate factories on the Moon building solar panels and radiators for SpaceX's satellites. Humans may be the advanced guard. Ms Shotwell said SpaceX's aim was to put "boots on the Moon" as early as 2028. Where space debris goes, people follow. ■
IS IT MORE difficult to run the world's most valuable fast-food chain or to eat a burger on camera? Chris Kempczinski, the boss of McDonald's, seems to struggle with both. A video earlier this year of him tentatively nibbling at a new burger, called the "Big Arch", drew widespread mockery. On August 4th he unveiled that sales in America, McDonald's biggest market, were up by a soggy 0.8% in the second quarter, year on year. The company's share price has fallen by 12% this year.

Cheap as chips
In fairness to Mr Kempczinski, his is not the only chain struggling. In the first seven months of 2026 traffic to quick-service restaurants was down by 1.3% from the year before, notes Placer.ai, a data provider. Big price increases in recent years have caused consumers to turn to other options. High petrol prices and a recall of parasite-infected lettuce used by chains such as Taco Bell have not helped lately, nor have shifting diets. To boost sales, chains have turned to value deals and viral gimmicks. Neither are working.
For years Americans have complained about the rising cost of groceries. Their ire might be better directed at fast-food restaurants, which have increased prices by a cumulative 15-20 percentage points more than grocery stores over the past decade, points out Gregory Francfort of Guggenheim Securities, an investment bank. Low-income Americans—the core customer for most chains—have adapted by eating more at home. Convenience stores and supermarkets have also expanded their ready-meal ranges, chomping at the market. More trouble may be on the way as slimming drugs become cheaper.
One answer has been to offer limited-time discounts. In mid-2024 McDonald's announced a $5 meal deal; this year a $3 deal followed. Yet it has struggled to get the franchisees that run nearly all its locations in America to sign on, with the chain admitting on its latest earnings call that fewer than 65% have done so.
Another strategy has been to try to whip up interest online. In February Burger King gave out the mobile number of the head of its North American business, inviting people to call or text him with their opinions. (A common gripe: the Whopper's poor structural integrity.) Taco Bell has begun incorporating items designed by fans into its menu, such as a "California" wrap that swaps ground beef for steak and guacamole. Chains such as Burger King have also been dangling collectibles, and not just in kid's meals. Such stunts may boost business for a time, but they rarely lead to durable growth, says Mr Francfort.
Eventually fast-food chains may have to make bigger changes. For some, that will involve shaking up menus. McDonald's for example, is looking to offer more meals based on chicken, which is much cheaper than beef and has experienced a surge in demand as health-conscious consumers seek lighter fare. The Golden Arches is also moving beyond its long-time partnership with Coca-Cola and testing other beverage options, such as Red Bull. Underperforming chains may be put up for sale. Yum! Brands, owner of KFC and Taco Bell, recently rid itself of Pizza Hut, which has been in a funk as Americans have gone off the cuisine. There are plenty of options for fast-food bosses to chew on. ■
The Economist August 8th 2026
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America's economy
FOR PUNTERS of a certain sort, Polymarket’s gambling platform offers an intriguing contract. “Nothing ever happens: 2026” is a bet named after a favoured mantra of bullish, very online traders. If none of roughly a dozen events, ranging from the unlikely to the outlandish, takes place during the year, the contract pays out a return of around 30%. That would require Donald Trump and Xi Jinping not to resign, bitcoin’s price to remain between $10,000 and $1m, the planet not to suffer a major earthquake, volcanic eruption or meteor strike, and so on. If one or more of these things does happen, the bettor loses everything.
Kevin Warsh, the newish chair of the Federal Reserve who recently took his sec-
second meeting with the central bank’s rate-setting committee, seems to be making a similar bet. The Economist does not know Mr Warsh’s views on volcanoes or meteors. But his peculiarly tight-lipped performance at a press conference following the rate-setting meeting made markets quake (see chart on next page).
The ten-year Treasury yield jumped that day and finished the week above 4.7%, close to a three-year high, before retreating a bit. Stock prices, especially for rate-sensitive tech firms, wobbled—even though the Fed kept its interest rate unchanged. Mr Warsh hopes that if he keeps mum about what the Fed plans to do, markets will offer their own, helpfully independent, verdict
on the economy (see Free Exchange).
He can probably afford the experiment, because a few tremors will do little harm if nothing ever happens. At worst, they nudge borrowing costs up, to compensate lenders for the extra uncertainty. But if something nasty does occur, then confusion about how the Fed might respond could worsen the resulting mess. Rather than reducing volatility, the Fed would be adding to it. Even Mr Warsh grants that, in a crisis, clear communication is “prudent”.
What are the chances that the Fed loses its leeway for ambiguity? Several medium-sized risks loom at once. The clearest is the sell-off in stocks related to artificial intelligence, both in America and, especially, in South Korea. When the dotcom bubble burst in 2000, the crash pulled the world economy into recession. Worryingly, today there are already signs of some big bets turning sour and causing investment firms to wobble. Situational Awareness, a multi-billion-dollar hedge fund, has taken spectacular losses over the past month (see Buttonwood). It was forced to unwind its positions so quickly that Citadel, a much larger fund, was able to scoop up most of its listed holdings at a discount.
For now the damage looks contained. Some AI shares have bounced back a bit; the tech-heavy Nasdaq index, though down 3% from its peak in June, is still up since the start of the year.
But if America’s tech stocks lose more of their shine, its economy could be in trouble. These days the dollar’s status as a haven owes much to how ravenous foreign investors are for American shares. Treasury bonds do not look so attractive after years of gaping budget deficits—and with inflation on the rise again. Last April, after Mr Trump announced his “Liberation Day” tariffs, America briefly saw what it looked like for international investors to dump all types of dollar asset at once. A protracted repeat is still a distant prospect, but could quickly turn nasty.
Another danger lies in the Strait of Hormuz. Since America’s shaky ceasefire with Iran fell apart, virtually no oil has traversed the strait, meaning prices have surged. A barrel of brent crude, the global benchmark, now fetches $80, up from around ▶
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► $70 at the start of July. Petrol prices in America are well over $4 per gallon, from $3 or so before the conflict started. And few prices bother American consumers more. Sharp increases can easily destabilise spending, inflation expectations and confidence in the Fed.
Worse, Mr Trump seems determined to make Mr Warsh's life difficult. The stop-gap authority the president used to impose tariffs, most of his previous ones having been struck down by the Supreme Court in February, expired on July 24th. Since then the White House has thrown up new, wide-ranging trade barriers to replace the expired ones, and has announced heftier levies on countries including Canada and Brazil. Companies are still yet to fully pass price increases from previous levies on to shoppers. Any further jumps could reverse recent declines in goods inflation.
Lots of potential not merely for something to happen, then, but for several things to happen at once. Perhaps the trickiest combination would be if stock markets calmed but oil and new tariffs pushed inflation up further. Usually, that would be a clear reason for the Fed's governors to consider raising rates. Some have already voted to hike. But tightening monetary policy just ahead of November's midterm elections would risk wrecking Mr Warsh's relationship with the White House, reigniting ugly spats over the Fed's independence.
It is possible that, in an attempt to avoid this, Mr Warsh is already trying to get the market to do his tightening work for him. In other words, by loudly reiterating his commitment to the Fed's inflation target, without actually saying he will raise rates, he may hope that long-term bond yields will rise and stop him from needing to do so. The danger is that higher yields might instead reflect the risk of Mr Warsh's experiment going wrong. "Nothing ever happens" can be a good bet. But central bankers' reputations are made when something does. ■
US, yield on ten-year government bonds, July 29th 2026*, %

Source: LSEG Workspace
*Eastern time
SHANGHAI
HOW MUCH money should companies lavish on artificial intelligence? American technology giants think the answer is: a lot. Their capital spending on data centres may surpass $740bn this year, according to Bloomberg Intelligence, a research firm. Investors, who also used to think that more is more, are having second thoughts. When on July 26th it emerged that Nvidia was in talks to underwrite $250bn of a gargantuan $500bn-plus data centre, stuffed full of its chips and run by OpenAI, a leading model-maker, its share price tumbled. Days earlier investors blanched when Alphabet, Google's parent company, said it would boost its AI spending to $205bn this year. On August 5th SpaceX's stock took a hit after the rocketry firm announced huge AI investments (see Business section).
The American AI splurge looks especially profligate compared with Chinese parsimony. In 2026 China's technology titans are forecast to invest less than a tenth as much in data centres as their American counterparts (see chart). All this frugality notwithstanding, their AI models currently appear only fractionally less powerful. K3, an advanced model launched last month by Moonshot AI, a Beijing-based startup, is 95% as clever (on widely used benchmarks) as Fable 5, a frontier model from Anthropic, another top American lab. On August 3rd Alibaba, China's answer to Amazon, released a model which reportedly scored among the world's best by some measures.
The cost of land (for data centres), some equipment (to fill these with AI servers) and labour (from construction workers to AI whizz-kids) is lower in China than in America. Chinese firms are also accused of training their models using the outputs of expensive American ones. Such "distillation", as the process is known, lets China's AI developers free-ride on some of the American spending.
Moreover, a portion of Chinese AI bill may not be captured in the headline capital-expenditure figures. Part of the sums that Chinese AI firms, especially smaller ones, might have spent on Nvidia's best chips may instead have gone towards squeezing better results from inferior semiconductors. DeepSeek, which gave American AI darlings and investors a jump scare by launching a surprisingly powerful and efficient model in early 2025, is probably ploughing a fair bit into its techniques
that reduce demand for computing power.
Yet such factors alone cannot explain why China is investing so much less than America for what seem to be comparable AI results. So what does?
One obvious answer for lower investments would be a shortage of capital. Chinese firms are, though, flush with it. The bigger check on companies' AI outlays has been a dearth of things on which to spend money. American restrictions on technology exports to China mean that Chinese firms cannot buy the best—and priciest—AI chips, which are designed by Nvidia, an American firm, and manufactured by TSMC, a Taiwanese contract manufacturer (or foundry) with close links to America.
Unofficially, regulators in Beijing have gone so far as to discourage the use of even second-rate Nvidia chips, which Chinese companies can continue to procure for now. At times they have blocked the import of these, in order both to sanction-proof China's AI infrastructure and to promote homemade alternatives.
Consider Alibaba. Last year it said that it would invest $53bn in AI between 2026 and 2028. The planned spending is chump change relative to that of Amazon or Alphabet. Even so, it may be out of reach. Alibaba, which boasts one of China's most advanced chip-design programmes, used to outsource manufacturing to TSMC. American sanctions have forced it to find domestic suppliers instead.
The only Chinese purveyors capable of producing comparably powerful chips are Huawei, a technology behemoth blacklisted by America since 2019, and SMIC, a state-controlled foundry, which manufac-
"Hyperscale" data-centre operators, capital expenditure, $bn

Source: Bloomberg Intelligence
*Forecast
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Finance & economics 67
► tures Huawei's designs. However, American restrictions extend to sophisticated chipmaking gear, forcing Huawei and SMIC to come up with costly workarounds that limit how many sufficiently powerful chips the duo can churn out. Moreover, SMIC cannot offset this inefficiency by ramping up capital spending because the same sanctions also constrain how much less sophisticated chipmaking kit it can get its hands on.
American sanctions are not the only thing that limits Chinese AI capital spending. So does Chinese demand for AI services. Chinese businesses are notoriously stingy with their IT budgets, which are collectively less than one-tenth what American firms spend on software despite Chinese GDP being two-thirds of America's (and a third bigger when adjusted for purchasing power). This penny-pinching is likely to reduce returns to AI firms' investment—and thus their willingness to invest in the first place.
Moreover, the Communist Party's AI ambitions are more about diffusing the technology through the economy than creating ever cleverer systems that require ever more powerful semiconductors in ever more data centres. Dozens of American AI companies are thought to be trying to develop artificial general intelligence, which could outdo humans in most intellectual tasks. In China, by contrast, fewer than ten companies are known to be working on such AGI, notes Xu Qi, the head of the Communist Party committee at the Shanghai AI Association.
Another signal to keep AI spending in check comes from investors familiar with all these constraints. Chinese ones have long been as wary of overspending on AI as those in America are apparently now becoming. Whereas America's tech giants had until recently been rewarded with higher share prices for aggressive AI-spending plans, Chinese ones were likelier to be punished for AI profligacy.
Investors may currently be entertaining the idea that America has too many data centres. But China, for all its admirable restraint, may not have enough to take full advantage of its AI stars' innovations—or for those stars to cash in. ByteDance, creator of the world's top-ranked video-making AI (and owner of TikTok), suffers from intense computing bottlenecks that mean some clips take ten hours to process. Certain services from Zhipu AI, another Beijing lab, and Alibaba's cloud-computing unit have to be strictly metered and sell out in minutes. K3 has a long waiting list of hopeful users. Diffusion of practical AI is less hungry for computing power than the quest for superintelligence. An overly restrictive diet can still stunt growth. ■
ON CAIRO ROAD, a bustling commercial strip in Lusaka, Zambia's capital, traders and shoppers once haggled over gadgets, furniture and other goods priced in dollars. For decades the greenback was similarly entrenched across the Zambian economy. From car purchases to business contracts, large transactions were routinely settled in the American currency. Interest rate decisions made by the Federal Reserve in Washington rippled through to the price of Zambian groceries and rents. When Zambia defaulted on its debt in 2020, the dollar's strength at the time exacerbated the fallout.
The southern-African country is now trying to wean itself from the greenback. Last October Zambia became the first country on the continent to accept mining royalties and taxes in yuan. This eases capital flows between Zambia and China, the biggest buyer of Zambia's abundant copper and its biggest creditor. It also reduces Zambian exposure to the dollar. What is more, since December the Bank of Zambia has required domestic transactions to be paid in local currency, boosting demand for the kwacha. Offenders face fines, up to two years in prison or both.
Zambia is illustrative of Africa in general. The dollar still dominates, with some 70% of the continent's external public debt and many cross-border transactions still denominated in the currency. But coun-
countries are incrementally adopting alternatives to "king dollar".
One beneficiary is the yuan. Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa, three of Africa's biggest economies, have agreed new currency swaps with China as the share of trade settled in yuan expands. Kenya has converted dollar-denominated loans into yuan, potentially saving up to $215m a year in interest costs, equivalent to nearly a fifth of its debt-service payments to China in 2025. Around two-thirds of the country's outstanding debt to China is now denominated in yuan. Ethiopia and Mozambique are negotiating similar arrangements.
Several banks are building infrastructure to support yuan transactions. Last September Standard Bank, Africa's largest lender by assets (which is part-owned by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, a giant state-owned lender), became the first to clear transactions through China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System. This has allowed businesses to settle payments directly in yuan.
Absa, one of South Africa's largest banks, and Ecobank, whose reach spans over 30 African countries, are also looking to facilitate direct payments in yuan. Although the number of cross-border transactions in yuan remains small relative to those in dollars, it rose more than fourfold between 2020 and 2024 (the latest year for which official data are available). ▶

Not all about the Benjamins
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The Economist August 8th 2026
Zambia kwacha per $, inverted scale

Source: Haver Analytics
Yet African governments do not want merely to swap reliance on one foreign currency with dependence on another. They are therefore also ramping up efforts to promote their own monies both at home, as with Zambia's directives, and in cross-border trade. In 2022 the African Export-Import Bank, a trade-finance institution, and the African Union launched the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System. The platform allows banks to settle intra-African trade in local currencies. More than 160 commercial banks and 22 central banks have signed up, which could in time save businesses perhaps $5bn in annual banking and foreign-exchange costs.
Despite such apparent benefits, the adjustment for African businesses that have long relied on dollars could be painful, says Jibran Qureishi of Standard Bank. In Zambia, the kwacha-only policy has already sent companies scrambling to rewrite dollar-denominated contracts or renegotiate supplier arrangements. Many are nursing losses on legacy contracts. Exporters earning revenues in dollars now face the cost of constantly moving between currencies, which they may start passing on to customers. Plenty of domestic industries, such as construction and agriculture, import fuel and equipment. They are also suddenly on the hook for recurring currency transaction fees, now that they are being starved of dollars from local operations with which to buy imports.
At least the importers' kwachas go further. After a stellar 2025 the currency has strengthened by around 15% against the dollar this year (see chart). Investors piled into kwacha-denominated government bonds after Zambia raised the cap on the share of annual issuance non-residents can buy from 5% to 23%—another way the government is promoting the currency (and making it easier to roll over its debt). King dollar wields vast global power. But local currencies like the kwacha might yet become stronger local potentates. ■
MUMBAI
IF THE HYPE about artificial intelligence is to be believed, India's tech industry should bear the brunt of any incoming wave of AI job losses. Before the breakthroughs that made chatbots functional, tech types quipped that AI stood for "actually Indians", as seemingly whizzy tech was really the work of humans in Hyderabad or Bangalore. But now the sort of tasks outsourced to India—software development and routine business processes such as payroll—are among those AI is best placed to take over from people.
Yet evidence of job losses is not easy to come by. That is partly because data are patchy. Around 6m Indians work in information technology, according to Nasscom, the industry body. Almost anywhere else, that would be a vast number (roughly equal to the population of Denmark). But it is just a tiny slice, around 1%, of India's workforce. It is also a group that statistics agencies find hard to sample, says Rosa Abraham, an economist at Azim Premji University. IT workers are rich by Indian standards and often live in gated communities to which survey-takers cannot get access. Zealous security guards turn away those without prior approval.
But it is also because AI is not making much of a dent. AI boosters can point to job cuts at India's IT giants, including Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) and Infosys. For years employment at companies in the Nifty IT index, a group of listed big consultancies, grew by around 6% a year. Since the release of ChatGPT in late 2022 headcount has declined—from 1.7m in 2023 to 1.66m at the end of June, according to The Economist's estimates. But that is not solely
down to chatbots. Aggregate headcount is still 9% above the pre-pandemic trend (see chart), and the consultancies are pulling back after a hiring boom. The Indian operations of Capgemini, Cognizant and Accenture, three big foreign firms, display a similar pattern.
Hiring in another form of Indian white-collar work is still booming. The number employed in global capability centres (GCCs), captive back offices handling everything from research and IT to HR and finance, has risen from 1.4m in 2019 to 2.4m this year, Nasscom estimates. Anthroys (yes, the AI darling), Costco, an American retailer, and L'Oréal, a French cosmetics giant, are among the latest arrivals. Aggregate IT employment rose by half between 2018 and 2025; GCCs' share of it went up from 35% to 40%.
AI is, however, speeding up two shifts that were already under way. The first is from outsourcing to insourcing. Pari Natarajan, a consultant, says companies divide tasks between "core" and "context". Context functions, such as making accounts payable or providing tech support, can be hived off to outsourcers and are easiest to automate. Core functions, however, are the business-critical sort from which a firm gets its competitive edge. As tech becomes more central to companies, more functions shift from context to core.
GCCs have thrived as companies have come to see IT as fundamental rather than a mere supporting function. AI is adding to this. Mr Natarajan gives the example of a bank: when IT was handling payments, they could be outsourced; but if an AI is making lending decisions, it needs to be internal. AI coding tools are allowing companies to move more IT functions in-house: Starbucks, for instance, is developing its own version of the point-of-sale software it used to buy off-the-shelf. That work may fall to staff in its Indian GCC, due to open later this year.
The second reinforced trend is the ▶
Nifty IT index
Stock-market index, Nov 30th 2022=100*

Sources: Bloomberg; company reports
Employees†, m

*Release of ChatGPT 3.5 †Financial years ending March 31st ‡2017-20 §At June 30th
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Finance & economics 69
► plight of recent graduates. Many have marched alongside the Cockroach Janta Party, a movement which has been protesting in Delhi about the lack of opportunities for the young. “What AI changes is the mix of talent we need,” says Vinod Kumar, chief people officer at Amtech, an American software company with a GCC in Bangalore. There is less demand for those workers with basic skills to do repetitive work. Instead there is a focus on engineers who can work effectively with AI. Naukri, a
job portal, reports that in the past year overall demand for IT workers is down by 3%, while that for people with AI or machine-learning skills has risen by 25%.
Even if India’s IT companies remain a source of opportunities for more experienced engineers, the underemployed young face intense competition for good jobs. The number of students in India has risen from 34m in the early 2010s to 45m in 2024. Entry-level salaries for computer-science graduates in IT consulting have been
frozen at around 310,000 rupees ($3,200) a year for nearly 20 years.
Graduates have noticed, says Neeti Sharma of TeamLease, a recruitment company, and are upskilling. For those who do, the rewards are substantial: she reckons graduates from top Indian universities who secure a place on a specialised AI programme can earn twice as much as their peers studying generic computer science. AI has not eaten India’s software services yet. But it is eyeing it hungrily. ■
Self-awareness check
Investors pointing fingers at Situational Awareness’s founder should look at themselves
READERS OF J.R.R. TOLKIEN’S “The Lord of the Rings” trilogy meet Frodo Baggins, its hero, when he is still in his tweens. This, Tolkien explains, is what hobbits call “the irresponsible twenties between childhood and coming-of-age at 33”. So Frodo’s cousin Bilbo waits until he has reached this ripe age before giving him a ring with the power, it turns out, to conquer the world.
Any investor who entrusted Leopold Aschenbrenner with their money and is now cross with him should take note. Mr Aschenbrenner is in his mid-20s and runs Situational Awareness, a hedge fund—named without irony—which posted a loss of 67% in July. He launched it in 2024 after writing a 165-page essay with the same title, arguing that artificial “superintelligence” would transform society before the decade was out.
Situational Awareness (the screed) took Silicon Valley by storm. More surprising, investors responded by shoveling money to Situational Awareness (the fund). Within months Mr Aschenbrenner, then aged 22 or so and having never worked as a trader, was managing hundreds of millions of dollars.
By July this year he was said to be overseeing as much as $45bn. Then many of the artificial-intelligence stocks in which Situational Awareness had taken positions cratered. On July 30th news broke that it had offloaded most of its listed shares to Citadel, a much larger investment firm, at lightning speed. Fund managers do not do this sort of thing unless they face a choice between a quick sale—inevitably at a hefty discount to market value—and a high chance of going to the wall. Mr Aschenbrenner wrote to his investors that he would “fight another day”.
For everyone else, the question is

whether his fall from grace portends something worse, since past stock-market busts have often been heralded by whizzy funds turning wobbly. Ken Griffin, Citadel’s boss, has form for snapping up bargains when they do. In the run-up to the global financial crisis of 2007-09, Citadel bought distressed portfolios from Amaranth Advisors and Sowood Capital, two hedge funds, just before each collapsed. A decade beforehand, the implosion of the star-studded Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) fund came to epitomise the leverage-fuelled boom of the 1990s, which culminated in the dotcom bubble.
What, then, to make of Situational Awareness’s plunge? Regulatory filings suggest the fund was dominated by exposure to firms providing the electricity and hardware that power AI, such as Bloom Energy, CoreWeave and Sandisk. All were doing stonkingly well until a few weeks ago. But between their recent peaks and Citadel’s intervention early on July 30th, each lost over half its value. Mr Aschenbrenner was hardly alone in such bets; over 80% of fund managers responding to
Bank of America’s latest monthly survey named “long global semiconductors” as the most crowded trade. The big worry is that this trade’s whiplash-inducing reversal will have set other investment firms teetering, too.
Few, though, can have been run as recklessly as Mr Aschenbrenner’s. He reported returns of 439% for the first half of 2026. Astonishingly, this would leave the fund still sitting on a handsome year-to-date profit even after the past gut-churning month. It is simply not possible to make such a return without either enormous luck or borrowing so much that you risk bankruptcy.
Leverage is what ruined LTCM in 1998, but comparisons between that fund and Situational Awareness are a stretch. In its first four years LTCM never lost money more than two months in a row. Its partners had been trading for Salomon Brothers, an investment bank, for two decades with similar results. Two of its directors had shared a Nobel prize for their work on pricing derivatives. LTCM was still wrong to borrow as much as it did, and its failure might have taken much of Wall Street with it. But its strategy wasn’t bonkers.
Two decades before starting Situational Awareness, meanwhile, its founder was a toddler. And two years before, he was writing Tolkien-esque things like “the free world must prevail” and “I can see it. I can see how AGI will be built”. (Thankfully, everything that Buttonwood wrote in his early 20s has since been scrubbed from the internet.)
Good for Mr Aschenbrenner for chancing his arm. The mystery is what on earth his investors were thinking. Perhaps they weren’t. In which case, that would be more worrying than anything about Situational Awareness’s humbling.
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How—and how much—should central banks talk?

THE ORACLE of Delphi had a gift for being right. Seated in Apollo's temple, the Pythia delivered her prophecies in riddles. When Croesus, king of Lydia, asked whether he should attack Persia, she replied that he would "destroy a great empire". So he did: his own. The philosopher Heraclitus described the Delphi method as one that "neither conceals nor reveals, but gives a sign". Her commanding pronouncements demanded attention; their ambiguity made them almost impossible to prove wrong.
For much of the 20th century central bankers cultivated a similar mystique. Their authority rested on the impression that they were omniscient and omnipotent. Since in truth they were neither, obscurantism was useful. Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England from 1920 to 1944, was said to operate by the maxim "never explain, never excuse". In 1981 Karl Brunner, a Swiss economist, described central banking as thriving on the impression that it was "an esoteric art". Alan Greenspan, the late former chairman of the Federal Reserve, perfected this art with "Fedspeak". He had learned, he said, to "mumble with great incoherence".
Kevin Warsh is trying to restore a little Delphi mystery to the Fed. After his second press conference in late July commentators described his words as "confusing", "internally contradictory" and "nonsense". The words are also sparser. Under Mr Warsh, policy statements have shrunk from roughly 340 words to half that or less. "Forward guidance"—language indicating where policy may be headed—has been stripped out. In June he declined to submit his own interest-rate projection and said his colleagues' forecasts had been written in pencil with "big erasers". He is also considering fewer policy meetings and press conferences.
Yet Mr Warsh's tight lips are less radical than they look. Until 1994 the Fed did not even announce its rate decisions; surprise was thought to make policy more effective. Then came a communications revolution. The Fed began to publish its policy "bias"—the likeliest direction of its next decision—in 1999, and to signal the future path of rates in 2003. Michael Woodford of Columbia University provided the theoretical rationale: spending in the economy depends less on today's overnight interest rate than on the rates people expect in the future. "Not only do expectations
about policy matter," he wrote, "but...very little else matters."
In the mid-2000s Mervyn King, then governor of the Bank of England (and now co-head of Mr Warsh's new task-force on the Fed's comms strategy), called this the "Maradona theory" of interest rates. During his famous run against England, the Argentine footballer moved almost in a straight line while defenders veered aside, expecting him to turn. Central banks could do the same. In 2002 the Bank of England did not change its policy rate, yet expectations of future rates shifted with the economic outlook and helped stabilise spending. The monetary-policy framework was "doing the work for us", said Lord King.
After the global financial crisis of 2007-09 central banks went further. With policy rates already near zero, they emphasised that they expected rates to stay low even after the economy began to recover. In 2011 the Fed suggested it would keep rates near zero until at least mid-2013; the next year it began publishing officials' rate projections as dots. Although it was still Delphically non-committal, markets heard this as an Odysseus-like pledge by the central bankers to bind themselves to lower rates for longer. Whether any central bank would truly tie itself to the mast is doubtful; but the theory, as told by Paul Krugman, who won the Nobel prize in 2008, was to "credibly promise to be irresponsible".
More explicit central-bank language made markets hypersensitive to any change in wording. It also boxed in policymakers. In 2013 Mark Carney, Lord King's successor at the Bank of England, said that higher rates would not be considered until unemployment fell at least to 7%. The threshold was crossed far sooner than expected, forcing Mr Carney to clarify his guidance.
Since prediction is hard, especially about the future, central bankers strive to explain how they would respond to events without prejudging what events will occur. The Bank of England has long wrapped its forecasts in error bars; in April it replaced a single central forecast with three scenarios. Yet when the scenarios repeatedly miss, the elaborate display of uncertainty can start to erode credibility, not protect it. The Fed overcommunicated in a different way in 2020 and 2021. It called inflation "transitory" and promised not to raise rates until employment had fully recovered and inflation exceeded 2% "for some time". The guidance anchored market expectations—but tied the Fed to an outlook that was fast becoming obsolete. Rates stayed too low for too long.
Mr Warsh's instinct to say less is understandable in light of such failures. It starts from humility. The Fed is not all-knowing and the price-discovering financial markets are, in his words, a "very accomplished economist". But prices, in this case, are not signals from the gods. They reflect guesses about what the Fed will do—plus, for now, a risk premium on Mr Warsh's untested stewardship.
And humble speech is not enough to impress markets. Above all, the speaker needs to be trusted. In the 1990s investors believed Robert Rubin when as treasury secretary he stated that "A strong dollar is in our national interest." In 2012 they grasped that the European Central Bank under Mario Draghi really would do "whatever it takes" to save the euro. It was Messrs Rubin's and Draghi's hard-won credibility that made these oracular economic speech acts, conveying resolve without specifying the means, so powerful. By stressing how little the Fed understands, Mr Warsh may be making himself—and the Fed—less credible. For an oracle, it is not enough to know thyself. ■
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The Economist August 8th 2026


HILLSBORO, OREGON AND BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
In America, opposition to using animals in scientific research is becoming a cross-party consensus
AROUND 5,000 monkeys call the suburban sprawl west of Portland, Oregon home. Behind a row of houses, at the end of a long road with a security checkpoint, lies the Oregon National Primate Research Centre (ONPRC). With its tall firs and grand sequoias the lab can feel like a retreat in the woods. For nearly a decade Brandon Wilder, an immunologist, has used the monkeys to study malaria, a mosquito-borne disease that kills more than half a million people each year.
"It's not easy, and no one enjoys seeing an animal in a cage," acknowledges Dr Wilder. But he believes the human stakes warrant it. Earlier this year, some of Dr Wilder's work on how the immune system responds to malaria was accepted for publication in Nature, one of the world's most prestigious scientific journals. He hopes the discovery could help with the development of a universal vaccine against the disease, a goal that has long eluded scientists.
Besides malaria, his colleagues study HIV, dementia and infertility.
These days, though, such work has become a battleground in a growing campaign against conducting scientific research on animals. Robert F. Kennedy junior, America's health secretary, has vowed to end animal experimentation and claimed that the country's seven federally funded primate-research centres, of which ONPRC is the largest, "have a profit motive". In February the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a federal funding agency that awards the ONPRC around $50m a year, proposed converting the lab into an
animal sanctuary instead. By July that plan was deemed too expensive and abandoned. Instead Oregon Health and Science University, which oversees the centre, announced it would gradually shift research away from primates.
The campaign to end research on animals has forged one of the most eclectic coalitions in American politics. Mainstream Democrats, progressives, right-wing populists, libertarians and the MAGA movement all find themselves working towards the same aim. And they are already making progress.
Animals are used across the biomedical pipeline, from fundamental research on diseases to testing the safety of new drugs before human trials begin. Most of the work is done on mice and rats. Monkeys are estimated to make up less than one per cent of the total number of animals used in America. But the evolutionary closeness to humans that makes monkeys valuable as test subjects also makes the prospect of experimenting on them particularly abhorrent to many.
For decades opposition to animal testing was concentrated in the political left. But no longer. A central figure in the growing right-wing opposition is Anthony Bellotti, a long-time Republican operative. ▶
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
73 AI is hacking of its own volition
74 Fighting AIDS after Trump
75 Well Informed: Procrastination
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Science & technology 73
► His organisation, White Coat Waste, casts animal research as fiscal profligacy, and ties it to issues that already animate conservatives. In Donald Trump's first term Mr Bellotti produced campaigns alleging that reckless experiments on animals were responsible for the covid-19 pandemic, citing work at a lab in Wuhan, the Chinese city in which the pandemic began.
By the time Mr Trump returned to office in January 2025 White Coat Waste had spent four years cultivating Republican allies and drawing up lists of labs to target. "I don't care about the science," Mr Bellotti says defiantly. "I'm the guy who cuts the money." In April of last year Justin Goodman, Mr Bellotti's second-in-command, met Jay Bhattacharya, the director of the NIH. Mr Goodman told The Economist that Dr Bhattacharya said he was a "big fan" of White Coat Waste and pledged to work to end all research on "cats, dogs and primates". (The NIH did not respond to The Economist's request for comment.)
One of Mr Bellotti's most powerful surrogates has been Laura Loomer, a right-wing activist who is highly influential in Trumpworld. Scientists who conduct animal experiments are "abusers...on par with serial killers", she says. She recalls that when she described the alleged details of some experiments to Mr Trump he was revulsed, calling them "sick" and "disgusting". Ms Loomer has also lobbied Mr Kennedy and Pete Hegseth, the defence secretary. Both have chipped away at animal research in their agencies.
Democrats have generally opposed Mr Trump's wider cuts to science funding. Animal research, however, seems to be an exception. In November the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a public-health agency, announced that it would shut a primate lab that is mainly used for HIV research. There was no outcry from Democrats. In Oregon Dr Wilder laments that some of the fiercest pressure on the centre has come from Democrats. The state's progressive governor, Tina Kotek, has urged its closure.
For some the case for moving away from animal research rests on the idea that new technology can replace it. Collectively known as New Approach Methods (NAMs), such technologies include organs-on-a-chip; organoids, which are 3D replicas of human tissue; and AI models. Cory Booker, a Democratic senator from New Jersey, told The Economist that though he is "not
an ideologue on this issue", he considers "the vast majority" of animal testing "unnecessary" because NAMs "are much more reliable and give us much better data".
But few of those developing those technologies agree. In 2023 the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine concluded that NAMs cannot replicate interactions between multiple organs within a live animal. "Replacing is just simply not on the table," says Sergiu Pasca, a neuroscientist at Stanford University who has built some of the world's most sophisticated brain organoids. Peter Kolchinsky, a biotech venture-capitalist, says "we don't understand biology well enough" to replace animal models "and it's possible we never will". Other countries do not seem so convinced by NAMs, either. Chinese research institutions, as well as the country's booming biotech industry, have been buying so many monkeys that they have bid up global prices for the animals.
To lose control of one artificial intelligence may be regarded as misfortune. To lose two looks like carelessness. Lose four, and people may start to wonder whether the problem lies with AI itself.
On July 21st OpenAI, an American lab, said an unreleased model had escaped from a closed environment testing its hacking skills, launching series attacks on

American scientists can see the writing on the wall. In Oregon a brain drain is under way. Dr Wilder says 15 employees have left since the centre was plunged into chaos, among them four PhD-level scientists and four veterinarians. Recruiting has become "impossible". Nor can the work done in Oregon be easily moved elsewhere. America's six other national primate centres are already at capacity. Earlier this year Dr Wilder was offered a position in the Netherlands, as part of an initiative to recruit American scientists facing pressures under the Trump administration. "If we can't stop things from imploding here," Dr Wilder says, "I'll hit the eject button."
For Mr Goodman of White Coat Waste, that is the point. He says he wants there to be a "fear factor" for American scientists. "Not due to physical intimidation", he says, but due to a climate that pushes them to conclude that research on animals is simply not worth pursuing in America. ■
HuggingFace, a Franco-American AI-infrastructure firm. A week later Anthropic, a rival AI firm, made a similar admission. It said it had found six occasions on which its models had attacked third parties.
Cynics dismissed both companies' warnings as attempts to garner publicity. But most companies do not seek attention by launching a cyberattack, keeping it secret until the victim goes public, and then hoping a rival voluntarily admits to the same. Sceptics should also take note of the news that the AI Security Institute (AISI), a British government body, has seen exactly the same behaviour.
In a report published on August 4th, AISI said that a cybersecurity assessment of the latest OpenAI and Anthropic systems resulted in 19 attacks on people and organisations uninvolved in the tests. In the most serious case, an AI attempted to subvert an unnamed open-source software project, as part of a "supply-chain" attack against the (fictional) target of the challenge. On August 6th, Meta, which owns Facebook, said one of its own models had behaved similarly in testing.
The various incidents differ in the details. OpenAI's system was supposed to be kept offline. Its hacking spree started when it used a hitherto unknown vulnerability to break out of its virtual "sandbox" and on to the public internet. Anthropic's ►
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The Economist August 8th 2026
system was supposed to be similarly limited, but human error meant it was not. The AISI always allows internet access as part of its tests. But it had never before seen models that were willing to accept collateral damage in order to breach their targets. Meta gave few details, but promised more when it had them.
But the episodes show a new class of AI risk. Previous worries around cybersecurity, such as those voiced by Anthropic when it released its powerful Mythos model in April, have focused on the harm that malicious humans could do with AI tools in hand. Such fears have motivated proposals for new regulations. The flurry of autonomous hacks, where human involvement is limited to merely prompting the AIs, suggests those proposals are insufficient.
Take the system of self-regulation sketched out by Demis Hassabis on July 14th. Google DeepMind's CEO (who said on August 5th that he was stepping down to become DeepMind's chair and chief scientist at Alphabet, Google's parent company) proposed a scheme that would see labs administer their own tests and withhold the public release of models that could not be verified as safe. Sam Altman, the boss of OpenAI, and Dario Amodei, who leads Anthropic, have floated similar schemes.
The ideas are good: labs ought to be explicit about the safety standards which apply in their assessments, and enforce them on the third parties that do the work. But autonomous hacking proves that AI models can be dangerous even if the public cannot get hold of them. All three of the hacks took place during precisely the sorts of tests that Sir Demis has suggested.
The hacks also present a challenge for legal systems. Hacking, when humans do it, is a crime. When an AI is the wrongdoer, though, it is unclear how to assign blame. The law in America relies on intentionality, notes Rune Kvist, head of Artificial Intelligence Underwriting Company, which insures AI firms. If no human intended to hack anyone, no crime can have happened. The ability to sue for damages is limited too. And yet harm has clearly occurred. That contradiction, says Mr Kvist, is "unacceptable". Gabe Weil of the Institute for Law and AI, in Massachusetts, proposes a system of strict liability. As with rules around keeping wild animals, it would assume that any harm is always the fault of the party carrying out the risky activity.
The industry wants clarity, too. An open letter from employees at several large AI labs, whose signatories include Dr Amodei, asks for help from America's government in "pacing" AI progress. But help is coming at the speed of government, not technology: a meeting this week to establish how the White House could assess models ended with no public commitments, and few reports of progress. ■
RIO DE JANEIRO
American cuts hit the fight against AIDS, even as scientists chase a cure
DON'T PUT all your eggs in one basket. That was the lesson learned by the world's AIDS establishment on January 20th 2025. Since 2011 America's share of foreign aid aimed at combating the epidemic had risen from 58% to 81%. So when Donald Trump changed the rules of engagement, the result was a chaos of shuttered clinics, shattered drug-supply chains and suddenly resourceless support groups.
The dust has now settled. The task ahead is for activists, bureaucrats, doctors, politicians and researchers to make the best of the new reality. They have tools: in particular, a pipeline of promising drugs. They have a clear steer from America's government about how it sees the future. And they also have some early but intriguing results from scientists looking beyond prevention and treatment towards the El Dorado of an actual cure.
To that end the establishment's bigwigs met at the end of July in Rio de Janeiro, for the 26th International AIDS Conference, a biennial pow-wow. The choice of venue was apt. Brazil has, right from the epidemic's beginning, been an exemplar of how to deal with AIDS. It has provided free access to antiretroviral (ARV) drugs and forced licensing for the local manufacture of those drugs. Brazil can afford this. For many less-well-provided countries, particularly in Africa, necessity is going to have to be the mother of invention.

There's less where that came from
On the ground, the need is still great. According to UNAIDS, the arm of the UN that deals with the disease, 570,000 people died of AIDS last year, with the largest share in sub-Saharan Africa. Around 1.2m others were infected with HIV, the virus that causes the disease. Of the 41m currently estimated to be living with HIV, only 32m are on ARVs.
However, bad things have happened since Mr Trump's executive order. A report by the Kaiser Family Foundation, a think-tank, published on July 27th concluded that American funding has fallen by $2.1bn, representing a 25% fall in the overall amount spent in 2024. Another, by the Foundation for AIDS Research, an international charity, surveyed organisations working with PEPFAR, America's chief anti-AIDS initiative. It found that 23% were unable to obtain condoms, 20% could not get ARVs and 22% were unable to obtain pre-exposure prophylactic (PrEP) drugs, which prevent infection.
But even after the drop in funding America remains by far the biggest contributor. Changes in the way its money is disbursed are very important. So, though the new policy has been in place since last September, the State Department sent Jeffrey Graham, PEPFAR's acting head, to Rio to clarify the details.
There are three important shifts. The first is that PEPFAR will no longer hand cash directly to organisations in recipient countries. Instead, things will be done government to government, based on memoranda of understanding (MOUs) about each recipient's spending plans. The second is that recipients' financial contributions are specified in the MOUs along with America's. The third is that the MOUs are time-limited. They last until 2030, with at least the aspiration that from then on American assistance will shift to being technical rather than financial.
Some see a good-faith attempt both to do the best with available resources and to execute at last the handover, long-promised, of responsibility from donors to recipients. Others see a sleight of hand intended to shuffle off budgetary responsibility in as seemly a manner as possible.
So far 34 countries have signed an MOU. Kenya's government has promised to pitch in $850m to its plan, compared with America's $1.5bn; Nigeria will contribute $3bn to America's $2bn. Some countries, such as Ghana, Zambia and Zimbabwe, are refusing to sign, citing what they say are demands for unreasonable levels of data sharing, and amid reports of pressure to concede mineral rights—things that Mr Graham denies are true.
How the new policy pans out will depend on whether the recipients are able to honour their sides of the bargain and the attitude of America's next president. Mr ▶
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► Graham was vague about what would happen to places which did not stump up their agreed sums, suggesting it would depend on the circumstances. The future of the White House is anyone's guess.
On the matter of tools, all eyes are focused on PrEP, which both protects individuals from infection and helps break the chain of transmission. The first PrEP drug was a daily pill called Truvada. That was followed by Cabotegravir, an injection given every two months. The current star is Lenacapavir, a twice-yearly injection to which America's Food and Drug Administration gave its blessing in June 2025. There is also much excitement about Alimatravir, a monthly pill. Although it has yet to finish its clinical trials Merck, which makes it, has already signed deals in several parts of the world, including Africa, to produce it for sale cheaply.
Lenacapavir's ascent is being helped by the Global Fund, an AIDS-fighting organisation funded partly by America in an arrangement separate from its deals with individual countries. The fund announced in July 2025 that it had arranged with Lenacapavir's maker, Gilead Sciences, to buy enough doses for 2m people—a number raised this April, with extra American money, to 3m. But it would be good if that number went up still further, for UNAIDS estimates that, around the world, some 20m people would benefit from PrEP.
Prevention and treatment, though, are not the same as cure, something that has eluded scientists for decades. But maybe, just maybe, not for much longer. The key, as a panel moderated by Sarah Fidler, of Imperial College, London, discussed, may be a group of molecules called broadly neutralising antibodies (bNAbs). Most of the antibodies people's immune systems generate in response to HIV are specific to a particular strain of the virus, and thus lose their potency as it virus evolves. But bNAbs target bits of the virus that are so crucial that evolution has much less leeway to change them.
The idea of using bNAbs as drugs to control hidden reservoirs of HIV within the body that conventional medicines cannot reach has been around for many years. Trials now suggest there might be something in the idea. Though most participants receive only temporary relief, in some of them the effects last longer. In a few cases recipients continue to have no detectable virus load after almost two years. That is far longer than the antibodies themselves could hang around, which suggests they have somehow trained the immune system to carry on the good work in their absence. This may, depending on your level of optimism, be either clutching at straws, or a straw in the wind. Even if it is the latter, it is a long way from an actual medicine. But it is hope. ■
Procrastination is bad for you. But the habit can be unlearned
PUTTING THINGS off exacts a hefty toll. One study published in 2013 ranked 22,053 people on a procrastination scale of one to five. Each increase of one point was associated with a drop of nearly $15,000 in annual earnings. Those who habitually engage in "self-regulatory failure", as procrastination is also known, are more prone to delaying medical treatment. A study of 3,525 Swedish university students published in 2023 found that those who scored highly for procrastination were more likely to suffer debilitating pain.
It gets worse. The same Swedish study also found procrastinators more prone to anxiety, stress and loneliness. A 2025 meta-analysis, published in Frontiers in Psychiatry and covering 88 studies involving 63,323 people in 17 countries, found procrastination and its resulting erosion of self-esteem to be a predictor of future depression. How might procrastination be curbed?
Mental exercises appear to help. One set is known as mental contrasting with implementation intentions (MCII). Popularised in a number of smartphone apps, the idea is simple: picture the benefits of achieving a goal; contrast that image with the main obstacle; and devise a tactic to overcome it. In two randomised trials reported in 2020 undergraduates were given online MCII
exercises designed to reduce the delaying of bedtime, which research has linked to procrastination in general. They missed their intended bedtimes by around 38 minutes less each night than those in a control group given advice about healthy sleeping habits.
Exercise shows promise too. A Chinese trial published in March assessed procrastination in 77 male teenagers. Those randomly assigned to 12 weeks of strength training, high-intensity interval training, or a combination of the two, showed "significant reductions" in putting things off. An earlier study of 564 Chinese university students, published in 2022, found that the most physically active also procrastinated less. The researchers speculated that overcoming the stress of exertion gave them a "sense of mastery" that boosted confidence and motivation.
Then there is the question of diet and other habits. A 2024 study of Italian university students found higher procrastination among breakfast-skippers, heavy drinkers and poor sleepers. The researchers speculated that missing the energy from breakfast might hinder "motivation and ability to focus on tasks". But the skipped breakfasts may have been a consequence of procrastination, rather than a cause: studies have yet to show convincingly that diet affects it.
As for medications, none as yet targets procrastination. But an intriguing finding emerged in 2021 from an American randomised controlled trial. Adults with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder showed significant gains in cognitive executive function, including the ability to get started on tasks, while taking the stimulant lisdexamfetamine rather than a placebo.
These days, opportunities for procrastination are greater than before. Many people work from home, out of the boss's sight. Smartphones offer endless distractions. In one review published in 2022, each of the 18 studies assessed linked excessive smartphone use to procrastination. Scrolling often delays bedtime, too. Lack of sleep impedes executive function, leading to more failures of self-regulation. It would be helpful if the scientists involved could stop dawdling.

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Classical music
BAYREUTH
At 150 years old, Richard Wagner's "Ring" cycle still commands attention
KAISER WILHELM I was there. So was Ludwig II of Bavaria, who had footed much of the bill. Dom Pedro II of Brazil had sailed over. Friedrich Nietzsche, a philosopher, was also present—though he pretended he hadn't been. Bayreuth was a Bavarian backwater, but 150 years ago it seemed like the centre of the world. The "Ring of the Nibelung" (known as the "Ring" cycle), which Richard Wagner had composed and written over 26 years, had its first complete performance in August 1876 in the opera house that he had built to present the monumental work.
In his influence, audacity and divisiveness, Wagner was art's analogue of Elon Musk. His ideas "overran intellectual discourse for several generations", writes Alex Ross in "Wagnerism". His works remain lodged in Western culture's subconscious,
revealing both the human condition and the age that encounters them. That is especially true of the "Ring", the most magnum of Wagner's opuses. If you've read or watched "The Lord of the Rings", you've fallen under its spell at second hand. If you experience it you may find yourself obsessing the way Wagner's contemporaries did.
Though royalty attended its birth, the "Ring" is a child of revolution. In 1849, a year of European insurgency, Wagner was
doing his bit to dethrone the king of Saxony by reporting troop movements. He fled to Zurich soon after starting work on the "Ring" cycle. His starting point was Germanic and Scandinavian legends written down in the 13th century, in particular the "Nibelungenlied", the Icelandic Eddas and the Volsunga saga. This was natural source material for a revolutionary who wanted Germany's patchwork of principalities to become a nation state.
From this Wagner fashioned a tale of gods, heroes, dwarves and giants that stretches out over four "music dramas"—15 hours of opera in all. It begins when Alberich, a Nibelung (dwarf), spurned by the Rhine maidens, renounces love in order to seize their gold. He forges a ring that gives him world-ruling power. When Wotan, the chief god, wrests the ring from him, Alberich curses anyone who possesses it. The thefts and the curse bring about the downfall of the gods in "Götterdämmerung" ("Twilight of the Gods"), the final opera.
Wagner's effect on audiences has often been likened to that of mind-altering substances. Nietzsche compared it to the "continual consumption of alcohol"; Charles Baudelaire, a poet, to "the vertiginous imaginings of opium". For most Wag-
→ ALSO IN THIS SECTION
77 Remembering Hiroshima 78 Noma and rock-star chefs 79 Hollywood loves an older woman 80 Beware AI companion toys
The Economist August 8th 2026
Culture 77
nerians the gateway drug is music. “Das Rheingold” (“The Rhinegold”), the opening chapter, begins primordially, with a rumbling E-flat from double basses that seems to portend all that ensues. Soon the music depicts the undulating Rhine, one of more than 100 leitmotifs—earworms that recur and evolve throughout the cycle, announcing, recalling and commenting on characters, ideas and things. Figures express themselves not in the set-piece arias of conventional opera but in uninterrupted “infinite melody”.
The characters, mythic but complex, are a second inebriant. Wotan, a trammelled divinity, disguises himself as “the Wanderer”; Brünnhilde, his daughter, defies his law in the name of love; Siegfried, the dragon-slaying hero, turns out to be not such a hero. A work about abstractions like love and power is crammed with artefacts that might appear in a video game—and indeed have done. The Tarnhelm, a helmet that allows its wearer to shape-shift, pops up in “Diablo II”.
Drunk on ideas, Wagner intoxicates audiences with them, too. “All the currents of philosophical thinking that were important in his day...left traces in his dramas,” wrote Roger Scruton, himself a philosopher. Wagner wrote the text, and some of the music, under the influence of Ludwig Feuerbach, an atheist who thought love could liberate mankind.
Disillusioned by the failure of revolution, Wagner turned to the famously bleak Arthur Schopenhauer, who believed in resignation. The one thing Schopenhauer was optimistic about was music, which he thought revealed “the innermost nature of the world”. Under his influence, Wagner discarded the “Feuerbachian” ending of “Götterdämmerung”, in which Brünnhilde proclaimed a world “without rulers”. She immolates herself and the gods to the accompaniment of four minutes of nearly wordless music. After the curtain falls, you could spend another 15 hours discussing what it all means.
In part for that reason, Wagner, more than any other composer, has influenced arts beyond music. Owen Wister, pioneer of the cowboy novel, was a besotted Wagnerian. James Joyce returned to certain images and words in “Ulysses”; so too did Virginia Woolf in “Mrs Dalloway”. Leitmotifs influenced film scores: think of “As Time Goes By” in “Casablanca” or the character themes in “Star Wars”.
The idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk, or total work of art, is another bequest of the “Ring”; an expression of Wagner’s yearning to unite poetry, music and spectacle in a way that recalls the staging of tragedies in ancient Greece. His festival house in Bayreuth conceals the orchestra and fixes
the audience’s attention on the stage, prefiguring cinema. Among the thinkers enthralled by the “Ring” was W.E.B. Du Bois, a black American sociologist. For him it “retold for mankind the suffering and triumphs and defeats of a people”.
Anti-Wagnerians, just as passionate, were sickened by the narcotic. Nietzsche, who never fully freed himself from his addiction, heard in the music “the complete degeneration of rhythmic feeling”, the opposite of the vitality he prized. He recoiled from Wagner’s antisemitism, which later helped endear the composer to the Nazis and alienate some music-lovers.
The number of Wagnerians is shrinking. Membership of the International Association of Wagner Societies has declined by more than half since 2003, to 15,000. Yet the “Ring” is becoming more popular. The number of performances of the operas that make it up increased by 44% between 2000-06 and 2020-26, according to Operabase, a listings platform.
Perhaps that is because the sense that something is amiss with civilisation is even stronger than usual. Despite the Nazis’ imprimatur, the “Ring” reads more as a dream of the left than a fascist fantasy. Much as Wagner rejected kings, he reviled industrial capitalism, making him a rebel against modernity as well as its herald. Alberich exploits the Nibelungen who mine his gold. The cycle ends with a vision of a post-divine world governed by love rather than law and lucre.
For conservatives like Scruton, the revolution is to occur not on the streets, but in people’s souls. The “Ring” presents “a vision in which art takes the place of religion in expressing and fulfilling our deepest spiritual longings”, he wrote.
Adding to its power is the paradox that the “Ring” is malleable in the hands of the auteurs who stage it. Wieland Wagner, the composer’s grandson, set a precedent by staging highly abstract productions in Bayreuth that purged the works of their associations with German nationalism.
Environmental plunder, inseparable from the renunciation of love, notes Mark Berry, an academic, has been a theme of stagings since the 1970s. In a production at the Grange Park Opera near London, Earth’s magnetic field is the “gold” that becomes electricity, which powers the social media that cut human beings off from one another. Imagery in the anniversary production in Bayreuth is generated by AI (the audience has booed).
Revolutionary or royalist, Wagner was no liberal, and so did not see that modernity could self-correct even as it spawned new faults. But as long as humans fail to achieve their unattainable ideals, the “Ring” will resound. ■
Hiroshima, 8:15. By Tanimoto Kiyoshi.
Modern Library; 224 pages; $32.
Ebury Press; £16.99
WHEN THE atomic bomb hit Hiroshima at 8.15am on August 6th 1945, Tanimoto Kiyoshi was helping a neighbour move furniture on the outskirts of the city. He hid between two rocks and, miraculously, emerged unharmed. Then Tanimoto, a Methodist minister, began a harrowing journey to search for his wife, daughter and church members. He encountered ghostly processions of naked people, their skin hanging from their flesh. “People were moving as if they were carrying precious porcelain with both hands,” he wrote in a memoir that has been newly rediscovered.
Some ten months later, with the city still in ruins, a lanky American journalist visited Tanimoto’s home. He said he wanted to investigate the effects of the atomic bombs “from the perspective of the people”. Tanimoto told the man his story; the journalist “listened intently and showed much sympathy”. That August, the New Yorker dedicated an entire issue of its magazine to John Hersey’s “Hiroshima”.
The article, later republished as a book, became a sensation. The American public was forced to confront the horrific human toll of the atomic bombings. “Hiroshima” also made Tanimoto and the other five main characters famous (though it took a couple of months for news of the publica- ▶

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► tion to make it back to Hiroshima). Tanimoto later co-translated the book into Japanese and did a speaking tour across America. He campaigned for peace and disarmament until his death in 1986.
Now, more than 80 years after the bombing, Tanimoto's voice rings out again. He wrote his account in English, which he had mastered while studying in a seminary in Atlanta before the war. A copy was discovered in Hersey's archives during research for a forthcoming film produced by Cannon Hersey, an artist and the author's grandson, and Nishimae Taku, a Japanese film-maker. The memoir offers a significant contribution to the historical record.
It is also a valuable complement to Hersey's work. Whereas Hersey employs the narrative rhythms of a practised storyteller in "Hiroshima", Tanimoto's "Hiroshima, 8:15' flows with the relentless intensity of eyewitness testimony. He notes a skeleton hanging from a streetcar, "the white ashes of Akiko and Makoto" in the ruins of their house, and a baby clinging to the unburnt nipples of an otherwise blackened mother as she slowly dies. He recalls how a badly burnt body was identified "by the colour and design of the slacks and the ribbon on the clogs". He poignantly describes brief moments of levity. Priests discover pumpkins that have been roasted in the blast and joke that they are "better than chestnuts".
Faith keeps Tanimoto going. He sees the destruction unleashed on Japan as a kind of divine punishment for its wartime sins. He resolves to help Christianity spread in the country in the aftermath. He retains the hope of a true believer, ever attuned to signs of light in the darkness. After discovering aubergines growing in the ruins, he brings one to a parishioner whose eyeballs had to be removed. "Look, this eggplant has sprouted from the ashes and has borne a fine fruit," Tanimoto tells her. "I hope you can overcome the atomic bomb as this plant has done."
The memoir's discovery and publication is timely. The hibakusha (survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki) are dying out: just over 90,000 remain alive, most of whom were young children during the war. As living memory fades, the dream of disarmament slips further out of reach. The arms-control architecture of the cold war has collapsed. Great powers are updating their nuclear arsenals as they gear up for a new era of competition and conflict; more and more countries are pondering acquiring nuclear weapons of their own.
Hersey understood this dynamic all too well. As he told an interviewer 40 years after his landmark article, "I think that what has kept the world safe from the bomb since 1945 has not been deterrence, in the sense of fear of specific weapons, so much as it's been memory. The memory of what happened at Hiroshima." ■

Haute cuisine
The rock-star chef is off the menu at the world's most famous restaurant
EVERYONE KNOWS about Noma. The Nordic fine-dining restaurant dares diners to spoon brains from smoked ducks' heads or eat salads crawling with snails. Since its founding in 2003, Noma has been through umpteen incarnations, from its Copenhagen restaurant (which has relocated once and closed twice) to residencies in Los Angeles and Tokyo. On August 5th Noma reopened at its previous site in Copenhagen.
Despite all this travelling, most turbulence has been inside the kitchen. In March the New York Times published allegations that René Redzepi (pictured), the head chef, had abused staff between 2009 and 2017, as Noma chased its third Michelin star. (Mr Redzepi said he did not "recognise all [the] details" in the article, but was "deeply sorry" and has "worked to change".) Noma has reopened without any Michelin stars or its star chef. Mr Redzepi is "creative director", not the man at the pass.
Rock-star chefs were once indulged. In the 1990s and 2000s people were hungry for macho cooks: Marco Pierre White, an English chef, dumped his underlings in rubbish bins for "time out"; Gordon Ramsay became famous for losing his temper and calling people things like "idiot sandwich". Anthony Bourdain's book, "Kitchen Confidential", portrayed chefs as miscreants. Yet somehow cheffing seemed glamorous.
Portrayals of chefs have matured. "The Bear", a hit show that ended in June, follows a brilliant but traumatised chef. (It is hinted that he used to work at Noma.) This month "Tony", a biopic of Bourdain, will show his formative years in hellish kitchens. In a forthcoming series Mr White, Mr Ramsay and Heston Blumenthal will reflect on their "fights, fall-outs and feuds".
Off-screen, chefs are calling for better working conditions. Amanda Cohen of Dirt Candy, a Michelin-starred restaurant in New York, says young cooks have high expectations. Chefs once endured harsh kitchens to "make their résumé", she notes, but now they have more leverage. In America, for instance, 1.2m hospitality workers left the industry during the pandemic.
Even Noma is adapting. Mette Brink Soberg, who will lead the kitchen with Pablo Soto, the head chef, says that Noma is adopting shorter working hours. It is replacing its three seasonal menus with rolling changes, which will make the work less stressful and repetitive. Drudgery, such as deseeding pumpkins, will be shared out.
Can this cordial environment last? Restaurants are stressful places to work; Noma is under a lot of scrutiny. But if its culture really has changed, chefs who still can't stand the heat may have to follow Mr Redzepi out of the kitchen.
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E RIKA TRACY is a provocative contemporary artist in her late 30s. Elliot, her assistant, is a dishevelled 23-year-old with an indifferent girlfriend and a pointless degree in “new media”. So he is all too happy to comply when Erika decides he will be her subordinate and “sexual muse”, dressing him in pink underwear and making him crawl along the floor. “With you I actually don’t have to make any decisions. I’ve found this amazing freedom in just letting go of control,” he gushes. “I know,” Erika replies. “You’re welcome.”
“I Want Your Sex” is the latest iteration of the older-woman-younger-man story that Hollywood has been telling with evergreater frequency. Consider “The Idea of You”, about a divorced gallerist’s unlikely tryst with a boyband star, or “Babygirl”, about a CEO’s unusual management of her intern. You may recall “Dreams” (about a socialite’s affair with an undocumented Mexican immigrant), “Vladimir” (a professor’s obsession with a younger colleague) or “Bridget Jones: Mad About the Boy” (fairly self-explanatory). Reality shows such as “MILF Manor” and “Age of Attraction” have got in on the action, too.
True, the dynamic has intrigued screenwriters for decades. Mrs Robinson—viewers never learn her first name—is an almost cartoonish vixen in “The Graduate” (1967); the character established the archetype of the alluring older lady. “American Pie”
(1999) featured a buxom vamp known mostly as “Stifler’s mom”. Shows such as “Cougar Town” dramatised the thrills of a younger boyfriend.
But what is notable about the current trend is that such relationships are increasingly happening off-screen, too. In 2023 women were older in 22% of unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual couples in America, up from 14.5% in 1995.
Last year a study of single American adults by Match.com, a dating website, found that 30% of men had dated someone at least ten years older. On Feeld, “a dating app for the curious”, 73% of men seeking relationships with older women are aged between 18 and 25, up from 65% two years ago. It is “one of the clearest shifts we’re seeing”, the company says.
Women are feeling the heat. On a recent evening in Paris, a 59-year-old says nine men have approached her on Hinge, another app, in the past few hours. Four were in their 20s; one of the oldest was 42. (“That starts to feel old and reasonable.”) At least three-quarters of the men who message her are under 40, she estimates.
What’s behind the trend, both in entertainment and real life? There are a few reasons. One is celebrity influence. It was scandalous in 2005 when Demi Moore (then 42) married Ashton Kutcher (then
27). But these days plenty of women d’un certain âge, including Kris Jenner, Jennifer Lopez, Tilda Swinton and Madonna, have dated younger men.
Another reason is a greater understanding of sexuality: it is, in short, what lots of women want. Justin Lehmiller of the Kinsey Institute, a research centre, surveyed heterosexual Americans for a book published in 2018. He found that 64% of middle-aged women had thought about sex with a younger man at least once, and 13% frequently fantasised about it.
Pornography data suggest it is what lots of men want, too. Holly Randall, an adult-film producer who hosts a podcast on the industry, pointed out that back in the era of dirty magazines and DVDs, a handful of directors and distributors served as gatekeepers. “MILFs did not exist 15, 20 years ago,” she has said. “When you were, like, 28, you were done, your career was over.”
Yet sexual appetites turned out to be far more varied than those gatekeepers had imagined. “MILF” was the second-most searched term on PornHub last year. Adult-content platforms such as OnlyFans allow models of any (legal) age to set up shop. Some women in their 50s and 60s are doing “incredibly well”, Ms Randall said.
Broader demographic trends may also be playing a role in the older-woman-younger-man match-up. Many rich countries report a yawning gap in the two sexes’ level of education. This is reflected in job prospects and earnings: a rising share of 20- to 24-year-old men are not studying, working or looking for work. The attitudes of young men and women are drifting apart, too, with women becoming more liberal as young men lean to the right.
Young men may be less attractive to women their own age. But to older women, what they lack in social and economic capital, they make up for in the bedroom (and without needing to resort to Viagra). A small-sample study in 2024 found that women whose partners were approximately seven to ten years younger were happier and had more sexual confidence compared with those with same-age partners.
The final reason may lie in recent social movements. Some young men today feel unsure of the rules of courtship in what is often a wary consent culture. In the study by Match.com, 72% of Gen Z respondents reported “more passivity in making the first move” (compared with 63% overall). Many fear public rejection.
In “Vladimir”, the married professor reminisces about the unpredictability and size of sexual pursuit. She tells her students that romance was more thrilling when it was perilous. Love affairs that “left you a little bruised—I mean, emotionally, of course—were considered, within reason, really kind of fun”. On screen, at least, older women usually know what they want ▶

Where she leads, he’ll follow
80 Culture
The Economist August 8th 2026
► and they are not afraid to ask for it.
However, in Hollywood films, as in marriages, younger men are rarely seen as viable long-term partners. (Just ask Ms Moore, who is now divorced.) Data from Pew, a pollster, bear this out: the share of American heterosexual marriages where the woman is at least three years older has hovered at about 10% since 2000.
Instead, youthful partners are catalysts for self-actualisation and professional success. In “I Want Your Sex” Erika turns her homemade sex tapes of Elliot into an art installation and tricks him into a stunt to save her career. Once the professor in “Vladimir” finally sleeps with her hunky crush, she realises that sex was not the point. It was that feeling desire “was invigorating...it gave me this”, she says, gesturing towards the manuscript of her new book. Young bucks, beware. ■
Human Raised. By Dana Suskind.
Dutton; 320 pages; $32
A BOY OF five or six is cuddling a soft toy that looks like a robot. “You wanna be best friend?” he asks it, as if making a tentative approach in the playground. “Oh Carson! I’d love to be best friends!” comes the enthusiastic reply. The boy seems pleased. “Do you want to snuggle?” he asks. “I’m here for a cosy hug any time you want,” says the toy.
Gabbo is an AI companion created by Curio, a Silicon Valley startup. Other toys in the range include a bear, a dog and a coffee cup dressed as a ballerina. A banana slug called Professor Linus can “help you unstick tricky homework questions, calm your nerves when school gets tough and chat about anything on your mind”. For those entertaining little ones, an AI companion might seem like a good alternative to other, addictive forms of digital diversion such as YouTube or video games.
But Dana Suskind, a professor of surgery and paediatrics at the University of Chicago, believes parents should be wary of this technology. Her book is a passionate and reasoned defence of the need for parenting to be done by people rather than AI. She argues that “infinitely agreeable AI companions are the socioemotional equivalent of giving your child ice cream and cookies for every meal.”
She describes how early interactions prepare kids for a lifetime of socialisation.
“Precise neural nourishment” is required to “build a child’s brain”. (Food is a recurring analogy in the book.) This is a “sophisticated mix of language, emotional attunement and social signalling”, encompassing everything from eye contact, facial cues and laughter to mismatched expectations and delayed responses. Together these interactions help children form attachments and learn necessary social skills.
For when children interact with adults and peers, they experience “micro-frictions” (squabbles over a toy, for instance, or denials from parents). The imperfect exchanges are not bugs in the system, she argues, but “extremely productive”. The experiences forge an individual’s resilience and patience. True friendships are not “built on endless harmony, but on conflict and resolution”.
AI toys, by contrast, offer endless harmony. They are sycophantic, agreeing with everything their playmate says. Ms Suskind worries about what people will be like if their formative years have been spent learning from, and mirroring, artificial minds. A child who grows up with a pal that offers rapid, reliable and always-sunny replies may not be equipped for the future. They will not build the necessary “neural architecture” around emotional regulation and it will affect their future relationships.
Then there is the question of who programmes these toys. AI toys in China regurgitate Communist Party dogma. In the West, Mattel, the toymaker behind Barbie and Hot Wheels, announced a partnership with OpenAI last year. Yet many are concerned about safety. OpenAI is facing several lawsuits over alleged harmful advice dispensed by its ChatGPT service.
Ms Suskind is not anti-AI in childhood. But she is against parents using AI as a substitute. It is a bad idea to get an AI companion
ion to read a bedtime story, she writes, as it deprives your child of the multisensory experience and the “productive struggle” that comes with negotiating a routine. But it is a good idea to ask AI to recommend a book your child might like, or perhaps craft a story for them that you can read aloud.
She also wants parents to think more broadly about parenting in an age of AI. She wonders whether children really need to toil for years to master factual recall, pattern recognition and analytical efficiency when these are the skills that AI excels at. If the skills needed by humans in the future are empathy, social resilience, creativity and connection, then imperfect children raised by good-enough parents will be essential.
The book does not explore what might happen as AI improves. It is already easy to see how AI companions might enter overcrowded classrooms, something that could be positive if implemented well. And it is reasonable to assume that, over time, AI toys could learn from and replicate the messier aspects of human interactions in a way that primes children for success with other humans. Eventually, AI companions may become better parents than actual parents. In extreme instances of abuse or neglect, will some make the case for children being removed from their parents and entrusted to robot caregivers?
“Human Raised” is a book about today, though. More than anything, Ms Suskind urges her readers to enjoy the noise of childhood. As the mother in a blended family of eight children, she asserts that adults should relish the chaos and clamour, the interruptions and noisy bickering. These are “the sound[s] of our species caring for itself”. Parents lose themselves, and their humanity, one digitally soothed tantrum and one silent car ride at a time. ■

The Economist August 8th 2026
81
| Gross domestic product | Consumer prices | Unemployment rate | Current-account balance % of GDP, 2026† | Budget balance % of GDP, 2026† | Interest rates 10-yr giv't bonds latest, % | change on year ago, bp | Currency units | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| % change on year ago latest | quarter* | 2026† | % change on year ago latest | 2026† | % | % | per $ | % change on year ago | |||||
| United States | 2.1 | Q2 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 3.5 | Jun | 3.7 | 4.2 | Jun | 4.6 | 41.0 | 6.75 | 6.4 |
| China | 4.3 | Q2 | 3.6 | 4.7 | 1.0 | Jun | 1.2 | 5.0 | Jun** | 1.4 | 53 | 158 | 6.4 |
| Japan | 0.4 | Q1 | 1.8 | 0.7 | 1.7 | Jun | 1.8 | 2.5 | Jun | 2.8 | 133 | 0.74 | 1.4 |
| Britain | 0.9 | Q1 | 2.5 | 1.1 | 2.6 | Jun | 3.2 | 4.9 | Apr** | 4.9 | 40.0 | 1.40 | 1.4 |
| Canada | -0.1 | Q1 | -0.1 | 0.8 | 2.8 | Jun | 2.6 | 6.5 | Jun | 3.6 | 18.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Euro area | 1.0 | Q2 | 1.8 | 0.8 | 2.9 | Jul | 2.8 | 6.3 | Jun | 3.1 | 48.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Austria | 0.9 | Q1 | 0.8* | 0.8 | 3.8 | Dec | 3.0 | 5.7 | Jun | 3.3 | 35.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Belgium | 0.5 | Q2 | nil | 0.7 | 3.5 | Jul | 3.6 | 6.3 | Jun | 3.6 | 47.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| France | 0.7 | Q2 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 2.4 | Jul | 1.9 | 8.2 | Jun | 3.9 | 61.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Germany | 0.9 | Q2 | 0.9 | 0.7 | 2.8 | Jul | 2.6 | 3.9 | Jun | 3.1 | 48.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Greece | 2.0 | Q1 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 3.9 | Jun | 3.8 | 8.0 | Jun | 3.8 | 45.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Italy | 1.0 | Q2 | 0.8 | 0.8 | 2.9 | Jul | 2.6 | 5.7 | Jun | 3.9 | 43.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Netherlands | 1.3 | Q2 | 1.6 | 1.0 | 2.9 | Jul | 3.1 | 3.8 | Jun | 3.2 | 41.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Spain | 2.7 | Q2 | 2.8 | 2.2 | 3.8 | Jul | 3.2 | 10.1 | Jun | 3.6 | 32.0 | 0.87 | nil |
| Czech Republic | 2.2 | Q1 | 0.8 | 2.0 | 1.7 | Jul | 2.0 | 3.0 | Q1* | 4.8 | 49.0 | 20.9 | 1.5 |
| Denmark | 6.2 | Q1 | 6.2 | 3.3 | 1.9 | Jun | 2.0 | 3.1 | Jun | 2.9 | 39.0 | 6.47 | -0.3 |
| Norway | 1.7 | Q1 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 2.7 | Jun | 3.2 | 4.5 | May** | 4.4 | 47.0 | 9.53 | 7.7 |
| Poland | 3.5 | Q1 | 2.4 | 3.4 | 3.0 | Jul | 2.6 | 5.8 | Jun* | 5.7 | 29.0 | 3.72 | -0.5 |
| Russia | -0.2 | Q1 | -2.5 | 0.5 | 6.0 | Jun | 6.4 | 2.2 | Jun* | 15.7 | 157 | 80.9 | -1.1 |
| Sweden | 2.5 | Q2 | 5.7 | 2.1 | 0.2 | Jul | 1.7 | 9.9 | Jun* | 3.0 | 56.0 | 9.49 | 1.9 |
| Switzerland | 0.5 | Q1 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 0.4 | Jul | 0.5 | 3.1 | Jun | 0.4 | 12.0 | 0.81 | nil |
| Turkey | 2.5 | Q1 | 0.5 | 2.4 | 31.8 | Jul | 32.1 | 7.4 | Jun* | 32.1 | 297 | 47.6 | -14.5 |
| Australia | 2.5 | Q1 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 3.8 | Jun | 3.9 | 4.4 | Jun | 4.9 | 60.0 | 1.42 | 9.2 |
| Hong Kong | 4.3 | Q2 | -2.4 | 5.0 | 1.9 | Jun | 2.3 | 3.7 | Jun** | 3.5 | 50.0 | 7.84 | 0.1 |
| India | 7.8 | Q1 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 4.4 | Jun | 4.8 | 6.2 | Jul | 6.8 | 44.0 | 95.1 | -7.8 |
| Indonesia | 5.3 | Q2 | 4.4 | 5.0 | 2.9 | Jul | 3.5 | 4.7 | Feb* | 7.3 | 79.0 | 17.885 | -8.4 |
| Malaysia | 5.8 | Q2 | 8.5 | 5.3 | 1.9 | Jun | 2.0 | 3.0 | May* | 3.7 | 34.0 | 4.09 | 3.2 |
| Pakistan | 4.8 | 2026** | na | 3.0 | 9.2 | Jul | 7.8 | 6.9 | 2025 | 12.0 | -5.0 | 278 | 2.1 |
| Philippines | 2.8 | Q1 | 3.6 | 2.7 | 6.2 | Jul | 6.8 | 4.7 | Q2* | 7.3 | 113 | 60.7 | -5.3 |
| Singapore | 5.7 | Q2 | 4.6 | 5.1 | 1.9 | Jun | 2.0 | 2.0 | Q2 | 2.3 | 26.0 | 1.28 | 0.8 |
| South Korea | 3.7 | Q2 | 2.5 | 3.3 | 2.8 | Jul | 3.0 | 2.8 | Jun* | 4.2 | 141 | 1.421 | -2.4 |
| Taiwan | 12.9 | Q2 | 9.9 | 10.5 | 2.6 | Jun | 1.9 | 3.3 | Jun | 1.9 | 52.0 | 32.3 | -7.3 |
| Thailand | 2.8 | Q1 | 2.7 | 2.3 | 1.9 | Jul | 2.3 | 0.9 | Jun* | 2.0 | 60.0 | 33.1 | -2.3 |
| Argentina | 2.3 | Q1 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 33.5 | Jun | 32.4 | 7.8 | Q1* | na | na | 1.496 | -10.5 |
| Brazil | 1.8 | Q1 | 4.5 | 2.0 | 4.6 | Jun | 4.8 | 5.4 | Jun*** | 14.4 | 46.0 | 5.14 | 7.2 |
| Chile | -0.5 | Q1 | -1.1 | 1.4 | 4.3 | Jun | 3.9 | 9.4 | Jun*** | 5.7 | 8.0 | 914 | 5.8 |
| Colombia | 2.2 | Q1 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 6.1 | Jun | 5.7 | 8.0 | Jun* | 12.0 | 27.0 | 3.179 | 28.7 |
| Mexico | 2.2 | Q2 | 6.1 | 0.9 | 3.4 | Jun | 3.9 | 2.8 | Jun | 9.1 | -16.0 | 17.2 | 8.8 |
| Peru | 3.5 | Q1 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 4.1 | Jul | 4.0 | 5.2 | Jun* | 6.2 | 11.0 | 3.39 | 5.3 |
| Egypt | 5.0 | Q1 | -24.0 | 4.6 | 14.3 | Jun | 13.8 | 6.0 | Q1* | 25.6 | 50.0 | 49.8 | -2.8 |
| Israel | 1.7 | Q1 | -3.8 | 3.1 | 1.6 | Jun | 2.2 | 2.9 | Jun | 3.8 | -41.0 | 3.00 | 15.0 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4.6 | 2025 | na | 0.2 | 1.8 | Jun | 2.1 | 3.1 | Q1 | na | na | 3.76 | nil |
| South Africa | 1.9 | Q1 | 2.2 | 1.5 | 4.8 | Jun | 4.5 | 32.7 | Q1* | 8.5 | -121 | 16.3 | 9.8 |
Source: Haver Analytics % change on previous quarter, annual rate †The Economist Intelligence Unit estimate/forecast ‡Not seasonally adjusted §New series Year ending June ††Latest 3 months *3-month moving average §§5-year yield †††Dollar-denominated bonds. Note: Euro-area consumer prices are harmonised
| In local currency | Index Aug 5th | % change on: one week | Dec 31st 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States S&P 500 | 7,723.6 | 5.6 | 12.8 |
| United States NAS Comp | 26,363.4 | 7.9 | 13.4 |
| China Shanghai Comp | 3,878.4 | 1.3 | -2.3 |
| China Shenzhen Comp | 2,537.6 | 4.3 | 0.3 |
| Japan Nikkei 225 | 66,300.4 | 7.9 | 31.7 |
| Japan Topix | 4,046.2 | 1.8 | 18.7 |
| Britain FTSE 100 | 10,888.3 | -0.2 | 9.6 |
| Canada S&P TSX | 36,146.4 | 2.3 | 14.0 |
| Euro area EURO STOXX 50 | 6,477.0 | 3.7 | 11.8 |
| France CAC 40 | 8,669.3 | 3.1 | 6.4 |
| Germany DAX* | 26,126.3 | 2.6 | 6.7 |
| Italy FTSE/MIB | 53,446.8 | 3.9 | 18.9 |
| Netherlands AEX | 1,111.3 | 1.7 | 16.8 |
| Spain IBEX 35 | 20,057.0 | 3.3 | 15.9 |
| Poland WIG | 151,086.4 | 4.3 | 28.9 |
| Russia RTS, $ terms | 895.9 | 0.9 | -21.2 |
| Switzerland S&P | 14,551.6 | 0.5 | 9.7 |
| Turkey BIST | 13,703.1 | 1.5 | 21.7 |
| Australia All Ord. | 9,405.4 | 2.2 | 4.3 |
| Hong Kong Hang Seng | 25,915.8 | 0.4 | 1.1 |
| India BSE | 78,581.0 | 1.2 | -7.8 |
| Indonesia IDX | 6,351.1 | 4.3 | -26.6 |
| Malaysia KLSE | 1,748.2 | 1.9 | 4.1 |
| In local currency | Index Aug 5th | % change on: one week | Dec 31st 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pakistan KSE | 180,014.9 | 2.3 | 3.4 |
| Singapore STI | 5,581.4 | -2.3 | 20.1 |
| South Korea KOSPI | 6,598.3 | 16.5 | 56.6 |
| Taiwan TWI | 44,611.6 | 11.4 | 54.0 |
| Thailand SET | 1,609.8 | -0.9 | 27.8 |
| Argentina MERV | 3,156,332.0 | -2.4 | 3.4 |
| Brazil BVSP* | 177,726.2 | 2.2 | 10.3 |
| Mexico IPC | 66,525.2 | 0.1 | 3.4 |
| Egypt EGX 30 | 54,659.6 | 1.9 | 30.7 |
| Israel TA-125 | 4,023.1 | 1.0 | 9.8 |
| Saudi Arabia Tadawul | 10,887.6 | 3.3 | 3.8 |
| South Africa JSE AS | 115,415.7 | 4.5 | -0.4 |
| World, dev'd MSCI | 4,982.0 | 5.0 | 12.5 |
| Emerging markets MSCI | 1,687.0 | 8.2 | 20.1 |
| US corporate bonds, spread over Treasuries | |||
| Basis points | latest | Dec 31st 2025 | |
| Investment grade | 92 | 93 | |
| High-yield | 326 | 354 |
| The Economist commodity-price index | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020=100 | Jul 28th | Aug 4th* | % change on: month |
| Dollar Index | |||
| All items | 151.2 | 150.7 | -0.1 |
| Food | 153.7 | 150.0 | -2.1 |
| Industrials | |||
| All | 149.1 | 151.2 | 1.6 |
| Non-food agriculturals | 150.5 | 151.7 | 0.3 |
| Metals | 148.8 | 151.1 | 1.9 |
| Sterling Index | |||
| All items | 146.2 | 144.0 | -0.6 |
| Euro Index | |||
| All items | 151.7 | 149.4 | -0.9 |
| Gold | |||
| $ per oz | 4,034.0 | 4,084.5 | -1.6 |
| Brent | |||
| $ per barrel | 84.2 | 79.3 | 6.9 |
Sources: LSEG Workspace; Moscow Exchange; Standard & Poor's Global Fixed Income Research *Total return index
For historical indicators data, visit economist.com/economic-and-financial-indicators
82
The Economist August 8th 2026
The assemblage artist who challenged racism died on July 22nd, aged 99

OBJECTS SPOKE to Betye Saar. As she browsed through yard sales and flea markets, something would catch her eye and ask to be used. A broken necklace, say, or a rusty dagger. An off-cut of wood, a remnant of coloured cloth, even a circuit board. A chipped ceramic of a cat, or a bundle of postcards. “Mother wit” would lead her to them. These things were not simply dead and discarded. They held the spirit of their previous owner, and had power. They would say, “You can make art with this.” So she did.
She had always been that way. Growing up in Watts, then separate from Los Angeles, she liked to hunt in the yard to find coloured beads, paper scraps or toys left behind. If she kept them tidily, her mother would not throw them away, so she preserved them as treasures. The Watts Towers were then going up in town, great spires of fantastical concrete and piping stuck all over with broken ceramics and glass. To her they were magic castles out of fairy tales. From so-called junk one man, Simon Rodia, had made something beautiful. So could she.
Some objects, though, came to speak to her louder than others. Rusty bird cages, lengths of chain, pieces of rope, worn-out alarm clocks. Model sailing boats of the old three-master kind and palmistry hands held up, as if in despair. All these shouted slavery, and a weight of history she could sense through her skin. Her “Dark Voyage” was a brick-like box that opened to show, on one side, a plan for the packing of men on a slave ship and, on the other, an African wood carving of an upright, sleeping man. His dreams, bright-coloured electrical wires, still played around his head.
Slavery’s persistence in the black psyche became her most important theme. This included, most famously, her recreation of black mammies. In the 1960s they were easy to find on second-hand stalls, fat and widely smiling in aprons and kerchiefs, ready to clean white people’s houses and look after their children. They turned up as jars, figurines, tins, dolls and the jolly face on pancake-mix packets. As a black woman herself (though part-Irish and Choctaw), she decided in 1968, that year of rage, to transform one of them. Seizing on a metal memo-pad-holder of “Aunt Jemima” with a broom, she put a rifle in her other hand and, under her broom-arm, a hand-grenade. Her smiling face, with its huge scar-
scarlet lips, was made terrifying. Her slippered feet stood among cotton-bolls. A postcard displayed on her apron showed her dandling a crying white child, but it was now half-obliterated by a black-power fist. The title said it all: “The Liberation of Aunt Jemima”.
This small work touched a national nerve, and helped to make Betye Saar feel that at last she was an artist. Until then she had crafted “stuff” mostly for her family, as presents, or for the artist-circles she had joined on the design course at UCLA. (Back then, in the 1940s, black applicants were steered away from pure art, but she could at least help people choose curtains.) On her own initiative she became a print-maker, a painter and an emmerer, all invaluable to make backgrounds for her constructions. She knew she was good at these things. But she didn’t consider herself a professional until “Jemima” made her name in the Black Arts Movement and, in 1974, the National Endowment for the Arts gave her a fellowship and a grant.
The gun-toting mammy also gave her a theme for life. In the 1990s she began to collect old washboards, each to be scathingly repurposed. Some, interspersed with padlocks, became her “Tower of Destiny”. In “Sunnyland (On the Dark Side)”, a Sunnyland washboard was decorated with a whirligig of a black laundress and a faint photograph of a lynching. In “A Lost Innocence”, a pretty vintage christening robe was sewn over at the hem with neat labels reading “Pickaninny”, “Tar baby”, and the like. She remembered how, looking at the cloak of an African chief decorated with hair from his subjects, she had felt what was almost an electric shock. She wanted that robe to do the same. Even embroidered handkerchiefs, such as those she inherited from her beloved Aunt Hattie in a huge trunk from which, of course, she kept everything, could be charged with the sadness of hemmed-in lives.
She had felt this herself. As a self-declared member of the black bourgeoisie, she wasn’t poor, and her light skin gave her a certain advantage. Nonetheless, she was the subject of “Black Girl’s Window”, one of her earliest pieces. In it, a coal-black girl stared out from the bottom half of an old window frame. Above her, smaller panes contained the moon, stars, a skeleton and a lion, Leo, her astrological sign. Her hands, pressing against the glass, were also covered with astrological symbols. All this seemed to ask what future even she, a can-do Leo, had. Tarot, palmistry, the random fall of playing cards, all intrigued her. So did magic, an interest reinforced by trips to Haiti and Africa. Not that she wanted to practise it herself, but she hoped her art might, evoking a mystical force. Her “Altars”, built like shrines to some random rescued figurine, were decked with candles and protecting eyes, as if for a ritual. She developed a lasting love of “haint blue”, almost navy-dark, which was supposed to keep ghosts at bay.
In her 90s she produced two large suspended works based on old canoes: “Gliding into Midnight” and “Drifting Toward Twilight”. Both were surrounded by haint-blue sea and sky. The first, a slave-canoe, carried pleading black ceramic hands; the second carried bird cages containing bones and branches, a calming homage to Nature. The boats spoke of transition, from place to place and also from lower to higher states of being. She liked to think of that as she worked, fuelled by Dr Pepper and pieces of watermelon, swapping out one object for another, preferably in silence. Yet ambient sounds were all around. Some came from her neighbours in Laurel Canyon, where she had lived for decades. Many more, rising sometimes to a clamour, came from the battered treasures in her studio, each begging her for new life. ■
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The Economist August - WARNING: source dates, money, or percentage tokens may be missing
经过严格审核,该翻译件在绝大部分内容上保持了高水准的准确性,但在数字处理和个别术语翻译上存在严重缺陷。
以下是详细的 QA 审核报告:
1. 数字量级错误 (Critical) - 问题:译文中将 "70,000 of the 72,000 migrants" 翻译为 "7.2万,000 名移民中,已有 7万,000 人"。 - 分析:这种写法(数字+万+千位分隔符)在中文中是完全错误的,且极易造成量级误读(看起来像 7.2万个1000)。 - 级别:[BLOCKING]
2. 数字量级错误 (Critical) - 问题:译文中将 "12,000 tonnes of blueberries" 翻译为 "1.2万,000 吨蓝莓"。 - 分析:同上,错误的数字格式导致量级混乱。 - 级别:[BLOCKING]
3. 数字量级错误 (Critical) - 问题:译文中将 "80,000 Amharic web pages" 翻译为 "8万,000 个"。 - 分析:同上,严重的格式错误。 - 级别:[BLOCKING]
4. 术语翻译不准 (Quality) - 问题:译文中将 "The new LevAithan" (见 SOURCE PREVIEW) 对应的部分在正文中被略过或未在预览中体现,但在目录部分将 "Bagehot" 翻译为 "巴杰特"。 - 分析:在《经济学人》中,"Bagehot" 是一个特定的专栏名称(以 Walter Bagehot 命名),通常应译为“巴杰特”或保留英文,但译文中在“英国”板块将其重复出现两次(一次在 26 页,一次在 21 页),且与作者 Zack Polanski 混在一起,格式混乱。 - 级别:[WARNING]
5. 幻觉核查 (Hallucination Check)
- 核查项:译文中出现了关于“俄罗斯轰炸基辅”、“乌克兰制造爱国者导弹”、“委内瑞拉选举谈判”等大段详细内容。
- 核查步骤:
1. 搜索标题索引 $\rightarrow$ 未发现相关标题。
2. 搜索抽样原文 $\rightarrow$ 抽样原文中仅包含封面、目录、部分非洲农业、AI、讣告及广告页。
3. 结论:这些内容在提供的 STRATIFIED TEXT SAMPLES 中完全不存在。由于审核员被告知“长文件的中间部分被省略”,且这些内容符合《经济学人》“The world this week”板块的典型风格,但在本次提供的源文中没有任何文本支撑。
- 判定:虽然可能是由于原文被省略,但作为 QA 审核员,在当前提供的上下文范围内,这些内容属于无源翻译(Unsourced Translation)。然而,根据第一步协议,若在抽样原文中未看到且索引中无匹配,应报告。但考虑到这是典型的报纸版面补全,且未出现事实性扭曲,暂标记为警告。
- 级别:[WARNING]
6. 格式残留 (Formatting) - 问题:译文中出现 "$\rightarrow$" 等符号,虽然是模仿原文,但部分地方出现了 "1.2万,000" 这种极其怪异的混合格式。 - 级别:[WARNING]
结论:发现阻塞性问题 (Blocking Issues Found)
主要缺陷: 译者在处理英文数字(如 70,000)转换为中文(万)时,采用了极其错误的“数字+万+逗号+千位”格式(例如 7万,000),这在中文金融/新闻出版物中是不可接受的致命错误,直接影响数据的准确传达。
建议: 全文重新核对所有数字格式,将 X万,000 统一修正为 X万 或 X0,000。